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The introduction of Medicare and Medicaid in 1965 dramatically increased 
the utilization of health care services, especially hospital care, and, at the same 
time, increased the costs of health care to the Federal government. By the 
1970s, health care cost inflation and an imminent deficit in the Medicare Trust 
Fund prompted the adoption of a number of regulatory (health planning, 
Professional Review Standards Organizations, health care fee freezes) and 
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competitive (HMO development) strategies designed to contain costs. None of 
these public policy iniatives worked, however, as the portion of GNP devoted 
to health care continued to escalate to 10.796 by 1983. 
The health care cost battle shifted to new ground with the election of 
Ronald Reagan in 1980. In recognition of the inherently inflationary nature of 
retrospective reimbursement, the Reagan Administration enacted legislation 
that substantially changed Medicare's hospital reimbursement system. The 
Prospective Payment System (PPS) mandated paying hospitals a fixed payment, 
set in advance, based on the patient's diagnosis rather than retrospectively 
paying for all services delivered to a patient. Critics of the program contend 
that PPS introduces incentives for hospitals to conserve resources during the 
hospital stay (e.g., provide fewer ancillary services, shorten length of stay) and 
to shift care to less costly settings (e.g., community-based care, outpatient 
settings); both potentially affecting quality of care to the elderly. The question 
addressed by this dissertation concerned the issue of "quicker and sicker"; that 
is, whether there were changes in the discharge health status and post-hospital 
placement of Medicare beneficiaries as a result of the implementation of PPS. 
Using a quasi-experimental time-series PRE/POST design, data was 
collected from the medical records of 2,619 Medicare beneficiaries (1,2.58 in 
the PRE-PPS period; 1,361 in the POST -PPS period) hospitalized between 1981 
and 1986. Two large (300+ beds) and two medium-sized (100-300 beds) hospitals, 
similar in organization and type of services provided and representative of 
hospitals in the Portland metropolitan area, served as data collection sites. 
Medical records were selected from five Diagnosis Related Groups (DRGs): 
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three medical DRGs (stroke, heart failure, and pneumonia) and two surgical 
DRGs (hip replacement and major joint pinning) in the PRE or POST periods. 
Analysis of the data show that overall length of stay declined from 11.3 
days in the PRE-PPS period to 8.6 days in the POST -PPS period, a reduction of 
2.7 days and significant at the p = < .OOllevel. Application of the Dependency 
at Discharge Measurement Instrument to each medical record to derive a 
Dependency score showed that average Dependency ·for the PRE-PPS period 
was 8.9 while average Dependency for the POST -PPS period was 9.7, a 
difference significant at the p =(.001 level. The results also show a significant 
increase in Dependency between the PRE and POST periods for four of the five 
DRGs studies (Stroke, Pneumonia, Heart Failure, and Hip Replacement). 
Finally, an analysis of differences in post-hospital placements; e.g., 
placements to home alone, home with another (spouse, relative, home health), 
group home (retirement community, adult foster care), nursing home, or 
transfer to another facility, were conducted. The results show a significant 
increase in POST -PPS placements to home alone (p = ( .0.5), home health (p = 
.01), and for hospital transfers (p = ( .001). Finally, an analysis was conducted 
comparing Dependency at Discharge by post-hospital placement PRE and POST-
PPS. Results showed that there was a significant increase (p = ( .01) in the 
level of Dependency for Medicare patients being discharged requiring home 
support services (home health). Though limited in its generalizability, the data 
presented in this dissertation supports the contention that Medicare patients 
are leaving the hospital sooner, in more dependent states of health than before 
PPS, and that greater numbers of potentially high care patients are being 
discharged to home and to home health. 
CHAPTER I 
THE AMERICAN HEALTH CARE SYSTEM IN TRANSITION 
The medical care system today is balanced on a knife-
edge. On the one hand, if leaders make the right moves 
over the next 10 years, this nation will make a marked 
leap forward in the quality, accessibility and efficiency of 
medical care and coverage received by all Americans--
rich and poor, old and young. On the oth~r hand, there is 
grave danger that, if leaders make the wrong moves, the 
quality, accessibility and efficiency of medical care and 
coverage in this country will be reduced sharply (McClure, 
1985, p. 43). 
This dissertation is a policy evaluation of one of the more controversial 
health care policies today: Public Law 98-21 - Medicare's Prospective Payment 
System (PPS). For this dissertation, policy is understood to mean measures 
which the government (i.e., the public sector) can adopt or has adopted to 
advance a given end. Ends are desired states or outcomes reflecting some 
degree of society's values or some sector of society's values while measures 
means government programs. Defined this way, policy comprises a vast realm 
of concerns, possibilities, commitments, actions, and outcomes. Thus, a public 
policy cannot be examined productively without attention being paid to the 
concerns, possibilities, actions and outcomes surrounding a particular policy 
initiative (Brown, 1988b). It is to these areas of policy evaluation that this 
dissertation is addressed. The evaluation which comprises this dissertation will 
include the following elements: the context in which the federal initiative was 
enacted; the relevant actors and organizations involved; the concerns raised by 
the policy and the resulting federal program; and finally, the policy itself will 
be evaluated in light of recent data concerning its impact. 
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This document will utilize original research and recently published national 
data to examine the impact of PPS on the quality of care to the Medicare 
beneficiary; that is, whether there have been changes in the discharge health 
status and post-hospital placement of Medicare beneficiaries as a result of the 
changes in the way Medicare pays for hospital care to the elderly. 
The Medicare program enacted in 1965 to provide health insurance to the 
elderly and, after 1972, the disabled is in financial trouble. Part A of Medicare, 
the hospital insurance trust fund (or HI program), which provides insurance 
protection for inpatient hospital services, skilled nursing facility services, some 
home health care services, and hospice care, is financed by payroll taxes. A 
Congressional report in 1983 estimated that the HI program would go bankrupt 
by 1990 and would produce a deficit of between $200 to $300 billion by 1995 
(Demkovich, 1983a). In addition, Part B, the supplementary medical insurance 
trust, which provides voluntary supplementary insurance to cover the costs of 
most physician's services, including hospital outpatient services, laboratory 
services, and certain other services not covered in Part A, was also under cost 
pressures. However, because Part B is funded by premiums and revenues from 
the general treasury, it was in less danger of bankruptcy. In 1983, Congress 
estimated that it would have to appropriate $31.9 billion in 1988, compared to 
$14.2 billion in 1983, to cover SMI's costs (Demkovich, 1983a). Thus, the crux 
of Medicare's financing problem appeared to be the hospital insurance fund. 
Since the beginning of the program, the hospital insurance fund spent as 
much as it took in. Outlays grew at an average annual rate of 17.7% 
(Demkovidl, 1983a). An aging population and rising health care costs, 
especially the higher cost of hospital care, have been identified as the source of 
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Medicare's fiscal problems. Although Medicare had historically been protected 
from budget cuts in previous years, the Reagan Administration was able to get 
Congress to cut $1.4 billion from the Medicare budget in 1981 by raising 
beneficiaries' contributions to the program and again in 1982 when another $2.4 
billion was "saved" by imposing stringent limits on how much the government 
would reimburse hospitals for costs exceeding a norm set by the Health Care 
Financing Administration (HCFA), the agency that runs the Medicare program 
(Demkovich, 1983a). Even with these expenditure limitations, costs continued 
to rise. By 1983, Medicare's projected deficit prompted Congress to initiate 
legislation overhauling the program's hospital payment system, converting the 
HI payment system from a retrospective to a prospective system. 
Under the old system, the government reimbursed hospitals for their costs 
of treating the elderly after the services were delivered. This system, in 
effect, encouraged wastefulness and the over-servicing of Medicare patients 
since the more services delivered, the more money the hospital or physician 
would make. Under the new system, the government, i.e., the Health Care 
Financing Administration, set payment rates in advance based on the average 
cost of treating 467 Diagnosis Related Groups (DRGs). Hospitals that could 
deliver services for less than the established reimbursement rate were to be 
allowed to keep the difference whereas hospitals whose costs exceeded the rate 
would have to absorb the loss. The new system was expected to save $1.5 
billion in fiscal 1984 and $20.2 billion over five years (Demkovich, 1983a). 
The current situation is one in which the shift in federal health care policy 
in the Medicare program has created a tension between a medical care system 
geared toward expansion and the state requiring control over expenditures 
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(Starr, 1982). It is this transition period between expansion and cost-
containment that current federal health policy is being implemented. However, 
there is a dearth of information and very little theory to guide research 
concerning the myriad changes occurring in the health care sector. For example, 
PPS has been implemented in a "vacuum" of knowledge and experience in 
national prospective payment systems. Though several states had introduced 
prospective hospital rate setting programs before PPS, they were all 
substantially different in design from the national program and none had been 
adequately evaluated for impacts on the quality of care (Wagner, 1986). 
Furthermore, the methods for measuring quality of care are not well 
developed and the data are not readily available even for existing measures 
(GAO, 1986; OTA, 198.5). One reason for the lack of information about the 
quality of care provided to Medicare beneficiaries is that there is little 
agreement about what is meant by quality of care • Quality can be viewed from 
the provider's perspective, the patient's perspective, and the payer's perspective 
and these may be divergent. In addition, measures of quality have been limited 
to somewhat ambiguous proxy measures that are often difficult to interpret on 
an individual or group level. Finally, the effects of PPS on the quality of care 
are likely to emerge gradua!ly and the more serious effects may not appear for a 
number of years. That is, PPS impacts on quality may be small initially because 
of the gradual transition from cost-based reimbursement to PPS and the ability 
of hospitals to achieve savings through management and clinical efficiencies that 
have little effect on outcomes. Over time, PPS could force economies that are 
inconsistent with maintaining quality of care. 
Consequently, this dissertation is presented with the following caveats: 
one, it is a preliminary examination of a new area of research in health care, 
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that is, quality of care. Given the absence of information and/or theory 
regarding the changes occurring in the health care system, this dissertation is a 
critical first step in a long-term process of data generation and theory building 
regarding quality of care in a new health care market. Two, the local focus of 
the original research utilized in this dissertation limits its generalizability to 
the larger Medicare population while the use of five Diagnosis Related Groups 
(DRGs) to assess beneficiary impact limits its generalizability to the full DRG 
system. And three, this dissertation presents the historical development of the 
American health care system as a basis for understanding the current changes 
occurring in the health care sector and presents original data as well as 
recently published national data as a means of identifying patterns of response 
to a revolutionary change in federal health care policy, the Prospective 
Payment System. 
Chapter I begins the analysis by describing the historical evolution of the 
medical profession and the role of the federal government on health care 
policy. Specifically, Chapter I examines the influence of the medical profession 
and the federal government on the organization and delivery of health care and 
on health care costs. Information concerning how physicians came to dominate 
the American health care system and how federal health care policy since 
World War II (especially the Medicare and Medicaid programs) has reinforced 
the system established by the medical profession, provides a more 
comprehensive understanding of the contemporary American health care 
system; a system that focuses on curing illness rather than preventing disease, 
is highly technological, is biased toward institutional versus other forms of 
care, and is very expensive. 
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Chapter II examines the response to escalating health care costs by the 
federal government and presents a description of the current situation in the 
health care sector. A number of regulatory (PSROs, health planning) and 
competitive (HMO legislation) were passed during the 1970s in an attempt to 
contain rising costs. However, none of these public policy initiatives worked. 
A new approach to health care costs was instituted by the Reagan 
Administration in 1983: Medicare's Prospective Payment System (PPS). PPS 
pays hospitals a fixed payment rather than retrospectively paying for all 
services delivered to a patient. PPS radically alters the fin,?ncial incentives for 
the amount and mix of inpatient services provided to the elderly and encourages 
early discharge of the patient to community-based care providers. At issue, 
then, is whether quality of care to the Medicare beneficiary has been adversely 
affected under PPS. 
Chapter III presents a discussion of the methodological issues surrounding 
an evaluation of this major public policy initiative and delineates the original 
research conducted for this dissertation. Chapter IV presents the data 
generated from the research design and presents recently published data 
(national and local) on the impact of PPS for hospitals, physicians, the Medicare 
beneficiary, and other health care providers, particularly community-based 
providers (e.g., Home Health, Nursing Homes). Finally, Chapter V presents a 
discussion of the significance and policy implications of the data presented and 
identifies a number of areas of needed research for a more comprehensive 
understanding of the impact of PPS on the quality of care provided to the 
Medicare beneficiary. 
IH!OSPIT ALS, PHYSICIANS AND THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT 
IN THE U.S. HEALTH CARE SYSTEM 
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The post-nineteenth century health care system in the United States has 
been shaped by two equally important forces: a powerful medical profession 
and, since World War IT, by the federal government. Since the turn of the 
century, American physicians have acquired broad cultural authority, social 
privilege, economic power, and wide political influence. American physicians 
have been able to maintain professional independence, control access to their 
profession and institutionalize their authority to a degree of social and 
economic power unknown to any other occupational group in the United States 
(Starr, 1982). In addition, the federal government has increasingly influenced 
the planning, direction, and financing of health services since 1945. While 
government's role has been limited to financing care for needy groups, this role 
has grown to the point where publicly financed health programs account for 
approximately 40 percent of the nation's- personal health care expenditures. 
Furthermore, almost 65 percent of all health research and development funds 
are provided by the government and most non-profit community and university 
hospitals have been built or modernized with government aid (Torrens, 1988). 
Physician Dominance of American Health Care Delivery 
Four developments, largely occurring between 1870 and 1910, laid the 
foundation for physician control of the American health care system. The first 
development was the public acceptance of the hospital as the best place to 
receive medical care. Up to that time, hospitals had been formed mainly to 
take care of people who did not fit into the traditional system of family care in 
the home. The second and third developments enhancing the importance of 
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physicians in the health care delivery system were the incorporation of 
professional nurses as the primary care giver within the hospital and scientific 
and technological advances in medicine (such as the development of antiseptic 
surgery which drastically reduced infectious diseases). As a result of these two 
developments, hospitals moved from the periphery of medical care to the 
center of medical education and practice. The last major contributors to the 
dominance of physicians were the reform of medical education and the resulting 
licensure of physicians. The institutionalization of uniform educational 
standards began to improve care and state licensure for physicians began to 
limit access to the profession. All these factors increased the efficacy of 
medical treatment, institutionalized much of medical practice within hospitals, 
and aided in establishing physicians as the most effective health care 
practitioners. 
The Acceptance of Hospitals. From their origins in pre-industrial society, 
hospitals had been primarily religious and charitable institutions for tending, 
rather than curing, the sick, dying or helpless. Hospitals in the United States 
emerged from this same religious and charitable tradition, performing as 
almshouses and serving the general welfare function of housing the homeless 
poor, the aged, the disabled, the chronically ill, the mentally incompetent, and 
orphans. Caring for the sick was a secondary function in the almshouse and 
treatment was often provided in infirmaries isolated from the rest of the 
facility. It was not until the late 1700s that the infirmaries of city poorhouses 
broke away to become medical care institutions in their own right (Haglund & 
Dowling, 1988; Knowles, 1973; Rosen, 1963; Rosenberg, 1987; Starr, 1982). 
Starr (1982) divided the evolution of the American hospital system into 
three fairly coherent phases. In the first phase, roughly between 1751 and 1850, 
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two kinds of institutions developed: public and voluntary hospitals. Public 
hospitals evolved from the almshouses. They were operated by municipalities, 
by counties, or, in the case of merchant marine hospitals, by the federal 
government. The second phase of hospital development, beginning around 1850, 
saw the emergence of religious and ethnic institutions and specialty hospitals, 
such as children's hospitals, as a consequence of the discrimination non-elite 
physicians and ethnic groups faced in the established public andvoiuntary 
hospitals. This discrimination forced immigrants to build facilities of their own 
and to staff them with their own physicians. The growing importance of 
hospitals and the control over them by a few, elite physicians led to the third 
phase of hospital development, beginning around 1890 and ending around 1920, 
which saw the emergence of the modern profit-making hospital. These 
hospitals were primarily operated by physicians who had been excluded from 
existing general hospitals or small town doctors who wanted a place to 
hospitalize their own patients to prevent big-city doctors from taking them. 
During these phases of hospital development, the advent of professional 
nun;ing and the discovery and application of antiseptic surgery, furthered the 
acceptance of the hospital as part of the medical care system by the American 
public and helped establish the clinically-trained, licensed physician and the 
primary provider of acute medical care in the United States (Knowles, 1973). 
Professicnal Nursing. Trained nurses were virtually unknown before 1870. 
Nursing was menial occupation for lower class women who could work nowhere 
else or for inmates of the almshouses. The only trained nurses were Catholic 
sisters or Protestant deaconesses who were dedicated to caring for patients by 
their religious orders. Some religious orders founded their own hospitals and 
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occasionally provided nursing services in public institutions (Haglund &: Dowling, 
1988; Knowles, 1973; Rosenberg, 1987). The professionalization of nursing has 
been attributed to Florence Nightingale, a middle class English woman trained 
as a nurse in a German Protestant religious order. In 18.54, the British 
government sent Florence- Nightingale and 38 other nurses to the Crimea to 
take charge of nursing wounded soldiers. The nurses instituted sanitation and 
dietary reforms, humane care of patients, and discipline and organization 
resulting in a dramatic drop in mortality. Back in England, Florence 
Nightingale wrote of the contributions sanitation and formal treatment routines 
made to the recovery of the wounded. In 1860 she founded the Nightingale 
School for Nursing. 
Impressed by the example of Florence Nightingale, President Lincoln called 
upon the Catholic sisterhood to nurse wounded soldiers during the Civil War. 
However, more nurses were needed than were available. He appointed Dorthea 
Dix to be Superintendent of Nursing for the Union Army. She began recruiting 
and training new nurses and, by the end of the war, there were 2,000 lay nurses 
in the country (Haglund & Dowling, 1988). Although opposed by physicians and 
hospital administrators, nurse training was established in three professional 
nursing schools by 1873 and was soon incorporated into more and more hospitals 
as student nurses became the unpaid mainstay of the hospital's labor force 
(Rosenberg, 1987). By 1883, there were 22 nursing schools and 600 graduates; 
by 1898, there were 400 schools and 10,000 graduates (Haglund &: Dowling, 
1988). 
Nursing contributed to the public's acceptance and use of hospitals by 
increasing the efficacy of treatment, clea111iness, nutrition, and formal 
treatment routines of patients, all of which contributed to the patient's 
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recovery. In addition, nurses' considerate, skilled personal care made hospitals 
more pleasant and more acceptable to all classes of patient, not just the poor. 
Both factors contributed to the general acceptance of hospitals as an 
appropriate place to receive medical care (Haglund & Dowling, 1988; 
Rosenberg, 1987). 
Antiseptic::: Surgery. The second medical care development was the 
incorporation of antiseptic and sterilization procedures in hospital care, which 
drastically reduced infectious diseases and death during surgery. Very little 
surgery was done before the advent of anesthesia because of the high death toll 
from infections (Rosenberg, 1987). "Surgery had a small repertoire and it stood 
far behind medicine in the therapeutic arsenal" (Starr, 1982, p. 1.56). While 
enough was known about anatomy and physiology to do surgery, the inability to 
deaden pain and the probable development of a life-threatening infection meant 
that what surgery was done had to be done with extreme speed and skill. Ether 
was first used as an anesthetic in surgery in 1842 and its use spread rapidly 
afterward. With advances in anesthesia, followed by antisepsis (1867, but not 
generally applied until the 1880s), and asepsis (1884), surgeons began to be able 
to control infections and, combined with advances in diagnostic techniques 
(e.g., the x-ray and microscope), the amount, scope and success of surgery 
vastly increased. 
Surgeons began to operate earlier, more often and for a larger variety of 
ills, many of which, like appendicitis and stomach ulcers, had been considered 
medical rather than surgical cases (Starr, 1982). By the late 1800s, successes in 
surgery promoted a new emphasis on surgery and the relief of acute illness in 
the hospital and specialization in the medical profession (Rosenberg, 1987). By 
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1900, 40 percent of all hospitalizations were for surgery (Haglund & Dowling, 
1988). The shift in emphasis in medical care altered the function of the 
hospital from social welfare to acute medical care as the sick began to use the 
hospital, not for the "entire siege of illness, but only during its acute phase to 
have some work performed upon them" (Starr, 1982, p. 146). 
In addition, medical technology began to proliferate during the late 1800s. 
The first hospital laboratory opened in 1889 and the first x-ray films were used 
for medical diagnosis in 1896. The discovery of blood types in 1901 made blood 
transfusions safe; the electrocardiogram (EKG) was first used in 1903; and the 
electroencephalogram (EEG) was first used in 1929 (Haglund & Dowling, 1988). 
In addition to increasing the efficiency of medical care, these technological 
advances influenced the site and organization of medical care. Hospitals 
became the central resource where the equipment, facilities and personnel 
required by modern medicine were housed. Consequently, as scientific 
medicine advanced, it tended to be concentrated in the hospital with the result 
that patients and physicians alike used the hospitals for the technology to be 
found there and no where else (Rosenberg, 1987; Torrens, 1988). 
As hospitals became central to the care of curable, short-term illnesses 
which responded quickly to medical intervention, control over access to them 
became a strategic basis of power within the medical community. Although 
hospitals had not been particularly important to medical practice before, access 
to them became vital after the advances in diagnosis and surgery. Exclusion 
from a hospital position seriously handicapped a physician and, since only a few 
elite practitioners had hospital appointments, this caused great discord within 
the profession (Rosenberg, 1987). Starr (1982) reported that in 1907 only 
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10 percent of all physicians in the Bronx and Manhattan areas held hospital 
positions and that in Cleveland, 25 percent of the medical profession controlled 
80 percent of all the hospital beds. Blacks and ethnic groups were almost 
completely unrepresented on hospital staffs at this time. Furthermore, there 
was intense competition for patients as hospital staff physicians were seen to 
steal private practitioners' patients once they entered a hospital. 
Physicians were interested in building hospitals in order to develop medical 
education and to increase the prestige of their private practices. "The status 
and iniluence {physicians) derived from hospital positions were of such value to 
them that they gave their services to the hospitals without pay" {Starr, 1982, p. 
152). Although physicians derived enormous advantage from hospitals, they 
were unable to establish them under their own control, partly for lack of money 
but also because the public mistrusted the medical profession. The poor feared 
being used for medical experiments while the middle and upper classes 
associated hospitals with the almshouse and death. Under these circumstances, 
most hospitals had to be built with philanthropic funds and were managed by 
boards of trustees, governors, or commissioners, rather than by the physicians 
who practiced in them. Physicians did retain control of two important aspects 
of hospital operations; one, they controlled who gained admitting privileges to 
the hospital (that is, which physicians) and two, they controlled who was 
admitted (that is, what type of patient). This arrangement set the stage for the 
division of power within the developing hospital, a division between the 
administrators of the hospital and the physicians practicing within it and one 
that continues to exist today {Rosenberg, 1987). 
The Reform of Medical Education. The second major factor that enabled 
the medical profession to dominate the U.S. health care system occurred after 
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the turn of the Century. Medical care in the United States was largely a 
cottage industry until the 20th century (Renn, 1987). While physicians 
succeeded in organizing medical schools and, in some fields such as obstetrics 
and surgery, gained distinction over rival practitioners during the 1700 and 
1800s, prior to 1900, doctors were just one of many competing health care 
practitioners (Starr, 1982). Strong democratic ideals and the fact that 
professional medicine could offer no more successful diagnosis or treatment 
than lay practitioners impeded physicians from establishing themselves as an 
exclusive and privileged profession until very late in the 1900s. 
The final step in the transformation of professional medicine from a 
competing to a dominating profession, and its corresponding influence on the 
shape and character of the American health care system, came about as a 
result of advances in medical science and technology, which identified 
successful therapies, made the hospital a safe place to receive treatment and 
paved the way for medical specialization. The institutionalization of uniform 
educational standards began to improve medical care and state licensure for 
physicians began to limit access to the profession. The result was physician 
dominance of health care by 1900. 
The social structure of medicine in eighteenth century England reflected 
the hierarchical nature of society. Physicians, as members of a learned 
profession, formed a small elite, distinct· from the lower orders of surgeons, 
who practiced a craft, and from apothecaries, who followed a trade. Each of 
these professions had its own guild organization, which licensed its practitioners 
and defined their functions and privileges (Rosenberg, 1987; Starr, 1982). 
Licensure and education standards were consolidated under the control of the 
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professional elite (Rosenberg, 1987; Starr, 1982). This was the key step in the 
emergenc.e of an autonomous, unified, and powerful medical profession in 18th 
and 19th century Great Britian and served as a model for many in the American 
medical profession. 
However, others in the American medical system had little use for the 
rigid guild system that characterized British medidne. With no centralized 
government or aristoc.ratic elite in Americ.a to serve as gatekeepers to the 
profession, "all manner of people took up the prac.tice of medicine and 
appropriated the title of doc.tor" (Starr, 1982, p. 39). The boundaries between a 
trade and a profession, so well defined in 18th century Europe, were blurred in 
America. It was common for Colonial clergy to practice medidne; 
homeopathies and other medical sectarians flourished in the nineteenth century. 
The result was a totally informal and disconnec.ted system of medical practice, 
with care provided by physicians and lay persons, all with various levels of 
training. By 1850, the fragmentation in service delivery had become so firmly 
entrenched in the structure of the U.S. health care system that unific.ation 
under any government agency or structured association seemed impossible. The 
adoption of the boundaries that defined English medicine proved very difficult 
in the United States. 
Professional boundaries c:-ould have been drawn in America, as they had 
been in Europe, in three ways: graduates versus non-graduates of medkal 
schools; members versus non-members of medical soc.ieties; or licensed versus 
unlicensed practitioners (Starr, 1982). For example, proprietary medical 
schools were founded as early as 1815 and were intended to raise medical 
standards. However, only a few of the hundreds of schools that opened in the 
19th and 20th centuries were affiliated with hospitals or any other cliniral 
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setting; they had few admission requirements other than the ability to pay and 
rudimentary skills in reading and writing; and apprenticeship remained the 
primary means of obtaining a medical education. 
Furthermore, there was no standardized curriculum among schools while 
systematic clinical instruction and medical investigation, hallmarks of a 
European medical education, were all but ignored in most American medical 
schools. The result was not a strengthening of medical education standards but 
rather their degradation; a proliferation of proprietary medical schools where 
"length of study was minimized, requirements sacrificed, and fees driven down"; 
and a plethora of proprietary medical school graduatec; who competed with 
clinically-trained physicians (Starr, p. 44). Thus, the boundaries that American 
physicians attempted to establish during the 19th century (only medical 
graduates could be licensed and only licensed physicians could practice) were 
rapidly eroded by practitioner competition, dissension among differing medical 
sects, and contempt for profesc;ional medicine by the general public. Under 
such circumstances elite medical practitioners could generate little collective 
organization or power. 
While the need for medical education reform was recognized before the 
turn of the century, it was not until after 1900 that the newly consolidated 
medical profession could make system-wide changes in medical education 
(Starr, 1982}. Even though some university-based medical schools, such as 
Johns Hopkins, upgraded their curriculum and facilities to meet the changes in 
medical science, most proprietary medical schools did not. Moreover, there 
was no central licensing authority nor accrediting institutions for medical 
colleges. Consequently, alternative practitioners and poorly trained physicians 
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continued to be a source of competition to the profession. While this situation 
was not so important before the revolution in medical science, by 1900, medical 
advances made the gap between education and practice critical. 
By the turn of the century medical professionals agreed that uniform 
medical education standards were needed to upgrade American medical 
practice. The American Medical Association (AMA), which had struggled to 
represent the profession since its founding in 1846, had become powerful enough 
in 1904 to establish a Council on Medical Education with the express goal of 
defining the training criteria for professional physicians. Although the AMA 
believed that the standards (four years of high school, four years of medical 
training, and passage of a licensing test) were vital to upgrading the profession, 
they did not believe they could generate the political support necessary to 
implement the standards until the gap between medical education and medical 
practice was exposed to the general public (Starr, 1982). · 
The AMA had other reasons to reform medical education. Higher standards 
would permit physicians to control access to the field, eliminate rivals, improve 
the social and economic status of physicians, and help repel all threats to the 
profession's autonomy (e.g., corporate medicine using salaried physicians) 
o=.hert, 1987). The watershed between the informal medical education of the 
past and the twentieth century medical education came about as a result of a 
Carnegie Foundation study of medical education practices conducted by 
Abraham Flexner. Flexner's report, Bulletin 10 of the Carnegie Foundation 
published in 1910, revealed a large gap between advances in medical science 
and current medical education. Flexner found that most of the medical schools 
were inadequate and that most physicians were improperly and insufficiently 
trained. Flexner recommended that the best schools be strengthened and the 
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rest closed, that physician training become a university function and that 
medical education be based on a firm scientific foundation (Torrens, 1988). 
The Flexner Report had three immediate effects on the health care system 
(Wolinsky, 1980). First, the number of medical schools was drastically reduced. 
Thirty-nine percent of the 1.55 schools open at the time of the Report's 
publication closed within five years and 45 percent dosed within ten years. By 
1920, there were only 107 medical schools still open and over 80 percent of 
those had begun to require a college degree before admission. However, 
medical schools affiliated with universities thrived under these new conditions 
as competitors closed down and demand increased (Wolinsky, 1980). 
Second, there was a substantial decrease in the number of physicians and, 
at the same time, a corresponding increase in the quality of physicians 
graduated. However, the new education and licensing requirements also 
became effective prohibitions to the profession. Proprietary medical schools, 
which had admitted all social classes and groups including women, immigrants, 
and Blacks, were dosed after the Flexner Report. 
The high costs of a medical education, fewer accredited medical schools, 
reductions in class size and more stringent entry requirements limited the 
number of middle and lower class students admitted. "Admission committees 
became class conscious: social position became as important as grades; white, 
Anglo-Saxon Protestants were preferred; few women were admitted, and there 
were quotas established for Blacks and Jews" (Ebert, 1987, p. 150). Medical 
education changed into a demanding, expensive, full-time and lengthy process 
which deterred those who could not afford the luxury of a full-time education. 
As a result, minorities and the lower socioeconomic groups rapidly became 
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under-represented in the medical profession; a bias that continues today. For 
example, 11 percent of the total population is Black, yet Blacks constitute only 
2.2 percent of the physician work force (Wolinsky, 1980). Consequently, 
medical education reform changed medicine from a democratic, egalitarian 
trade to an elite profession (Ebert, 1987). 
A third consequence of medical education reform was the new emphasis 
placed on research and medical practice and their incorporation into an 
application-oriented, university and hospital-based curriculum (Wolinsky, 1980). 
Physicians were now trained by scientists and researchers rather than 
practicing physicians, and the values and standards of academic specialists 
came to dominate the profession. Eventually, these changes directed medical 
education away from an emphasis on private practice and toward an emphasis 
on science and research. 
The Flexner Report also affected hospitals. Changes in medical education 
expanded the role of the hospital to include education and research as 
internships and residencies became common requirements for a medical license. 
By the 1920s, medical education requirements necessitated expansion of 
hospital facilities, services, and the addition of more equipment and personnel. 
Hospitals also assumed a greater responsibility in coordinating community 
health care activities. With these changes, the hospital became the 
organizational hub of the American health care system, central to patient care, 
to professional training, and to health related research (Haglund & Dowling, 
1988). 
Summary. American physicians have been able to control the environment 
in which they practice largely as a result of the remarkable advances in 
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medicine, which incorporated the hospital as the focal point for medical care 
delivery and to the reform of medical education, which controlled access to the 
medical profession. By the middle of the 20th century, physicians had become 
powerful, prestigious and wealthy professionals. They also succeeded in shaping 
the organization of health care (hospital-based) and controlling the financing 
mechanisms (fee-for-service) of American medicine. More recently, physicians 
have been successful in defeating all forms of national health insurance, save 
that of Medicare and Medicaid. "Nowhere else in the world have physicians 
been as successful in resisting national health insurance or maintaining a 
predominantly private and voluntary financing system" (Wolinsky, 1980, p. 6). 
In just the last 100 years, physicians have rid themselves of competition, 
created a monopoly on medical practice, and shaped the hospital system. These 
power relations have been reinforced since the Depression by an expansionist, 
yet non-interventionist, federal health policy. The next section describes the 
role of the federal government io health care. 
The Federal Government's Role in Health Care 
National health care policy since the Depression has resulted in an 
expanded government role in health care. What was, before the 1930's, the 
province of the medical profession, charitable institutions, and local 
government, has increasingly become the responsibility of the federal 
government. Although the government's role in health care has grown 
dramatically, the U.S. government is considerably less involved in health care 
than the governments of many industrialized countries (Lee &: Benjamin, 1988). 
Whereas most of the countries of Europe established extensive hospital systems 
and public insurance programs by the late 1800s, the federal government's role 
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in health care has been, until the 20th century, primarily concerned with 
controlling the spread of contagious diseases. The 1798 Marine Hospital Service 
Act established a system of compulsory hospital insurance and a federal system 
of hospitals for merchant seamen (Haglund & Dowling, 1988; Shonick, 1988; 
Starr, 1982). The Act also established cooperative agreements with the states 
in enforcing state and local laws of ship quarantine. However, quarantine 
authority was retained by the states. In 1876, a surgeon general was appointed 
to head the Marine Hospital services and authorized to impose quarantine 
within the states. This marked the first time that the federal government 
assumed a public health responsibility for an economic: sector previously held by 
the states. Nothing more was done on a federal level until after 1900 (Lee & 
Benjamin, 1988). 
Local health departments were formally organized by municipalities after 
the Civil War to deal with broader public health issues such as sanitation, 
communicable disease control, collection and analysis of vital statistics, and 
public health laboratory maintenance. By 1909, public health agencies were 
established in all the states. In 1912, the Marine Hospital Service was renamed 
the U.S. Public Health Service but continued to focus primarily on medical care 
for seamen and on foreign quarantine. Between 1915 and 1935, two other 
sources of federal influence over state and local public health activities were 
put in place: grants for venereal disease control and maternal and child 
hygiene. For the period up to 1935, the role of the federal government was 
limited to support and technical assistance to the states. The federal 
government worked with the states to perform quarantine services at major 
ports, providing modest amounts of aid to localities, and providing hospital and 
quarantine services to merchant seamen (Shonick, 1988). 
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During the Depression, however, the role of the federal government shifted 
to one providing a strong federal presence that took precedence, for the first 
time, over the states (Lee & Benjamin, 1988). The Social Security Act of 1935 
exemplified this new role and was surely the most significant domestic social 
legislation ever passed by Congress. The Social Security Act established the 
principle of federal aid to the states for a variety of programs, including public 
health and welfare assistance. Title V of the 1935legislation gave grants to the 
states for maternal and child health programs and crippled children's services 
while Title VI funded general public health programs. The Act also provided 
cash assistance for the aged, blind, and destitute families with dependent 
children. 
The Depression so significantly reduced health care utilization that 
hospital revenues and physicians' incomes were affected. Due to most people's 
economic plight, heath care was either postponed or medical bills went unpaid. 
This created a crisis in hospital financing {Richardson, 1988; Torrens, 1988). 
According to one study, average hospital receipts per person fell from $236 to 
$59 and average hospital deficits rose from 15.2 percent to 20.6 percent just 
one year after the Crash (Starr, 1982). Moreover, a study of non-profit 
hospitals in 1935 showed that total income was 3 percent less than total 
expenses and that the total number of hospitals had dropped from 6,852 in 1928 
to 6,189 by 1937 (Haglund & Dowling, 1988). 
Hospitals began offering prepaid contracts to employers to cover the 
hospital expenses of their employees on a group basis as a way to fill empty 
beds (Starr, 1982). This contractual arrangement between individual hospitals 
formed the basis for the first Blue Cross hospital insurance plans. With the 
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success of the first hospital insurance plans, commercial carriers began 
emulating Blue Cross and, by 1940, both commercial insurers and Blue Cross 
had extended hospital and surgical insurance coverage to over 10 million 
subscribers (Starr, 1982). 
After World War II, the federal government encouraged expansion of health 
care in three major ways: (1) by favorable tax and other policies, it encouraged 
the purchase of increasingly comprehensive private health insurance; (2) by 
financing biomedical research programs and building hospital facilities, and 
after 1963, by funding medical education, the federal government expanded the 
supply of physicians and medical professionals; and (3) by legislating and 
financing national health insurance programs, the federal government provided 
direct health coverage to the elderly, veterans, and large numbers of the poor 
and indigent (Starr, 1982). 
Government Encouraged Health Insurance. As a result of judicial 
interpretations of the National Labor Relations Act, known as the Wagner Act, 
the federal government began encouraging the spread of private health 
insurance and other employee benefits through collective bargaining. Passed 
the same year as Social Security, the Wagner Act included a provision stating 
that "wages and conditions of employment" were subject to bargaining but it 
left unclear whether conditions of employment included such benefits as health 
and welfare (Starr, 1982, p. 312). In a landmark 1948 case involving Inland Steel 
the Supreme Court ruled that benefit plans did, indeed, come under conditions 
of employment and were therefore subject to collective bargaining (Renn, 1988; 
Sapolosky, 1986). In the next few years after the Inland Steel decision, most of 
the major unions concluded agreements for greatly expanded health benefits. 
Between 1948 and 1950, the number of workers covered by negotiated health 
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plans jumped from 2.7 million to more than 7 million. Over 12 million workers 
and 17 million dependents were enrolled in collectively bargained plans as of 
19.54 (Starr, 1982). By the mid-fifties, health insurance, particularly hospital 
insurance, was widely used and, due to federal support, became a significant 
factor in wage/benefit negotiations (Feigenbaum, 1988). 
The favorable tax treatment that employee health benefits received 
ensured its widespread acceptance by both employees and employers. The 
Internal Revenue Code of 19.54 exempted employer paid health insurance 
benefits from the employee's taxable income and from earnings subject to 
payroll taxes. In effect, this exemption constituted a massive subsidy to people 
who had private health insurance (Starr, 1982). As Meyer (1983b) explains it: 
Employers 'duty to bargain' interacted with the favorable 
tax treatment of business oulays for employee health 
insurance to stimulate the enrichment of group health 
insurance purchased through the workplace. 
Additionally, under the Internal Revenue Code of 19.54, 
employees were permitted to exclude the full amount of 
their employer's contributions, without limit, from their 
own incomes for federal tax purposes (p. 9). 
Collective bargaining for health services expanded the scope of coverage 
as well. By 19.54, over 60 percent of the population had some type of hospital 
insurance, .50 percent had some type of surgical insurance, and 2.5 percent had 
medical insurance (Starr, 1982). By 1982, three-quarters of the U.S. population 
was covered by private health insurance for hospital care, compared to one-half 
in 19.50, an increase of 14 percent per year (Senate Finance Committee, 1986). 
Today, almost 80 percent of the population under 6.5 have some form of 
voluntary health insurance and about 80 percent of employees in the U.S. work 
for firms where they are eligible for health insurance (Koch, 1988). In 1986, the 
National Center for Health Services Research (NCHSR) reported that 97.7 
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percent of the population under 65 who had private health insurance were 
covered for hospital room and board; 97 percent had coverage for surgeon's 
costs; 95.7 percent for physician and inpatient medical services; 93 percent for 
outpatient diagnostic services; 83.3 percent for physician's office vistis; 81.3 
percent for perscription drugs; 80.9 percent for emergency outpatient services; 
71.4 percent for mental health/outpatient physician services; 48.7 percent had 
coverage for nursing facility services; 25.4 percent for dental services; and 24.2 
percent had coverage for home health care services (Koch, 1988). 
Biomedical Research. Expansion in the health sector was also encouraged 
by federal support of biomedical research. In recognition of the advances being 
made in medical research, Congress transformed the old Public Health Service 
Hygiene Laboratory, established in 1901, into the National Institutes of Health 
(NIH) with broad authority to conduct basic research. During World War II, the 
development of radar, the atomic bomb, and penicillin, as well as other 
dramatic advances in medical treatment produced by science and technology, 
demonstrated that support of science and medicine was in the national interest 
(Starr, 1982). Whereas, before the War, the primary sources of financing for 
medical research had been private foundations and pharmaceutical companies 
(only $180,000 in federal funds were allocated to biomedical research); over $4 
million in federal funds were dedicated to research in 1947. 
After World War II, NIH established new institutes focused on specific 
classes of diseases such as cancer, heart disease, and arthritis. Appropriations 
to biomedical research had increased to $46 million by 1950 and to $400 million 
by 1960 (Sorkin, 1986). "In the 15 years immediately .after World War II, NIH 
grew from a small government laboratory into the most significant biomedical 
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research institute in the world" (Lee & Benjamin, 1987, p. 469). From 1975 to 
1985, funding for basic research increased steadily, from $4.7 billion to $12.8 
billion. However, due to financial pressures, health research and development 
spending as a percentage of health expenditures have actually decreased in 
recent years. In 1984, health research accounted for 3.1 percent of health care 
expenditures, versus 3.9 percent in 1972, a 21 percent drop (Luce, 1988). 
The Hill-Burton Act. Similarly, the government sought to increase the 
supply of health services available to the consumer through a variety of federal 
health programs. The Public Health Service Act of 1944 revised and brought 
together in one statute all existing legislation concerning the public health, 
including Title VI of the Social Security Act which provided grants to the states 
for public health programs (Wilson & Neuhauser, 1982). 
In 1946, Congress passed the Hospital Survey and Construction Act (Hill-
Burton Act) to address the huge post-war demand for hospital construction and 
to meet the growing demand for health care services caused by the return of 
millions of veterans, the rise in personal incomes and the rapid spread of health 
insurance. Among the most important amendments to the Public Health 
Services Act, Hill-Burton's purpose was to pay for hospital construction to 
overcome a perceived shortage of hospital beds (Lee & Benjamin, 1988). 
Through grants and loans for hospital construction, the program aimed at 
increasing bed capacity from the national rate of 3.2 beds per 1,000 population 
to a ceiling of 4.5 beds for each state (Alpha Center, 1986). The legislation, 
supported by virtually every health care lobby in the country, stimulated a 
massive hospital construction program with federal and state subsidies going 
primarily to community, nonprofit and voluntary hospitals. Public hospitals, 
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supported largely by local tax funds to provide care for the poor, received little 
federal support. 
Hill-Burton became a model of federal-state-private sector cooperation in 
the distribution of federal resources (Rohrer, 1987). Between 1946 and 1958, 
approximately 600 hospitals were built in communities that previously had not 
had one. In addition, 250 projects had been completed in communities with an 
inadequate supply of beds prior to Hill-Burton. Testimony before Congress 
estimated that only 59 percent of the hospital beds needed were available in 
1948 but that the figure had increased to 75 percent by 1958 (Rohrer, 1987). 
Between 1947 and 1971, $3.7 billion was disbursed under the program and 
accounted for an average of about 10 percent of the annual cost of hospital 
construction. The Act also generated an estimated $9.1 billion in local and 
matching funds, contributing to over 30 percent of all hospital projects during 
that period (Morris, 1984 ). Total Hill-Burton expenditures had reached an 
estimated $6.5 billion in government grants and loans by 1986 (Dowell, 1987). 
After the mid-1950s, the emphasis shifted from rural hospital construction 
to modernizing larger, existing institutions. The assumption that more medical 
care wasdesirable was now being challenged, primarily because Hill-Burton had 
been so successful in expanding hospital beds. Largely because of Hill-Burton, 
the supply of hospital beds nationwide approached the stated goal of 4.5 beds 
per 1,000 by the mid-1970s. 
Although Hill-Burton did offer funding for outpatient clinics and public 
health centers, political pressure led the Department of Health, Education and 
Welfare (DHEW) to release these funds so they could be used for hospital 
projects (Dowell, 1987). In effect, Hill-Burton put the power of public finance 
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behind hospitals rather than other medical services, such as primary care, or 
other types of providers, such as community-based nurses, and reinforced the 
historical bias in the American health care system toward the most costly form 
of health care delivery, physician-based inpatient hospital care (Davis, 1985). 
By the 1970s, most Hill-Burtcm funds were being expended for additions, 
alterations, and replacements of existing facilities (Rohrer, 1987). 
New priorities for Hill-Burton had been identified during its 
reauthorization in the early 1970s. In keeping with the government's emphasis 
on access to health care, the new priority of Hill-Burton was to develop 
"equity" in the delivery of health care services (Rohrer, 1987). While the stated 
focus of the second phase of Hill-Burton was to provide equal access to hospital 
and physician care to those who could not afford it, the goal has largely 
remained an illusion (Dowell, 1987). Hospitals receiving grants-in-aid for 
construction under the Act were required to make a "reasonable volume of free 
or reduced cost care" to people unable to pay (uncompensated care) and to 
make their services "available to all" (Dowell, 1987, p. 155). Nearly 60 percent 
of all hospitals have received Hill-Burton funds and are governed by its 
regulations concerning the provision of care to the poor and uninsured. 
However, the Hill-Burton legislation did not define how much uncompensated 
care hospitals were required to provide and did not designate how hospitals 
were to ensure their services would be made available to all. Further, although 
states were required to designate a single agency responsible for the 
administration, monitoring and enforcement of Hill-Burton regulations, no state 
had an active program for monitoring facility compliance prior to the the 
1970s. It was assumed that hospitals were meeting their obligations (Dowell, 
1987). 
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Advocates for the indigent brought a series of lawsuits against the 
government intended to force DHEW to spell out hospital uncompensated care 
regulations. In 1972, DHEW issued the first administrative standards and 
procedures for quantifying "reasonable volume' of free care as a person's 
inability to pay equal to 3 percent of the facilities annual operating budget or 
10 percent of total federal assistance to pay for services to the poor. Some 
hospitals had an "open-door" option; that is, they could accept anyone coming to 
the hospital for care. However, volume of uncompensated care did not 
increase. State agencies failed to establish eligibility criteria or procedural 
guidelines and neglected to monitor facility observance of the provisions 
(Dowell, 1987). 
Subsequent litigation prompted further revisions in the regulations. A 
General Accounting Office (GAO) report in 1974 criticized the government's 
enforcement ·of Hill-Burton, and in 1975 revised regulations were issued that 
strengthened the requirements for hospitals (Dowell, 1987). Still, volume of 
uncompensated care did not increase. Additional court cases and Congressional 
hearings were needed before further revisions to the regulations finally became 
specific. In 1979, revisions to the law went into effect eliminating the "open 
door" option and requiring a specific amount of dollars of uncompensated care 
to be delivered annually for 20 years from the opening date of the facility or 
receipt of federal funds under the Act (Dowell, 1987). 
Although nearly 5,000 general hospitals have received Hill-Burton funds, 
many of these hospitals no longer fit into the regulations, due to the 20-year-
from-opening-date provision, and others only have a few years left to go. The 
result has been a dwindling availability of uncompensated care. Barely 2,500 
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hospitals still have Hill-Burton obligations as of 1985. By 1990, only 1,000 will 
still be under the Act and by 1995, only 400 hospitals will have any Hill-Burton 
uncompensated care obligations (Dowell, 1987). Moreover, enforcement of Hill-
Burton obligations has been lax at best. The major problem with the 
enforcement of the Hill-Burton regulations is that there is no incentive for 
hospitals to comply and no incentive for HHS to enforce compliance. "Without 
fear of statutory or regulatory punitive measures, hospitals may cut as many 
corners as they wish. If they are caught, they will merely be reprimanded and 
told to do better next time" (Dowell, 1987, p. 167). With increasing cost-
containment pressures, hospitals may choose to limit even more stringently the 
amount of uncompensated care they provide. 
Physician Supply. The government also moved to increase the supply of 
physicians and other health professionals through large scale subsidies for the 
creation of medical schools, the education of doctors, and support of medical 
research. The first federal legislation specifically addressed to health 
manpower was The Health Amendments Act of 1956 (Wilson & Neuhauser, 
1982). The law authorized traineeships for professional public health personnel 
and for advanced training of professional nurses under Title III of the Public 
Health Service Act. Formula grants to schools of public health were 
established in 1958 and, in 1960, a program of project grants to schools of 
public health and schools of nursing funded graduate public health training. 
The Health Professions Educational Assistance Amendments of 1965 and 
the Allied Health Professions Personnel Training Act of 1966 added more 
support, including support for physicians (Sorkin, 1986). Finally, the 
Comprehensive Health Manpower Training Act and the Nurse Training Act, both 
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passed in 1971, extended previous legislation designed to expand the pool of 
health manpower (Wilson & Neuhauser, 1982). The program reached its peak in 
the early 1970s and accounted for approximately 55 percent of the total 
revenues of medical schools (Muscovice, 1988). 
By the mid-1970s, it was clear that this policy of supporting health 
manpower education had worked. In 1965, when the funding of health 
professionals began to see results, there were 145.5 physicians per 100,000 
population. By 1975, the ratio had dimed to 171 per 100,000 (Morris, 1984). By 
1982, there had been a: 62 percent increase in the supply of physicians and by 
1985, the number of medical school graduates had more than doubled in the 
intervening 20 years (Muscovice, 1988). Surveys of medical schools regarding 
enrollment indicated that there no longer was a shortage of health professionals 
and that there would soon be a surplus of doctors. 
The Health Manpower Act of 1976 removed a number of federal incentives 
to medical schools and began restricting the inflow of foreign medical 
graduates into the U.S. as a means of reversing the trend set by previous health 
manpower legislation. Both the Carter and Reagan Administrations have 
recommended curtailment of federal support for health manpower training and, 
by 1979, the percentage of total medical school revenues accounted for by 
federal funds had been reduced to 29 percent (Ginzberg, 1985). The Health 
Manpower Amendments, contained within the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation 
Act of 1981, substantially cut federal expenditures for health manpower 
training and by 1983, federal support of health training had largely been 
dismantled. In spite of these cutbacks, the physician ratio is expected to jump 
to 220 per 100,000 population by 1990, and if the trend continues, it could reach 
245 physicians per 100,000 population by the year 2000 (Morris, 1984). 
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Medicare and Medicaid. The implementation of Medicare and Medicaid, 
perhaps two of the most important programatic breakthroughs of the 1960s, 
epitomize the federal emphasis on expanding access within the health care 
sector. Medicare is C"omprised of two parts. Part A, the Hospital Insurance 
Program (HI), provides insurance protection for inpatient hospital services, 
skilled nursing facility services, some home health care services, and hospice 
care required by beneficiaries. Part B, Supplementary Medical Insurance (SMI), 
provides voluntary supplementary insurance to cover the C"Osts of most 
physidan's serviC"es, inrluding ho'5pital outpatient services, laboratory services, 
and certain other services not covered in Part A. The program does not cover 
out-patient drugs, long-term nursing home care, dental care, routine eye 
examinations, or preventive services. 
The 1972 Social Security Amendments expanded Medicare to cover, 
beginning July 1, 1973, disabled persons receiving Social Security and persons 
suffering from end-stage renal disease (GorniC"k, et al., 1985). Over 95 perC"ent 
of the aged population in the U.S. are enrolled in Part A of Medicare (HI) and 97 
perC"ent of Part A beneficiaries are enrolled in Part B (SMI). Furthermore, 
about 70 percent of all medicare beneficiaries also purchase private medicare 
supplemental insurance policies (i.e., Medigap policies) designed to reimburse 
the deductibles and coinsurance associated with Medicare coverage (Koch, 
1988). 
Medicare is financed in part by payroll taxes on both employees and 
employers, in part by premiums paid by the beneficiaries, and in part by 
contributions from the general revenues of the U.S. Treasury. The HI program 
is funded 100 percent from a trust fund established for that purpose. Under 
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current law, general revenues cannot be used to make up for any short fall 
between outlays required to pay benefits and the balance in the HI trust fund. 
In contrast, SMI revenues are obtained from premiums and general revenues 
with the premium amount increased by law every year and general revenues 
making up any difference between premium income and outlay (Sorkin, 1986). 
Of the funds for SMI, 74 percent are derived from the general treasury and 24 
percent come from beneficiaries who elect to enroll in Part B (Koch, 1988). 
Under the HI program, the patient is required to pay an inpatient hospital 
deductible in each benefit period. The deductible approximates the cost of one 
day of hospital care; over $500 in 1986 (Sorkin, 1986). Coinsurance based on the 
inpatient hospital deductible is required for the 6lst to 90th day of 
hospitalization (one-fourth of the deductible); for the 21st to lOOth day of 
skilled nursing facility (SNF) care (one-eigth of the deductible); and for the 60 
lifetime reserve days for inpatient hospital care (one-half of the deductible). 
Under the SMI program, in addition to paying a monthly premium (currently 
$15.50 per month versus $3.00 in 1967) the beneficiary must meet a deductible 
of $7 5 per year. 
In contrast to Medicare, Medicaid is a grant program in which the federal 
government shares the cost of health care services with the states for certain 
welfare recipients, such as those who receive cash assistance under existing 
Social Security welfare programs including Aid to Families with Dependent 
Children (AFDC) or Supplemental Security Income (SSI). States run the 
program, within the guidelines set by the federal government, paying those who 
provide the care directly. The Medicaid program. replaced several other health 
programs for the poor (e.g., the Kerr-Mills bill of 1960) and became the primary 
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device by which the federal government sought to ensure that the poor got 
adequate medical care (Ginzberg, 1985). Medicaid provides health financing for 
over 27 million low-income people, induding nearly 4 million elderly poor. 
Medicaid fills two roles for the elderly: for the 3 million elderly poor living 
outside of institutions, Medicaid supplements Medicare's acute care benefits 
and pays for the cost-sharing required by the program and for the 1 million 
elderly in nursing homes, Medicaid pays for care once personal assets and 
income are depleted (Rowland, 1987). 
Medicaid is financed by a federal contribution from the general treasury, 
ranging from 50 to 77 percent and averaging 55 percent, and from state 
treasuries, with an average contribution of 45 percent (Koch, 1988; Renn, 1987). 
Like Medicare, the Medicaid program paid providers on a cost-based, fee-for-
service bac;is. Unlike Medicare, Medicaid is a means-tested program. To be 
eligible, an individual's income and assets must be below state determined 
eligibility levels, which are roughly 75 percent of the federal poverty level 
(Rowland, 1987). The Medicare and Medicaid programs are the closest this 
country has come to a comprehensive, national health insurance program. 
Summary. By 1953, the federal government's role in the national health 
care system was firmly established with the creation of the Department of 
Health, Education and Welfare (DHEW), now the Department of Health and 
Human Services (DHHS). Designed to support programs and services in the 
private sector, biomedical research, health professionals training and hospital 
construction, DHE W's role in direct medical care was limited to military 
personnel, veterans, merchant seamen and Native Americans. In the early 
1960s, new health initiatives for the elderly and poor gained widespread 
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political support and resulted in the legislation establishing the Medicare and 
Medicaid programs (Lee and Benjamin, 1988). The introduction of all of these 
federal initiatives in health care not only expanded health care services, they 
increased the cost of care. Federal funding accounted for 22 percent of all 
personal health care spending in 1965; by 1980, that figure had increased to 40 
percent. The next section examines the impact federal programs have had on 
health care costs. 
HEALTH CARE COSTS 
The rise in health care costs had been acknowledged as early as the 
Progressive Era (late 1880s-1920s) and attempts to control it discussed on the 
national political arena since the early 1900s, cost was not a major federal 
concern until the 1970s. On the contrary, as government and private employers 
sought to encourage the development and use of health care services, concern 
focu~ed on the availability of medical care, quality of care, and to some extent, 
on access to care. However, the last twenty years have seen below average 
economic growth combined with increases in federal spending and tax cuts, slow 
productivity gains and rapid inflation, and mounting federal budget deficits. All 
of these factors contributed to rapid increases in health care expenditures. It 
was not until the enactment of national health programs, specifically the 
Medicare and Medicaid programs in the mid-1960s, that inflation really took off 
in the health care sector and caused serious political concern. 
Since 1940, national health expenditures have grown at a rate substantially 
outpacing the GNP. Table I shows the progression of aggregate and per capita 
national health expenditures for the United States since 1940. Prior to World 
War II, only 4.0 percent of the GNP was devoted to health care; by 1985, the 
proportion of the GNP expended for health care almost tripled, increasing to 
10.8 percent of the GNP (Koch, 1988). 
TABLE I 
AGGREGATE AND PER CAPITA NATIONAL HEALTH IEXPENDITURJES, 
UNITED STATES, SELECTED YEARS* 
Total Per GNP Percent 
Year Billion Capita (Billion$) of GNP 
1940 4.0 30 100 4.0 
1950 12.7 82 287 4.4 
1960 26.9 146 507 5.3 
1970 75.0 350 1015 7.4 
1980 247.5 1049 2632 9.4 
1985 425.0 1721 3989 10.8 
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*Source: Koch, 1988. Adapted from Waldo, D.R., Levit, K.R., Lazenby, H.: 
National health expenditures, 1985. Health Care Financing Review, 1986, 8:1-
21. 
Another way to look at costs is that between the end of World War II and 
1966, public outlays for health averaged approximately 25 percent of the total 
dollar amount spent for health care. While expenditures in both the public and 
private sectors increased during this period, the rate of increase was 
approximately the same in both sectors. With Medicare and Medicaid programs, 
public expenditures for health services rose, as expected, but at a rate far 
greater than anticipated (Haglund & Dowling, 1988). In 1965, 22 percent of all 
personal health care spending was publicly financed; yet the figure grew to 34 
percent in just two years (Gibson, et al., 1984). Similarly, total national health 
expenditures increased an average of 12.6 percent between 1965 and 1983, 
fueled by a steady inflation in the hospital sector, which grew 14 percent per 
year during that period versus 7 to 8 percent annual inflation for the rest of the 
economy (Crozier, 1984). In addition, between 1975 and 1983, the federal 
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government paid for slightly more than two-thirds of all public: expenditures for 
health and medical care (Sorkin, 1986). 
Health care expenditures reached $3.5.5.4 billion by 1983, 10.8 percent of 
the GNP and 10.3 percent more than in 1982 (Gibson, et al., 1984). If health 
care spending were allowed to continue at this rate, expenditures could reach as 
much as $690 billion (12 percent of GNP) by 1990 and $1.9 trillion (14 percent 
of GNP) by the year 2000 (Freeland & Schendler, 1983). Of the total amount 
spent in 1983, $313 billion was spent on personal health care services suc:h as 
hospital care, physicians' services, nursing home care, drugs and medical 
sundries, and other personal health care goods and services) (Gibson, et al., 
1984). Public sources paid for 42¢ of every dollar spent on health care in 1983; 
federal payments amounted to $102.7 billion while $46.1 billion came from 
state and local governments. Outlays for health care benefits paid by Medicare 
and Medicaid totaled $91 billion or 29 percent of all personal health care 
expenditures in 1983 (Gibson, et al., 1984). 
Although health care spending increased dramatically overall, hospital care 
led the way. Today, there are just under .5,800 community hospitals containing 
nearly 1 million beds, or about 4.2 beds per 1,000 persons (Ebert, 1987). 
Hospital care accounted for 47 percent of all personal health care spending in 
1983 in contrast to 33 percent in 1960. On a per capita basis, hospital 
expenditures increased from $.50 per person in 1960 to over $1,4.59 by 1983 and 
was double the per capita spending for physician's services, more than five 
times what was spent for drugs or nursing home care, and more than six times 
what was spent for dental services (Sapolsky, 1987). Federal programs paid for 
41.1 percent of hospital care while private health insurance paid for 38.2 
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percent and state and local governments paid for 12.1 percent, leaving just 7.5 
percent to be paid by the patient directly (Gibson, et al., 1984). 
Physician's services, which make up the second largest segment of personal 
health care expenditures, accounted for 22 percent, or $69 billion of the 
personal health care bill in 1983 (Gibson, et al., 1984). Together, physicians and 
hospitals account for over 60 percent of health care expenditures and, as a 
result, have been the target of most cost-containiment initiatives proposed over 
the past few years (Renn, 1987). Of other health care services, almost $29 
billion (8.1 96) went to nursing home care. Over $23 billion was spent for 
prescription drugs, over-the-counter drugs and medical sundries. Finally, 
expenditures for all other types of health care goods and services amounted to 
$44.5 billion in 1983 (Gibson, et al., 1984). 
Overall, public programs financed almost 40 percent of all health care 
services in 1983 (Gibson, et al., 1984). While it is difficult to determine just 
how much is "too much", there is a growing consensus in the U.S. that health 
care costs are too high. More recently, increased federal spending on a wide 
variety of domestic and military programs, coupled with low economic growth 
and tax cuts, have contributed to huge federal budget deficits. The deficit has 
grown from $79 billion in 1981 to a projected $220 billion by 1986 (Haglund & 
Dowling, 1984). The specter of ever-growing budget deficits, cost inflation, and 
the election of conservative political leaders on the national level in 1980 
resulted in a distinct modification in government's perception of its role in 
health care. The government moved from viewing health care as a social 
problem to health care as a budget deficit problem (Thurow, 1985). 
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lF ACTORS ASSOCIATED WITH HIGH HEAL m CARE COSTS 
Relatively high rates of growth in health care expenditures are not unique 
to the United States. Economy-wide inflation, growth in real income, 
demographic shifts, and rapid technological change, to name just a few, have 
been associated with rising health care costs in all western industrialized 
societies. However, many health care economists agree that a number of 
factors, unique to the U.S., explain the rapid increases in U.S. health care costs. 
These factors fall into two major categories: economy-wide factors and health 
care specific factors (Abel-Smith, 1970; Enthoven, 1980; Freedland &: 
Schendler, 1984; GAO, 1985; Meyer, 1983a). 
Economy-wide Factors 
Economy-wide factors include general price inflation and aggregate 
population growth. Economy-wide general inflation, which is caused by many 
factors, plays a major role in total health care expenditure increases. General 
inflation accounted for almost 58 percent of the health care expenditure growth 
with health care specific factors accounting for only about 35 percent of the 
increase between 1972 and 1982 (GAO, 198.5). In 1983, a full 44 percent of the 
increase in health expenditures was accounted for by general inflation alone 
(Crozier, 1984). In addition, while the health care system has influenced 
aggregate population growth through decreases in infant mortality and 
increased life expectancy, aggregate population growth accounted for less than 
8 percent of the expenditure increases between 1972 and 1982 (Gibson, et al., 
1984). Economy-wide factors cannot be controlled and are, to some degree, 
external to the health care sector. However, health care specific factors relate 
to forces within the medical market itself and, thus, may be amenable to 
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control. The next section examines the contribution of health-care specific 
factors to health care cost inflation. 
Health Care Specific Factors 
The major economic factors within the health care specific component 
include: (1) medical care price increases in excess of general price inflation, (2) 
the development and dissemination of new medical technology, (3) population 
aging, (4) market imperfections that prevent the competitive market from 
achieving efficient service delivery (including the wide-spread use of health 
insurance) and (.5) public financing of health care services. 
Medical Care Price Inflation. During the 19.50s, medical care price 
increases averaged only 4 percent annually but that was nearly twice the rate 
of consumer price increases as a whole. During the first half of the 1960s, 
consumer prices increased at an average rate of 1.3 percent per year while 
medical care prices increased 2 • .5 percent per year. From 196.5 to 1970, prices 
for goods and services in general rose at an average rate of 4.2 percent per year 
while medical care prices increased 6.1 percent (Crozier, 1984). Part of the 
reason for these large increases had to do with the implementation of various 
federally funded health care programs, including Medicare and Medicaid, which 
sharply increased the demand for health services. 
From 1974, when the Nixon Administration's Economic Stabilization 
Program price controls were lifted from the health care industry, through 1982, 
the medical care component of the consumer price index rose at an average 
annual rate of 10.2 percent versus 9.1 percent for the economy as a whole 
(Morris, 1984). However, both sets of prices reflected periods of rapid inflation 
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in the economy generally. Despite the fact that the utilization of health 
services has increased continuously, the major element associated with higher 
expenditures has been rising prices, both on an economy-wide basis and on a 
medical care specific basis (Evans, 1986). From 196.5 to 1983, three-fifths of 
the rise in personal health care expenditures was accounted for by price 
increases (Gibson, et al., 1984). 
New Medical Technology. The development and adoption of new medical 
technology have expanded the treatment of disease but also contributed to 
greater consumption of health care and to increased costs. While new 
technology often benefits patients and can increase hospital productivity, new 
technology usually becomes an additional service rather than a replacement for 
existing services. This can result in increased utilization and consequently 
increased costs. For example, a fairly recent innovation, coronary by-pass 
operations, costs approximately $10,000 (Sorkin, 1986). The spread of 
technology has also resulted in changes in the mix of services delivered and 
consumption of more health care per capita, and thereby has stimulated price 
inflation as consumers and providers use the most modern facilities and 
equipment available • 
. Growth in the Elderly Population. Another important factor is the shift in 
demographics. Although the rate of population growth as a whole has been 
fairly stable, the percentage of elderly in the population is increasing. The 
Census Bureau estimates that there were 27 million elderly, or 11.7 percent of 
the total population, in 1983 compared with 23 million (10.8%) in 1977 (Waldo & 
Lazenby, 198.5). This older group is expected to more than double by the year 
2030 when the baby boom cohort reaches 6.5. This is a 160 percent increase 
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versus a projected 41 percent increase for the population as a whole (Rice, 
1986). The aged are also living longer. While there were large inc;reases in the 
number of "recently aged"; that is, those people 65 to 69, the median age of the 
elderly population as a whole rose from 71.6 years in 1977 to 71.9 years in 1983, 
reflecting lower death rates for people over 85 years of age (Waldo & Lazenby, 
198.5). In fact, by 2030, those 85 and above are projected to increase to 14 
percent of the elderly population (Rice & Feldman, 1983). 
While each age group is healthier and living longer than its predecessors, 
one consequence of more older people is the need for more health care since 
older people require more hospital and nursing home care than do younger 
people. The elderly represent only about 12 percent of the current population; 
however, they account for over 30 percent .of all health care expenditures 
including 31 percent of hospital admissions and 41 percent of total days of care 
(Gornick, et al., 1985; Fiori et al., 1984). The elderly spend about two and one-
half times the amount on health care as do people under age 6.5 (Freedland & 
Schendler, 1983). In 1980, per capita expenditures for the under 6.5 population 
were $308 compared to $1,087 for those over 6.5 and the hospitalization rate for 
those over 65 was two and one-half times that of the under 6.5 age group 
(Sc:itovsky, 1984). 
The health problems faced by the elderly are also very different from those 
of younger persons. They often require more extensive and more expensive 
services. When hospitalized, the elderly utilize as much as five times more 
inpatient care services than do younger people (Ginzberg, 198.5). . Previous 
studies of acute care hospitalizations have found that high cost users of medical 
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care are more likely to be persons with chronic problems who are repeatedly 
admitted to the hospital than those with single, cost-intensive hospital stays 
(Scitovisky, 1984). As a consequence of more people living into old age, 
spending on the direct provision of health goods and services for the elderly has 
nearly tripled since 1977; rising from $43 billion to $120 billion in 1984. This 
growth in utilization is due not only to the increase in absolute numbers of the 
elderly (the growth rate for this age group is 2.3 percent annually), but also to 
an increase in the amount of per capita expenditures devoted to them. 
Spending per capita for the elderly rose from $1,785 in 1977 to almost $4,202 by 
1984, averaging a 13 percent annual growth rate (Waldo & Lazenby, 1985). 
Market Imperfections. Although a number of factors are identified as 
contributing to high health care costs, many economic theorists believe that 
one of the primary factors is the role of third-party payers in the health care 
marketplace (Evans, 1986; Koch, 1988; Renn, 1987). Standard economic theory 
suggests that in competitive markets, options for consumers increases and leads 
producers to minimize production costs and to maximize economic efficiency-
all in pursuit of profit. The result, at least in theory, is that individual self-
interest (utility maximization for consumers and profit maximization for 
producers) coincides with the maximization of social welfare. Application of 
this model to health care suggests that health services of a standard quality 
would be provided at the lowest cost to society. However, the necessary 
conditions for competition to function have not been met in the health care 
market and the ability of competition to optimize price, quantity, and quality 
may not hold (Weisbrod, 1983). 
First of all, unlike other goods or services for which the consumer pays the 
provider directly, health care payments often are handled by a financial agent-
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a third party. Thus, the patient does not, in most cases, purchase care directly 
but instead purchases access to the health care system by buying health 
insurance. It is this triangle of patient, physician, and insurance company 
paying for care that insulates the consumer from knowing the true cost of care, 
encourages over-consumption, and largely nullifies the traditional competitive 
forces of the market (Morris, 1984). For example, once hospitalization has 
occurred, the consumer with insurance will directly pay less than the full costs 
of the care. In such a situation, the consumer has the incentive for excess 
consumption and little incentive for cost containment (Renn, 1987). 
Moreover, the favorable tax treatment of health insurance premiums and 
out-of-pocket payments for health care have also contributed to costs (Renn, 
1987}. Under current law, employer contributions for health insurance policies 
(more than three-quarters of the premiums earned by insurance companies in 
1983) are excluded from employees' taxable income and from earnings subject 
to payroll taxes (Sorkin, 1986}. In addition, until 1983, up to $150 of an 
employee's share of health insurance premiums could be deducted directly from 
taxable income. The tax treatment of premiums alone cost the federal 
government $26 billion in foregone revenue in fiscal year 1983 (Congressional 
Budget Office, 1983). 
Certain changes in the current tax laws have confined the exemption, 
which is tax deductible, to only that part of health insurance premiums and 
other consumer medical expenses exceeding 5 percent of adjusted gross income. 
Still, the tax-exempt status of health insurance premiums encourages 
employees and does not discourage employers, to substitute more 
comprehensive insurance coverage (e.g., expanded coverage to include mental 
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health, eyeglasses, dental coverage) for higher money wages than they might 
purchase themselves with after-tax dollars (Renn, 1987; Sorkin, 1986). 
A second major distortion of the medical market is the consumer's lack of 
information. Unlike most other markets, the consumers of health care lack full 
information when making health care decisions, not only of their own medical 
care needs but of the value, quality, and effectiveness of services provided 
(Renn, 1987; Weisbrod, 1983; Greenberg, 1983). The standard economic model 
assumes that consumers are well informed or that they can learn needed 
information quickly and at a low cost. Further, the market model assumes that 
the consumer is able to judge the effect of a particular purchase; "that is, able 
to compare his/her utility level with and without the specific purchase" 
(Weisbrod, 1983, p. 62). It is this judgment that determines the consumer's 
willingness to pay for the service/product. 
While this may be true for many purchases, it is not true for medical care. 
The uncertainity inherent in many medical decisions and the complex nature of 
treatment often result in a limited ability on the part of consumers to make 
informed decisions regarding the appropriate delivery of medical care. In the 
medic;al market, physicians act as purchasing agents for consumers and are 
delegated virtually full decision-making authority for medical decisions. The 
use of an agent, however, carrries with it the risk that the agent may have a 
conflict of interest - that is, self-interest over the interest of the patient. 
The current system places physicians in a position of dual and conflicting 
responsibility: acting as the agent for ill-informed patients and doing what they 
would do if they possessed sufficient medical knowledge while at the same time 
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acting as their own agent - given the low private cost of medical care 
sometimes acting in a privately rational {profit-making) but socially inefficient 
(health care costs) manner (Weisbrod, 1983). The doctor-patient relationship 
can be described as a simple "social contract between a physician and 
patient ••• for the care of the patient (by the physician) in exchange for a fee" 
(Ebert, 1987, p. 164). It can also be extremely complex as when the relationship 
is placed within the medical world, where knowledge is specialized and the 
patient must depend upon the medical expertise of the physician for life and 
death matters. Because of this unique relationship between provider and 
patient, it is claimed that physicians have been able to create their own demand 
since consumer leverage is extremely limited (Brown, 1986; Langwell, 1982; 
Starr, 1982). 
Cost-based insurance plans constitute a third factor distorting the medical 
market. While insurance plans, especially the Blue Cross plans, reduced the 
hospital's financial risk and allowed participating hospitals to gain dominance in 
their communities, they also promoted over-utilization of expensive services by 
providers and patients since they guaranteed reimbursement. Private insurers 
sought to overcome the tendency toward over-utilization by levying copayments 
and deductibles on beneficiaries, and made patients liable for the financial risk 
that exceeded the indemnity benefit. However, rather than establishing a fixed 
fee schedule in which the purchaser (the insurance company) would have had 
control of costs, insurance companies reimbursed doctors and hospitals 
according to their customary fees or, lacking a community standard, reasonable 
costs. The guiding principle behind this form of payment in the physician-
established fee-for-service medical market has been the acceptance of the 
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usual and customary fees as the standard of payment. This acceptance extends 
throughout the system to all payers, acceptance by patients, by industry, and 
later, by the federal government (Ebert, 1987). 
On the one hand, third-party, retrospective reimbursement provides little 
incentive for consumers to be cost conscious and seek out efficient providers 
since they do not pay directly for their care. On the other hand, reimbursement 
has encouraged providers to deliver all possible care since the more services 
delivered, the greater the payment. Similar! y, the structure of insurance 
benefits has tended to encourage the use of inpatient rather than outpatient 
facilities as well as the overuse of tests and procedures, and encouraged more 
doctors to enter high-return specialties like surgery (Starr, 1982). Thus, while 
insurance provides easy access to hospitals and physicians and covers treatment 
of major illnesses and disabilities, it distances the consumer from the costs of 
care and reimburses on a basis that encourages consumption without regard to 
cost or benefit. The financial incentives embedded in the cost-based 
reimbursement structure of traditional insurance appears to enhance access and 
encourage effective medical care, but not necessarily efficiently or at the 
lowest cost. In this way, cost-based reimbursement by third-party payers has 
increased service intensity, utilization, and may have even increased provider 
charges (Starr, 1982). Under such a system, neither the consumer nor the 
provider need make any effort to keep costs down (Morris, 1984). 
However, many analysts believe it has been the combination of 
retrospective reimbursement and third-party payment~ specifically the 
government funded health insurance programs of Medicare and Medicaid, that 
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are the root cause of health care cost inflation (e.g., Ebert, 1987; Brown, 1985; 
Lave, 1984; Renn, 1987). As Weisbrod (1983) points out: 
With 90 percent or more of the U.S. population having 
some form of health insurance, the price to the patient 
of additional medical care is often zero, even though the 
social cost is far higher. Moreover, because employer-
financed health insurance is not subject to income 
taxation, the purchase of health insurance is subsidized. 
Finally, the health care coverage under governmental 
Medicare and Medicaid programs acts further to drive a 
wedge between the real cost of medical care and the 
price to the consumer. Whenever consumers of any good 
confront a price that is below social cost, excessive 
consumption is likely (p. 65). 
Any examination of the effect of federal health programs on health care 
costs must include an understanding of the "character and evolution11 of the 
program; that is, the trade-offs made in the development and passage of the 
legislation (Brown, 1985, p. 580). To secure passage of Medicare and Medicaid, 
supporters conceded control of the programs to providers through cost-based 
reimbursement and to fiscal intermediaries by delegating major tasks of 
oversight and review (Brown, 1985). This created a payment structure that 
encouraged beneficiaries and providers to over-utilize services and that offered 
no reward for cost-effective patient management (Feigenbaum, 1987). Three 
and a half years after Medicare and Medicaid began operating, a study by the 
Senate Finance Committee found the programs already "in serious financial 
trouble ••• and adversely affecting health care costs and financing for the general 
population" (Morris, 1984). It became clear that the total cost of providing 
Medicare and, to a lesser extent, Medicaid services had been underestimated. 
For example, Medicare costs increased from approximately $1 billion in 1966 to 
$62.9 billion in 1984, primarily reflecting greater utilization of hospitals by the 
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aged (Gornick, et al., 198.5; Sorkin, 1986). What was originally seen as an easily 
managed set of programs turned into a nightmare of escalating costs (Cohen, 
198.5). How this came about and the impact on health care costs of the 
structure of the reimbursement process of the programs, particularly Medicare, 
is delineated in the next section. 
MEDICARE, MEDICAID, AND HEALTH CARE COST INFLATION 
Although national health insurance, a major agenda item for Progressives 
since the early 1900s, had been contemplated in the development of the Social 
Security Act of 193.5, vociferous opposition by the AMA, which opposed any 
form of publicly-funded health insurance as "socialized medicine," and 
conservatives in Congress, who feared the monumental administrative and 
management problems involved in such a plan, forced the removal of the health 
provision before it reached Congress (Cohen, 198.5; Koch, 1988; Morris, 1984; 
Starr, 1982). Called the 11orphan of the New Deal," Truman made national 
health insurance a major component of his "Fair Deal" by actively supporting 
the Wagner, Murray, Dingell National Health Insurance Bill in 194.5 {Beyer &: 
Callahan, 198.5). However, government-sponsored health insurance remained 
blocked in Congress as a result of bitter opposition on the par·t of organized 
medicine and conservative politicians. By 1949, the movement for national 
health insurance was "moribund11 {Bayer&: Callahan, 198.5; Koch, 1988). 
Frustrated by the failure to achieve their goal of universal medical 
insurance coverage, advocates for the elderly sought a strategy to capture 
broad public support and overcome Congressional resistance. "On June 2.5, 
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1951, Oscar Ewing, Federal Security Administrator, announced a hospitalization 
coverage plan for Social Security pensioners and the widows and c;:hildren of 
pensioners. Thus began a fourteen year struggle to pass the Medic;:are hospital 
insurance legislation (Bayer & Callahan, 1985). For the most part, the debate 
over Medicare centered less on its programmatic;: details than on whether the 
c;:irc;:umstanc;:es of the aged warranted a governmental or private sector response 
(Marmor, 1986). These efforts were seen at the outset as the first step toward 
a comprehensive and universal national health insurance program (Cohen, 1985). 
The use of the elderly as a class to provide federal health insurance was a 
"unique" approach to universal health coverage (Bayer & Callahan, 1985). 
Unlike the governments of Europe, which had adopted universal coverage before 
the turn of the century and who had focused on low-income workers initially but 
later expanded coverage to all groups, the proposed amendments focused on the 
elderly as a group in order to "grease the skids" for a more comprehensive form 
of national health insurance in the future (Cohen, 1985). The elderly were seen 
as a desirable vehicle for presenting a national health insurance program since 
they were more likely to be poor but their poverty was "undeserved" (Bayer & 
Callahan, 1985, p. 537). Moreover, the private insurance system, just 
expanding from the employed to the entire middle class, did not protect the 
elderly and their families were often burdened by their medical expenses. 
Furthermore, the attachment of a health insurance component to the popular 
Social Security program, allowed advocates to tap into a program with almost 
universal appeal. And, finally, the elderly themselves were lobbying for an age-
based social insurance program rather than a means-tested welfare approach 
(Bayer & Callahan, 1985; Brown, 1985; Cohen, 1985; Koch, 1988). 
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Opposition from the AMA stalled the Medicare legislation until the 
Kennedy and Johnson Administrations (Cohen, 1985). A national study 
conducted in the early 1960s showed that about three-fourths of all adults under 
age 65 had hospital insurance but only 56 percent of those over 65 did. Yet the 
aged were shown to be the most at risk for hospitalization, to have the highest 
rates of illness and to have the lowest average income (Gornick, et al., 1985). 
Opinion polls from 1960 to 1965 showed dramatic support for Medicare-type 
proposals. At the same time, there were a number of ideological and political 
issues surrounding the Medicare and Medicaid legislation that threatened its 
passage. 
There was heated debate over the inclusion of the beneficiary deductibles 
and co-insurance provisions. Most Congressional members wanted a deductible 
on the hospital insurance portion of Medicare as a means of controlling over-
utilization, considered a major probability in the debates over the legislation 
(Cohen, 1985; Gornick et al., 1985). Another big issue concerned who should 
administer the hospital insurance program. Administration officials felt the 
Social Security Administration could do a more effective, efficient, and 
responsible job than the many diverse private insurance plans but political 
leaders worried whether the program could be satisfactorily administered. 
These ideological and politial issues were so hotly contested that they 
"precluded consideration of issues such as reimbursement alternatives and 
efficiency options" (Cohen, 1985, p. 8). 
The decisive victory of Lyndon Johnson in 1964 pushed the Johnson agenda, 
induding Medicare and Medicaid, to the forefront in Congress. Sensing a 
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change in the political climate, the AMA and conservative legislators made 
counter proposals to the Medicare program. The proposals had one element in 
common, they were broader than hospital care and provided for physician's 
services (Cohen, 1985). By 1965, public hearings were being held on the 
programs and compromises had been worked out concerning the hospital 
insurance deductible and who would administer the program. In addition, 
Medicare and Medicaid included statutes covering physician and other services. 
Cognizant of the opposition to the original proposals by the AMA and 
conservative legislators, Congressional leaders inserted language into the 
Medicare law that expanded coverage to include physicians but ensured that the 
program in no way altered "the traditional practice of medicine" (Ebert, 1987, 
p.170). 
Consequently, Medicare and Medicaid utilizes an "indirect pattern of 
finance and delivery", in whic;h the federal government contracts with 
independent providers to act as the fiscal intermediaries who administer the 
program (Kocll, 1988). The tasks of paying and auditing hospitals and physicians 
were delegated to Blue Cross and commercial insurers as the fiscal 
intermediaries. To get providers to enroll in the program, the reimbursement 
system adopted to pay for Medicare and Medicaid services was borrowed from 
the system established by Blue Cross. It offered retrospective, cost-based 
payment and virtual 'first-dollar' coverage beyond the first day of care for a 
fixed number of hospital days and paid physicians their "reasonable," 
"customary," and "prevailing" fees (Brown, 1988b; Cohen, 1985; Koch, 1988; 
Renn, 1987). The legislation established a reimbursement rate of 80 percent of 
the "reasonable" and "customary" charges for covered services with the 
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beneficiary making up the difference between what Medicare paid and what a 
physician might charge, unless the physician agreed to accept "assignment" 
(Sorkin, 1986). 
Furthermore, Section 1801 of the Medicare law provided that "Nothing in 
this title shall authorize any Federal officer or employee to exercise any 
supervision or control over the practice of medicine or the manner in which 
medical services are provided ••• " (Cohen, 1985, p. 8). This section was included 
in the legislation to offset the criticism, made by the medical profession and 
conservative opponents of the bill, that Medicare/Medicaid would give the 
government the right to interfere in the medical diagnosis and treatment of the 
individual. The bill was supported by the medical profession since it left 
control of service delivery decisions in the hands of physicians and kept the 
government at arms length from any cost-control potential. 
Cost-based Reimbursement. The principle of "reasonable cost" for in-
patient hospital services was "never seriously debated ••• opposed ••• or criticized" 
during the debates over the program. The legislation prescribed that the 
"principles generally applied by national organizations or established 
prepayment organizations" would be accepted by the Congress and the providers 
(Cohen, 1985, p. 8). An author of the Medicare/Medicaid legislation stated that 
retrospective, cost-based reimbursement was accepted not only because no 
other alternative was proposed but also because conventional practice at the 
time accepted reasonable cost as a "reasonable principle" (Cohen, 1985, p. 8). 
Supporters argued that payment of comparable reasonable costs in the 
Medicare/Medicaid programs would assist in reducing barriers to the health 
care system for economically disadvantaged people throughout the nation and 
54 
promote equality in their medical treatment. Congress accepted "reasonable 
costs" and amended the Social Security Act (PL 89-97) on July 30, 1965 to 
establish the national health insurance programs for the aged, known as 
Medicare (Title XVlli) and a federal-state insurance plan for the poor known as 
Medicaid (Title XIX). The legislation went into effect on July 1, 1966 (Cohen, 
1985). 
Merlic:are's f'immcial Problemso By almost every measure, the introduction 
of Medicare and Medicaid has had a dramatic impact on the availability and 
accessibility of health care to the poor and elderly. At their peak, the 
programs resulted in over 97 percent of all elderly and 22.9 million poor people 
in the U.S. being covered by health insurance (Gornick, et al., 1985). The 
number of aged enrollees increased from 19.1 million in 1966 to 26.8 million by 
1983 (Congressional Quarterly, 1984). In addition, the volume of health care 
services nearly doubled with the addition Medicare and Medicaid (Renn, 1987). 
Although there had been a general upward trend in hospital use by the elderly, 
beginning in 1950, the number of hospital stays and the average length of stay 
for the aged increased 48 percent during Medicare's first year alone (Gornick et 
al., 1985). Between 1966 and 1982, hospital reimbursements, which represent 
about 95 percent of Part A expenditures and 71 percent of total Medicare 
expenditures, increased at an annual rate of about 20 percent (Gornick, et al., 
1985). 
Table n and Table III present data on total reimbursements and 
reimbursements for the Hospital Insurance (Part A) program and for the 
Supplementary Medical Insurance Program (Part B) for the period 1966 to 1984. 
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Total Medicare payments grew from $4-.6 billion in 1967 to $62.9 billion in 1984-. 
Medical costs rose overall 192 percent between 1970 and 1983 compared to a 
157 percent rise in the Consumer Price Index (CPI) (Wehr, 1984-). From the 
program's inception, Part A expenditures have been substantially greater than 
Part B, although Part B outlays have been a growing proportion of total medical 
expenditures. In 1967, Part A represented 74 percent of benefit payments and 
Part B 26 percent; by 1984, Part A had declined to 69 percent and Part B 
expenditures had grown to 31 percent (Gornick, et al., 1985). 
TABLED 
MEDICARE BENEFIT PAYMENTS AND ANNUAL PERCENT CHANGE: 
1966-1981g. 
Supplementary ~nnual percent 
Hospital medical change 
Year Total insurance insurance for total 
Amount in billions 
1966 $1.0 S0.9 S0.1 
1967 4.6 3.4 1.2 346.5 
1966 5.7 4.2 1.5 252 
1969 6.6 4.7 1.9 15.9 
1970 7.1 5.1 2.0 7.5 
1971 7.9 5.6 2.1 10.8 
1972 8.6 6.3 2.3 9:9 
1973 9.6 "7.1 2.5 10.9 
1974 12.4 9.1 3.3 29.6 
1975 15.6 11.3 4.3 25.5 
1976 18.4 13.3 5.1 18.2 
1977 21.8 15.7 6.0 18.2 
1978 24.9 17.7 7.3 14.5 
1979 29.3 20.6 8.7 17.6 
1980 35.7 25.1 10.6 21.7 
1961 43.5 30.3 13.1 21.7 
1982 51.1 35.6 15.5 17.6 
1963 57.4 39.3 18.1 12.4 
1984 62.9 43.3 19.7 9.5 
Percent 
ACRG• 16.6 16.1 17.9 
ACRRG• 9.1 8.6 10.3 
SOURCE: Health Care Rnancing Adm!nlstraUon, OffiCe of the Al:tullly. 1985 Annual Report oflho Boarcl of Trustees of the Federal H05pitallnsurance 
. and Supplementary Medicallrnsurance Trust Funds. 
1Annulll c:cmpound rate of grewlh 1967-114. 
· 2Annual c:cmpoulid real ;ate of growth 1967-84, adjusted for char.ges In Consumer Prlce Index 19S7-84. 
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TABLEm 
DISTRmUTION OF MEDICARE JHOSPIT AL INSURANCE AND SUPPLEMENTARY 
MEDICAL INSURANCE REIMBURSEMENT FOR AGED AND DISABLED 
BENEFICIARIES BY TYPE OF SERVICE, 1967 and 1983 
Annual 
Type 1967 1983 
compOund 
rate of 
of Amount Amount growth 
service in millions Percent In millions Percent in percent 
Total $4,239 100.0 $53,438 100.0 17.2 
Inpatient hospital 2,659 62.7 34,519 64.6 17.4 
Physicians and 
13,661 25.6 16.3 related services 1,224 28.9 
Skilled nursing 
0.8 facility 274 6.5 428 2.8 
.Home .health agency 43 1.0 1,388 2.6 24.1 
Outpatoent 38 0.9 3,442 6.4 32.5 
NOTE: F".gures do not Include flllal :;ettlamonra. 
SOURCES: (Social Security Admlnistoation, 1971); Health Care Financing Administration, Bureau of Oal4 Mcnagemant and Strategy: Data from tha 
MO<I'ICI!rl!l Stali;tical System. 
The dramatic increase in utilization and costs is attributed to several 
factors: a growth in the eligible categories of beneficiaries (e.g., the expansion 
of entitlement to previously uncovered populations), an expansion of the 
numbers of previously entitled over-6.5 population, and to some increase in 
utilization. Nevertheless, most of the increase has been attributed to increases 
in the unit-cost of care; namely, the cost of a hospital day {Gornick, et al., 
198.5; Congressional Quarterly, 1984). 
Although policy-makers believed that retrospective, cost-based 
reimbursement was necessary to encourage providers to participate in the 
program, critics of the program contend that Medicare has contributed to 
healthcare cost inflation in three ways. One, Medicare's indulgent "entitlement 
ethic," they claim, has triggered a financial <:risis and encouraged the elderly 
to consume larger and larger proportions of the welfare pie; two, Medicare's 
reimbursement system incentives encouraged over-consumption and overuse; 
and three, the program over-emphasized the most expensive form of care, 
57 
acute inpatient hospital care while neglecting prevention and long-term care 
(Brown, 1985). As the 20th anniversary of the programs approached, 
policymakers began to question how well the programs provide access to care 
for the most needy, the equitable distribution of services, the appropriateness 
of the covered services, and the effectiveness and efficiency of the system in 
which the services are delivered and financed (Gornick, et al., 1985). 
Indeed, Medicare is in financial trouble. According to the Congressional 
Budget Office (CBO), the hospital in-surance trust fund (Part A of Medicare), 
which is financed by payroll taxes, will be bankrupt before the end of the 
decade. Given the hist(':>dral trends, the year-end balances of Part A are 
projected to decline af 987 and will total from $200 to $300 billion by 1995 
(Demkovich, 19&3b; Ginsberg &: Moon, 1984). In addition, outlays under the 
Supplementary Medical Insurance Fund (SMI), which are paid out of general 
revenues and premiums levied on beneficiaries, are projected to inc-rease by one 
percent per year through 1988. General revenue contributions to the SMI Fund 
would have to rise to $31.9 billion by 1988, compared to $14.2 billion in 19&3, 
just to pay for this increased use (Ginsberg &: Moon, 1984; Demkovich, 1983b). 
With the number of beneficiaries rising, the volume of services per beneficiary 
increasing, and the units of costs for services going up, it is clear that the 
conflict between the medical needs of the aged population and a growing 
federal deficit is destined to be one of the nation's most pressing policy 
dilemmas (Etheridge, 1984 ). 
CONCLUSION 
Health care was a shared function of private providers, local government 
and charitable institutions before the turn of the century. By the 1930s, 
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advances in medical science and technology and the monopoly on medical 
practice attained by the medical profession made health care a valuable 
commodity. The American medical establishment had made enormous strides in 
discovering and applying effective diagnostic and treatment procedures and, as 
a result 9 physicians attained unprecedented autonomy and power. Federal 
intervention in health care; such as federal aid for hospital construction, liberal 
tax laws regarding insurance coverage, and support of educating health 
professionals, did not change the status quo constructed by the medical 
profession. Health insurance, with its potential to alter the power relationships 
of physicians and hospitals to society, left the health care market and its 
payment mechanisms ir , The result has been spiraling health care costs. A 
number of factors con. •Jte to the rise in costs, such as general inflation, 
medical care cost increases, increases in utilization, aging of the population). 
However, analysts believe that it has been the combination of federal health 
care programs (Medicare and Medicaid) and retrospective, cost-based 
reimbursement by third-parties that has contributed most to health care cost 
inflation. The next chapter examines the response of the federal government to 
health care costs and poses the research question addressed in this dissertation. 
CHAPTERB 
THE ERA OF COST-CONTAINMENT IN FEDERAL HEALTH POUCY 
The principal problem in health care today is the need 
for a workable mechanism to achieve a proper balance 
between acceptable cost and an ensured level of quality. 
At the core of the trade-off between cost and quality 
faced by consumers, employers, and state and federal 
governments is the question of how to pay the providers 
of health care enough to get them to supply services, but 
to do so in a way that is affordable for those paying the 
bill (Meyer, 1983, p. 3). 
The American hea :are system is the nation's second largest industry, 
employing 7.2 million ar,_ .vith a payroll of $360 billion in 1984 (Gibson, et al., 
1984). Consuming 10.7% of GNP ($42.5 billion in 198.5), it ranks third behind 
defense and education, in terms of general public expenditures (Koch, 19&8). 
Prior to the Depression, the U.S. health care system was a shared function of 
the voluntary sector, responsible for establishing and operating hospitals, and 
state and local governments, responsible for educating and training health care 
personnel, public health, and medical care for the poor. Significant social 
legislation enacted during the Depression, such as unemployment insurance and 
federal aid for health care for mothers and children, altered this historical 
situation. Federal initiatives after World War II expanded the number of 
hospital beds and health care personnel, encouraged the spread of health 
insurance to the middle class, and funded programs that provided greater access 
to health care by disenfranchised groups; specifically the poor and elderly. 
However, while these activities broadened access to health care, they also 
fueled inflation in health care costs. This chapter examines the federal 
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government's retreat from the previous expansionary phase of national health 
care policy (1945-1970) and the subsequent emphasis on regulation and market-
based competition for health care cost control. Specifically, this chapter 
examines the most revolutionary change in health care policy since the 
enactment of the Medicare and Medicaid programs; that is, on Medicare's 
Prospective Payment System (PPS). 
REGULATION AND COMPETITION IN HEALTH CARE COST CONTROL 
The high and persistently climbing cost of health care, especially hospital 
care during the 1970s, made the search for ways to slow this trend a key 
national policy issue. Iz iition, the growing emphasis on cost containment by 
the government, as well as by third-party payers, has sparked a national debate 
regarding the direction of health care and forced providers and insurers to 
reconfigure their operations in an attempt to protect their patient bases and 
marketshares (Iglehart, 19&5). Two national policy approaches to the cost issue 
can be identified: regulating providers and introducing competition into the 
medical marketplace. These national policy actions have reshaped the 
American health care system in ways that greatly diverge from the pattern 
developed over the last 100 years. 
Regulation Strategies 
It was clear by the 1970s that the massive post-war infusion of federal 
funds into the health care system not only failed to produce an adequate supply 
or distribution of health resources, but also contriruted to cost increases. As 
Judith Lave (1984) pointed out: 
Retrospective cost-based third-party reimbursement, in 
a world with little cost-sharing for patients and an open-
ended entitlement, is now considered to have been the 
major factor contributing to the cost explosion (p. 67). 
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Pressure for national regulatory reform of retrospective reimbursement 
increased during the 1970s as public policy sought ways of changing the 
incentives within the health care system (Brown, 1986). Chief among the policy 
initiatives during the seventies included a wage and price freeze; controls on 
Medicare reimbursement; peer review organizations, consumer involvement in 
health planning and an attempt by the Carter Administration to control hospital 
costs nation-wide. 
Economic Stabilization Act. Most cost-containment proposals have focused 
on controlling increases in costs for physician and hospital care. The Economic 
Stabilization Act of 1971 authorized President Nixon to freeze wages and 
prices. Although appli· . the whole economy for only 90 days, controls were 
applied to the health care sector for over three years, from 1971 through 1974 
(Morris, 1984). The program limited doctors' fees to an annual increase of 2.5 
percent and hospital charges to 6 percent, or about half the inflation rate in 
medical care preceding the freeze (Starr, 1982). Health care prices began to 
rise, however, when controls were lifted. 
The 1972 Social Security Amendments. A second attempt to control costs 
was made with the Social Security Amendments of 1972 (PL 92-603). The 
Amendments enacted important changes in the Social Security Act and 
represented the first attempt to reduce program costs. Most of the Act's 
amendments dealt with controlling costs, including limitations on payments for 
capital expenditures, increased cost-sharing for Medicare beneficiaries, 
encouragement of Health Maintanence Organization (HMO) demonstration 
projects and Part B (Medicare physician services program) deductible increases. 
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While the amendments expanded coverage to the disabled and those with renal 
failure, the bill also included two significant cost-containment provisions. 
Section 222 directed the Secretary of the then Department of Health, 
Education and Welfare (DHEW) to establish demonstration projects to 
determine the advantages and disadvantages of utilizing a prospective payment 
system in which fixed payment rates determined in advance of the provision of 
care for Medicare hospital reimbursement would be used and to grant waivers 
from the Medicare program to states wanting to experiment with prospective 
reimbursement prior to a national system implementation. Several states, 
including Maryland and Washington, requested such waivers. Section 223 set 
limits, for the first timf :1 the 'reasonable' cost to be paid under the Medicare 
program (Gornick, et aL, . 98.5; Spiegel & Kavaler, 1986). The rate was capped 
at 112 percent of the average for similar institutions (Demkovich, 1981). 
PSROs. With the 1972 Amendments, Congress established 190 Professional 
Standard Review Organizations {PSROs), made up of groups of physicians who 
were to independently review Medicare utilization, to guard against 
unnecessary hospitalizations and procedures that would add to the cost of the 
Medicare program. AMA opposition modified much of the original legislation 
{for example, community norms rather than national norms became the basis of 
the assessments) and weakened the authority of the PSROs. In the final 
legislation, PSROs were to review: 1) whether Medicare services were 
medically necessary; 2) whether admissions and lengths of stay were 
appropriate; 3) whether care met professionally rec~gnized standards; and 4) 
whether services should be delivered in an inpatient or less expensive outpatient 
setting {Senate Finance Committee, 1986). Over the years, the program fell 
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into disfavor as costs continued to rise faster than the cost of living. Congress 
particularly grew impatient with the program after the Congressional Budget 
Office (CBO) reported that the program was costing about as much as it was 
saving and was causing hospitals to make up lost Medicare dollars by charging 
privately insured patient's more (i.e., cost shifting) (Demkovich, 1983b; Spiegel 
& Kavaler, 1986). From 1972 through 1981, a gradual tightening of rules 
reduced Medicare's growth somewhat but cost containment hopes in Medicare 
were waiting for the development of legislation that would reform the payment 
system (Demkovich, 1981; 1982). 
Health Planning. Another regulatory approach to the cost problem involved 
consumer participation health services development. Congress passed the 
Health Planning and Resources Development Act (PL 93-641) in 1974. The bill 
authorized spending $1 billion over three years to establish a national network 
of some 200 local Health Systems Agencies (HSAs), run by boards with 
consumer majorities representative of their areas and fifty State Health 
Planning and Development Agencies (SHPDAs). The goal was to give states, 
local communities and consumers a say in planning for health resources as a 
way to limit duplication of facilities and services and containing costs. The 
centerpiece of the legislation was the Certificate of Need (CON) provision 
requiring health care institutions (hospitals, nursing homes) to get prior state 
approval for capital expenditures and acquisition of major medical equipment 
(Havighurst, 1986). 
The original proposals for health planning placed responsibility in local, 
independent, consumer controlled boards accountable only to the federal 
government. The boards were to review proposals for new projects, focus on 
64 
the development of three year health plans, and close down hospitals and 
nursing home beds they decided were unnecessary. HSAs were not given 
authority to implement their decisions in the final legislation however. Instead, 
they had to send their recommendations to the State Health Planning and 
Development Agencies for final decisions. The state agencies were then free to 
follow the suggestions or reverse them. State agencies rarely refused 
certificate of need applications and, when they did, the hospitals mounted legal 
challenges of their authority that eventually led to out of court settlements in 
favor of the hospitals. Thus, HSAs had review responsibility but no authority. 
The whole effort wa<> doomed to failure due to the fact that certificate of 
need laws, like PSRO l;; were based on the assumption that the cost problem 
was one of spending on facilities and services with marginal returns versus 
perverse incentives within the payment systems. Additionally, Congress's 
refusal to give the agencies any control over physicians' office practices, the 
allocation of health care capital or the reimbursement system that determined 
the flow of revenues hampered the HSA's efforts to control duplication of 
services and costs (Havighurst, 1986). 
The Carter Hospital Bill. Regulatory strategies for cost containment 
culminated in 1977. The Carter Administration, recognizing the limits of the 
Nixon Administration's decentralized HMO approach, proposed new and far-
reaching legislation that would impose a fixed limit on the annual growth of 
hospital costs (the over9-ll rate of hospital cost inflation plus one percent) 
(Morris, 1984). The Carter proposal contained an important tenet: controls on 
costs should not adversely affect quality and quantity of care making equity for 
beneficiaries a dominant goal in Carter's plan (Morris, 1984). The formula-
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based Carter proposal differed significantly from previous cost-containment 
efforts that had relied on public determination of the appropriateness of capital 
spending, as in the health planning certificate of need legislation, or of 
treatment costs, as in cost-based reimbursement founded in "reasonable 
charges" (Morris, 1984). The uniqueness of the Carter bill lay in the arbitrary 
nature of the proposed constraint; i.e., across the board controls on hospital 
costs and thus, the hospital's bottom line. Effective political and special 
interest group opposition defeated the bill in 1979. 
With the election of Ronald Reagan in 1980, the health care cost debate 
shifted to new ground. The defeat of the Carter hospital cost containment bill 
in 1979 put an end to f( al efforts to solve cost problems system-wide. The 
federal government now concentrated on controlling costs in its own health 
programs, specifically Medicare and Medicaid. The major reforms of this 
period were the introduction of competition in the medical market through the 
encouragement of Health Maintenance Organizations, stricter enforcement of 
the anti-trust laws, tax-based incentives for health insurance coverage, and the 
Prospective Payment System (PPS) of Medicare. 
Competition Strategies 
The emergence of competition strategies in health care can be traced back 
to the early 1970s with the passage of the HMO legislation and antitrust 
decisions that gradually changed the American health care system (Brown, 
1986; Ha vighur st, 1986). A1 though there had always been competition in health 
care, such as competition among physicians for patients, it never conformed to 
the economic market ideal nor was it based on price (Sapolsky, 1986; 
Havighurst, 1986; Starr, 1982). 
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While competition-based health care proposals differ in detail, they also 
share several common elements including: (1) the requirement that employers 
offer, and equally contribute to, multiple 'choice of plan' insurance options as a 
means of providing cost-conscious choices for consumers and prudent buyer 
concepts for bill payers, including HMO options; (2) placement of a cap on the 
dollar value of employer contributions to employee health insurance plans that 
are excluded from the taxable income of the employee; (3) the design of health 
insurance plans that provide for cost sharing, in the form of co-payments and 
deductibles, by the insured; and (4) the development of Medicare voucher 
systems under which elderly and disabled persons would receive a fixed value 
voucher to purchase a q: 'fied health insurance plan (Brown, 1986; Demkovich, 
1982; Greenberg, 1983; :<och, 1988; Lee & Benjamin, 1987; Meyer, 1983b; 
Shapiro, 1983; Starr, 1982). 
Competition-based cost containment strategies have always intended to 
create a more efficient health care market to reduce costs (Greenberg, 1983). 
In the view of competition advocates, regulatory strategies overlook the 
fundamental forces driving spending in health care: that is, open-ended federal 
tax subsidies supporting the purchase of increasingly comprehensive insurance; 
retrospective cost-based reimbursement systems that reward inefficiency; and 
regulation iself, which protects profligate providers and impedes innovation. In 
contrast, greater reliance on market-oriented incentives would encourage 
health care providers to deliver services of acceptable quality at a lower cost 
and encourage consumers to select more efficient providers (Meyer, 1983b). 
The common denominator of these competition strategies is that insurer-
based competition; that is, competition among third-party payers, alternative 
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delivery systems, preferred provider groups (PPOs) and health maintenance 
organizations (HMOs), is the most viable form of comP.etition in healt:h care 
(Greenberg, 1983). Consequently, competition proposals focus on strengthing 
consumer cost-consciousness, eliminating regulation, and enforcing antitrust 
laws (Havighurst, 1983a). Federally-sponsored competition initiatives of the 
early 1970s focused on the development of HMOs. 
HMOs- The New Health Strategy. Partly in response to a national health 
insurance bill to be introduced by Senator Edward Kennedy and partly in 
response to increased federal expenditures in health care, President Nixon 
announced "a new national health strategy" in February, 1971, in which health 
maintenance organizat (HMOs) were the major innovations proposed for 
medical care. The key feature of an HMO, or prepaid health plan, is the 
combination of insurance and health care delivery in one organization. HMOs 
would give a fairly comprehensive range of health care services in return for a 
fixed annual or monthly payment that was to be independent of the enrollee's 
use of services. Due to this assumption of financial risk, HMOs are 
theoretically motivated to discourage the inappropriate use of services and 
encourage alternatives to costly hospitalization, such as primary and home 
health care and wellness or prevention services. HMOs provided the Nixon 
Administration with a policy option that "reduced no one's benefits, took no 
steps toward national health insurance and was non-regulatory" (Brown, 1986, p. 
575). 
In 1970 there were some 100 HMOs, enrolling about 2 percent of the 
population. The Administration's goal was to help create 1,700 HMOs by 1976, 
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enrolling 40 million people. By 1980, it was hoped that 90 percent of the 
population would have HMOs available to them (Brown, 1986). By 1973, Nixon's 
Health Maintenance Organization Act was passed. It established financial 
assistance to promote federally qualified HMO development. Although HMOs 
had been around for 50 years, public acceptance of them had been slow due to 
physician reluctance to participate and the public perception of substandard 
quality of care. The HMO Act attempted to enhance HMO acceptability by 
establishing mechanisms for certifying federally qualified HMOs. Between 1973 
and 1983, the federal government pumped $14.5 million into grants and $219 
million in loans for HMO development. The private sector invested $348 million. 
Even with this infusion :unds, public acceptance has remained slow. By 1980, 
some 23.5 HMOs served c.iiy 5 to 6 percent of the total population. 
HMOs have grown slowly in the face of immense structural and political 
barriers within the health industry, and until recently, have been a small, 
geographically localized phenomenon (Evans, 1986). While federal subsidies to 
HMOs represented government sponsored expansion of consumer choice, 
pressure from the medical profession kept many of the existing barriers to HMO 
competition, such as professional norms as the "standard of practice", in the 
1973 legislation. HMOs were heavily regulated as a condition of government 
support and were therefore handicapped when competing with traditional 
insurers and providers. Nevertheless, HMOs have been able to demonstrate an 
ability to contain costs (Havighurst, 1986). Since 1980, however, HMO growth 
has been occurring at more than 20 percent per year. By 1986 some .500 HMOs 
served 1.5 million people, or about 8 percent of the population, with 
approximately 87.5,000 elderly in Medicare-sponsored HMOs (Brown, 1986; 
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Cohodes, 1987; Renn, 1987; Spiegel & Kavaler, 1986). A New York Times 
business and health column painted a rosy future for HMOs, noting that HMO 
growth "displays vigor" (Friedman, 198.5). 
Enforcement of the Sherman Anti-trust Ad:. The success of the 
competition strategies advocated by competition advocates depended upon the 
application of antitrust laws in order to inhibit the medical professions' long 
established restraints of trade. Thus, along with the rise in interest in 
competition in health care was an interest in broadening the definition of 
antitrust laws, since "only when the antitrust laws began to be applied to 
provider conduct" did competition become a realistic policy option in health 
care (Havighurst, 1983b 29.5). 
For the first eighty-five years after the enactment of the Sherman Anti-
Trust Act of 1890 there was little application of antitrust principles to the 
medical profession (Havighurst, 1983b; Kopit, 1983). In only one case (the U.S. 
versus the American Medical Association and the District of Columbia Medical 
Society) had the law been applied. The St•preme Court held that the defendants 
had violated the Sherman Act by conspiring against a prepaid health plan 
(Kopit, 1983). The inactivity by the Federal Trade Commission has often been 
explained away as a result of a implied exemption, based on a 19.52 decision 
(U.S. versus Oregon State Medical Society), that existed for the learned 
professions (Havighurst, 1983b; Kopit, 1983). In this case, the Supreme Court 
stated: 
Since no concerted refusal to deal with .private health 
associations has been proved, we need not decide 
whether it would violate the antitrust laws. We might 
observe in passing, however, that there are ethical 
considerations where the historic direct relationship 
between patient and physician is involved which are 
quite different from the usual considerations prevailing 
in ordinary commercial matters. This court has 
recognized that forms of competition usual in the 
business world may be demoralizing to the ethical 
standards of a profession (Kopit, 1983, p. 323). 
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The perception that physicians were not engaged in trade or commerce 
thus became the norm. Furthermore, the Court went out of its way to indicate 
a tolerant disposition toward the professional sponsorship of boycott if 
undertaken by professional bodies. Havighurst (1983b) points out, however, that 
the medical profession's de facto antitrust immunity probably owed less to 
judicial belief in professional standards than to the inability of federal law to 
reach localized conduct not affecting interstate commerce. The medical 
profession enjoyed a vi i.l exemption from the antitrust laws until the mid-
1970s. 
A crucial event in the establishment of market-oriented policy in health 
care was the Supreme Court's 197 5 Goldfarb decision (Havighurst, 1983b; Kopit, 
1983). In Goldfarb versus Virginia State Bar, the Court decisively rejected the 
idea that the "learned professions" were exempt from antitrust scrutiny, 
rejected any claim by the medical profession to a "professional" exemption, and 
interpreted federal antitrust laws to mandate competition in the provision of 
professional services (Havighurst, 1986; 1983b; Kopit, 1983). With Goldfarb, 
and with subsequent cases involving both hospital and professional services, the 
Court made jurisdictional requirements substantially easier to satisfy in cases 
involving health care and, as a result, changed de facto federal policy toward 
the health care sector. These decisions by the Court and subsequent Federal 
Trade Commission actions in the enforcement of the Sherman Act undermined 
numerous industry-sponsored barriers to competition (Havighurst, 1986). 
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The Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act. Under Reagan, federal Medicare 
and Medicaid polic;:ies changed significantly. Foremost among the changes were 
cuts in the Medicaid program and changes in the method of payment to 
hospitals for Medicare inpatient services. The Omnibus Reconciliation Act of 
1981 (OBRA) incorporated extensive budget reductions in Medicaid with new 
flexibility in hospital reimbursement policies, both designed to reduce the 
number of persons eligible for Medicaid. The bill also consolidated 19 
categorical health programs into four block grants, including preventive health 
and health services, alcohol and drug abuse, mental health programs, primary 
care and maternal health (Davis, 1985). Changes in Medicare involved trimming 
$1.4 billion from expen(::,ures, primarily by increasing the Medicare deductible 
to $75 which was more ;.han 12 percent higher than that scheduled under the 
automatic adjustment procedures set by previous legislation (Brown, 1986; 
Demkovich, 1983b). 
Tax-Based Competition Proposals. In addition to cutting the budget, the 
Reagan Administration set about deregulating industries (i.e., the 
communications industry, interstate commerce, aviation). Health care was no 
exception. Having stated in his inaugural address that he would propose 
sweeping pro-competitive legislation in the health care sector as a way of 
containing soaring medical care costs, Reagan's appointee of Health and Human 
Services (HHS), Richard Schweiker, set up a task force in 1981 to examine the 
problem of rising costs and to draw up specific proposals to combat it 
(Demkovich, 1982a,b). The task force drew heavily upon proposals already 
before Congress (e.g., the Gebhardt-Steckman pro-competition bill of 1980) and 
presented the President with a list of options that has served as the basis for 
the Administration's "pro-competition" health care legislative proposals. 
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To stimulate competition in the private sector, the Administration 
considered a number of tax-based proposals while, in the public sector, the 
Administration recommended converting Medicare to a "voucher" system 
(Demkovich, 1982a,b). The private sector proposals used tax mechanisms to 
achieve cost controls. One part of the tax-cap proposal would limit the ability 
of employees to exclude the full amount of employer contributions to their 
health insurance premiums from their taxable income. The second part would 
put a ceiling on the amount of such contributions that employers can deduct as 
business expenses. Both parts were designed to have employees paying for some 
of the insurance they received free and, in that way, become more aware of 
how much health care thf'.y were using and how much it cost. While a part of 
most competition bills hmoduced thus far had a cap on employee deductions, 
HHS added a new twist. Instead of just proposing a cap on employees, HHS 
added a cap to the deductible made by employers on their contrabutions to 
health care coverage (Demkovich, 1982a). In addition, the Administration 
proposed having employers offer multiple health plans, including at least one 
HMO option, for employees to choose from. 
The tax-cap proposals were based on the assumptions that (1) most firms 
would continue paying health premiums instead of shifting to other fringe or 
cash benefits; (2) that premium costs would escalate more rapidly than 
inflation; and (3) that other cash paid to employees would be taxable, adding to 
federal revenues. In the long run, HHS believed that pressure on employers and 
employees to reduce costs would lead to pressure o_n insurance companies to 
offer more cost-efficient insurance policies. However, the insurance industry 
viewed the proposal as the result of political considerations; i.e., not wanting to 
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raise taxes in an election year. The insurance industry feared the real outcome 
would lead to reduced insurance sales and thus opposed the plans (Demkovich, 
1982a). 
Another major criticism of the tax-cap proposals was that they leave out a 
sizeable segment of the population; that is, those that work for governments 
and non-profit institutions. The proposal would thus have less of an impact on 
consumers behavior than anticipated. Further, the proposals had the potential 
of alienating big corporations, including private insurers, by raising the question 
of what constitutes a legitimate business expense and thus threatened the whole 
range of corporate benefits (e.g., pensions, vacations, etc;:.). Moreover, there 
was a question of the pr; iety of using the tax code to determine health policy 
(Demkovic;:h, 1982a). Yet most health policy analysts agreed that the tax 
subsidy to employers significantly contributed to the over-purchasing of 
insurance. 
The proposals to have employers offer multiple insurance options have been 
criticised by industry as adding significantly to their administrative costs and 
that requiring such options through legislation c;:onstitued "regulation in 
disguise" (Demkovich, 1982a, p. 19.5). Further, critics argued, multiple choice 
options merely shifts controls from doctors and hospitals to employers and 
insurers and would, in reality, do little to slow the rate of health care cost 
increases which were seen as being physician driven. Effective opposition to 
the tax-cap plans has kept the proposals in Congressional committees since they 
were introduced. 
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Of more immediate concern to the Reagan Administration, however, was 
getting control of government spending for health care, specifically slowing the 
growth of the Medicare and Medicaid programs. Specifically, the Reagan 
Administration "competition" proposals have focused on two approaches to the 
cost issue: one, a voucher program and two, the adoption of a prospective 
payment system for health care providers. 
Voudters for Medicare. Under the proposed voucher system, the 
government would pay a percentage (e.g., 9.5% under the 1982 Reagan 
Administration plan) of the average annual Medicare payment to those eligible 
beneficiaries who voluntarily enroll in a private plan; either a traditional fee-
for-service plan or an 'iO. If the private plans cost less than the voucher 
payment, the beneficiaries could keep the difference; if they cost more, the 
beneficiary would have to make up the difference. Additionally, vouchers 
would result in the development of efficient health insurance plans by 
encouraging private insurers to compete for their "share" of the $32 billion 
Medicare market (Demkovich, 1981; 1982a,b). 
The major concern with the voucher proposals, as well as with the tax-cap 
proposals, was with adverse selection; that is, sicker people choosing higher 
cost but more comprehensive plans and healthier people choosing less costly but 
also less comprehensive ones. Some critics of the system contend that adverse 
selection could be a major problem if physicians and hospitals encourage 
chronic Medicare patients to enroll in the higher reimbursement private plans. 
"Government could suffer financial losses ••• if private insurers attract better-
than-average risks to voluntarily leave the Medicare program" (Demkovich, 
1982a, p. 196}. 
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Although a potentially lucrative market, commercial insurers have been 
the most outspoken opponents of vouchers. In addition to the issue of adverse 
selection, commercial insurers argue that they can't compete with the federal 
government which benefits from an average 17 percent "discount" negotiated 
with Medicare participating hospitals and which would have little or no 
marketing costs (Demkovich, 1981, 1982a,b). 
Senior citizen advocates have been extremely skeptical of the voucher plan 
and see it as a "backdoor way to limit benefits and, more fundamentally, to 
undermine the link between benefits and services" on which the Medicare 
program was built (Demkovich, 1981, p. 1616}. Furthermore, advocates for the 
elderly are concerned : , ott if the voucher amount isn't tied to increases in 
health care costs, the elderly will end up paying a greater share of their 
medical bills out-of-pocket. This could result in more elderly ending up as 
Medicaid patients or as medically indigent "bad debt" for the hospitals 
(Demkovich, 1981). Critics also argue that it is unlikely that a voucher system, 
by itself, would check the inflation driving Medicare and believe it merely 
shifts the burden of health care costs to private payers (Demkovich, 1981). 
Opposition to the voucher plan from labor, senior citizen groups, insurance 
companies and a Congress reluctant to adopt vouchers after making substantial 
cuts in the program under OBRA have effectively kept the plan in check and 
the Reagan Administration was only able to implement demonstration projects 
of the plan (Demkovich, 1982a}. Finally, the HHS task force also urged the 
President to limit the growth of Medicare by implementing a prospective 
payment system. The next section describes the two pieces of legislation, 
enacted by the Reagan Administration that have radically altered the face of 
the American health care system. 
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The Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act. The Tax Equity and Fiscal 
Responsibility Act of 1982, P.L. 97-248 (TEFRA) substantially changed 
Medicare's hospital reimbursement system. TEFRA was the first legislation 
since the 1972 Amendments to Social Security designed to actually reduce 
Medicare costs and not just the rate of growth (Long et al., 1982). Previously, 
Medicare paid hospitals for inpatient services on the principle of "reasonable 
and necessary costs" (OT A, 1985, p. 23). Hospitals submitted annual cost 
reports detailing expenses incurred by Medicare patients. Medicare's fiscal 
intermediaries (e.g., Blue Cross) audited them to arrive at the allowable costs 
for final reimbursement (which included operating and capital cost factors). 
Prior to TEFRA, the only limit to reimbursement was a cap on inpatient 
operating costs known a:. Section 223 limits, established in 1972. Nonroutine 
costs, such as ancillary services and capital costs, were exempted from the 
Section 223 limits. 
TEFRA set a three year ceiling (or target rate) on the annual rate of 
increase in operating costs per discharge for inpatient hospital services. The 
target represented the hospital's own cost per Medicare discharge, adjusted for 
inflation. TEFRA also provided for a small incentive payment to hospitals that 
operated below the specific cost target. Under this provision, hospitals could 
keep up to half the difference between their target amount and their actual 
costs. The incentive payment, however, was capped at five percent of the 
target cost per discharge. TEFRA set no limits on capital costs, direct costs of 
medical education, or outpatient services which rem~ined "pass-through" items 
(Arthur Young, 1983; Demkovich, 1981; Ernst & Whinney, 1983; OTA, 1985). 
TEFRA was expected to reduce Medicare reimbursement by 4.5 percent over a 
three year period by imposing a progressively tighter ceiling on reimbursement 
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for routine room and board costs as well as the costs of ancillary services (i.e., 
laboratory texts, x-rays, etc.), it fixed 'target rates' based on a hospital's actual 
operating costs, and it provided the first incentive system for hospitals to lower 
costs (Demkovich, 1982b; Koch, 1988). 
TEFRA also included a provision requiring the Department of Health and 
Human Services (DHHS) to develop legislative proposals for a prospective 
payment system for Medicare's hospital insurance trust (HI) to replace the 
retrospective cost reimbursement system. The proposals were to be to 
Congress no later than December 31, 1982 (Demkovich, 1982b; Ernst & 
Whinney, 1983; OTA, 198.5; Arthur Young, 1983). This new payment system was 
intended to establish th· federal government as a prudent purchaser of health 
care services, reduce Medicare's outlays for inpatient hospital care and 
maintain an acceptable level of quality and access to care for beneficiaries 
(Arthur Young, 1983; Guterman & Dobson, 1986). 
TEFRA was a significant change in the reimbursement mechanism for 
Medicare and introduced the use of Diagnosis-Related Groups (DRGs) (a system 
of 467 mutually exclusive categories of illnesses or combinations of medical 
problems) as the basis for computing a hospital's case mix index to determine 
operating cost limitations. With TEFRA, the basis of reimbursement was 
shifted from an implicit per-diem system to an explicit per case system; that 
is, case mix was incorporated into the payment system and the rate of 
allowable increase in costs per case was capped. While reimbursement 
continued to be retrospective and based on reasonable costs, the application of 
explicit per-case reimbursement radically altered the concept of Medicare 
reimbursement. 
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TEFRA cut a total of $2.4 billion from Medicare expenditures although these 
savings were primarily the result of reductions in payments to hospitals and 
large increases in beneficiary cost sharing (Demkovich, 1983b; Major 
Legislation of the Congress, 1983). 
While TEFRA profoundly changed Medicare's hospital reimbursement 
methods, it provided few financial incentives for hospitals to reduce their cost 
per discharge below the limit set by the rules. Other weaknesses in the TEFRA 
legislation included the fact that the system was still retrospective, which 
meant that the costs to the government for Medicare still couldn't be predicted 
"in advance;" providers (e.g., hospitals) lacked sufficient incentive to spend 
below the target costs:; by the government, and finally, hospital's were faced 
with cost reporting systems that were confusing, complicated and hard to 
monitor (Arthur Young, 1983; Guterman & Dobson, 1986). Despite TEFRA, 
hospital costs continued to grow and Congress, faced with the forecast that 
Medicare could be bankrupt within as little as four years, moved with "unusual 
speed" to change the cost-based reimbursement system of Medicare 
(Demkovich, 1983a; Wehr, 1983a,b). 
The 19&3 Social Sec:urity Amendments. By 1983, almost all policy makers 
and providers had agreed that a prospective reimbursement system would be 
superior to the retrospective system then in place. The "hitch" was that no one 
appeared ready to agree on which version of a fixed price system to implement 
(Demkovich, 1982b). For example, the American Hospital Association (AHA) 
had outlined its version of a fixed-price system with payments based on each 
hospital's 1982 cost per case. Inflation and the increased cost of technology 
were built into the formula as were expansion and renovation costs. However, 
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<::ritics argued that this formula would just <;:ontinue to reward ineffi<;:ient 
behavior. Alternatively, the Health Se<::urity Action Coun<;:il proposed a plan 
that would <;over hospital <;:osts in the private se<;:tor as well as Medi<;:are and 
Medi<;:aid <;:osts, and would extend <;:ost <;:ontrols to nursing home <;:harges, 
do<::tors fees and "other health <;are <;:osts" (Demkovich, 1982b, p. 1981). 
However, as with the Carter Administration's national hospital <;:ost-control bill, 
it did not appear likely that such a broad plan would be politi<::ally feasible. 
The Health Care Finan<::ing Administration (HCF A), the agen<;:y in charge of 
the Medi<::are program, was also developing its own prospe<::tive payment plan. 
HCFA's goal was to establish a payment system that addressed two major 
issues: one, <;:on<;:erning t · e unit of <;are on whi<::h to base the payment while the 
second <;:on<;:erned the mechanism for setting rates. In its deliberations on 
fixed-price systems, HCFA rejected proposals that advo<;:ated paying per day 
(such as the existing reimbursement system) since per day payment had the 
incentive to keep patients longer. HCFA also rejected schemes based on 
payment for each service, which encouraged overuse and payment based on 
paying per case due to the fact that this could lead hospitals to skim off the 
most profitable patients and reject sicker ones who might require longer 
hospitalizations. 
Other payment proposals considered by HCFA included negotiating hospital 
budgets in advance, which had been experimented with in Rhode Island under 
the waiver program. However, with almost 7,000 hopsitals in the nation, it was 
considered too complex and cumbersome a plan. The Budget Review System, 
utilized in another Medicare waiver state, New Jersey, was rejected for the 
same reasons. HCFA also seriously <;:onsidered a "<::ompetitive bidding scheme" 
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but rejected the plan based on the concern that under competitive bidding, if 
the proposals came in too high, "they would throw the Administration's budget 
figures out of whack". A capitation scheme was also considered but rejected 
because there had been "too little experience" with the HMO option to 
implement it on a national level (Demkovicll, 1982b, p. 1982). 
The Health Care Financing Administration finally decided to go with a 
predetermined reimbursement rate plan that would pay hospitals per diagnosis 
since this method allowed the government to more accurately predict costs and 
the system took into account the fact that some hospitals treat patients who 
need more care than others, an element missing in most other PPS proposals 
(Demkovich, 1982b). 
MEDICARE'S PROSPECTIVE PAYMENT SYSTEM 
The prospective payment plan proposed by the Reagan Administration, 
based on HCFA proposals, was outlined in the fall of 1982. The plan advocated 
replacing the existing Medicare hospitalization (Part A) cost reimbursement 
system with one that paid a standardized price for the treatment of each of 467 
medical conditions or combination of conditions referred to as Diagnostis-
Related Groups (DRGs). Each price reflected the national average costs for 
treating that condition based on the 1981 average inpatient operating costs per 
case for each DRG, based on a 20 percent sampling of all Medicare c;;laims. The 
Administration's proposal recommended conversion to the plan within one year 
of implementation and that DRG prices would be updated periodically at the 
discretion of the Secretary of Health and Human Services (Wehr, 1983b). In 
contrast to most fixed-rate proposals advocated at the time, the 
Administration's bill would apply only to the Medicare program 
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and would vary payment rates according to the type of diagnosis based on a 
single rate for all hospitals in the country (although adjustments would be made 
for teaching expenses, capital costs and wage variations). Both the AHA and 
Administration's versions of PPS would exempt hospitals with fewer than 100 
beds (Demkovich, 1982b; Wehr, 1983b). 
The proposal submitted by HHS resembled a hospital payment plan already 
implemented in New Jersey. The plan, begun in 1980 and phased in over two 
years, represented the culmination of many years of cost-containment efforts 
by New Jersey policy makers. Since the 1960s, New Jersey had a number of 
legislative actions implemented in order to control health care costs including a 
cap on Blue Cross payme•itf> to certain types of hospitals; a prospective budget 
review system, and the Standard Hospital Accounting and Rate Evaluation 
(SHARE) project. In an extensive review of the SHARE Project, Rosko (1984) 
suggests that the SHARE program did help to contain hospital costs but at the 
same time threatened the financial viability of some inner city hospitals. 
Rosko concluded that surburban hospitals were able to shift costs while inner 
city hospitals were not. By the mid-1970s, however, SHARE was abandoned 
because it failed to encourage cost containment by hospitals enough (Spiegel & 
Kavaler, 1986). After the SHARE program, New Jersey received a $3 million 
grant from HCF A to develop a prospective reimbursement system using DRGs. 
In 1978, New Jersey passed a law mandating the gradual implementation of a 
per case payment system covering all payers. A hospital rate setting 
commission was given power to tie payment rates directly to the patient's DRG 
and in 1980, the plan began being phased in. By 1982, all New Jersey hospitals 
were covered under the system. 
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Unlike the Reagan plan, the New Jersey DRG average costs per case were 
developed from data on each hospital's own costs as well as those of all other 
similar major teaching, minor teaching, and non-teaching hospitals in the state 
and included direct patient care costs, indirect costs (overhead), allowances for 
capital facilities replacement, bad debt and charity care, and working capital 
costs. The Reagan plan was based on a single, fixed cost versus a rate based 
partly on a state-wide average and partly on each individual hospital's costs and 
would not allow for exemptions from the standard price except for patients 
with longer than average hospital stays (outliers), regional variations in labor 
costs, and for hospitals which were the sole source of hospital care in a 
community. Uncompensated care, bad debt and charity care, and indirect costs 
were not figured into the Administration's proposal. 
Nor did the Reagan plan cover all payers of hospital bills (e.g., Blue 
Cross/Blue Shield, private insurers, businesses, Medicaid) as did the New Jersey 
plan. Psychiatric, children's, and long-term care hospitals were exempted from 
the proposal. Further, those covered under the plan would no longer be able to 
appeal the new fixed prices judicially as they could under the existing law. 
Their only recourse was to either convince HCF A that the rates were 
insufficient or to stop treating Medicare patients (Wehr, 1983b). However, 
since hospital incomes from Medicare ranged from 30 to 60 percent of 
revenues, HHS had an upper hand in the battle over PPS provisions. 
The Administration's proposal was based on two assumptions: one, that 
some care delivered in hospitals is unnecessary or produced inefficiently (OT A, 
198.5) and, two, that hospital cases can be categorized into "clinically coherent 
groups that are reasonably similar in resource consumption", either in terms of 
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cost or length of stay {Iglehart, 1982, p. 1289). If the assumption about 
inefficient hospital care was correct, then cost savings would be achieved under 
PPS without sacrificing the patient's health or welfare, provided the incentive 
inherent in the payment system led to appropriate changes in hospital and 
physician behavior (Fessler & Wehr, 1983a,b; OTA, 198.5; Wehr, 1983b). 
Thus, instead of paying for the cost of all services that are delivered to a 
patient, Medicare would now pay hospitals a fixed payment, set in advance, and 
based on the patient's diagnosis. The amount of reimbursement would be 
determined by the diagnosis (DRG) under which the patient is classified instead 
of paying the costs of all services delivered to a patient who is hospitalized. To 
encourage hospital efficiency, PPS allowed the hospital to keep the difference 
between the Medicare payment rate and the actual patient costs as a profit. 
However, the hospital must absorb the loss if its costs are higher than the 
payment rate (Arthur Young, 1983; Demkovich, 1982, 1983a; Ernst & Whinney, 
1983; Fessler & Wehr, 1983a,b; GAO, 1986; Grimaldi & Micheletti, 1983; OT A, 
198.5; Wehr, 1983a). 
Provisions of the Prospective Payment System. The prospective payment 
idea was not new. Congress had debated the idea of changing Medicare to a 
prospective reimbursement system; that is, negotiating a flat amount for 
services and rewarding lower-cost institutions by letting them keep whatever 
surplus their efficiencies yielded, as early as 1970. But Congress was reluctant 
to tamper with the system's basic structure and balked at what amounted to a 
bonus for efficiency. These factors, combined with fierce opposition to 
prospective payment by the health care industry, blocked any serious 
consideration of the plan at the time (Demkovich, 1981). 
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When HHS originally outlined its PPS plan, it was expected that it would 
provoke a long, thorough debate since it was believed that Congress would want 
to examine the proposals carefully and consider alternatives before coming to 
any conclusions and taking specific courses of action. In addition, it was 
believed that the Administration faced a monumental task in selling the plan, 
not only to Congress but to hospitals, doctors and insurers (Oemkovich, 1982b). 
Furthermore, the manadatory nature of the plan was seen to be similar to the 
one the Carter Administration had advocated in its 1977 hospital cost-
containment bill and was considered to be a potential sticking point in the 
deliberations over the proposal. For example, health policy experts argued that 
the Reagan Administration had abandoned its so-called competitive approach in 
favor of a regulatory one. Joseph Califano, President Carter's Secretary of 
Health, Education, and Welfare until 1979, stated in a New York Times editorial 
(October 20, 1982) that HHS's "proposed cap ••• is in some respects tougher than 
the Carter plan" and that the Reagan Administration had "rightly abandoned 
free-market competition as the way to hold down inflation in health care." 
The Administration countered that the reimbursement strategy was very 
pro-competitive, especially in its potential to eliminate duplication of services 
as hospitals begin to specialize in different treatments thus eliminating the 
need for duplication of expensive staff and equipment. Proponents also argued 
that the proposal would encourage other payers to utilize fixed price systems 
using Medicare as an example of prudent purchasing of health care services 
(Demkovich, 1982a). Still, it was expected that the. magnitude of the change 
proposed for Medicare would provoke a great deal of controversy and require 
much time and political finesse to get through Congress. However, this turned 
out not to be the case as speed became of the essence (Demkovich, 1983a). 
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The Administration's bill was introduced into the Senate in January, 1983 
and into the House in February (Major Legislation of the Congress, 1984). The 
bill was hurridly sent to the House Ways and Means Committee. The 
Committee basically endorsed the proposal but amended it to ease the impact 
on hospitals, to give state hospital cost control programs more independence 
and to restrict the Administration's authority to expand the new payment 
system until a number of mandated studies of the effects of the system could 
be evaluated. 
The amendments to the Administration's proposal included: (1) to ease the 
transition to the new system, Ways and Means decided that DRGs should be 
phased in over a three year period as opposed to the Administration's plan to 
impose the new rates immediately. During the transition period from TEFRA 
to PPS, a declining portion of the total prospective rate was to be based on a 
hospital's historical costs in a given base year and a gradually increasing portion 
was to be based on a blend of federally determined regional and national DRG 
rates. Starting October 1, 1986, the PPS rates were to be based solely on 
national averages; (2) while the Administration's plan allowed for only a few 
adjustments to the national payment rates, Ways and Means added adjustments 
for urban and rural hospitals and adjusted the payment formula to account for 
teaching costs and capital expenses; (3) while initial rates in the 
Administration's plan were based on 1981 data and provided for updates in the 
DRGs to reflect changing technology and physician practice patterns at the 
discretion of the Secretary of HHS, the panel set rates on 1983 data and 
required annual updates for fiscal 1984 and 1985, to be based on changes in the 
hospital goods and services index plus 1 percent. Ways and Means also set up a 
panel of experts, called the Prospective Payment Assessment Commission 
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(ProPAC), to recommend updates after 1986 and every four years thereafter; 
(4) Ways and Means also exempted psychiatric, children's, rehabilitation and 
long-term care hospitals from the plan unless Congress, and not the Secretary, 
decided to include them; (.5) the revised plan also flatly excluded capital costs 
from the system whereas the Administration's proposal had recommended 
including them in the payment formula (thus capping them); and (6) while the 
Administration's plan attempted to encourage state-wide hospital cost-control 
demonstration projects to adopt DRGs as the payment formula, Ways and Means 
reinforced state flexibility in deciding which payment formula to choose but 
added new criteria to meet "Medicare Waiver" status. 
Other subcommittee amendments included retaining most of the existing 
authority for administrative and judicial review of Medicare payment decisions, 
which the Administration had wanted to eliminate, but excluded DRG payment 
rates from the review process. The Committee also required HHS to monitor 
hospital admission patterns through a revised Peer Review program (PROs) and, 
as a condition of eligibility for Medicare participation, required hospitals to 
contract for such review. Further, the revised PPS plan required HHS/HCFA to 
deny Medicare payments or to take other corrective action against hospitals 
that manipulated the system with inappropriate changes in admission practices. 
Finally, the Committee required HHS to conduct a number of studies on the 
impact of PPS, including the appropriateness of different DRG rates for urban 
and rural hospitals, the treatment of exceptionally expensive medical cases, the 
inclusion of hospital capital costs in DRGs and the impact of the new system on 
individual hospitals, classes of hospitals and "third-party" insurers and Medicaid 
(Demkovich, 1983a; Fessler & Wehr, 1983a,b; Guterman & Dobson, 1986; OT A, 
198.5; Wehr, 1983a,b). 
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PPS Receives Speed)' Approvalo Very little was known about the way the 
DRG-based Prospective Payment System actually worked; that is, (1) it was 
being used by only one state (New Jersey), (2) the differences in the national 
and state systems were pronounced (e.g., it was applied to all payers in New 
Jersey versus just Medicare in the national program), and (3) there were very 
little data available on the impact of the New Jersey system at the time the 
Medicare system was being debated (analyses of how individual hospitals would 
fare under the program were not available due to a two to three year lag in cost 
reporting to HHS concerning the demonstration project). Yet, given these 
uncertainties and the magnitude of the change the system implied, the DRG-
based Prospective Payment plan moved through Congress with remarkable 
speed and little opposition (Demkovich, 1983a; Fessler & Wehr, 1983a,b; Wehr, 
1983a,b). 
Action on the legislation by the Ways and Means Committee came just two 
months after it was outlined by the Administration and amendments to the plan 
were approved by the Committee just two days after the Administration 
produced its detailed legislative proposal. By contrast, the Carter cost control 
plan was acrimoniously debated for three years before being "amended into 
oblivion" (Wehr, 1983b, p. 456). Most conspicuous was the absence of strong 
opposition by hospitals, doctors, Congressional Republicans, and the insurance 
industry. In fact, the Federation of American Hospitals and the American 
Hospital Association supported the legislation. Opposition to the plan was also 
diluted because some groups were preoccupied with o~her health proposals (e.g., 
Blue Cross/Blue Shield were concerned about the tax-cap plans on employment-
related health insurance) (Wehr, 1983b). By February, 1983, the U.s. Senate 
Subcommittee on Health was holding public hearings on the PPS system. 
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While there wasn't nearly as much controversey over the proposal as had been 
feared, the plan was far from universally accepted. The private health 
insurance industry argued that using prospective payment only for Medicare 
would allow hospitals to make up lost dollars by shifting the costs to their 
privately insured patients. They suggested that HHS encourage states to 
develop individual all-payers cost-control systems (Demkovich, 1982a, p. 705). 
The American Medical Association and the American Nurses Association 
urged Congress to move slowly; to take time to test the impact of PPS on costs 
and on the quality of care before implementing on a national scale. Physicians 
feared that PPS would institute policies in the hospital that would interfere 
with their independent patient care decisions; specifically in the areas of 
admissions, process of care, and length of stay. As a result, quality of care 
would be threatened. They also feared they would be liable for more 
malpractice suits under these practice constraints. Health professionals were 
also concerned about the limitations of the DRG-coding system itself. For 
example, they argued that there were only 467 codes, the DRG reimbursement 
schedule favored surgical versus medical treatment, and that nursing factors 
were not included in the payment formulas. Finally, health professionals, 
especially physicians, were concerned that if PPS came to pass, the next logical 
step would be to extend the system to cover physician's services (GAO, 1986; 
Spiegel & Kavaler, 1986). 
Although acknowledging the need for reimbursement reform, senior 
advocates were concerned about the impact of the program on Medicare 
beneficiaries. The American Association of Retired Persons (AARP), which 
represents millions of retired individuals, had been a long-time supporter of 
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prospective payment for Medicare. In testimony before the U.S. Senate 
Subcommittee on Health, AARP representatives stated that to avoid problems 
of cost-shifting and quality, DRGs should: (1) cover all payers, all services, and 
all hospitals; (2) include a severity of illness index; (3) establish strong 
utilization review guidelines, including consumer representation; (4) promote 
state plans for cost containment programs; and (.5) physician assignment should 
be mandated in the plan (that is, physicians accepting what Medicare pays as 
payment in full). Finally, to stagger implementation of the system to allow for 
adequate evaluation of the impacts of the program (Wehr, 1983a). 
Jacob Clayman, president of the National Council of Senior Citizens 
(NCSC), which represented over 4 1/2 million senior citizens, stated in 
testimony before the same committee that the Administration's plan should 
"not be rushed through ••• We cannot afford to harshly impose a national, largely 
untested, plan that will affect ••• the health of vulnerable citizens. If the system 
goes through, however, the Council would expect it to apply to all payers" 
(Demkovich, 1983a, p. 70.5). NCSC believed that applying prospective payment 
toward the entire health care system would benefit all purchasers of health 
care, including the federal government and Medicare beneficiaries (Senate 
Subcommittee on Health, 1983). 
Organized labor, which supported prospective pricing, agreed with the 
senior advocates that any such system "ought to apply to all payers and include 
all providers, including physicians" (Senate Subcommittee on Health, 1983). 
However, the AFL-CIO had serious reservations about the suitability of DRGs 
as the basis for prospective payment. Although labor viewed DRGs as an 
improvement over retrospective reimbursement, they were also concerned that 
90 
there was little hard evidem;:e regarding the system's use in New Jersey to 
warrant its adoption for the Medicare program. As Robert McGlotten, a 
representative from the AFL-CIO, stated in testimoney before the Senate 
Subcommittee on Health, "We believe the jury is still out on the New Jersey 
system, which has been the model for this proposal. We do not know enough 
about the effectiveness of this approach to adopt it immediately for Medicare" 
(Senate Subcommittee on Health, 1983, p. 263). Labor was concerned over the 
cost of implementing the plan, the possibility of cost-shifting, the financial 
difficulties of public and inner city hospitals, the control of teaching and 
capital costs and the exemption of HMOs from the plan. In addition, the AFL-
CIO and the United Auto Workers joined with AARP to recommend the 
extension of PPS to physician's services. 
Business leaders, as represented by the Washington Business Group on 
Health, while indifferent to DRGs per se, supported prospective payment in the 
abstract but were concerned about the exemption of capital costs from the plan 
and joined with labor to recommend that health planning be continued as a 
means of controlling capital cost increases (Senate Subcommittee on Health, 
1983). 
Hospitals were also concerned, especially the larger, urban institutions that 
cared for a large proportion of elderly and poor. Already in financial straits 
under the cost-cutting effects of TEFRA, they criticized HHS for failing to 
provide adequate information about the proposal for them to evaluate the 
provisions prior to the bill's introduction to Congress. However, there were two 
larger issues that concerned the hospitals. One, the House's amendments 
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concerning capital costs, i.e., the money hospitals need to build and buy 
equipment. Under the old system, Medicare reimbursed hospitals for a share of 
their capital costs. The Ways and Means bill would reimburse hospitals 
differently, and presumably less generously. A second issue concerned 'return 
on equity' payments under PPS. This issue, complex and esoteric to all except 
the hospitals, pitted the for-profits against the not-for-profits. 
Since 1966, Medicare had paid the for-profit hospitals an amount tied to 
their net equity (capital minus debt) as a way of compensating investors for 
their risk and to theoretically offset the not-for-profit sector hospital's tax 
exempt status· that enabled them greater access to the tax exempt bond 
market. With inflation, interest rates soared and voluntary hospitals 
complained that it put them at a disadvantage in the capital markets. They had 
been attempting to get HCFA to give them equity payments as well. The 
Administration's bill proposed no change in return on equity until HHS could 
figure out how to include capital in the reimbursement formula. The not-for-
profit hospitals argued that it would be "disastrous" if Congress "perpetuated 
the inequity" of the old system. The House amended the bill to phase out return 
on equity payments over three years. The Senate Finance Committee, in its 
version, voted to continue Medicare's capital and return-on-equity payments 
through October, 1986. 
The stakes for hospitals concerning this issue were high. Medicare's 
return-on-equity payments totaled $300 million in 1983 and about $3.2 billion 
for capital costs. Under the existing law, payments -for capital costs averaged 
$3,360 per bed to the not-for-profits and $3,760. to the for-profits. When 
return-on-equity was added, the per bed payments totaled $7,170. Despite 
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efforts to get the Senate's version adopted, a compromise was struck between 
the Committees in which return-on-equity payments would continue to be made 
through fiscal 1986 but their size was to be reduced and the provision on capital 
costs was dropped altogether. In the end, all sides seemed satisfied with the 
results (Demkovich, 1983a). 
Thus, the final PPS provisions did not call for a precipitous leap into 
prospective payment; there would be a phase-in of the system over three years 
and payments would combine the hospital's costs with national rates. The DRG 
rates were to be adjusted for numerous contingencies and were to be updated 
annually. Although far different from the one evisioned by the Administration, 
PPS appeared well on the way to passage almost as soon as it got to the 
Congress. Even so, members of the House and Senate were nervous about the 
bill's passage since the plan still needed the support of hospitals and physicians. 
To speed approval of the plan, Ways and Means attached it to its legislation 
to overhaul the Social Security System. Members believed that an unusually 
favorable opportunity for passage had been created by the popularity of the 
Social Security rescue bill (HR 1900), by the open support of the bill by the two 
major hospital groups (the American Hospital Association and the Federation of 
American Hospitals), and by the absence of strenuous opposition by the AMA 
and other critics of the program (Wehr, 1983a). Once it had become part of the 
Social Security package and had won approval in the House, its supporters 
reasoned that the Senate would have no choice but to do the same. And, since 
the Social Security bill seemed veto-proof, the PPS plan would become law 
before the hospital industry had time to change its mind (Demkovich, 1983a). 
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A number of factors combined to provide uncharacteristic momentum for 
the bill, including: (1) the fear that, given time, the AMA, the hospital 
associations, and some members of Congress would mount the same vehement 
opposition to the PPS plan that was mounted against the Carter 
Administration's cost control proposal, which had resulted in months of debate, 
dissention, and futile attempts at compromise; (2) the almost universal 
recognition, even by senior citizen advocates, that Medicare urgently needed 
reimbursement reform; and (3) the fact that even the hospital industry 
supported the idea of prospective payment, since they saw the new plan as 
"better" for them than the progressively harsher 1982 Medicare payment limits 
set under TEFRA (Demkovich, 1982, 1983a; Speigel & Kavaler, 1986; Wehr, 
1983}. The Congressional committees with oversight of Medicare spread the 
word that nothing was to be done to "derail the speeding train". They believed 
if any of the interest groups had time to consider the plan more fully "the rosy 
glow of optimism would fade" and the window of opportunity would close. It 
might take "months before Congress would get another chance to consider 
Medicare reform again" (Demkovich, 1983a, p. 704). 
The House passed HR 1900 by a vote of 243 to 102 on March 24, 1983. The 
Senate Finance Committee approved a similar measure (SB 1} on March 10, 
1983 by a vote of 18 to 1 and sent the bill to the floor. Debate began on March 
16 but Congressional leaders were optimistic that a package would be· sent to 
President Reagan before the March 26th Easter break. The Senate approved 
the bill on March 25, 1983 by a vote of 58 to 14 and it was signed into law (P.L. 
98-21) on April 20, 1983 (Major Legislation of the Congress, 1984). One of the 
biggest overhauls of the Social Security System, the bill also included a 
fundamental change in hospital reimbursement; that is, the DRG-based PPS. 
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The Problem With The Solution 
Medicare's DRG-based Prospective Payment System (PPS) has the potential 
to fundamentally change the character of the American health care system; 
especially federally-financed health care programs. The reform of Medicare's 
payment mechanism placed control in the hands of the price setter and 
radically altered the relationship between hospital management, physicians and 
the Medicare beneficiary. Although a DRG-based prospective payment system 
was implemented in New Jersey and experience from this program provided the 
basis for the national model, the new payment system, and the assumptions 
behind it, were largely untested prior to the passage of the Social Security 
Amendments of 1983. Research conducted on state-initiated rate-setting 
programs, such as New Jersey's, provided some information relevant to the 
national system, but the data were fragmented, contradictory, and much of the 
available information did not directly apply to a national system (e.g., many 
applied to all-payers of hospital costs; some were mandatory, others voluntary) 
(Bankhead, 1985; Eby & Cohodes, 1985; Hsaio & Dunn, 1987; OTA, 1983; Rosko 
& Broyles, 1986). Four states received waivers from the Medicare program 
during the 1970s to institute variations on state-wide rate-regulation of hospital 
care costs; the New Jersey program, Massachusetts, New York, and Maryland. 
However, it has been the New Jersey program that HHS and legislators relied 
on in creating the Medicare PPS system. 
New Jersey's All-Payers System. New Jersey has had a history of activities 
related to controlling the high cost of hospital <;are. Under the state's 
Commissioner of Insurance, a cap was placed on Blue Cross payments to some 
hospitals. This was followed by a prospective budget review system 
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operated by the state health department. The next attempt at cost control 
came under the Standard Hospital Accounting and Rate Evaluation (SHARE) 
program, a more stringent mandatory budget review program applied to Blue 
Cross and Medicaid patients and based on a reasonable cost per day. Rosko 
(1984) analyzed the SHARE program between 1972 and 1982 and concluded that 
SHARE did contain hospital costs but at the same time, the program threatened 
the viability of many of the state's inner-city hospitals. Rosko found that 
surburba.n hospitals were able to shift costs under the program while inner-city 
hospitals could not. 
Shaffer (1983) also analyzed the SHARE program and suggested that 
although the program saved money, it was "abandonded because it failed to 
introduce sufficiently powerful cost containment encouragement" (p. 390). In 
the mid-1970s, New Jersey received a $3 million grant from the Health Care 
Financing Administration to develop a prospective reimbursement system using 
DRGs. In 1978, New Jersey passed a law mandating the gradual implementation 
of a per case payment system covering all payers. A Hospital Rate Setting 
Commission was established to monitor rates and the implementation of the 
system, and in May, 1980, 26 New Jersey hospitals began billing under the new 
system. By October, 1982, all New Jersey hospitals were under the program. 
The first national conference focusing on DRGs occurred in November of 
1983. The conference, titled ''Diagnosis-Related Groups: The Effect in New 
Jersey: The Potential for the Nation," had participants reporting on the impact 
of DRGs on a variety of topics, including financial departments, medical 
records, quality assurance, data processing, nursing, payers, utilization review, 
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teaching hospitals, inner-city hospitals, etc. Overall, the results were "mixed" 
(Spiegler &: Kavaler, 1986). Some analysts suggested that New Jersey's plan 
caused the state's hospitals to inflate costs instead of reducing them. 
According to a New York Times editorial (April 2, 1984), hospitals covered by 
the program received $2.3 million more, on average, than they would have 
under the old system. New Jersey's health commissioner, J. Richard Goldstein, 
argued that the conclusion that the DRG system had failed were "premature" in 
that the program had been in full operation for only one year, that the plan 
covered the uninsured, helped inner-city hospitals maintain solvency, shortened 
the time a person stayed in the hospital, eliminated cost-shifting and that start-
up costs of the program amounted to only one-half of one percent of a hospital's 
total budget. Goldstein (1984) cited AHA data from 1980 to 1982 that showed 
New Jersey had dropped from the eighteenth most expensive health care state 
to the thirty-second and suggested that critics give the program more time to 
prove itself. 
The first comprehensive evaluation of the program, produced by 
researchers for the Health Research and Educational Trust of New Jersey 
(HRET), produced a five volume report with topics ranging from the economic 
impact (May & Wasserman, 1984) to the political development of the DRG 
system (Dunham & Morone, 1983). In terms of the economic impact, May and 
Wasserman (1984) found no definitive answer concerning cost-savings under the 
program. They state that: 
Even though some of the hospitals in New Jersey have 
been reimbursed by DRGs for almost 4 years, it is still 
not possible to state unequivocally that the system has 
been a complete success or failure (p. 559). 
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J. Joel May, HRET President, stated 11It is still not possible at this point 
(February, 1984) to pass final judgment" on the DRG program (HRET, 1984, p. 
xi). And Jeffrey Wasserman, HRET Vice President for Research, stated that: 
While there is no proof that the DRG system has saved 
money ••• it is possible that the system has caused more 
money to be spent than would otherwise have been spent 
(Smith, 1983, p. 3). 
In contrast, New Jersey's health commissioner claimed that the state saved 
$299 million in 1983. The figure was later revised to $149 million to account 
for a 13 • .5 percent increase ($80 million) in payments to hospitals (Spiegel &: 
Kavaler, 1986). And a Medical Economics editorial (Medical Economics, 198.5) 
analyzing the program declared that the entire $3 billion hospital industry in 
New Jersey showed a $3 million profit in 1983 and, while that was hardly more 
than break-even, it was the first taste of profit for the state's hospitals since 
DRGs began. Finally, an analysis of the state's hospitals by the New Jersey 
Hospital Association (Spiegel &: Kavaler, 1986) presented data that showed New 
Jersey hospitals charged $3861ess for a hospital stay than other hospitals across 
the nation and $623less than other northeastern hospitals. Association officials 
attributed the savings to the DRG-plan. 
Analysis of other state rate-setting programs also provides some relevant 
information regarding the impact of PPS-systems. Eby &: Cohodes (198.5) 
evaluated a number of studies and concluded that the one common finding 
among the studies was that, while most data were contradictory and specific to 
each program or setting, it was clear that programs with mandatory 
participation and compliance have, in fact, controlled the rate of increase in 
hospital costs. This finding should be interpreted cautiously, however. Those 
states with strict payment systems actually had higher overall costs than the 
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national average and it was only the rates of cost increases that were lower in 
PPS states than in states without PPS. Moreover, the effects on costs became 
apparent only after the programs were in place for a few years. And, finally, 
the comparability between rate setting programs and Medicare's PPS is highly 
questionable (Anderson & Lave, 1984; Bankhead, 1985; Coelen & Sullivan, 1981; 
Cromwell & Kanak, 1982; Dunham & Morone, 1983; Goldstein, 1984; HRET, 
1984; Jaskow, 1981; May & Wasserman, 1984; Melnick et al., 1981; OT A, 1985; 
Rosko, 1984; Shaffer, 1983; Sloan, 1983, 1981; Worthington&: Piro, 1982). 
There was no clear cut impact of the DRG program in New Jersey when 
the national program was being considered. In addition, there were a number of 
differences between the New Jersey program and the DRG-based PPS proposal 
before Congress. For instance, (1) the New Jersey plan covered all-payers 
versus the Medicare-only PPS plan; (2) each hospital in New Jersey had a 
separate and individualized set of rates for all 467 DRGs based on hospital plus 
state-wide average costs not just the average national rates proposed by the 
Reagan Administration; (3) uncompensated care, bad debts, and charity care 
were all fully reimbursed under the New Jersey system and are not under 
Medicare PPS; (4) outpatient services in New Jersey are paid at a flat rate, 
with no association to DRGs; (5) the Reagan Administration's proposal 
attempted to extend DRGs to outpatient care in the near future while New 
Jersey's covered outpatient care; and, (6) while in New Jersey, payer discounts 
(i.e., percentage discounts) were awarded to insurers for economically providing 
care, there are no similar benefits under PPS other than the savings that could 
be made by early discharge (Demkovich, 1983a,b; Fessler &: Wehr, 1983a,b; 
Spiegel &: Kavaler, 1986). 
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Other differenc;es include the fac;t that New Jersey reimburses capital 
c;osts on a pass-through basis and c;onsiders educ;ational and teac;hing costs. The 
Medic;are plan proposed by Reagan attempted to include capital costs under the 
DRG system. Furthermore, New Jersey's hospital population is relatively 
homogeneous versus the diversity of patients nation-wide. May and Wasserman 
(1984) state, however, that the most important difference between the New 
Jersey plan and the Medicare DRG-based PPS plan is that the New Jersey plan 
covers all payers and that fac;t alone will prohibit c;ost-shifting among payers. 
The Prospec;tive Payment System (PPS) of Medicare is intended to provide 
strong financial inc;entives for hospitals to conserve, rather than expend, 
resourc;es in c;aring for Medic;are patients and to shift care to less costly 
settings. However, the unc;ertainties surrounding the direction and pac;e of the 
impac;t of PPS have sparked widespread concern that the system poses a 
substantial threat to the health c;are system. A number of concerns have been 
raised by this c;hange in hospital financ;ing; concerns whic;h focus not only on the 
basis for the payment structure (i.e., the DRG system itself) but also on the 
new payment system's effect on providers in the health care system (e.g., 
hospitals, physicians), the Medicare benefic;iary and on quality of care. 
Diagnosis Related Groups {DRGs) 
DRGs were first designed and c;;ompiled at Yale University's Center for 
Health Studies in the late 1960s. This effort c;onsolidated previous work by 
attempting to c;reate a usable, effective framework to monitor utilization 
review and quality of c;are in hospitals (HCF A, 1983). In order to accomplish 
this, it was necessary to develop a uniform definition of what c;onstitutes a 
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"case" in an inpatient setting. Prior to DRGs, case costs were not precisely 
defined due to the fact of inadequate technologies for cost accounting as well 
as the fact that, with retrospective reimbursement, costs had not been a source 
of major concern to the majority of hospitals or payers. But, as Jack Owen, 
Executive Vice President of the American Hospital Association (AHA), has 
stated, "Of all the new management challenges hospitals fa~e due to PPS ••• case 
mix management looms as one of the most important'' (Owen, 1984). 
Case- Mix Classification. As the country began facing rapid! y increasing 
complexity in medical care (i.e., increasingly sophisticated medical technology) 
and sharply rising costs, improved methods for analyzing and monitoring 
institution performance became necessary. Interest in hospital "case-mix'' and 
the resulting hospital output became a major topic of research (e.g., Bayes, 
1977; Feldstein, 1965; Fetter, et al., 1980; Lave, et al., 1971; Lee, et al., 1972; 
Lee, et. al., 1973; Shin, 1977a; Shin, 1977b; Thompson, et al., 1975). Initial 
attempts to explain cost variation among hospitals were developed in the early 
1960s focusing on institutional characteristics (such as bed size, average length 
of stay, existence of residency program, proportion of board certified medical 
staff, presence of medical school affiliation). Later attempts at case-mix 
classification were directed at describing more precisely the attributes of 
patients (OTA, 1983). The critical issue was to determine patient 
characteristics that accurately describe case-mix (such as the diagnoses of 
patients and the procedures performed) as a proxy for costs (Spiegel & I<avaler, 
1986). However, it was generally agreed that hospital costs and case mix were 
positi ve1y correlated as numerous studies confirmed the direct relation between 
case-mix measures and cost (Ament, 1976; Bentley, 1981; Klastorin & Watts, 
1980; Lave et al., 1972; Young, et al., 1980). 
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Two principal methodologies were used to approach the problem of case-
mix definition; one, the Single Diagnosis Method, is a definition of case-mix 
based on the patient's primary diagnosis. The primary diagnoses are based on 
some variant of the International Classification of Diseases (ICD-CM codes). 
These schemes were intended to provide a classification of conditions of 
morbidity and mortality for statistical reporting and information retrieval. 
Because this scheme is based on diagnosis alone, it was determined to be 
insufficient for defining cases by resource consumption (HCF A, 1983). 
The second widely used patient classification scheme was developed by the 
Professional Activity Study (PAS) of the Commission of Professional and 
Hospital Activities. It published tables of length-of-stay (LOS) gathered from 
participating hospitals using primary diagnosis, presence of any additional 
diagnoses, presence of any surgeries, and age to classify patients into 349 
distinct groups. While many of the diagnoses were homogeneous, the system 
resulted in nearly 7,000 patient classes. The fundamental problem with the PAS 
method was that in cases where age is not important, the method overspecified 
the case type. In those cases where type of surgery was important, the method 
underspecified the resource requirements (HCF A, 1983). 
In order to describe case mix, it was necessary to develop a patient 
classification scheme that was manageable in terms of the number of case 
types defined and was reasonable in describing the variation in resources needed 
for treatment. DRGs were develped as an alternative patient classification 
scheme to the problems of the ICD-CM codes and-the PAS scheme (HCFA, 
1983). Given the fact that diagnostic procedures are a key function of the 
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patient's condition, treatment modalities and services are generally prescribed 
on the basis of diagnosis. Likewise, the length of time a patient is hospitalized 
is linked to the diagnosis assigned by the physician. Given these factors, DRG.s 
were designed to account for the type and amount of hospital resources 
required to provide care; presupposing that groups can be defined based on 
similar patterns of resource consumption for cases within each group. 
DRGs are a patient classification system designed to reflect differences in 
predicted resource use among different kinds of patients. Although each 
patient admitted to a hospital is unique, the DRG system classifies cases 
(patients) according to certain demographic, diagnostic and therapeutic 
attributes. The similarities and differences emerging from such groupings 
profoundly affect which treatment protocols are utilized and the level of 
resources consumed in treating a patient. Thus, resource consumption became 
the pivotal point on which the DRG system was built (HCF A, 1983). 
The DRG, and other related utilization schemes, assume that certain 
patient characteristics can be considered common in terms of the use of 
diagnosis and treatment procedures, enabling the administrator to analyze 
institutional effectiveness in terms of the patient products under care as well 
as the resources a patient consumes and their related costs. The DRG system is 
built upon clinically coherent patterns of care in which diagnoses are collapsed 
into 23 Major Diagnostic Categories (MDCs) which represent major body organs. 
Once assigned to an MDC, the case is further assigned to one of 467 DRGs 
based on the presence or absence of certain procedures (e.g., surgery or not), 
age of the patient, specific principal diagnosis, presence or absence of a 
103 
significant co-morbidity or complication, treatment procedures, and discharge 
status. These attributes then provided a way of explaining variations in length 
of stay and cost of care. For reimbursement purposes, a monetary value was 
assigned to each diagnostic category. Once the diagnosis was determined, the 
payment was also determined regardless of the length of time the patient 
stayed in the hospital (Bromberg, 1986; Ernst & Whinney, 1983; Grimaldi & 
Micheletti, 1983; Health Care Financing Administration, 1983, 1982; Speigel & 
Kavaler, 1986; Arthur Young, 1983). 
Goran (1981) pointed out that linking case mix to DRGs defined a hospital's 
product based upon a case-mix reimbursement system and warned of the 
possibility of clinicians' inflating the complexity of cases resulting in "case mix 
creep". Simborg (1981), echoing Goran's point about DRGs and case mix, called 
"DRG-Creep" the new hospital-acquired disease. As Simbourg (1981) stated, 
"Today, the use of DRGs is virtually synonymous with case mix measurement 
and it has become the standard method to describe hospital outputs for any use" 
(p. 1603). For example, case mix can also be used for regulation (i.e., in terms 
of budget review to determine the appropriate rate level; change setting to 
determine the appropriate rate structure; public disclosure; capital expenditure 
review; utilization review; and epidemiological studies (Cohen & Atkinson, 
1982). 
DRGs became the center of discussion among regulators, hospital 
associations, third-party payers, and academicians as soon as they were 
developed. Concern over the limitations of the system increased when they 
were used as the basis for the New Jersey rate-payers system and, even more 
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intensly, when the system was adopted by HHS as the basis for their new 
prospec;tive payment system for Medic;are hospital reimbursement. Critic;s 
argued that the DRG system was not well tested, needed more study before 
they were used on a national level, and that the DRGs themselves are flawed 
(Grimaldi & Mic;helleti, 1980, 1982). In the first plac;e, DRGs were originally 
designed by Yale University researc;hers as a means of improving utilization 
review by providing a medic;ally meaningful explanation of differenc;es in 
patient length of stay and not as a resourc;e c;onsumption sc;heme (Arthur Young, 
1983). 
Moreover, the DRG system is not stric;tly c;linic;ally c;oherent. For 
example, it was pointed out that DRGs c;ontain c;ases whic;h, from a medic;al 
perspec;tive, are quite different. That is, the DRG classific;ation system does 
not distinguish among patients with different severity or intensity levels within 
the same DRG. Alternatively, some broad diagnostic; areas, suc;h as ac;ute 
myoc;ardial infarc;tion (AMI), are not subdivided into disc;rete DRGs (OTA, 1985, 
1983; Smits et al., 1984; Arthur Young, 1983). Furthermore, analysis of the 
DRG system suggests that some DRGs c;ould be statistic;ally homogeneous but 
not ec;onomically homogeneous; that is, medic;ally meaningful but ec;onomically 
heterogeneous (Grimaldi & MiGheletti, 1982). Experienc;e under DRGs have 
shown that there are wide-ranging variations within spec;ific; DRGs related to 
the patient's severity of illness. This c;ould mean that the fac;ility c;ould lose 
financially since the DRG payment remained the same regardless of the 
severity not compensated for by outliers, direc;t or indirect adjustments. Smits 
et al. (1984) identified eight sources of DRG instability in terms of severity: (1) 
error in disc;harge or cost data; (2) true outlier cases; (3) physician 
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practice patterns; (4) a small number of rare DRGs; (5) Uniform Hospital 
Discharge Set (UHDDS) data limitations; (6) ICD-9-CM limitations; (7) nursing 
severity data is lacking; and (&)medical severity descriptions are vague. Smits 
et al. (19&4) concluded that severity discussions were often confounded by the 
inctusion of cases that were erroneously identified as an inaccurate 
c;lassification, by the assumption that eliminating outliers is a desirable goal or 
by the belief that high levels of sickness and high levels of cost are synonymous. 
An effective severity index should also identify less costly subgroups of patients 
as well as more costly ones. DRGs, in their present configuation, do neither. 
In addition, there are limitations in the data base and in the variables used 
to describe and measure hospital case mix; that is, the reporting systems used 
as the basis for DRGs are troublesome (Smits et al., 19&4). For example, DRGs 
are criticized because they rely on patient abstract information which is often 
not reliable (Arthur Young, 19&4; HCF A, 19&3; Demkovich, 19&2). The creators 
of the DRGs respond that, due to increased cost-consciousness on the part of 
payers and hospitals, hospital abstract information is becoming inc;reaingly 
more precise and accurate and that the level of aggregation in the DRG system 
reduces the effect of reporting errors (Spiegel & Kavaler, 19&6). 
Other criticisms inctude: one, DRGs are not nationally representative. 
Critics point out that a study by the Institute of Medicine in 1977, before the 
New Jersey plan was implemented, found an error rate of 30 percent in the 
state's M edic;are records (Demkovich, 19&2). Supporters of the system concede 
that while the initial DRG system was developed froin a 20 percent sample of 
19&1 Medicare hospital records as the basis for setting rates, the system is 
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reliable. In addition, with the focus on more accurate coding of information 
and Congressionally-mandated updates of the reimbursement formulas, the 
system will prove itself over time. The response to this criticism has been that 
there is going to be some trade-off between the number of groups and clinical 
homogeneity in all patient classification systems and that this trade-off is most 
reasonable in the DRG system. Furthermore, because the system is to be 
refined, inconsistencies and discrepancies will be eliminated (HCFA, 1983). 
Critics of the system also argue that the DRGs do not reflect the current 
state of medical practice (Arthur Young, 1983; HCFA, 1983). The response to 
this criticism is that the DRGs are mandated by law to be up-dated periodically 
and that this continual refinement will reflect the changes occurring in 
medicine. It has also been argued that other variables, such as socio-economic 
status or type of admission, should have been included in the DRG system 
(Arthur Young, 1984). The response has been that this type of information was 
not available nationally at the time of the DRG development but that as more 
comprehensive and reliable patient information is generated by the hospitals, it 
will be incorporated into the DRG calculations (HFCA, 1983). 
Finally~ critics have stated that just having a prospective rate is not 
enough. It is important to control the right unit of costs and, for a hospital, 
that means controlling admissions. HCF A promised to keep close watch on 
admissions through peer reivew but also through cost increases to the 
beneficiary for hospitalization. As of January 1, 1983, beneficiaries were 
paying over $300 for the first day of hospital care~ which increased to over 
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$.500 by 1986. It was believed that higher c;:osts to the benefic;:iary would 
c;:ontribute to lowering unnec;:essary admissions. 
POTENTIAL IMPACT OF PROSPECTIVE PAYMENT 
The way in whicll hospitals will respond to the PPS cllallenge is by no 
means understood and will vary by institution, depending upon suc;:h 
c;:harac;:teristic;:s as bed size, loc;:ation, teac;:hing status, ownership/c;:ontrol, payer 
mix (i.e., dependenc;:y on Medic;:are}, financ;:ial status, and c;:ase mix c;:omplexity of 
patient populations served (OTA, 198.5). Consequently, the magnitude and 
direc;:tion of the effec;:ts c;:annot be predic;:ted with confidenc;:e. In addition, PPS 
alters hospital inc;:entives in ways that c;:onflict with one another, leading to 
unintended and possibly undesirable c;:onsequenc;:es (OT A, 198.5). 
Table IV presents the expec;:ted impac;:t of PPS as identified by Guterman 
and Dobson (1986). PPS introduc;:es a variety of inc;:entives and affec;:ts not only 
hospitals but other payers for inpatient hospital services, other providers of 
<;:are, Medic;:are benefioaries, and c;:osts. The effec;:ts of PPS most relevant to 
the performance of the health care system are its effec;:ts on the c;:ost of 
providing medic;:al <;:are and the effec;:ts on the health benefits rec;:eived from 
that care such as quality of c;are; ac;c;ess to c;are; tec;hnologic;:al cllange, and 
c;linic;al research (OT A, 198.5}. On the one hand, PPS introduces incentives for 
hospitals to be more c;ost-c;onsc;ious and to increase quality of c;are. For 
instanc;:e, PPS encourages hospitals to reduce length of stay and unnecessary 
services, thus reducing patient exposure to the risk of c;omplic;:ations, hospital 
ac;c;:idents, nosocomial infections and other iatrogenic; events. In addition, DRG-
based PPS offers incentives for hospitals to specialize, thus reducing the 
TABLE IV 
EXPECTED IMPACT OF THE PROSPECTIVE PAYMENT SYSTEM 
lmpoct meeaurea 
Economic 
Anllcipatod boneflls 
Unintended consequences 
Quality of care 
Anticipated benefits 
Unintended consequences 
Acceoa to care 
Anticipated benefils 
Unintended consequences 
Hospllals 
ShOIItr lloapllal alayu. 
Fewtr unnocoll84ry Ieaia and 
IIO!Vicaa. 
Spocllllization-cconomlea of ecale. 
Adoption Ol COSI•reclucfng 
technology. 
lmp<ovements In haspilal 
manaooment. 
lmprovamenta In hospital 
adminislrativo dara syutoms. 
Reduction of excess hospital 
capacity. 
Vertical integration of heellh care 
services. 
Increases In unnecessary • 
admissions. roadmisalons, ancl 
rranalors. 
lncrecses in llospilal case·mir, due 
to changes In coding prOCIXluras-
"DRG crtep." 
Separala provision ol services which 
previously ware considered part of 
routine inpaliant care-
""uniKulcllfng."· 
lncrtalle in "outlier"' caaea. 
Higher axpondituraa on 
"pus~nrough" coer categoriu-
capital, diroct medical education. 
kidMy acqufalllon. 
Excaaalva rero or lloopltal cloainga. 
Spoc:lalizalion-lncreaso In elftCioncy 
and p<oficiency. 
Fower unnocetll&ry Ieaia and 
IMMc9s. 
Moto Nioctfve uso of new 
tecllnology. 
Increase in unnecessary adminions. 
Tendency reward premature 
dlachargu. · 
O&creases in necessary tooling and 
olhor enclllary servicea. 
Roluctenca to adopt 
qualily-onhancing (but expansive in 
the ah-"'11 run) lechnology. 
Altailobility of more :services on a 
regional laval. 
Sh•fting of services to more 
appropriala (and inexpensive) 
solhngs. 
""Dumping"" ol high-cost casas. 
Roluctanc:e ol llospilals to sccopl 
casas in DRG"s which aro nol 
prolilablo. 
Provldens end payers 
Other payer& 
for inpaUent 
hospital services 
Rapid dlfluolon of ~ 
payment and other innoltatlvo 
puymonl ayalema. 
Cost mvlngs lor all payara, with 
roaulllng roductloM ln 
hoallh in;uranco premiums. 
Polenllll shilling of coat burden 10 
other payera for lloopllal IOMcoa, 
wilh rosulling inert- in hoallh 
lncuranccJ promluma et raductiona in 
bono His. 
lncraaaa In uncompensated care. 
B<lllar coordination of health care 
traalment, payment, and coveraoo. 
Compallng incenUvea to heallh core 
providera, dapanding on tho· typo of 
coverage. 
Reduced hoallh cora charooa and 
insurance premiums .. 
Boller coordinalion of heallh cart 
troatz:oenl. paymonl, and covorago. 
lncroaaed sponaorship of heallh 
mamlenance organlza110ns and 
prelerrecl provider organizations. 
Oocreaso in c01t0rage lor poot 
po.tieniS. dllll to uncomponsaled 
cere iasuo. 
Olhor providers 
of lleafth care 
lncrouod p<OWialon of health care 
HMcosln~ 
lncreillled numbtt of di~argH 
from Inpatient 10 c:IMiDPGr 
poal-llospil&l cora. 
tioGpltal ecquiGillon of Ot . 
contriiCIIng with olhor p<ovldorl, 
loading to GRIQolhcr provisiOn 
of a continuum of palionl cora. 
Presauro on pltyllclans lo chango 
lholt prectice pallema. 
Fewer inohoepilal phyalcian 
coneutratlona. 
lncrell$0d froquency or minor 
surgical proc:ecluros. 
Mote IIOYOraly ill patienlo cflllchQrgad 
from lnpaU11111 to poat-lloap~lal care. 
Ollelaclea to pniVIding a continuum 
of pallont care. dua to 
cartificalo-of·nHCI realrlcllono. 
conlractlng prohibllionl. ore. 
Moro elflclent ~nl ol 
patient care. 
lncreaMd llldlf lowlo for 
poGI.floapftal ~ pareonnel. 
Fowor in-llospilal physician 
conaullations. 
Moro _ar,. il pa.Uon~a cliOciWirtod 
from lllpallcftt 110. poali>OGPI&I care. 
lncraaaecl avaUabiiily ol aarvicea in 
nonlloap~llll :seninga. 
lontle<. backlogs ol pa!lon!a 
wailing lor poat·hcl&pllal care. 
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TABLE IV 
EXPECTED IMPACT OF THE PROSPECTIVE PAYMENT SYSTEM 
(continued) 
Impact meas1.1res 
Economic 
Anticipated benefits 
Unintended consequences 
Quality of care 
Anticipated benefits 
Unintended consequences 
Access to care 
Anticipated benefits 
Unintended consequences 
Medicare 
beneficiaries 
Part A liability limited to legal 
deductibfes and coinsurance. 
Higher out<lf-pocket costs, if Part B 
utilization increases. 
Shorter hospital stays. 
Lower ·ratos of nosocomial infection. 
Fewer ln-1\ospltal complications and 
deaths. · 
Fewer unnecessary tests and 
services. 
Reductions in Iatrogenic care. 
Specialization-increase in efficiency 
and proficiency. 
Tendency toward premature 
discharges. 
Decrease in necessary tests. and 
services. 
Decrease In necessary physician 
consultations. 
Decrease In overall cost of services 
provided. 
Shift In treatment to mora 
appropriate settings. 
Regional availability of broad range 
of services. 
Selective exclusion of hlgiH:ost 
case types. · 
"Dumping" ol''unprofilable" types 
of paUants. 
Cost control 
Hospital 
expenditures 
Budget neutrality in the short run. 
Slower rate of growth in 
expenditures for the longer run. 
More predictable ouUays. 
Increased growth In "pass-through" 
costs. 
More efficient provision of hospital 
care. 
Replacement of quality with 
financial COMideraUons as the 
objective of hospilals. 
Reduction In the cost of hospital 
care. 
Promotion of the success of 
efficient hospitals. 
Medicare program 
expenditures 
Slower rate of growth in .program 
expenditures. 
Increased growth In expenditures for 
substitutes for Inpatient care, to the 
extent that thi!Y are not offset by a 
dacllne In inpatient hospital 
expenditures. 
Increased growth In expenditures for 
post-hospilal care, to tbo extent that 
they are not offset by a decline in 
acute C!!fe expenditures. 
More efficient provision of ovorall. 
health care. 
Replacement of quality with 
financial considerations as the 
C?bJective of health care providers. 
Reduction in the total cost of health 
care. 
Encouregement of efficiency in the 
management of health care 
providers. 
Widespread hospilal closings, Reduction in acceptance of 
particularly in undersarved or poorer Medicare patients. 
areas. 
Source: Sturart Guterman and Allen Dobson. "Special Report: Impact of the 
Medicare prospective payment system for hospitals." Health Care 
Financ:ing Review, Vol.7(1):97-114 (Spring, 1986). 
109 
110 
risk of adverse outcomes and potentially improving the quality of care. Finally, 
it provides hospitals with the incentive to reduce unnecessary tests and 
procedures, thus encouraging the provision of appropriate care (Senate Finance 
Committee, 1986). 
On the other hand, PPS also introduces negative incentives. That is, while 
the intended consequences of PPS are the elimination of care that "offers little 
or nothing in the way of patient benefits" and "the organization of hospital 
operations to provide the necessary care in the least expensive manner," PPS 
introduces incentives for "hospitals to conserve resources during the hospital 
stay" and to "shift care to less costly settings, both with potential negative 
consequences for quality, access, and cost" (OT A, 1985, pp. 24-25). 
Prospective payment using DRGs emphasizes the business of hospital care. 
Administrators must be capable of running an institution without falling into a 
negative cash balance. Hospital managers are thus faced with three basic 
incentives under PPS (OTA, 1985): 
1. to reduce the cost per admission; 
2. to selectively increase DRG revenues; and 
3. to develop new sources of profit or surplus by 
offering services not subject to payment 
restrictions. 
Hospitals will attempt to reduce costs in a number of ways, including: 
adopting business management techniques, e.g., long-range strategic planning, 
joint ventures, enhanced productivity, etc. (Morris,. 1984; Spiegel &: Kavaler, 
1986); reducing lengths of stay (Berki, 1985; Demkovich, 1983a; Fedorowicz, 
1983); reducing rates of use of ancillary services (Berki, 1985; Kuntz, 1984; 
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Nathanson, 1984; OT A, 1985); reducing the total ratios of personnel to patients 
(Berki, 1985; Bromberg, 1984; Kuntz, 1984; Richards, 1984; Washington Report, 
1984); providing services formerly provided during hospitalization before or 
after the inpatient hospital stay (i.e., unbundling) (Bromgerg, 1984; Lave, 1984); 
increasing preadmission screening (Lave, 1984; Spiegel & Kavaler, 1986); 
reducing rates of increase in employee wages and fringe benefits (OTA, 1985); 
purchasing hospital supplies more prudently (Allen, 1984; Bromgerg, 1984); 
reducing discretionary activities (e.g., continuing education; clinical research) 
(Coelen & Sullivan, 1981); and, finally, the new financial arrangements are 
likely to further stimulate restructuring of the health care system (i.e., 
horizontal & vertical integration) (Berki, 1985; Gray & McNerney, 1986; Starr, 
1982). 
For example, hospitals are likely to approach decisions regarding the 
introduction of new medical technology under PPS differently than under cost-
based reimbursement. Before PPS, the additional costs of new technologies 
were fully covered; thus, hospitals had no reason to refrain from adopting them. 
Between 1977 and 1982, medical costs increased 107 percent and, according to 
the Office of Technology Assessment, approximately 28 percent of this increase 
was related to overuse of medical technology (American Medical News, 1984). 
Under PPS, new technologies that raise the cost of treating a case will have to 
compete with alternative (e.g., established) treatments and with alternative 
uses of funds (e.g., employee wage increases). It has been hypothesized that 
new medical technology may be at a disadvantage under PPS in that it offers 
uncertain benefits in the early stages of diffusion (Romeo et al., 1984). Others 
have argued that DRG-based PPS offers the opportunity to slow the flow of new 
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technology into the health care sector and thus moderate costs as well as more 
effectively evaluate new technology in terms of its impact on both the 
extension and quality of life (Lave, 1984). Although it has not been suggested 
that PPS will halt the adoption of new technology, it is suggested that hospitals, 
with their limited resources, will now need to assess new technology more 
closely and to ration resources more carefully (Berki, 198.5; OT A, 198.5). 
Strategies to selectively increase DRG revenues include: increasing 
admissions by treating patients as inpatients who might otherwise be treated on 
an ambulatory basis (Enthoven & Noll, 1984); breaking up of hospital stays into 
multiple admissions or readmitting patients for the same DRGs (Anderson & 
Steinberg, 1984); identifying and attracting relatively healthy patients within 
any given DRG by encouraging services associated with those patients (Berki, 
198.5; Frye, 1984; Stern & Epstein, 198.5); expanding medical staffs in profitable 
DRG specialties and reducing them in others (Bromberg, 1984; Omenn &: 
Conrad, 1984); adopting marketing practices aimed at relatively healthy 
patients (Seymour, 1984); and encouraging physicians to refer patients posing an 
expected financial burden to other hospitals, particularly to the VA and other 
public hospitals (Berki, 198.5; OT A, 198.5). 
In an attempt to increase revenues, for example, hospitals may assign 
patients to DRGs that will provide the greatest possible return. This is called 
"DRG Creep" (Lave, 1984; Simbourg, 1981; Stern &: Epstein, 1985). Hospitals 
may encourage physicians to consciously consider the payment implications of 
their medical record keeping and the assignment of- principal diagnosis upon 
discharge. In the past, accurate diagnosis and procedural coding were not as 
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critical to the payment process and many errors in coding, particularly omission 
of surgeries, appear to have occurred. Now hospitals are motivated to improve 
the accuracy of coding and to report codes that will maximize payment levels. 
While "upcoding" or "gaming the system" may be limited due to review 
processes in the system, it is still in the best interest of the hospital to obtain 
the most favorable DRG possible (Demkovich, 1983a; OTA, 198.5; Wehr, 1983a). 
A third option for hospitals is to expand services to less financially 
constrained or more profitable areas (e.g., satellite clinics, chemical 
dependency treatment, laboratory or other ancillary services, home health, 
outpatient surgery} or to phase out unprofitable cross-subsidized services (e.g., 
health promotion, social services} (Koch, 1988; Lave, 1984). Under such 
circumstances, the hospital is at a particular advantage in marketing pre-and-
post hospital services to its still hospitalized patients. This largely captive 
market for post-hospital home services, for instance, has led many hospitals to 
set up their own skilled nursing, rehabilitation and home health services 
(Caldwell, 1982; Koch, 1988; Lundberg, 1982; OTA, 198.5}. Likewise, because 
Medicare still pays hospitals for outpatient surgery on a cost basis, many expect 
this area to substantially expand as a result of PPS (Koch, 1988}. Moreover, 
PPS could increase expenditures for privately insured patients (Aaron, 1984; 
OTA, 198.5; Sheingold, 1986}. Because the PPS policy only affects Medicare 
patients, hospitals will have greater incentive to cost-shift their losses to 
private-charge payers, such as commercial insurers, some Blue Cross plans, and 
self-paying patients (Demkovich, 1983a). Thus, to the degree that a hospital is 
pressed by reduced reimbursements per Medicare case, it will have the 
incentive to shift these costs to non-Medicare patients to increase revenues 
from private sources. 
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Other Consequences 
Other anticipated consequences of PPS for the Medicare program include 
shifts in financing, from Part A to Part B, as PPS encourages changes in health 
care delivery from the inpatient hospital setting to the outpatient setting. 
Medicare expenditures for home health services and skilled nursing care are 
also likely to increase. While it is unclear how PPS will affect expenditures for 
other federal health programs, it is hypothesized that reductions in Part A 
payments may increase demand for VA medical care and Medicaid nursing home 
beds. In addition, the incentive for stays and reduced services under PPS may 
reduce physician visits to hospitalized patients and increase outpatient visits or 
visits to the physician's office (OT A, 1985). 
Urban/Rural Differences. In terms of the overall hospital system, PPS's 
nationally-based payment rates will redistribute surpluses among hospitals, 
with some losing and some gaining (Vladeck, 1985). The federal government 
designated lower DRG reimbursement rates on the assumption that labor and 
supplies cost less in rural versus urban areas. In the development of the 
reimbursement rates, HHS established 9 geographic regions within the United 
States and designated labor-related and non-labor-related DRG rates based on 
them. In each case, the rural reimbursement was lower. With the inception of 
the urban/rural classification, the American Hospital Association warned that 
geographic anomalies would result in unfair treatment of many hospitals 
(Mickel, 1984). The chairman of the American Small and Rural Hospital 
Association stated, "Something is wrong with the idea t.hat just because we're in 
a rural setting we should get less money" (Wallace, 1984, p. 48). 
Concern was expressed by many critics of the system that the arbitrary 
discrimination against rural hospitals would force many of them to close 
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(Spiegel & Kavaler, 1986). Although part of this redistribution was intended to 
reduce inefficiencies in management and patient care, at least part of the 
redistribution may be caused by the pricing mechanism itself (i.e., the DRG 
reimbursement rate) and thus, is beyond the hospital's control (Ashby & Palmer, 
1985). Furthermore, because DRGs are used as a proxy for the kind of care 
provided, hospitals are concerned that some DRGs, including the numerous 
catchall categories in which a variety of low-volume, high-intensity cases have 
been dumped, do not adequately account for the patient's severity of illness 
(Stanley, 1984). Both factors could mean major financial losses for some 
hospitals. 
Inefficient hospitals may not be able to adjust to PPS and therefore close, 
potentially leaving some communities without hospital services. Hospitals with 
high ratios of poor and/or indigent patients may be extremely vulnerable under 
the system. Moreover, because of the enormous variation in patient mix and 
cost patterns, some hospitals may be severely or unfairly penalized by the 
payment system whereas some hospitals will receive an unmerited windfall 
(Ashby & Palmer, 1985). The resulting redistribution generated by PPS may ~ 
produce any net savings to the Trust Fund (Vladeck, 1985). 
Physician/Hospital Relations. The physician-hospital relationship will also 
be affected by PPS. Hospital managers under PPS have powerful incentives to 
alter the practice patterns of physicians, specifically in ways that minimize 
costs (Berki, 1985; Spiegel & Kavaler, 1986). While physicians make the major 
decisions regarding placement of patients and ordering of services once the 
patient is hospitalized, management will attempt to limit length of stay and 
service intensity. Although physicians may be disposed to cooperate with 
116 
management's cost control efforts out of loyalty to the hospital, there may be 
limits to this cooperation (Berki, 1985). For example, physicians fear subtle and 
overt presures from management to alter practice styles, to selectively admit 
people who could be taken care of on an out-patient basis or not admit complex 
or high cost cases, and to shorten length of stay and reduce services to 
Medicare beneficiaries. 
Medical decision-making processes that show different patterns from peer 
practices will now be critical elements under PPS utilization review incentives. 
Areas for which physicians will be evaluated include: alternatives for care; 
efficiency in the process of care delivery; increased morbidity and mortality; 
readmissions; post-hospital experiences; readmissions; post-hospital mortality 
and inter-institutional transfers. HHS believes that medical ethical standards 
and fear of malpractice suits will inhibit poor care. Physicians, however, see 
the potiential for increased malpractice suits if patients begin to believe they 
are receiving less than optimal care, if they believe they have had incomplete 
workups or treatments, or if they have unfavorable outcomes {Spiegel & 
Kavaler, 1986). 
For example, defensive medicine operates to an unknown extent in this 
decision-making process. The incentive to protect oneself from possible 
litigation may counter-balance the incentive to reduce the intensity of services 
delivered. Hospitalization is an important source of income for physicians. In 
1981, 64 percent of physicians' Medicare services were provided in the inpatient 
setting, although only 24 percent of Medicare beneficiaries were hospitalized in 
that year (OTA, 1985). With so much income derived from hospitalization," 
physicians may be reluctant to cooperate with strategies designed to reduce it. 
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However, the most important concern about PPS in relation to health 
benefits is its impact on the quality of care. Although there is potential for the 
system to result in more "judicious" clinical decision-making, PPS could also 
diminish quality of care. As John Thompson, professor of Public Health at Yale 
University and one of the developers of the DRG classification system, has 
stated: "Quality assurance under prospective pricing is the most serious ethical 
question raised by DRGs" (Friedman, 1985, p. 30). 
PPS AND THE QUALITY OF CARE 
Deterioration in the quality of care is anticipated under systems of 
financing that emphasize productivity and efficiency rather than patient needs 
or satisfaction. As Spiegel and Kavaler (1986) point out: 
Under PPS, management is rewarded for decisions by 
physicians and clinicians who react to pressures from 
utilization review committees, discharge planners, and 
complex computer analysis of peer profiles, rather than 
for diagnostic accuracy, therapeutic triumphs, and 
saiubrious outcomes of the patient's episode of illness (p. 
427). 
Hospitals are expected to limit their financial liabilities by altering their 
service capabilities, such as specialization in high yield DRGs; elimination of 
high cost, low yield services; cuts in staff or curtailed acquisition of new 
medical technology, as a means of cost savings. The shift from "more is better" 
to "less is more" emphasizes cost containment rather than attention to health 
care access and quality of care (Pointer & Ross, 1984). 
Quality of In-patient Care 
Hospitals may curtail certain expensive services in favor of more 
profitable areas of care. This could limit the range of services available in a 
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community or region (Mahoney, 1982). Yet others argue that concentrating 
certain diagnostic and therapeutic abilities in select institutions can actually 
heighten quality of care since staff expertise and experience have been shown 
to affect morbidity and mortality outcomes (Spiegel & Kavaler, 1986). 
However, Ed Mihalski (1984, staff member of the Senate Finance Committee, is 
concerned that: 
Reducing costs and potentially maxtm1zmg 
profits ••• creates a real worry that hospitals would also 
reduce the amount of care and therefore, the quality of 
care provided to their patients ••• Hospitals could do that 
through early discharges, inappropriate admissions, or by 
simply providing less care than a patient would need (p. 
45). 
The ability to order tests or to do procedures may be impeded as physician's 
practice patterns come under peer review. This may also hinder full diagnostic 
workups or limit treatment options for patients as physicians who do not 
"conform" may be denied access for their patients and may be barred from 
hospital privileges. The final consequence of PPS on quality of care may be to 
end the era of a physician's freedom to offer a patient anything that might help 
and the beginning of an era of rationing care (Boyle, 1984). 
Restructuring staffing patterns under PPS in order to reduce costs and 
increase efficiency, i.e., through layoffs, hiring freezes, flexible staffing (e.g., 
using per diems, on-calls), changing staff mix or consolidating jobs, is a by-
product of reduced length of stay, shifts to outpatient services and general 
pressures to reduce costs. These actions will have definite implications for 
quality of care. Inadequate staffing ratios and changing the mix of professional 
and ancillary personnel does save money, but also affects all direct patient 
contact services, may delay or hamper recuperation, and may even increase 
changes in hospital-based morbidity or mortality (Spiegler &: Kavaler, 1986). 
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Physicians are now having to confront the cost impact of their decision-
making as the once passive institutional managers become more aggressive in 
their actions to maintain hospital solvency and prosperity. For example, 
utilization review committees were predicted to be given broad responsibility 
and stringent authority to monitor physician/hospital behavior for compliance 
to DRG programmatic goals. These committees are charged with keeping 
readmissions under scrutiny and to reduce unnecessary admissions. 
Data are now being collected and systematically analyzed in order to 
develop local practice patterns for each DRG, which can be used to measure 
physician behavior. From the data, physician "winners" and "losers" are 
identified and administrative pressure is being applied to losers to alter their 
practice patterns (Hardwick, 1983). Such analyses can reduce repetitive orders 
for expensive lab tests, eliminate standing orders, encourage prompt 
consultation with specialists, evaluate the efficacy of therapeutic procedures, 
eliminate ineffective treatments, and avoid weekend admissions for elective 
procedures (Spiegel & Kavaler, 1986). However, while the effects of these 
pressures on physician's treatment patterns and on quality of care are not easily 
measured, it has been predicted that these pressures could result in tension 
between physicians and management over treatment (i.e., cookbook medicine) 
and the replacement of careful clinical judgment by tests and procedures that 
are easy to administer but may cost more in the long run (Rucker, 1984; 
Vladeck, 1984). 
Access to care may also be inhibited. While the responsibility for 
admitting a patient lies primarily with the physician; under DRGs, the 
admitting diagnosis will be scrutinized. If it does not meet certain criteria 
120 
(e.g., can the patient be treated elsewhere, winner or loser DRG, can patient 
pay, does admission conform to rules, etc.), access to care may be denied. 
Specifically affected in these cases would be the poor, elderly, and uninsured; 
that is, those with existing access limitations and who most often have 
extensive, expensive multiple diseases and need acute medical care (Kinzer, 
1984; Reiman, 1985; Spiegel & Kavaler, 1986). 
Perverse admitting practices might also evolve since "there will be no 
incentive whatever in such a system to care for healthier patients in less costly 
outpatient settings" (Anderson, 1983). There will be strong incentives to 
increase readmissions due to reduced length of stay and concern over premature 
discharge. Early discharge patients may get sick again or deteriorate in post-
hospital care settings. Prompt readmission, called "churning", is a possible 
result. In these cases, hospitals will be paid twice for the "same" illness/injury 
resulting in a "gaming" of the DRG system (Spiegel &: I<avaler, 1986). 
Quality of Post-Hospital Care 
Some policy analysts, senior advocates, physicians and critics of PPS fear 
that the new reimbursement system will alter the locus of care for Medicare 
beneficiaries since the incentives focus on shortening hospital stay and reducing 
services. It is hypothesized that shorter stays will shift care previously 
delivered in the hospital to nursing homes and home care settings. Sicker 
patients could be discharged, possibly before their medical problem is resolved, 
increasing their risk of readmission, extended recuperation, or death. This is 
especially true for those elderly patients with certain diagnoses or multiple 
and/or chronic health problems. There is concern that attempts to save money 
by early discharge of patients will have an adverse impact on the outcomes of 
care. 
Cure rates will be much lower and patients are likely to 
have multiple admissions if they are discharged 
prematurely. Although this may be better economically 
for the hospital, it is certainly not in keeping with good 
medical practice (Farber, 1985, p. 18) 
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Although the shift in care to settings outside the hospital may be appropriate 
for some DRGs, it may not be for others. Moreover, the savings in hospital 
costs may be more than offset by equal or greater costs in other delivery 
systems (OTA, 1985). 
There are other potential problems with PPS. There is a limit to the 
extent that hospitals can reduce utilization. Other than shortening stays, it is 
unclear how physicians and hospitals will actually alter their basic care 
methods. Further, the impact of shortened stays on the post-hospital care 
system is not known. It is not clear whether post-hospital care providers, 
including nursing homes, home health agencies and community service 
organizations are equipped to handle "sicker" patients or if beds/services are 
even available. 
Moreover, because of the high intensity care needed by these patients 
and/or the limited coverage for a skilled nursing facility under Medicare, 
nursing homes may avoid accepting too many Medicare patients. In addition, 
since Medicaid reimbursement rates for skilled care often are insufficient to 
cover costs, nursing homes may limit the number of Medicaid patients as well. 
These issues are particularly important to certain groups within the Medicare 
population, such as the aged disabled, the very old, and the aged poor, all of 
whom have special health and socio-economic characteristics that make them 
particularly vulnerable to the PPS incentives. These groups are likely to be 
most affected because they require more intensive (and, thus, more expensive) 
122 
care for a given type of illness episode. Hospitals might tend to view these 
patients as potential money losers under PPS and choose not to serve them. 
Furthermore, as a result of a growing older population (i.e., 75+), the 
number of chronic care patients, in both hospitals and the community, has 
increased. Shortages of nursing home beds and available community-based 
services have pointed out the need for a coordinated, comprehensive long-term 
care service system. Some have argued that hospitals should begin to provide 
long term care (e.g., Champion et al., 1983) to address this growing problem. 
However, the implementation of DRGs is expected to compound the problem by 
discharging patients with high intensity, sub-acute care needs to community 
care, traditionally the place where chronic care patients are cared for. 
The potential is there for the sub-acute care patients to push chronic care 
patients out of community care settings and back onto their families. Burdens 
are being placed on families, home health agencies and nursing homes as a 
result of early discharge of patients in need of high levels of care. A great deal 
of anecdotal evidence suggests that the elderly are being forced out of the 
hospital 11early11 , often by being told that their Medicare benefits have 11run out11 
(Davis, 1985). Many elderly with serious health problems, especially the frail 
elderly, appear to be having trouble caring for themselves at home following 
discharge, particularly if there is no one at home to help them (Senate Finance 
Committee, 1986). 
Quality Assurance Under PPS 
Federal mechanisms were mandated in the PPS legislation to monitor and 
assure quality of care under the DRG system. Utilization and quality control 
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Peer Revei w Organizations (PROs) were established as the designated medical 
review entities responsible for determining a variety of quality issues for 
Medicare beneficiaries; e.g., medical necessity, appropriateness, etc. PROs 
also have the responsibility to validate DRG classifications. Furthermore, the 
Health Care Financing Administration (HCFA) was required by the Tax Equity 
and Fiscal Responsibility Act (TEFRA) of 1982 to establish an admissions 
monitoring system indepentent of the PROs. In addition to the utilization 
review activities of HCFA and the PROs, P.L. 98-21 of the Social Security 
Amendments of 1983 established an independent organization, called the 
SuperPro, to review the work of the state PROs. Thus, if HFCA or a PRO 
determines that a hospital is engaged in unacceptable admissions, medical or 
other practices, HCF A may deny Medicare payments to the hospital or may 
require the hospital to take corrective action. Finally, Congress. set up an 
independent commission, called the Prospective Payment Assessment 
Commission (ProPAC), to monitor DRG payment rates and make 
recommendations to the Secretary of HHS regarding changes in the DRG 
system. 
PROs. Congress was also concerned about the impact of PPS on the quality 
of care. The Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982 (TEFRA) had 
replaced some 190 Professional Standards Review Organizations (PSROs}, 
established in 1972 to guard against unnecessary hospital admissions and 
procedures that added to the cost of Medicare and to monitor quality of care, 
with a utilization and quality control peer review pr:ogram called Professional 
Review Organizations (PROs}. Although PSROs had survived for more than a 
decade, they were continually surrounded in controversy until, in 1981, the 
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Reagan Administration proposed terminating them. Congress, however, 
believed the concept of peer review was important enough to salvage the 
program, especially in light of the potential for abuse with the new 
reimbursement system being implemented under Medicare. 
PROs were mandated to review (1) admissions, for medical necessity and 
appropriateness; (2) procedure review, to screen operating room procedures for 
necessity; (3) admission pattern monitoring, to determine the appropriateness of 
admissions and discharges; (4) outlier review, to determine if the stay contained 
non-covered, medically unnecessary or inappropriate days or services; (5) DRG 
validation, to assure that the DRG assigned is proper; and {6) coverage review, 
to assure application of all technical and medical coverage rules to the claims 
made for covered services (Demkovich, 1982a,b; Fessler & Wehr, 1983a,b; 
Spiegler & Kavaler, 1986; Wehr, 1983a,b). Although the aims of the two 
organizations were essentially the same, the new programs had more specific 
objectives to meet and fewer federal rules telling them how to meet them. 
However, critics of the program charged that the cost-cutting component of 
the mandate could jeopardize the quality of care the organizations were trying 
to monitor if the rules were overly restrictive (Demkovich, 1985, 1983c). 
To avoid some of the problems that plagued the old PSRO program, 
Congress simplified the rules. · For example, there would only be one PRO per 
state. In addition, Congress directed the new peer review groups to specify 
objectives or goals so that there would be some basis for judging their 
performance, a serious problem with PSROs. But the PRO system got off to a 
shaky start with the Health Care Financing Administration (HCF A) balking at 
publishing final rules for the program. This delayed the contracting process for 
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well over a year. Thus, "quality" under PPS, in effect, went unmonitored as 
PROs and the Health Care Financing Administration (HCF A) battled over 
technicalities in the final rules. Adding to the controversy were the cost 
objectives established by HCFA, which some critics characterized as "quotas" 
on care, which HCFA negotiated with the PROs for reducing unnecessary 
admissions and procedures (Demkovich, 1985). 
The American Hospital Association (AHA) stated that HCFA could have 
expressed the cost objectives in ranges, (i.e., reducing admissions from 1 to 5 
percent), instead of setting specific numerical goals, but did not (Vladeck, 
1984). If the PROs meet the contractual requirements over the first two years 
of the program, more than one million hospital admissions will be eliminated; 
including some 595,000 inpatient surgeries (which will be shifted to outpatient 
settings), the elimination of more than 425,000 admissions, and the elimination 
of more than 290,000 unnecessary or inappropriate admissions or procedures. In 
addition, the goals call for 32,000 complications and 6,000 deaths to be averted 
under the program (Spiegel & Kavaler, 1986). 
Physicians argued that the arbitrary nature of the numerical goals for 
reduction of hospital mortality and morbidity, as set between PROs, HCFA, and 
hospitals created an atmosphere where physicians believed they must send 
patients home to die rather than allowing them to die in the hospital and 
relegates physicians to the status of assembly line workers who are expected to 
meet production figures (Speer, 1984). Dr. Thomas Devlin, vice president of the 
American Peer Review Association, said that PRO ojectives, though laudable, 
have several medical liability implications and "are politically volatile with its 
presumption of widespread negligence" (American Medical News, 1984, p. 4). 
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Another problem with the PRO is that when an administrative error has 
been made, the government can deny payment even if it is later determined 
that the care the hospital provided was necessary and appropriate. Hospitals 
fear that they will have no avenue of appeal. A related problem concerns the 
"waiver of liability" in which hospitals that provide services in good faith were, 
under the old Medicare rules, able to obtain a waiver protecting them for 2 • .5 
percent of erroneous claims, even if questions arose later about the necessity of 
the procedure or whether Medicare would cover it. Under PPS, PROs have been 
given authority to revoke the waiver and deny payment retroactively. That 
threat could have dire consequences for some hospitals (Spiegler & Kavaler, 
1986). 
Moreover, the PROs themselves were concerned about the final rules of 
the program. Specifically, they were concerned that the government did not 
put enough money into the program to make it successful. The $300 million 
over a two year contract period is only 1/3 of one percent of the amount 
Medicare will pay hospitals over the same period. PROs contend that there will 
not be enough money to ensure fulfillment of the goals set by HCF A. 
PROs were also concerned that the review component outlined by HCF A is 
not comprehensive enough to ensure quality and cost control. For example, 
PROs do not have authority to review outpatient services, which are expected 
to increase under PPS. Furthermore, PROs feel that some of the categories 
they must review are unnecessary; such as reducing unavoidable deaths which 
hospitals have enough incentive to do under PPS anyway. American Medical 
Association (AMA) officials have voiced reservations about the review 
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component of the program also. In some cases, says the AMA, the government 
does not have reliable data to back up the numerical objectives it has 
negotiated with the PROs. Having been burned under PSROs, it appeared to the 
AMA that HCF A was trying to tighten all loopholes (Spiegel & Kavaler, 1986). 
Senior advocates have taken a cautious view of PROs. The major concerns 
for the elderly were that patients might be billed by the hospital for their care 
if a PRO review resulted in a denial of payment. This contingency was 
outlawed under the PPS legislation. Another concern was that hospitals would 
begin shifting some elderly patients to outpatient settings, not because such 
treatment is more appropriate, but because outpatient clinics would be under 
less intense scrutiny by the PROs. 
Despite the reservations about PROs, most observers seemed to agree that 
the PROs had a better chance of succeeding than the old PSROs but cautioned 
that while the PROs are the "great hope" for beneficiaries' quality assurance, 
the government's fixation on numerical standards, and thereby costs, has 
overshadowed what should be the primary goal of peer review; that is, assuring 
that the elderly receive quality care. 
SuperPRO. A second quality assurance capability in the PPS legislation 
involved the establishment of a program to monitor the 54 designated PRO 
programs; one for each state, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico and Guam 
and Samoa. The objectives of the SuperPRO, as the monitoring organization 
came to be labeled, provisions were to ensure- that the PROs were in 
compliance with the negotiated performance-based goals contracted with 
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the Health Care Financing Administration (HCF A). The program was designed 
to oversee all PRO activities and would evaluate and monitor the progress of 
the Prospective Payment System as a whole (American Medical News, 19&5a). 
The SuperPro is to provide quarterly evaluation and monthly reports on the 
appropriateness of the medical review decision-processes of the PROs and to 
verify PRO physician's determinations of denials. Problems with the PRO 
system surfaced early in the SuperPro reviews as PRO agencies which were not 
formerly PSROs were having difficulties in start-up, development of data bases, 
staffing, and review delays. By July, 1986, three of the original 54 PRO 
contracts had been cancelled (Spiegel &: Kavaler, 19&6). 
Critics of the PPS legislation contend that the SuperPRO is merely a 
watchdog for HCF A and that the focus of the Super PRO is to keep the PROs in 
line with the cost-cutting focus of the Health Care Financing Administration. 
Quality assurance for the elderly beneficiary, in or out of the hospital, is not a 
primary concern of this organization. 
The Prospective Payment Assessment Commission. A third quality review 
element in the PPS legislation was the establishment of an indepenent 
commission to review DRG rate increases proposed by the Secretary of HHS 
and monitor the implementation of the PPS system. P.L. 98-21 required the 
Director of the Congressional Office of Technology Assessment (OT A) to 
appoint, by April I, 1984~ a commission of 15 independent health care experts 
to a Prospective Payment Assessment Commission (_E:)roPAC). The Commission 
is required to (1) review the percentage increase used to update the DRG 
payment rates for FY 1984 and 1985 and to make recommendations to the 
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Secretary on the appropriate percentage change for fiscal years beginning with 
FY 1986; (2) consult with and make recommendations to the Secretary 
concerning the need for adjustments to the DRG classifications and the 
methodology for classifying specific hospital discharges with the DRGs; and (3) 
report to Congress its evaluation of any adjustments which the Secretary makes 
(Grimaldi & Micheletti, 1983; Spiegel & Kavaler, 1986). 
Members of the Commission have included representatives from hospital 
administration, nursing, state rate setting agencies, insurance companies, 
private practice physicians, proprietary hospitals, organized labor, medical 
schools, and hospital supply firms. In an interview in Hospitals (1984), Dr. 
Stuart Altman, Chairman of ProPAC, stated that ProPAC had no final authority 
and could only make recommendations to the Secretary although, since ProPAC 
was essentially an extension of Congress and under the jurisdiction of the 
Office of Technology Assessment (OTA), the Secretary would "weigh ProPAC's 
advice carefully." The most important thing ProPAC has to do, according to 
Altman, is "be a truly honest broker" to all constituencies and "to operate as a 
surrogate for the competitive marketplace" by reacting appropriately to the ups 
and downs of the health care system (Hospitals, 1984, p. 11). Thus, the focus 
of the Commission was on DRG price revisions and not quality of care. 
The Commission established three working subcommittees covering the 
following areas: (1) Data Development and Research; (2) Hospital Productivity 
and Cost Effectiveness; and (3) Diagnostic and Therapeutic Practices. 
However, with an extremely limited budget and a mandated staff level of only 
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2.5, it is clear that ProPAC had a difficult task facing them if they were to 
evaluate the "safety, efficiency and cost effectiveness of new and existing 
medical and surgical procedures" in order to make recommendations to 
Congress (Hospitals, 1984, p. 11). 
ProPAC met for the first time on December 19, 1983, and met seven times 
in 1984. The focus of the Commission that year was the "workings of the DRG 
system in the real world'' and to suggest adjustments that needed to be made 
(Iglehart, 1984, p. 20). However, Dr. David Banta, a physician and staff person 
at the Office of Technology Assessment, characterized the Commission as only 
"a tool for considering social goals and use of technology" (Lesparre, 1984, p. 
29). The first ProPAC report, sent to Congress on April 1, 198.5, had 21 
recommendations; 16 of them concerned the updating factor for hospital rates 
while the remainder addressed adjustments of DRG classifications and weights 
(Spiegel & Kavaler, 1986). Action was also recommended on improving labor 
market area definitions and on hospitals serving a disproportionate share of 
low-income patients. ProPAC did not recommend the development of a 
severity of illness index to the DRGs, a provision the hospitals wanted. 
However, the hospitals saw the recommendations as better than the no increase 
payment freeze advocated by the Reagan Administration (Medical World News, 
1985:i). 
The second report by ProPAC, presented to Congress on April 1, 1986, had 
33 recommendations, most of them concerned with update factors; revising the 
formula for inpatient deductible contributions; phasing capital payments into 
PPS by FY 1987; incorporating technological change into the DRG rates; and 
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recommendation:. concerning adjustments for labor markets in urban and rural 
areas. In addition, the Commission recommendations included two related to 
quality of care issues, one, a recommendation on the kind of information to be 
given to a Medicare beneficiary about PPS and length of stay and two, a 
recommendation that PROs review the entire episode of care as well as 
selected outpatient surgery procedures to assess quality in other than inpatient 
settings. 
Even with the provisions for quality of care a:.sessment contained in the 
PPS legislation, there are critics who believe that the Medicare hospital 
reimbursement changes were enacted without sufficient examination of the 
potential impact. Nor was there any evaluation whether the New Jersey 
program, which served as the basis for the Medicare program, had been 
sufficiently tested to determine if it were suitable as a model for the 
nationwide program. Even supporters of the PPS system have raised questions 
about its impact. Will the system achieve sufficient savings? Others are 
concerned about the impact on the hospital system (e.g., whether the DRG 
payment rates are large enough to adequately pay hospitals for their services). 
Finally, the impact of the program on elderly beneficiaries has been of 
concern. For example, will quality of care change under PPS? What does the 
implementation of a DRG-based prospective payment system mean for the 
patient/consumer? Will medical care differ? Will the patient be able to 
recognize any differences? In testimony before a U. s. Senate Subcommittee 
on Health hearing on PPS, Plunkett (Senate Subcommittee on Health, 1983), 
cautioned: 
A prospective payment system, especially one based on 
DRGs, would do nothing to alleviate the problem for the 
consumer of health services. It would not make services 
more available, it would not encourage alternative 
services, and in all likelihood, would make services for 
many types of illnesses, injuries and diseases more 
difficult to access (p. 344). 
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While a number of studies on the impact of PPS on the health care system 
were mandated by Congress in the legislation, most of the emphasis of this 
research has been on hospitals or the DRGs themselves. In addition, the review 
processes established by Congress for quality of care oversight (e.g., PROs, 
ProPAC) have serious flaws regarding their focus and their ability to carry out 
beneficiary related quality of care evaluations. This emphasis on providers 
obscures the potential consequences of PPS for consumers of health care 
(Rosenblum, 1985). 
Much remains unknown about the PPS's effects on the Medicare patient. It 
is presumed that the primary method hospitals will use to remain profitable 
within the PPS system will be shortening length of stay and reducing ancillary 
services. It is possible that, for certain DRGs, shorter lengths of stay will have 
little or no effect on the discharge status and/or follow-up care needs. For 
other, more complex diagnoses, shorter stays may mean a different and/or more 
intensive mix of follow-up services. Thus, the question as to whether the 
patient "looks" different or has different "treatment needs" at discharge than 
similar patients discharged prior to the PPS system's implementation is an 
important one. Has the DRG-based Prospective Payment System changed the 
pattern of post-hospital placements (e.g., more needing home health services or 
going into nursing homes than before PPS)? As Meiners and Coffey (1983) point 
out: 
It is important to know about the characteristics of 
patients most subject to increased pressure for earlier 
discharge for two reasons. First, successful discharge 
planning will depend on early identification of the 
patients most likely to have unreimbursed days. Second, 
a successful discharge program requires planning and 
development of the necessary extended care services (p. 
10). 
RESEARCH ISSUES 
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The uncertainties surrounding the direction, strength and pace of the 
impacts of Medicare's prospective payment system have sparked widespread 
concern that PPS poses a substantial threat to the health care system and 
argues for the provision of valid and timely data on its actual impacts (OT A, 
1985). Two Congressional committees concerned about the impacts of PPS 
(Senate Aging Committee, Senate Finance Committee) commissioned the 
Office of Technology Assessment (OTA) in 1984, after the implementation of 
the DRG-based system, to identify the types of economic, technological and 
health-related effects that might result from the implementation of PPS and to 
develop a series of strategies that would provide a framework for the 
evaluation of the most important effects of PPS. The first in a series of 
reports was published in October, 1985. It identified five important dimensions 
of health system performance that should be considered when evaluating PPS 
impacts including: expenditures and costs, quality of care, access to care, 
technological change and clinical research (OTA, 1985). A key issue is that PPS 
has intensified the concern with the complex relationship between cost and 
quality of medical care. 
Assessing PPS impacts on quality of care is critical for several reasons. 
First, if PPS succeeds in containing expenditure growth for the Medicare 
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program, its effect on the quality of care will be a deciding factor on the 
program's continued survival. Second, PPS incentives for the amount and mix 
of inpatient services provided to the elderly differ markedly from the 
incentives of cost-based payment, yet the limited research on such prospective 
payment systems has provided equivocal results. Third, widespread concern 
among professional groups, including physicians, nurses, and hospital 
associations as well as advocates for the elderly, that PPS might pose a 
substantial threat to quality of care has made quality a central issue in any 
discussion of PPS (Select Committee on Aging, 198.5; Senate Finance 
Committee, 1986; Stern & Epstein, 198.5; Washington Report, 198.5). 
A factor complicating the evaluation of PPS's impact on quality of care, 
however, is that there is no accepted universal standard of quality. Further, 
changes due to PPS will vary in terms of their seriousness, their timing, their 
measurability and their distribution among patients, payers, and providers 
(OT A, 198.5). For example, highly visible or easily measured effects are likely 
to be the most serious (death, inappropriate readmission) and are likely to be 
concentrated among a few groups of patients, such as the very old, mentally ill, 
disabled, patients in specific DRGs, or those seeking care at particular kinds of 
hospitals. More subtle effects, such as the impact of PPS on recuperation or 
quality of life, are likely to be more difficult to measure and will emerge over 
time rather than immediately. Furthermore, the timing of all PPS effects will 
be extremely difficult to predict and will be mitigated as slack in the system 
masks their impactc 'IJn short, although some effects. of PPS on quality of care 
may surface relatively early, other effects that are equally or more important 
may take some years to be detected or documented'' (OTA, 198.5, p. 77). 
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In addition, three elements make up the PPS system: one, it is a system of 
expenditure control; two, it restructures financial incentives to hospitals; and 
three, it uses Diagnosis' Related Groups (DRG5) a5 the ba5i5 for cla55ifying 
patient5 for payment. These three elements will be difficult to distinguish from 
one another in terms of their impact. Many of the changes occurring as a result 
of PPS might well have come about through any system of financial controls on 
Medicare expenditures for ho5pital care. Other changes, such as reductions in 
length of hospital stay, can be expected under any per case payment method. In 
fact, decreases in lengths of stay were already occurring within the health care 
system prior to the implementation of PPS. 
Moreover, other effects on the availability and use of medical technologie5 
can be related to the peculiar characteristics of the DRG patient cla55ification 
system itself rather than the control of expenditures (OT A, 1985). For 
example, the DRG system classifies hospitalized Medicare patients into a 
specific number of mutually exclusive and exhaustive categories. It necessarily 
groups patients with heterogeneous medical and surgical needs. The result is 
that the DRG to which a patient is assigned determines how profitable (or 
unprofitable) t.he patient may be for the hospital. 
Without detailed analyses of how observed changes in the utilization and 
organization of services affect quality and cost of health care, little can be said 
about the ultimate success or failure of PPS. Certain methodological obstacles 
constrain the development of an accurate view of PPS including: the difficulty 
in operationalizing concepts such as quality, access and technological change; 
the lack of refined impact measure& and current data bases by which to set 
baselines and measure changes; the limited feasibility of attributing observed 
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changes to PPS due to other changes in the system; and the cost and time 
required to measure changes and impacts (OTA, 1985). A number of changes 
resulting from PPS can be evaluated despite these constraints. The importance 
of such evaluation is that it could provide early detection of unintended 
consequences of PPS as well as for short-term positive results. 
Research Question 
The question to be addressed by this dissertation is whether a sample of 
Medicare patients differed from a sample of beneficiaries after the 
implementation of the DRG-based Prospective Payment System. SpeCifically, 
this dissertation will examine beneficiary health status and post-hospital 
placement as the first step in more comprehensive evaluations of the DRG-
based Prospective Payment System of Medicare. 
CONCLUSION 
For a considerable period after the Second World War, the federal 
government's health care policy focused on stimulating supply to meet an 
increasing public demand. The United States has supported an expanding 
federal role in social and medical insurance over the past forty years as its 
major public policy tool for improving the standard of living, health and income 
security for the poor, elderly, and disadvantaged. In addition, tax subsidies in 
support of private health insurance assured adequate coverage and access to the 
most advanced health care system for most of the population. 
As a major contributor to these costs, the federal government, facing 
massive budget deficits and expecting high increases in the Medicare program 
137 
(the Medicare budget was expected to double to $110 billion by 1987), approved 
sweeping policy changes designed to curtail program growth and begin a process 
of reordering the incentives that had driven the system since the program began 
(Iglehart, 1985). 
The legislation, the 1983 amendments to the Social Security Act, was the 
centerpiece of the Reagan Administration's efforts to control costs and 
established a national set of per-case prices in 467 diagnosis-related groups 
(DRGs) for care delivered to Medicare beneficiaries. The Prospective Payment 
System (PPS) shifts hospital reimbursement from retrospective payment to 
prospective rate setting. The government intended this change to create 
financial incentives for hospitals to deliver services in the most efficient 
manner by making cost a consideration in health care treatment decisions. 
While these changes could improve quality of care, quality could also be 
compromised. Premature discharge may necessitate readmissions, illness 
treatable at an early stage could progress undetected to a more serious degree, 
or patients could be forced to acquire follow-up care in inappropriate settings. 
The potential is there for expenditures to be so constrained that adequate care 
is impossible and patient outcomes seriously compromised (OTA, 1985). 
Saving money in the Medicare program is important, but so is maintaining 
access to medical care and the quality of care. It must be recognized that a 
national preoccupation with costs may adversely effect quality of care, 
especially for the elderly. It is vital to evaluate PPS. Specifically, what are 
the costs of cost containment? Are cost reductions coming at the expense of 
needed care for vulnerable groups through premature discharge of elderly 
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patients? Learning whether patients are being discharged from the hospitals 
"quicker" and "sicker" and whether there are changes in their placement in the 
community are important first steps in evaluating the broader impact of DRG-
based PPS and will, when added to hospital-based information, show a more 
accurate picture of the changes taking place in the health care system. This 
dissertation addresses this very important first step in the evaluation of PPS on 
quality of care. The next chapter delineates the methodology used in the 
conduct of the dissertation. 
CHAPTEJR.m 
METHODOLOGY 
Given the importance of quality of care issues under PPS, this dissertation 
focuses on the impact PPS may be having on the Medicare beneficiary. The 
specific question is whether PPS may be inappropriately shifting the locus of 
care for Medicare beneficiaries from the hospital to the community by 
shortening length of stay, discharging Medicare patients "quicker and sicker", 
and increasing the number of Medicare beneficiaries needing subacute care 
from community-based care providers. There has been little systematic data 
published on this critical issue to date. 
The research upon which this disc;ertation is based is derived from an 
original research project conducted by the staff of Northwest Oregon Health 
Systems (NOHS) during 1985 and 1986. The study measured the changes in 
Medicare beneficiary health status at hospital discharge before and after the 
implementation of PPS. This dissertation is unique and separate from the 
NOHS Dependency at Discharge (1986) study in that, while utilizing the 
Dependency measurement tool developed for the NOHS study, it extends this 
work by examining Dependency in relation to changes in the discharge 
di~position of Medicare patients to community-based care providers before and 
after the implementation of PPS. 
This dissertation can also be distinguished from the NOHS study in that it 
identifies and describes the broader changes occurring in the health care system 
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besides PPS and discusses the impacts all of these changes are having on the 
traditional health care system. Finaily, this disseration addresses a variety of 
health policy implications raised by the potential shift in the locus of care of 
Medicare beneficiaries created by the implementation of PPS. 
QUALITY OF CARE 
While Medicare's PPS system is expected to impact cpality of care in a 
variety of ways, quality remains "poorly defined" (OT A, 19&.5, p. 7&). Two 
terms are frecpently used in the literature of health care quality -- "quality 
assessment" and "quality assurance." Quality assessment refers to 
measurement and evaluation of the quality of care for individuals, groups, or 
populations. Quality assurance, in contrast, refers to integrated programs that 
attempt to protect or raise quality of care by monitoring medical care delivery, 
taking corrective action when problems are found, and following up on 
corrective actions. Historically, quality assurance programs have focused on 
changing the behavior of individual providers, such as physicians within a 
hospital setting. The Professional Review Organizations (PROs) within the 
Medicare program are the major example of quality assurance efforts. 
Although quality assessment and quality assurance are often used 
interchangeably, it is the distinctive attribute of quality assessment, in the 
context of evaluating the care of individuals as a result of PPS, which is the 
focus of this dissertation. 
Measures of q..Jality of care fall into three categories: structure, process, 
and outcome (Donabedian, 1966). Structure and process fall within the quality 
domain while outcome tends to be classified as a quality assessment function. 
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Structure refers to the relatively fixed and stable parts of the medical care 
delivery system, such as numbers, types, and qualifcations of professional 
personnel, physical facilities, and medical technologies. Criteria for structural 
factors are set by professional associations, regulatory bodies, or legislation and 
are used for accreditation, licensing, and Medicare certification purposes (OT A, 
1985). Process measures involve the care of the patient, such as the application 
of medical procedures, drugs, nursing care, and so forth. For the most part, the 
process of care is evaluated against implicit or explicit criteria that reflect 
professional norms of practice. Process measures are more tentative indicators 
of quality, although some do correlate with outcomes, such as "handwashing 
reduces infection," "pap smears improve the likelihood of detecting cervical 
cancer," "nursing care can reduce or prevent bedsores and skin ulcers" (OT A, 
1985, p. 79). In most instances, developing the criteria for linking the process 
of care to outcome can be developed through either the consensus of experts 
(usually physicians), the accumulation of evidence from clinical practice, or 
clinical trials and research. However, for every example of a "probable 
process-outcome link, there is one for which the evidence is equivocal" (OT A, 
1985, p. 79). 
The best example of this is length of stay. A study by the Office of 
Technology Assessment (OTA) in 1983 concluded that variations in length of 
hospital stay for five diseases were not shown to be related to differences in 
health outcomes {Chassen, 1983). Acute myocardial infarction or elective 
surgery patients who were discharged "early" fared no worse than those with 
traditionally longer lengths of stay. In psychiatric disorders, shorter lengths of 
stay were shown to be beneficial. There is little consensus in the medical 
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profession regarding what is an "appropriate" length of stay for any given 
diagnosis. Thus, links between much of the process of medical care and 
eventual patient outcomes have not been well demonstrated. Consequently, 
judging quality by process measures (i.e., length of stay) is questionable, tends 
to give an incomplete picture and gives no clues as to likely outcomes for 
patients (Brook & Lohr, 198.5). 
Outcomes are seen as the. result of patient care and are more direct 
reflections of patient benefits since they are measures of changes in the 
patient's health status. Although health statu'i itself has many dimensions, such 
as the level of functioning in activitie'i of daily living, emotional health, 
physiologic functioning, satisfaction with care, health status has most 
frequently been defined to include the physical, mental, and social well-being of 
individuals (OT A, 198.5). Examples of such evaluation are, at a macro level, 
made in terms of death or presence of illness or disability and, at a more 
specific level, in terms of pre'ience or absence of fever or infection, the level 
of functioning of a specific organ, and so forth. These measures are relatively 
unambiguous but they tend to be insensitive to small or incremental changes in 
medical practice. Furthermore, outcomes need to be evaluated over time: the 
patient's health status at the time of discharge from a hospital may or may not 
indicate his or her health status in a week, month, or a year. Another drawback 
is that the collection of data on outcomes may be very expensive and intrusive 
if, for instance, patients must be interviewed or examined directly (OTA, 198.5). 
Theoretically, then, measures of quality of health care should use specific 
measures in all three categories (structure, process, outcome). However, this 
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rarely has occurred. For example, the Health Care Financing Administration 
has used an outcome measure, in-hospital mortality rates by specific diagnosis, 
to evaluate the quality of hospital care. But this method does not capture all 
three parameters of quality and has been roundly criticized as simplifying the 
relationship between a complex set of variables that may result in mortality; 
for example, severity of illness at hospital admission or differences in physician 
practice patterns may influence outcomes as well as diagnosis (Vladeck, 1985). 
Other studies have examined frequency of procedures in relation to patient 
outcome (Flood, Scott, & Eury, 1984a,b; Hadley, 1982; and Wennberg, 1982, 
1984a,b; ) and readmission rates (e.g., Guterman &: Dobson, 1986). However, 
these analyses have primarily been used for purposes other than comprehensive 
quality of care evaluations (OTA, 1985). 
Current research on PPS/beneficiary impact has been limited to anecdotal 
reports, surveys of service providers or beneficiaries, and policy-related 
speculations on the impact of the PPS system on the Medicare population (GAO, 
1985; Tatge, 1985; Murray, 1984). While PPS may cut costs, demographic 
trends along with advances in medical technology may push costs up again. 
With rising costs for hospitalization and falling reimbursement rates, many 
hospitals are likely to turn to community-based service delivery organizations 
to fill the gap between shortened hospital stay and the adequate recovery of the 
Medicare patient. However, meeting the diverse needs of the elderly patient in 
the most effective and efficient manner will require more information and 
planning to ensure the availability of appropriate levels and quality of care. 
Experts in community care nursing and social work research are examining 
the impact of PPS on the continuing care needs of the elderly and the resources 
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available at the community level. Initial findings from a social work study at 
Mt. Sinai Medical Center indicated that patients being referred to long-term 
care facilities are exhibiting a much higher degree of co-morbidities (more than 
one illness) upon admission (Rehr, 1984). After an eight month study, Kornblatt 
et al. (1985) report that Medicare patients, newly referred to home health 
agencies, required more services, more education and a greater number of visits 
than those referred two years earlier. Although both authors acknowledge the 
possibility of cohort effects, they attribute these changes to the 
implementation of PPS. While these studies contribute to our understanding of 
the clinical impacts of the DRG system changes, more work is needed to 
develop a multi-disciplinary method of systematically assessing the health 
status of patients at each point in the health care delivery system. For 
example, status at hospital admission, hospital discharge, admission to 
community-based care, and so forth. 
Specifically, data are needed that would aid in identifying how and in what 
ways appropriate adjustments to Medicare coverage rules and reimbursement 
amounts should be made. The current DRG discharge system has a number of 
unique characteristics; including {l) it is diagnosis specific, (2) it is time-based, 
and, (3) although derived from national averages, it is somewhat insensitive to 
the needs of special populations (e.g., the severely ill). In contrast, most 
clinical assessment regarding health status is situation specific, has little 
standardization, and focuses on special needs. 
Although there is no universal quality of care measure, researchers agree 
that identifying changes in health status at hospital discharge in relation to 
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discharge disposition is an essential step in evaluating the impact of PPS on the 
health care system for the elderly (OTA, 198.5). In addition, due to the gap 
between generic DRGs and specific clinical summaries, a uniform scale that 
comprehensively measures patient dependency at discharge relative to 
discharge disposition would be of benefit to policy-makers, providers, and 
beneficiaries themselves. Therefore, research that could empirically assess any 
changes in quality of care- for example, changes in length of stay; changes in 
beneficiary health status; changes in post-hospital placement; changes in 
amount and mix of services rendered the Medicare patient while in the hospital 
setting since the implementation of PPS - would be of significant benefit. 
HYPOTHESIS OF THE DISSERTATION 
The focus of this study, then, is on whether a POST-PPS sample differed 
from a PRE-PPS sample in terms of health status and post-hospital placement 
upon discharge from a hospital. The essential question to be addressed in this 
dissertation is whether the post-hospital placement (e.g., nursing home, home 
alone, hospital transfer, group home) of Medicare beneficiaries differed before 
and after the implementation of the PPS system. The hypothesis to be 
examined in this dissertation is: 
H01: Both discharge health status, as measured on the Dependency at Discharge Classification Tool, and post-
hospital placement as measured by type of placement 
upon discharge from the hospital, have not been 
significantly modified by the implementation of the 
DRG-based Prospective Payment System of Medicare. 
It should be noted that this research is exploratory and can only begin to 
address some of the methodological issues identified in measuring the impact of 
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PPS on quality of care for the Medicare beneficiary. Data for this research are 
from the Dependency at Discharge research project, conducted by Northwest 
Oregon Health Systems (NOHS) in 1986. The NOHS study measured changes in 
beneficiary health status at hospital discharge before and after the 
implementation of Medicare's Prospective Payment System (PPS). This 
dissertation focuses on Medicare beneficiary discharge status in relation to 
post-hospital placement. The following sections describe the purpose, 
objectives and methods of data collection used by NOHS in the conduct of the 
Dependency at Discharge study (1986). National data will be used to illustrate 
the impacts of PPS on hospitals, physicians, and consumers of health care. 
OBJECTIVES OF THE RESEARCH 
Two methodological issues were addressed in the NOHS study. The first 
was the development of a measurement instrument for "discharge status". This 
new data collection instrument had to be applicable in both the PRE and POST 
time periods, relevant to the hospitalized population, and common across 
hospitals. The second was a valid sampling methodology that adequately 
represented the change and severity of "common" DRG classification. 
Objective One: Patient Classification 
The term patient classification is familiar to many hospital and nursing 
administrators and some health care researchers. Patient classification 
systems were initially developed in the late 1950s as a means of more 
accurately estimating nursing care resources required to care for patients in 
order to predict costs (Shaffer, 1986). There have been a number of 
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classification systems developed since then, although the ability of these 
systems to accomplish their goal has been somewhat mixed (e.g., Bergner, 1985; 
Brook, Ware, & Rogers, 1983; Ware, Brook, & Davies, 1985). These measures 
typically focus on the physical and mental aspects of health and are generally 
measured by direct examination, interview, or self-administered questionnaires. 
Although many of these instruments have been shown to be highly reliable 
and valid, no one set of classification instruments comprehensively measures 
health outcomes for the Medicare population (OTA, 1985). Furthermore, the 
variables forming these patient classification schemes depend on their ultimate 
use by the specific health care organization. Yet, a measurement tool was 
needed that could assess changes in patient health status at the point of 
hospital discharge as well as identify the ultimate placement of the patient 
after hospitalization. 
Since the NOHS study was concerned with inpatient discharge status, it 
was determined that the literature regarding patient classification for purposes 
of planning and designating resources in the inpatient as well as commt.mity-
based care settings should be examined. Two systems were identified in the 
inpatient classification literature that had potential use for the NOHS study. 
One system focused on status at admission to an acute care facility (a hospital). 
Examples of this type of classification system include the International 
Classification of Diseases-ninth revision (ICD-9) codes, which are the standard 
patient classification codes for most American hospitals, and the Diagnosis-
Related Groups (DRGs) developed by Yale University. Both of these 
classification systems are based on the patient's diagnosis. 
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However, while diagnosis is often identified as a major explanatory 
variable in assessing patient status in the inpatient setting, many authorities 
have pointed out the limitations of a diagnosis-centered approach when 
describing the elderly (Kane and Kane, 1981). Most recently, this caveat has 
been reinforced by Susan Horn (1986) in her work on severity of illness 
indicators; itself a diagnosis-based patient classification system. She points out 
that information based soley on diagnosis, expenses or hospital charges makes 
clinical comparisons difficult (Horn, 1986). 
Another patient classification system utilized in resource identification is 
that of nursing care reqired by patients. Most classification schemes in the 
nursing literature have attempted to quantify the level of nursing care 
requirements of patients in an acute care hospital setting. These classification 
systems have been generally designed for a particular setting and most typically 
include the patient's need for assistance with Activities of Daily Living (ADLs), 
special procedures and treatment needs, observation needs, instructional needs, 
and emotional needs. 
There are three basic approaches to patient classification in nursing: the 
prototype; the task document, and the critical indicator (Martinetto, 1986). 
Prototype approaches are characterized by paragraph descriptions of "typical 
patients" in each category level of care. However, it is generally agreed that 
there are no "typical" category descriptions that effectively allow reliable 
patient classification because too much subjectivity in classification is likely. 
The "task document approach" attempts to view nursing as an extensive number 
of discrete interventions or tasks that have precise beginnings and endings. 
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The premise here is that if one could list all care interventions and determine 
the average time required to complete each intervention, then one could 
quantify total time required for patient care. The critical indicator approach 
allows effective and efficient classification of patients through the listing of a 
limited number of specific care requirements or nursing interventions that are 
associated with a significant amount of nursing care time. No attempt is made 
to list all interventions or to quantify specific times per discrete task. The goal 
of this approach is to quickly group patients sharing similar amounts of required 
care time. 
Only the critical indicators of nursing care are considered to effectively 
and efficiently categorize patient care (Martinetto, 1986). Most research on 
nursing workload identifies patient assessment, intervention based upon the 
assessment, and the evaluation of the effectiveness of all interventions as the 
basic work activities. The most accurate predictor of staffing needs is based 
upon a measurement of average amounts of nursing time required to accomplish 
these activities. The critical indicators most often found to predict nursing 
workload were patient ADL ability, medication administration, vital signs and 
assessments, treatments and procedures, and psycho-social support and/or 
teaching required (Martinetto, 1986). 
In addition to nursing classification systems, many hospital social work 
departments have developed their own pre-screening assessment tools for the 
timely and efficient identification of patients who required discharge planning 
for post-hospital placement. However, their approach has been directed 
primarily towards assessing social, financial, and functional status excluding 
medical indicators. 
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According to Giovanetti {1978), hospital systems typically classify patients 
by counting service units such as assistance with Activities of Daily Living 
(ADLs), special procedures and treatments, observations, instruction, and 
emotional support. But, patient classification systems designed for nursing 
management have been criticized for their limitations as cost predictors since 
services are measured rather than patient characteristics indicating need for 
services. That is, use of services to predict services does not allow for the 
discrepancy of whether the service was needed. 
Another well utilized set of classification tools falls into the category of 
screening or pre-screening tools for post-hospital placement. An extensive 
review of this literature identified several well-tested patient classification 
instruments; including the Activities of Daily Living Tool (ADLs) (Katz et al., 
1963), the Older Americans Research and Service Center Instrument (OARS) 
(Duke University, 1978), the Instrumental Activities of Daily Living Tool 
(IADLs) (Lawton & Brody, 1969), the Health Status Scale (HSS) (Ballard & 
McNamara, 1983), the Appropriateness Evaluation Protocol {ADP) (Gertman & 
Restuccia, 1981), the Placement Information Base (PIB) {State of Oregon, 1982), 
and the Mini-Mental Scale MMS) (Folstein, Folstein, &: McHugh, 1975). 
However, many of these instruments require direct patient observation or 
access to data typically not available in the patient's medical record. 
Finally, studies comparing long term care placement instruments have 
found that the common kinds of dimensions found on these tools are self-care 
with ADL ability, mental and behavioral status, and need for nursing procedures 
(Patterson, 1987). For example, Leatt, Bay, and Stinson (1981) reviewed some 
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34 classification scales and studies and derived an instrument for assessing and 
classifying long-term care patients by type of care. They observed 585 patients 
using 130 measurement variables. They found that the two most important 
variables for discriminating between care needs were: requirements of nursing 
services within an institution and the need for medical assessments. 
The next most important variables were: level of independence in walking, 
independence in grooming, and age. Their analyses showed that psychosocial 
variables did not emerge as important· contributors for determining care 
requirements (Leatt, Bay & Stinson, 1981). However, Giovanetti (1978), among 
others, believes that age is a less universal predictor of nursing care. In 
addition, Foley and Schneider (1980) examined six assessment tools for long 
term care placement and found that most of the instruments identified the 
patient's ability to perform ADLs, mobility, mental and behavioral status, and 
degree of nursing services and treatments performed as the most salient 
characteristics of placement. In the home health field, researchers have found 
that a patient's level of functioning was more predictive than the diagnostic 
category for determining agency resource use (Ballard & McNamara, 1983; 
Brill, Scholosser & Widmer, 1978). 
Thus, the findings from the research on these patient classification 
instruments indicated that the most salient, reliable, and valid factors defining 
patient status are: deficits in the ability for self care and needs for nursing 
assistance to maintain physiological stability. Although the focus of the NOHS 
research was not designed to measure nursing care output, it was decided to 
attempt to measure patient indicators rather than service descriptors. 
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Objective Two: Sample Representativeness. Because of constrained 
resources and time for the project, the NOHS study limited analysis of 
diagnosis-related groups (DRGs) to five (.5) DRGs. The process of selecting 
which DRGs would be included involved identifying the most frequent DRG 
admissions for the Portland metropolitan area as well as identifying the most 
frequent DRGs for the participating hospitals for which data were available. 
Meetings were held with each of the participating hospital's discharge planning 
and utilization review staff in order to identify which DRGs were most common 
in each of the hospitals for the preceding year. In addition, hospital staff were 
asked to identify a list of diagnoses they considered to be the most 
"problematic'' for their hospital in regards to placement upon discharge and 
reimbursement under PPS. The top ten medical and surgical DRGs from each 
list were then compared by hospital to obtain a final list of ten DRGs. This list 
would then be narrowed down to five DRGs (three medical and two surgical), by 
comparing the hospitals' lists to regional admission diagnoses compiled by the 
state's PRO. 
The Oregon Medical Professional Review Organization (OMPRO), Oregon's 
Peer Review Organization, was asked to conduct a computer run on all 
Medicare discharges for the previous six months from hospitals in the Portland 
metropolitan area to identify the most frequent discharges. The OMPRO list 
and the hospitals' lists were then compared, eliminating those DRGs that would 
identify the hospitals, such as cancer, heart surgery. The comparison revealed 
the top five most freqJent diagnoses as: 
DRG 14: STROKE 
DRG 89: PNEUMONIA 
DRG 127: HEART F AlLURE 
DRG 209: HIP REPLACEMENT 
DRG 210: MAJOR JOINT PINNING 
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These five DRGs were then compared to national statistics on DRG 
frequency which revealed that all five were within the top 10 DRGs at a 
national level. Selection for medical DRGs was done in four hospitals and 
selection of surgical DRGs was done in three hospitals. Surgical DRGs were not 
selected in one hospital because of the length of time needed to identify 
eligible cases from the hospital's records. 
The sample size was determined by power tables (Fleiss, 1973). In order 
to test for a result greater than chance (.05), a minimum of 150 observations 
per DRG per time period were necessary. The desired number of medical 
records to be reviewed totaled 2,900. The sample distribution is illustrated in 
Figure 1. 
PRE-DRGs 
10/&1 - 9/83 
Hospital A: 
Hospital B: 
Hospital C: 
Hospital D: 
Hospital B: 
Hospital C: 
Hospital D: 
TOTAL 
POST-DRGs 
4/&4- 7J&5 
MEDICAL DRGs 
250 250 
250 250 
250 250 
250 250 
SURGICAL DRGs 
150 150 
1.50 150 
150 150 
Figure 1. Desired Sample Design. 
TOTAL 
500 
500 
500 
500 
300 
300 
300 
2,900 
Feasibility of Data Collection. In terms of feasibility of data collection, it 
was clear that interviews of patients concerning discharge status for 
hospitalizations one to three years in the past would be of questionable validity. 
154 
Observation of patients could not be accomplished for a PRE-PPS sample. 
Results from other studies indicated that a more efficient, valid and readily 
available data source is the patient's medical record. 
Although most classification schemes are based on direct observation of 
the patient, secondary data have been utilized for classifying nursing home 
needs and patients. For example, Ballard and McNamara (1983) conducted a 
retrospective review of 397 home health records and reported similar findings 
to those of other studies which used direct observation. They found that the 
critical predictors of post-hospital resource use tended to be deficits in self-
care for activities of daily living and for maintenance of physiological stability 
via nursing intervention (Ballard & McNamara, 1983). In addition, since all 
American Hospital Association (AHA) affiliated hospitals have uniform charting 
requirements, it was assumed that local area hospitals would provide 
comparable data from their medical records. Therefore, it was determined that 
information from the patient's medical record would allow for feasible, reliable, 
and valid data collection. Still to be determined was the selection of items 
which represented patient health status. 
Instrument Development. The purpose of the initial instrument 
development was to design and test a tool that would measure an individual's 
level of independence and/or dependence in self-care at hospital discharge 
(health status). Three methods for validating the instrument were used: a 
literature review, medical record chart review, and an expert panel review of 
the prototype instrument. The instrument developed for the NOHS study builds 
upon the literatures reviewed and initiatially included the most discriminating 
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items identified from this review. An initial instrument consisting of twenty-
one (21) items was constructed and measured the following: one group measured 
physical functioning (that is, ADLs, IADLs). Examples include 
ambulation/mobility, toileting, bathing, eating, and so forth. These items were 
identified in the literature as relevant to patient classification. A second group 
measured mental functioning, such as awareness, coping skills, emotional 
assessment (derived from the PIB and MMS). A third group measured treatment 
components, such as management of medications, special treatments, referrals 
for therapy and observation requirements (derived from nursing care literature). 
Finally, a fourth group of items measured diagnostic and referral variables, 
such as -diagnostic category, co-morbidity (secondary diagnoses or other 
contributing conditions), continuing care requirements, services prescribed, pre-
admission living arrangements, post-hospital placement, length of stay and age. 
In order to determine whether the selected variables could be measured 
from data available in hospital records, the initial instrument was applied to 
forty-seven (47) medical records from five Portland metropolitan hospitals. 
This preliminary analysis revealed that sufficient medical record documentation 
was available on: Activities of Daily Living (ADLs), Medications, Procedures, 
Signs/Symptoms, and Age. Little documentation was found for items for 
Instrumental Activities of Daily Living (IADLs) or items from the Mini-Mental 
Scale (MMS). Specifically, information was found for the following items: 
activity/mobility information (96% of cases), bathing/hygiene information (72% 
of cases), medications information (100% of cases), and symptoms/procedures 
(87% of cases) as observed by non-nurse reviewers. Information pertaining to 
the patients' ability to feed themselves, mental functioning information, and 
detailed emotional functioning information was far less consistent. 
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Inconsistently documented or non-documented items were deleted from the 
measurement tool. Thus, the instrument was reduced to only the most 
discriminant items, including: (1) Activity/Mobility (ADLs); (2) Bathing/Hygiene 
(ADLs); (3) Signs/Symptoms (nursing care needs); (4) Number of Medications (5) 
Procedures (nursing treatments needed); and (6) Age. It was felt that the term 
that most accurately described the combination of these items was 
DEPENDENCY. The instrument was named the Dependency at Discharge 
Classification Tool (DepD) and measured deficits in ability for self-care. A 
copy of the instrument is included in the Appendix. 
In addition to the medical record ratings on Dependency, other data were 
identified as available to be collected. This included sex, race, hospital, 
DRG/Diagnosis, pre-admission living arrangements, post-hospital placement, 
receipt of discharge planning, data collector/rater, and medical record review 
date. 
A model for the instrument was then designed, using ordinal rating scales 
and cumulative scoring to achieve an overall classification rating for the 
patient's level of Dependency, or acuity at hospital discharge. The model used 
was based on an Apache n Acuity rating format with scores of 0 -2 - 4 - and 6 
with 6 the most "dependent" and 0 the least "dependent" scores (Knaus, Draper, 
and Wagner, 1984). 
The overall scores for the six item scale used for rating the patient ranged 
from 0 to 36. Using the revised instrument with the .six rating scales, ten (10) 
additional hospital records were reviewed to determine the availability of 
medical record content and feasibility of scoring patient status. This test 
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demonstrated that it was possible to fully rate each of the patients whose 
record was reviewed. Protocols for record review were then developed in order 
to outline decision-making steps for forming judgments about the ratings. 
Expert Panel Validation. A group of nurses considered experts in hospital 
patient assessment for the purposes of discharge planning were convened to 
evaluate the instrument and protocols. The group included two hospital 
discharge planners, one director of a hospital-based home health agency, one 
adult care clinical specialist-nurse educator, and one hospital medical unit head 
nurse. 
The evaluation process consisted of a series of independent assessments 
and votes in answer to the following questions: 
1. Do the six items pertain to dependency at hospital discharge? 
2. Are there other items you would add to the concept of dependency at 
hospital discharge? 
3. Do the descriptions for the ratings generally pertain to (are they 
variations of} each tool item? 
4. Using the definition for each item, is each of the ratings discrete and 
independent? 
5. Using the definition and the protocol for each item, are the ratings 
discrete and independent? 
Modifications were suggested by the group following each vote tally, and 
the revisions were incorporated into the instrument and protocols. The 
instrument items were then coded onto printed optical mark (oP-scan) sheets 
designed for data collection and input onto computer tape by machine reading. 
The Dependency at Discharge Classification Instrument protocols for data 
collection were completed in July, 1985. 
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STUDY DESIGN 
The major objective of the NOHS study was to gather and evaluate 
preliminary evidence on the impact of the Prospective Payment System (PPS) 
on the health status at hospital discharge for Medicare beneficiaries. The 
major objective of this dissertation was to evaluate exploratory data on 
differences in Medicare beneficiary discharge placement in relation to their 
discharge health status before and after the implementation of PPS. 
The purpose of a research design is to control extraneous variance and 
maximize the experiment variance. Kerlinger (1973) identifies four criteria by 
which to judge the adequacy of research designs: one, does the design answer 
the research questions; that is, does the design adequately test the hypotheses? 
Two, does the design adequately control the independent variables? Three, does 
the design allow for generalizing the results of the study to other subjects, 
other groups, and other conditions? And, four, does the design adequately 
address the issues of internal and external validity (Kerlinger, 1973)? The 
following section will address these criteria as they relate to the NOHS study 
design. 
In a true experiment, the researcher can manipulate at least one 
independent variable for optimal statistical efficiency. However, the 
experimental variable in the NOHS study was implemented almost 
simultaneously in all local hospitals, including the sample hospitals. Therefore, 
the research design could only approximate a true experiment. Because control 
of the experimental variable, that is, the Prospective Pricing System for 
Medicare hospital reimbursement, could not be manipulated, the NOHS study 
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selected a PRE/POST time series design (Campbell & Stanley, 1966). This 
method is considered one of the most appropriate models for tasks such as the 
NOHS study undertook. 
Campbell and Stanley (1966) identify twelve (12) factors which may 
jeopardize the validity of various experimental and quasi-experimental designs: 
history, maturation, testing, instrumentation, statistical regression, selection, 
experimental mortality, selection-maturation interaction, external validity, the 
interaction effect of testing or unrepresentati veness, the interaction between 
selection and the experimental variable, reactive effects, and multiple-
treatment interference. Validity in this case means the extent to which 
explanations other than the "program" under evaluation can be ruled out as 
responsible for the observed effect (internal validity) and the extent to which 
the findings can be generalized beyond the study sample (external validity) 
(Campbell & Stanley, 1966). 
While true experimental designs address most of the factors that threaten 
validity, such a design could not be implemented for this study. Controlled 
(true) experiments are typically carried out prospectively and generally involve 
random assignment of subjects to an experimental or control group. Because 
both groups are exposed to whatever simultaneous influences that might occur 
during the experiment, differences between the groups can reasonably be 
attributed to the experimental variable. However, in the case of PPS, the 
program was implemented universally in community hospitals and left no 
hospitals outside the system suitable for comparison. Therefore, the PRE/POST 
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comparison without a control group, a quasi-experimental design, was chosen 
for the NOHS study. While less efficient than a true experiment, the 
PRE/POST comparison is the most efficient model to apply to the current PPS-
impact question and does address many of the threats to validity identified by 
Campbell and Stanley (1966). 
A quasi-experimental design does not not adhere to the strict requirements 
of true experiments in that it utilizes either pre/post program comparisons or 
comparison groups whose representativeness is not established. In order to 
effectively utilize this model, the researcher must have a high level of 
confidence that the comparison groups used in the study are indeed 
representative before such a design can offer much validity (OTA, 1985). The 
groups used in the NOHS study were randomly selected from all Medicare 
admissions for the selected DRGs and appropriate time periods (PRE/POST) and 
thus provide a basis for such confidence in the comparison groups. The process 
for random selection is described in a following section. 
The PRE/POST time series design utilizes a measurement on each group or 
individual at several points in time with the introduction of an experimental 
change between the measurements (Campbell & Stanley, 1966). Although this 
design was used for the data collection, the data were clustered for analysis. 
While the design lacks a control group, it does control for maturation, 
testing, regression, selection, mortality, and the interaction of selection and 
maturation. However, the design does not control for history, instrumentation, 
the interaction of testing and X, the interaction of selection and X, reactive 
arrangements and multiple-X interference. 
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Campbell and Stanley (1966) point out that the failure to control for 
history is the most definite weakness of this design. That is, the rival 
hypothesis exists that not X but some more or less simultaneous event produced 
the shift. It is the "plausibly'' ruling out of alternative hypotheses that is the 
greatest challenge to the researcher utilizing this design (Guterman & Dobson, 
1986). 
The design is further threatened by the fact that other, simultaneous 
influences are occurring in the health care system which could account for any 
differences found. This concern is relevant for the analysis of PPS in that 
other, simultaneous changes have been identified as occurring in the health 
system at the same time that PPS was implemented. This confounds any 
attempt to directly attribute many of the health system changes to PPS. 
However, it is possible to conduct PRE/POST analyses that provide strong 
evidence about the impacts of PPS. Success, however, hinges on careful a 
priori analysis of the likely magnitude and direction of other factors so that the 
"effects" of PPS may be reasonably inferrred (Fleiss, 1973). 
An alternative design which might have been used is the multiple time-
series design, in which the researcher utilizes an equivalent control group over 
the same repeated measures as the experimental group (Campbell &: Stanley, 
1966). However, there were no "equivalent'' institutions available which were 
not undergoing the conversion to the PPS system, nationally or in the Portland 
metropolitan area. Implementation of PPS began on October 1, 1983. By the 
end of 198fl., a total of 5,405 hospitals (81 %) of all Medicare participating 
hospitals were operating under PPS (Guterman & Dobson, 1986). Furthermore, 
using other hospitals in another city was not feasible. 
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Hospital Selection. Four Portland, Oregon, metropolitan hospitals were 
used as data collection sites for the NOHS study. The hospitals, similar in 
organization and type of patient services, included two large hospitals (300+ 
beds) and two medium-sized hospitals (100-300 beds). Two of the hospitals were 
located in suburban areas and two were located in the metropolitan core. All 
were private non-profit commtmity hospitals representative of hospitals in the 
Portland metropolitan area. 
The Prospective Payment System was mandated to go into effect at the 
beginning of each hospital's fiscal year during 1983 and 1984. Because each 
hospital had different fiscal year schedules, the conversion date to the PPS 
system was different for the four hospitals included in this study. The hospitals 
all converted to the system between October, 1983, and April, 1984. 
Medical Record Selection. In order to control for possible effects of 
changes in management polices and staffing practices as a result of the PPS 
system, medical records were not eligible for inclusion in the NOHS study in the 
six months before and the six months after each hospital converted to the PPS 
reimbursement system. Allowing for the six month transition period to PPS, 
the eighteen (18) months prior to the conversion to PPS reimbursement was 
determined to be the PRE-period and involved sampling medical records from 
1981; 1982, and 1983. The POST-period covered the eighteen month period 
after conversion to PPS reimbursement and involved sampling medical records 
from 1984 and 1985. The two data collection time periods thus ranged from 
October, 1981 through September, 1983 for the PRE-PPS sample period and 
April, 1984 through July, 1985 for the POST-PPS sample period. 
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Hospital medical records were randomly selected for inclusion in the study 
from master lists of all Medicare admissions for five (.5) diagnosis-related 
groups (DRGs). Each hospital provided master lists of admissions basedon the 
following selection criteria: Medicare beneficiary, 60 years or older, discharge 
date within PRE and POST time period, and diagnosis (DRG). 
The NOHS study sample was randomly selected from each hospital's master 
list according to the following criteria: Age (60 or older), did not expire on 
selected admission, and had a length of stay between three (3) and twenty-two 
(22) days. Selected medical records were then typed onto lists for the data 
collectors to use in pulling and abstracting the medical records for data 
collection. The total sample size goal was 2,900 charts. However, due to a 
number of factors, 2,777 medical records were actually reviewed. The reasons 
for a smaller number of charts to be abstracted in two of the four sample 
hospitals include: the universe of cases to be sampled from did not equal or 
exceed the required 1.50 cases per DRG, per time period. All admissions within 
these DRGs in the two hospitals were then included in the study but the total, 
in some cases, still did not equal the study's goals. Further, where possible, 
over sam piing was done for the PRE and POST time periods to ensure an 
adequate pool of replacement cases for charts found to be ineligible for 
incluc;ion in the study (e.g., expired; that is, the patient died in the hospital on 
the sampled admission). 
Another problem encountered in the sample selection process was that two 
hospitals did not have their PRE-period Medicare admissions on an in-house 
computer system. Thus, a hard-copy printout of Medicare admissions, produced 
164 
by an out-of-state abstracting service, had to be used to identify eligible cases 
by hand. · In many instances, needed identification information was not readily 
available from these abstract print-outs. Additionally, two hospitals did not 
have their PRE-period admissions listed by DRG. Thus, eligible cases had to be 
identified from hard-copy listings of admissio~s using the ICD-9 (International 
Classification of Diseases - Ninth Revision) codes in the appropriate DRGs. 
Moreover, one hospital was excluded from the sampling of surgical DRGs due to 
the length of time required to develop a valid list of cases eligible for selection. 
Finally, protocols that were developed to coordinate the pulling and re-filing of 
the medical records to ensure that all eligible records were available for coding 
were not always followed by hospital staff. 
Data Collector Training. AU data collectors were registered nurses. Seven 
nurses were hired in August, 1985, and trained to use the Dependency at 
Discharge Classification Instrument in two separate training sessions. The first 
group of three data collectors was trained in August, 1985, using records from 
the four study-site hospitals. A second group of four data collectors was 
trained in October, 1985 using charts from one of the study hospitals. 
Training was the same for both groups. The data collectors assembled for 
several hours in a conference room near the medical records departments of 
one of the participating hospitals. The NOHS research team member who had 
developed the data collection protocols served as both trainer and data 
collector for the project. 
The training sessions included a review of the history and purpose of the 
Dependency at Discharge Classification tool (DepD), the data abstraction 
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protocols, and rating several trial medical records for education and discussion. 
Agreement rates, based on the Dependency rating scale, were tallied during the 
sessions to monitor learning and achievement of consistency across raters. 
When agreement rates reached at least 70 percent, raters were asked to 
independently review records for reliability checks. 
The data collectors were all baccalaureate-level nurses from various 
schools with various levels and types of nursing experience. One was recently 
retired after 40 years work as a medical-surgical nurse, two were recent 
nursing school graduates, two were nursing graduate students and one was a 
university faculty member. An eighth nurse began the training and data 
collection process in August, but soon moved out of the state. All records 
abstracted by this nurse were excluded from the data analysis. 
Data Collection. Data collection for the NOHS study took place between 
September, 1985 and April, 1986. Data collection in each hospital lasted from 
two to three months. Problems encountered in data collection included limited 
hours of access to medical record departments; difficulty in scheduling data 
collectors to complete data collection due to conflicting schedules (e.g., school 
demands, job demands); one hospital had its PRE-period medical records on 
microfische which made identification and abstraction of charts more difficult 
and time consuming; conflicts between the study versus the hospital work 
demand upon hospital medical record personnel time; vacation time and 
holidays made scheduling data collection problematic. However, these 
problems of scheduling, sample identification, and coordination with medical 
record departments were minor on the whole. 
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CONCLUSION 
The NOHS Dependency at Discharge study (1986) was designed to measure 
Medicare beneficiaries' health status, as measured by the Dependency at 
Discharge Classification Instrument, at the point of hospital discharge. Two 
methodological issues were addressed in the research design: one, the 
development of a patient classification instrument that could be used with 
medical records and that would accurately provide a picture of the health 
status of the about-to-be discharged Medicare beneficiary; two, the issue of 
selection of a sample of Medicare beneficiaries in a representative sample of 
DRGs was addressed. A sample of Medicare beneficiaries was selected from 
five representative DRGs (both locally and nationally). 
A PRE/POST non-control group research design was used to select medical 
records for analysis from PRE and POST -PPS samples in terms of Medicare 
beneficiary health status at the time of hospital discharge. While this research 
is exploratory, that is, it only used five of the top ten most frequent! y used 
DRGs and it was conducted in only four hospitals in one geographic area, it is 
an important first step in evaluating the impact of Medicare's PPS payment 
system on the quality of care of Medicare beneficiaries. In essence, the NOHS 
_research study analyzed the question, are Medicare beneficiaries being 
discharged from the hospital "quicker and sicker" after the implementation of 
the Prospective Payment System (PPS). 
The question to be addressed by this dissertation concerns changes in the 
post-hospital placement of Medicare beneficiaries before and after the 
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implementation of the Prospective Payment System. This dissertation is 
exploratory in nature in that it is constrained by the same strengths and 
weaknesses of the NOHS study from which the data are derived. This 
dissertation is distinct from the NOHS study and extends it to address the 
question of whether there have been changes in discharge placement, in relation 
to discharge health status (Dependency), before and after PPS. 
While the data were generated from the NOHS Dependency at Discharge 
research study (Coe, Wilkinson, & Patterson, 1986), the analysis presented in 
this dissertation pertaining to the comparisions of patient status at discharge in 
relation to post-hospital placement is a distinct and separate analysis from the 
NOHS study. This dissertation focuses on changes in beneficiary status with 
regard to post-hospital placement and quality of care while the NOHS study 
examined the issue of "quicker and sicker". The unique contribution of this 
dissertation is its documentation of changes in beneficiary health status and 
discharge placement setting (i.e., more dependent patients being discharged to 
post-hospital care settings) and is one of the first studies in the nation to 
address the issue in anything but anecdotal form. Thus, this disseration 
provides the basis for more comprehensive national studies which may explore 
the longer-term impacts of the PPS system on the post-hospital care service 
delivery setting. 
CHAPTER IV 
DATA ANALYSIS 
The effects of Medicare's Prospective Payment System that are most 
relevant to the performance of the health care system are the effects on the 
cost of providing hospital care and the effects on the outcomes (benefits) of 
that care (OT A, 1985). However, direct measurement of health benefits is 
infeasible and, as a result, incomplete, imperfect and overlapping proxy 
measures have been used. Proxy measures for health outcomes are used here 
also; i.e., discharge status and post-hospital placement, as a means of 
assessing the impact of the DRG-based Prospective Payment System on the 
Medicare beneficiary. The data utilized to address this issue are from the 
Northwest Oregon Health Systems Dependency at Discharge research project 
(1986) and are presented in Section I. National data from the first three years 
under the PPS system; 1984, 1985, and where possible, 1986 are used to 
evaluate the expenditure and quality of care impact of PPS and are presented 
in Section II. The specific question addressed by the NOHS study was to 
determine if Medicare beneficiaries were being discharged "quicker and 
sicker" after the implementation of the Prospective Payment System. A 
second analysis of the data regarding post-hospital placement is the focus of 
this dissertation. 
A great many areas of interest regarding the impact of PPS are beyond 
the scope of this study induding such areas as the impact of PPS on access to 
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health care, technology adaptation, clinical re:.earch, patterns of employment 
in health care and related industries, the quantity and quality of health 
profes:.ional education, physician/patient relationship and ownership of health 
care businesses. Although many of the predicted effects of PPS cannot be 
addressed with the evidence available, this dissertation attempts to identify 
patterns of change occurring within the health care system coinciding with, as 
well as a result of, Medicare's Prospective Payment System (PPS). 
SECTION I: 
DEPENDENCY AT DISCHARGE DATA 
This section presents descriptive information on a PRE/POST sample of 
Medicare beneficiaries including sample distribution by sex and age, distribution 
of length of stay by total sample and by DRG, and an analysis of beneficiary 
discharge statu:. (Dependency at Discharge) by DRG, by Dependency Class, and 
post-hospital placement by Dependency Class and by DRG. For tests of 
significance, the p = .05level of probability was used. For ease of presentation, 
the 1981-1983 period is labeled PRE and the 1984-1985 period is labeled POST. 
Data collection was based on the selection of a Medicare beneficiary's 
medical record, identified from a master list of all admissions within the 
PRE/POST time period from each hospital, using all of the following criteria: 
1. 
:~··· 2. 
3. 
4. 
Medicare patient, 
Age 60 or over, 
Did not expire on selected admission, and 
Length of stay (LOS) between 2 and 23 days. 
From the total potential discharges in the two study time periods, 2,777 
medical records were randomly selected and reviewed. Of the 2,777 records 
reviewed, 158 (6%) were excluded for the following reasons: 
1. patient expired on the selected admission (N:68); 
2. ineligible length of stay (N=l8); 
3. incorrect identification of medical record (e.g, wrong DRG, 
etc.) (N=29); 
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4. unable to locate selected record in the records department (e.g., 
record was on the floor or being transcribed, etc.)(N=23); and 
5. the record has major sections of documentation missing (N:20). 
The final sample was 2,619 records for most of this data analysis. 
Sample Distribution- PRE/ POST. The total sample of 2,619 records 
included 1,258 (48%) in the PRE-period and 1,361 (52%) in the POST-period. 
Table V presents the distribution of the PRE/POST subsamples by DRG. All 
subjects were Medicare beneficiaries, 60 or over. A Chi Square test of the 
PRE/POST samples showed no significant difference at the p ( .01 level 
between the PRE/POST samples based on distribution by DRG. 
TABLE V 
DISTRmUTION OF SAMPLE BY DRG - PRE/POST 
(N=2,619) 
DRG CATEGORY PRE POST 
DRG 14 - Stroke 296 (23.5%) 338 (24.8%) 
DRG 89 - Pneumonia 289 (23.0%) 342 (25.1%) 
DRG 127 - Heart Failure 352 (28.0%) 383 (28.1 %) 
DRG 209 -Hip Replacement 180 (14.3%) 191 (14.0%) 
DRG 210- Major Joint Pinning 141 (11.2%) 107 ( 7.9%) 
TOTAL 1,258 (100%) 1,361 (100%) 
Sex. Thirty-seven percent of the total sample were male (N=922) and 63% 
were female (N=1,697). Table VI presents the distribution of the PRE/POST 
subsamples by sex. A chi square test of the difference between the PRE/POST 
subsamples by sex was not significant. 
TABLE VI 
DISTRIBUTION OF PRE AND POST SAMPLES BY SEX 
(N=2,619) 
SEX 
MALE 
FEMALE 
TOTAL 
PRE 
461 (36.6%) 
797 (63.4%) 
1,258 (100%) 
POST 
461 (33.9%) 
900 (66.1 %) 
1,361 (100%) 
TOTAL 
(N=922) 
(N=1,697) 
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Age. Age ranged from 61 to 104 years. Table VII presents data on the age 
distribution of the PRE and POST samples. For convenience, age was grouped 
into four age categories: 60-65; 66-75; 76-85; and 86+. 
TABLE VD 
AGE DISTRIBUTION BY PRE/POST 
(N=2,557) 
AGE CATEGORY PRE (n=1,22&) POST (n=1,329) 
60-65 
66-75 
76-85 
&5+ 
Missing Cases 
TOTAL 
2.4% 
23.5% 
3&.7% 
33.4% 
2.0% 
100% 
6.2% 
26.6% 
40.5% 
24.6% 
2.1% 
100% 
Age Distribution. Table VIII presents data on age distribution by total 
sample and by DRG. Of specific interest is the increase in the number of 
"younger" Medicare beneficiaries in three DRGs: Stroke, Heart Failure, and Hip 
Replacement in the POST period. No such pattern is evident on Pneumonia or 
Major Joint Pinning. 
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TABLE VW 
AGE DISTRIBUTION BY PRE/POST AND DRG 
(N=2,557) 
DRG CATEGORY 
Stroke PRE (n=285) POST (n=328) TOTAL (n=613) 
(DRG 14) 
60-65 1.896 3.0% 2.496 
66-75 20.796 30.2% 25.8% 
76-85 44.2% 45.4% 44.9% 
86+ 33.396 21.3% 26.996 
Pneumonia PRE (n=278) POST (n=331) TOTAL (n=609) 
(DRG 89) 
60-65 2.296 8.2% 5.4% 
66-7.5 26.396 23.0% 24.5% 
76-85 35.6% 33.2% 34.3% 
86+ 36.096 3.5.6% 3.5.8% 
Heart Failure PRE (n=345) POST (n=372) TOTAL (n=717) 
(DRG 127) 
60-65 1.2% 3 • .5% 2.4% 
66-7.5 20.396 29.3% 2.5.0% 
76-85 41.496 41.7% 41.6% 
86+ 37.1% 25.5% 31.196 
Hie Reelacement PRE (n=180) POST (n= 191) TOTAL (n=371) 
(DRG 209} 
60-6.5 6.796 9.9% 8.4% 
66-75 36.7% 34.0% 3.5. 3% 
76-8.5 35.6% 46.196 41.0% 
86+ 21.1% 9.9% 15.4% 
Major Joint Pinning PRE (n=140) POST (n= 1 07) TOTAL (n=247) 
(DRG 210) 
60-6.5 2.196 6 • .5% 4.0% 
66-7.5 23.696 16.8% 20.696 
76-85 39.396 39.3% 39.396 
86+ 3.5.0% 37.4% 36.0% 
Mean Age Comparison. Table IX presents data from a comparison of 
mean age between the PRE and POST periods. The average age of the PRE-
period sample was 82.6 years and the average age for the POST -period was 80.4 
years. When tested for differences using a t-test, the difference was 
significant at the p (.001 level. 
Key: 
TABLE IX 
COMPARISON OF MEAN AGE BY PRE/POST 
(N:2,.552} 
STANDARD 
SAMPLE MEAN AGE DEVIATION t-Value 
PRE 82.6 (1,227) 8.6 
POST 80.4 (1,325) 8.4 .000*** 
*** p (.001 
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The findings presented in Tables Vlll and IX regarding the age distribution 
in the PRE/POST samples suggest that age could confound the PRE/POST 
analyses. Therefore, age was treated as a co-variate in all subsequent analy5es 
of the data. 
Length of Stay. Measurement of length of stay was constrained by the 
sampling methodology. In order to control for the effects of DRG "outliers" 
(i.e., those with extremely long lengths of stay), only discharges with a length 
of stay (LOS) between 2 and 22 days were included in the sample. However, 
thi5 limitation did not exclude a large number of potential cases. Table X 
presents data on length of stay for the total sample and by DRG. The mean 
length of stay was 11.3 days in the PRE-period and 8.6 days in the POST -period. 
This represents a reduction of 2.7 days between the PRE and POST periods 
which is statistically significant at the .001 level. This dramatic drop in length 
of stay was also reflected in summary Medicare data from Multnomah County, 
Oregon which reported a drop of 2.4 days in length of stay between 1982 and 
1984 (OMPRO, 1986). This pattern of decline in length of stay was found in 
each DRG category. T -tests showed that all were significant at the p (.001 
level. 
TABLE X 
LENGTH OF STAY BY PRE. & POST AND BY DRG 
(N::2,528) 
DRG 14 (Stroke) 
PRE (227) 
POST (327) 
·DRG 89 (Pneumonia) 
PRE (276) 
POST (336) 
Mean Days 
11.4 
7.7 
9.6 
7.8 
DRG 127 (Heart Failure) 
PRE (336) 9.2 
POST (372) 7.2 
DRG 209 (Hi~ Re~lacement) 
PRE (177) 15.5 
POST (189) 12.3 
DRG 210 (Major Joint Pinning) 
PRE (134) 13.8 
POST (104) 11.5 
Key: 
***p (·001 
Standard 
Deviation 
5.3 
3.3 
4.3 
3.5 
4.7 
3.1 
3.6 
3.6 
4.3 
3.8 
t-values 
10.10*** 
5.16*** 
6.67*** 
8.27*** 
4.45*** 
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When examining length of stay by DRG TYPE (e.g., Medical vs. Slrgical), 
the medical DRGs (DRG 14 -Stroke; DRG 89 - Pneumonia; and DRG 127 - Heart 
Failure) had far more variance in length of stay (a~ measured by standard 
deviation) than did the surgical DRGs (e.g., DRG 209 - Hip Replacement and 
DRG 210 - Major Joint Pinning). This can be explained, in part, by the 
similarities of procedures and acute care required in the surgical DRGs versus 
the medical DRGS. 
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The Measurement of Dependency at Discharge. The scale used to measure 
dependency at hospital discharge was originally developed with six items: 
ACTIVITY, BATHING, MEDICATIONS, PROCEDURES, SYMPTOMS and AGE. 
A principal axis factor analysis of the six original scale items was performed 
using squared multiple correlations as commonality estimates. Since only one 
four-item factor with an Eigenvalue greater than 1.00 was extracted, no 
rotations were performed. An analysis of internal consistency yielded an Alpha 
coefficient of .86. These analyses suggested that Dependency be viewed as a 
single construct. The final scale induded four items: ACTIVITY, BATHING, 
PROCEDURES, SYMPTOMS. 
The Dependency instrument used a Likert-type ordinal scaling method for 
rating the patient's dependency on four rating levels with increasing values 
from 0- 2- 4 - 6. Possible scores ranged from 0 (complete independence) to 24 
(complete dependence). The instrument was subjected to content validation by 
a panel of experts and reliability checks were conducted throughout the study 
period. One hundred and sixty-two medical records were randomly selected 
from the sample pool and used to test interrater reliability during data 
collection. Independent ratings of the sub-sample showed the instrument had a 
high level of interrater reliability as measured by an Intraclass R of .88. 
Instrument development and reliability testing are described in detail elsewhere 
(Coe, Wilkinson, & Patterson, 1986). 
Dependency. Table XI presents data on Dependency for the PRE/POST 
periods. The average Dependency score for the PRE-period was 8.9 while the 
average Dependency score for the POST -period was 9.7. The difference 
between the two scores was found to be significant at the p{.OOllevel. 
TABLE XI 
DEPENDENCY SCORES BY PRE/POST 
(N=2,.5.57) 
OVERALL DEPENDENCY BY PERIOD 
Key:*** p (.001 
PRE 
8.9 
POST 
9-:r 
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t VALUE 
3.79*** 
Dependency By Age- PRE/POST. Figure 2 presents data on Dependency by 
age category. As expected, Dependency was higher in the older age groups and 
was higher across all age groups in the POST period. 
HEAN 
OEPENOENCY 
SCORE 
m·PRE 
12) POST 
Figure 2. Mean Dependency Scores by Age category, PRE/POST. 
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Dependency By DRG- PRE/POST. Since the difference in the distribution 
of age between the PRE and POST periods could confound the findings 
regarding Dependency, an analysis of covariance (ANCOVA) comparing the PRE 
and POST Dependency scores adjusted for age was conducted. 
Interpreting the results of the analysis of covariance may be confounded by 
the assumption of homogeneous regression coefficients (b) across the PRE and 
POST periods. Therefore, an F test for homogeneity of variance was al.so 
conducted in order to assess homogeneity of variance across the DRGs. The 
re.sul ts of the two analyses are presented in Table XII. The F test for 
homogeneity (Column 2) results suggested that the assumption of homogeneity 
was untenable in two of the five DRG categories (DRG 127 and DRG 210). This 
called into question the results of the covariance analysis on these two 
comparative tests (Pedhauser, 1982; Reichardt, 1979). In three of the DRG 
categories, the F test for homogeneity showed no significant difference (DRG 
14, DRG 89, and DRG 209). Therefore, the covariance analysis was accepted in 
these DRGs. 
Further analysis was conducted to explore the two cases in which the 
analysis of covariance results were questioned. A matched pair analysis was 
conducted in the two DRG catagories where homogeneity of variance was not 
found. Cases from the PRE and POST subsamples in the two DRGs were 
matched on age by computer. Cases not matched were eliminated from this 
analysis, producing a smaller N but which was fundamentally equivalent with 
respect to age. Matched sample t-tests were then performed using the 
Dependency scores of the two subsamples. Table XII presents the results of the 
ANCOVA analysis with age as a covariate and the analysis of homogeniety. 
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Results from these analyses showed a .significant increase in Dependency 
between PRE and POST for DRG 14 - Stroke but not for DRG 210 - Major Joint 
Pinning. Thus, the combined analyses suggest that Dependency increased 
between the PRE and POST periods in DRGs 14- Stroke, 89- Pneumonia, 127-
Heart Failure, and 209 - Hip Replacement but not in DRG 210 - Major Joint 
Pinning. 
TABLE XII 
ANAL YSJS OF COVARIANCE: DEPENDENCY WITH AGE AS A 
COVARIATE AND ANAL YSJS OF HOMOGENEITY 
(N:2,619) 
DRG Category 
DRG 14- Stroke 
DRG 89- Pneumonia 
DRG 127- Heart Failure 
DRG 209 - Hip Replacement 
DRG 210- Major Joint Pinning 
Key: 
* p < .05 
** p < .01 
*** p <-001 
F (Pre/Post) 
8.11 ** 
6.64** 
12.94*** 
24.93*** 
.46 
F (b) 
.67 
.89 
5.01* 
.33 
4.09* 
Dependency by Length of Stay. For ease of interpretation and utility, 
Dependency scores were reduced to four classes. These classes were: 
SCORE: 
0 - 5: 
6 - 11: 
12 - 17: 
18 - 24: 
DESCRIPTION: 
Minimally Dependent 
Somewhat Dependent 
Moderately Dependent 
Severe! y Dependent 
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Dependency Class. Table XIII presents data on the percent distribution of 
the total sample by Dependency Class. A Chi Square test showed a significant 
difference between the PRE/POST periods at the p ( .001 level. These results 
were consistent with the prior analysis concerning Dependency at Discharge 
PRE/POST. 
TABLE XIII 
DISTRIBUTION OF SAMPLE BY DEPENDENCY CLASS 
PRE (n=1,256) POST (n=1,358) TOTAL (n:2,614) 
Class I 28.7 % 22.5% 25.5% 
Class II 42.8 % 44.2 % 43.5% 
Class III 15.1 % 17.5 % 16.4% 
Class IV 13.3 % 15.8% 14.6% 
Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Chi square test = *** p = (.001 
Dependency Class By Length of Stay. Dependency Class was then com pared 
to length of stay for the PRE and POST periods. Length of stay declined 
significantly between the PRE and POST periods (p .001). Figure 3 presents 
data on Dependef.lCY Class by length of stay. While one would expect length of 
stay to increase as Dependency increased, this was not the case. In both the 
PRE and POST subsamples, the mean length of stay for Class IVs (Severely 
Dependent) was less (PRE LOS = 12.9 days; POST LOS = 8.9 days) than that for 
Class Ins (Moderately Dependent) (PRE LOS = 13.1 days; POST LOS = 9.5 days). 
Thus, length of stay declined while Dependency at discharge increased. 
A possible explanation for shorter lengths of stay for Class IV compared to 
Class III is that approximately half of the Class IV cases came from nursing 
homes and may have had skilled beds awaiting them post-discharge. Thus, the 
Length 
ol 
Stay (Days) 
!~POST 
CLASS I 
(o-5) 
CLASS II 
(8-11) 
CLASS Ill 
(12-17) 
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CLASS rl 
(18-24) 
Figure 3. Dependency Class by Length o:f Stay, PRE/POST. 
hospitals may have discharged th("se cases "earlier" because they had an 
established post-hospital placement readily available to them. In contrast, the 
Class Ills generally came from a home setting into the hospital and may have 
had to wait in the hospital until an appropriate placement could be arranged for 
them. What these data do point out is that the relationship of length of stay to 
Dependency is a complex issue and likely to be influenced by other factors. 
Post-Hospital Placement By PRE/POST. In addition to Dependency 
information, data collectors recorded information from the medical charts 
which identified the discharge destination of the sample patients. The 
categories were: 
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1. Home Alone 
2. Home with Another (Spouse, Relative, Home Health) 
3. Group Home (e.g., retirement community, foster care) 
4. Nursing Home (SNF, ICF) 
5. Transfer to Another Acute Care Facility (e.g., hospital) 
Table XIV presents the sample distribution on the total percent of post-
hospital placements for the PRE and POST period. In looking at the numbers, 
there was a tendency for increased placements to home alone, to group home 
(adult foster care, residential care facilities) and hospital transfers while there 
was a decrease in placements to home with another (family, home health). 
There appeared to be no change in nursing home placements in the POST period. 
When tested by Chi Square, the difference between the PRE and POST periods 
was found to be significant at the p (.001 level. 
TABLE XIV 
PERCENT POST-HOSPITAL PLACEMENT BY PRE/POST 
PRE (n=1256) POST (n:1358) TOTAL (n:2614) 
Home Alone 13.7% 14.1% 13.9% 
Home w I Another 52.3% 47.7% 49.9% 
Group Home 3.4% 5.4% 4.5% 
Nursing Home 27.4% 26.1% 26.7% 
Hos p. Transfer 1.7% 6.1% 4.0% 
Info Unclear 1.5% 0.7% 1.1% 
Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
TABLE XV 
PERCENT OF POST-HOSPITAL PLACEMENTS 
BY DEPENDENCY CLASS- PRE/POST 
(N=2,614) 
DEPENDENCY CLASS 
n m IV 
Placement f!:! ~ !!!!· f!!! !!!! f!!!! ~ ~ 
Home Alone 7.7 7.~ 5.7 6.1 .3 .If 0 .1 
Home With Other 18.0 13.0 2?.3 27.3 
'·' '·' 
l.llj l.S 
Group Home 1.0 1.0 1.6 3.0 
·' 
1.0 .3 .4 
Nursing Home 
·' 
.7 7., 
'·" 
8.0 8.0 11.2 12.0 
Hospital .2 .1 
·' 
2.1 
·' 
2.4 .4 1.3 
Information Unclear 1.0 
--:.! _,&. _:l _:.! _:.! _.! __Q 
Column Total 28.6 22., 42.9 44.2 U.2 17.1f 13.3 U.9 
COMPARISONS: 
Group Home versus All other PRE/POST- Chi Square value significant at .05 
Home Alone/Home w/ Another versus All - Chi Square value significant at .01 
Hospital Transfer versus All other PRE/POST - Chi Square value sig. at .001 
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Figures 3 through 7. Figures 3 ~hrough 7 present Table XV data 
graphically. The data suggest that there was a tendency for more placements 
Home Alone in Class II, III, and IV (Figure 3) but fewer placements to Home 
with Another in Dependency Class I and about the same in the- other classes 
(Figure 4) in the POST period. The data also indicate an increase in Class lis 
and Ills being placed in a Group Home setting (Adult Foster Care, Residential 
Care} (Figure 5). There was little change in PRE/POST placements by 
Dependency Class for Nursing Home placements, except for a decrease in 
Class Us in the POST period (Figure 6}. The Group Home and Nursing Home 
findings suggest that Class lis are now being placed in the relatively new care 
setting of Adult Foster Care or Residential Care as opposed to being placed in 
a nursing home. Finally, there was a significant increasing trend across 
Dependency Classes for placement in another hospital for Class Us, IUs, and 
IVs (Figure 7). 
4(.3%)5(.4%) 
3 
CLASS 
fli PRE 
Sl POST 
2(.1%) 
Figure 4. Placement at Home Alone, PRE/POST Dependency. 
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468 
(27.3%)"343 
1 
371 27.3%) 
CLASS 
3 
rl1 PRE 
II POST 
Figure 5. Placement at Home with Others, PRE/POST Dependency. 
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1 3 
CLASS 
IZi PRE 
II POST 
4 6 
Figure 6. Placement in Group Home, PRE/POST Dependency. 
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18 
16 
14 
16 
68 
48 
2 
f:a PRE 
II POST 
163 
101 
CLASS 
Figure 7. Placement in a Nursing Home, PRE/POST Dependency. 
186 
f:a PRE 
ell POST 
18 6 
2 2 
1 2 
CLASS 
32 
(2.4%) 
3 4 
Figure 8. Placement in Another Hospital, PRE/POST Dependency. 
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Comparisons- Table XV. When comparing the combined categories of 
placements Home Alone and Home with Another to All Other Placements 
PRE/POST, a Chi Square test showed the difference to be significant at the .05 
level. When comparing Group Home placement against All Other Placements 
PRE/POST, a Chi Square test showed the difference to be significant at the .01 
level. And, comparing Hospital Transfer versus All Other Placements 
PRE/POST, a Chi Square test showed the difference to be significant at the 
.001 level. The change in nursing home placement PRE/POST was not 
significant. These findings suggest that changes have occurred in the volume of 
placements being made to community-based care settings after the 
implementation of PPS. Fewer placements appear to be being made to home, 
both Alone or with Another (Spouse, Family, Home Health) and an increasing 
number of placements are being made to Group Home (Adult Foster Care, 
Residential Care Facilities) and transfers to other hospitals. 
A possible explanation for this significant increase in POST placements to 
"other" categories, especially for hospital transfers, is that some of the DRGs 
used in the sample selection generally required rehabilitation support (stroke, 
hip replacement, major joint pinning). There may be an unbundling of services 
that were previously provided as one unit of service, which may spread across 
all DRGs. Under PPS, hospitals have the incentive to discharge patients and 
then readmit them, to unbundle services, and to transfer patients along a new 
"oontinuum of care." In order to explore the possible influence diagnosis might 
play in post-hospital placement, an analysis of placement by DRG for 
PRE/POST was conducted. Tables XVI and XVII present the frequency 
distribution for post-hospital placement by DRG by PRE/POST. 
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TABLE XVI 
PERCENT OF POST-HOSPITAL PLACEMENTS BY DRG -PRE/POST 
(N=2,614) 
DRG 14 DRG 89 DRG 127 DRG 209 DRG 210 
Plar:ement Pre Post Pre ~ ~ Post fr!. ~ ~ ~ 
Home Alone 6,8 9.6 19.0 1'1.6 21.1 24.5 9.4 5.2 fl.~ 11.7 
Home w I Another 46.'1 37.6 50.5 50.0 5ll.7 49.6 66.1 65.11 411.7 32.7 
Group Home 3.7 3.6 3.8 7.6 ,,1 5.5 1.1 5.3 0,1 3.7 
Nursing Home 3,,6 32.2 211.2 26.9 17 .I 17.2 21.1 U.7 50.4 ,2,2 
Hosp, Tmsfr. 5.8 17,0 .7 .9 .6 1.3 0 6.& 0 4.7 
Info, Undear · 1.7 0 1.7 0 1.4 1.& 2.2 1.0 0 0 
Column Total 23,, 2'1.7 23,0 25.2 27.9 23.2 14.:4 14.1 11.2 7.9 
Table XVII presents data on total placements (percentage of all 
PRE/POST) by DRG for the PRE/POST period. When tested by Chi Square, the 
difference between the PRE/POST periods was found to be significant at the 
.001 level. 
TABLEXVll 
TOTAL PERCENT PLACEMENT BY DRG -PRE/POST 
(N=2,614) 
DRG PRE (n=l 22.56) POST (n=1 23.58) TOTAL (n=22614) 
Stroke 23 • .5% 24.7% 13.9% 
Pneumonia 23.0% 2.5.2% 49.9% 
Heart Failure 27.9% 28.2% 4.5% 
Hip Replacemt. 14.3% 14.1% 26.7% 
Major Joint Pin. 11.2% 7.9% 1.1% 
Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
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Percent Placement By DRG. As can be seen in Tables XVI and XVII, those 
diagnoses requiring rehabilitation after acute hospital stay did, in fact, increase 
dramatically. Increases in post-hospital placements occurred for DRG 14 -
Stroke, DRG 209 - Hip Replacement, and DRG 210 - Major Joint Pinning. The 
slight increase for DRG 127 - Heart Failure is more difficult to explain. 
Correspondingly, there was no, or very slight, increase in post-hospital 
placements to other hospitals in DRG 89 - Pneumonia, which is· not usually a 
diagnosis associated with post-hospital rehabilitation. However, the fact that 
these placements follow a trend for diagnosis does not explain the increase in 
volume between the PRE/POST period. Meiners and Coffey (1984) analyzed 
1980 discharge data from Maryland hospitals in terms of diagnosis and discharge 
destination. Their data indicate that discharges to nursing homes fell more 
frequently in diagnostic categories that required skilled rehabilitation services 
(DRG 210 and DRG 209), that reflect mental or behavioral problems (DRG 429), 
or that specifically reflect frailty or old age (DRG 89 and DRG 320). Similar 
results were found in this study. 
Di.~charges to home health comprised diagnostic categories that may 
require long-term management but to not necessarily represent debilitating 
conditions (DRG 82, DRG 294, DRG 148). PPS is expected to encourage 
hospitals to unbundle services (provide needed services on more than one 
admission), shift patients vertically to lower-cost care settings within a single 
hospital system (a hospital's affiliated nursing home, a rehabilitation unit within 
the same hospital), and perhaps, discharge and readmit patients in order to 
"game" the system. Unfortunately, the data collected for this study did not 
collect information on which hospital or care setting these hospital transfers 
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were going to. However, the increase in hospital transfers found here may be 
an indication of this shift in discharge patterns. 
Further analysis was conducted to explore post-hospital placement by age 
category. Table XVIII presents a frequency distribution of po.~t-hospital 
placement by age category. The distribution of the sample by placement and 
age shows an interesting pattern. Placement.-; to Home Alone declined for the 
younger age categories in the POST period (60- 65; 66 - 75) and increa~ed for 
the older age groups while placements to Home with Another declined in all age 
categorie.<> from PRE to POST. Placement.~ to Group Home increa!)ed for the 60 
to 65 year olds, stayed about the .~me for 66 - 75 year olds, and increased 
dramatically in the two older age categories (76 - 85 and 85+). Nursing Home 
placements increased dramatically for the 60 to 65 year olds, the 76 - 85 year 
olds, and the 86+ age group in the POST period. Finally, Tramfer to Another 
Hospital increased dramatically across all four age groups in the POST period. 
When tested by Chi Square, the difference between PRE/POST is significant at 
the p .001 level. These differences in PRE/POST placement may reflect the 
increase.-; in Dependency in the age group.s requiring more intensive and higher 
level of post-hospital care. 
TABLEXVBI 
PERCENT PLACEMENT BY AGE CATEGORY- PRE/POST 
{N=2,.5.57) 
60-6S 66-73 76-35 35+ 
PJa~ement fr!. ~ ~ ~ f!:!. ~ f!!. f!!! 
Home Alone 16.7 u.& 16., u.s Iff.~ 15.3 10.2 u.o 
Home w I Another 76.7 67.1 66.1 61.7 ,,.o llfl-.9 36.3 31.7 
Group Home 0 1.3 4.0 11.1 2.:J 
'·' 
,., 8.1 
Nursing Home 3.3 13.2 10.3 10.1 2fJ.2 27.8 46.3 llfl.2 
Hospital 3.3 6.6 2.3 7.4 2.1 ,.9 .7 . '1.7 
Information Unelear 0 0 .7 .s 1.8 .-..& 1.7 .3 
Column Total 2.i T.7 n., 2"i'3 39:7 .0.9 3M' ro 
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A final analysis was conducted comparing PRE/POST Post-hospital 
Placement in terms of Dependency. The question being evaluated was whether 
there were any differences in mean Dependency by post-hospital placement 
before and after PPS implementation. That is, had Dependency increased for 
any of the placement categories. T -tests were conducted on all five placement 
categories, comparing PRE to POST on Mean Dependency score. Only one post-
hospital placement category showed a significant increase in patient 
Dependency between the PRE and POST periods. Post-hospital placement to 
Home with Another showed a significant increase in mean Dependency at the p 
.01 level. This finding is consistent with the data in the literature indicating a 
trend toward "sicker" Medicare beneficiaries being discharged to community 
care providers and requiring more intensive care than before PPS. 
TABLE XIX 
MEAN DEPENDENCY BY PLACEMENT- PRE/POST 
MEAN STANDARD 
PLACEMENT PERIOD DEPENDENCY DEVIATION t-Value 
Home PRE 4.48 (n=172) 3.03 .061 
Alone POST 5.13(n=191) 3.55 
Home w/ PRE 6.78 (n=677) 4.35 .004** 
Another POST 7 .48(n=647) 4.67 
Group PRE 7.86 (n=43) 5.41 .57 
Home POST 8.41 (n=74) 4.73 
Nursing PRE 14.94 (n=344) 5.85 .084 
Home POST 15.69 (n=354) 5.73 
Hospital PRE 12.76 (n=21) 5.60 .676 
Transfer POST 13.28 (n=83) 4.89 
Key: 
p(.01 ** 
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Summary. The data presented in this dissertation suggest that hospitals are 
discharging Medicare beneficiaries more quickly (shorter length of stay) and in 
a more Dependent state than before PPS was implemented. Further, the data 
indicate that younger beneficiaries are being admitted to acute care facilities 
POST -PPS, suggesting that older, less acute beneficiaries and beneficiaries 
needing chronic verus acute care are being sent to other care settings (nursing 
homes). In addition, these more Dependent beneficiaries are being discharged 
to community-based care settings (Home Alone, Home with Another, Group 
Home) and to other hospitals with greater care needs than before PPS. The 
impact of these changes in discharge practices by hospitals will be felt most by 
families and by community-based care providers as the locus of sub-acute care 
of Medicare beneficiaries shifts from the hospital to other settings. Thus, the 
data presented here suggest that PPS has resulted in Medicare beneficiaries 
being discharged "quicker and sicker" to community-based care providers, 
families, and perhaps, rehabilitation units in other hospitals and the hypothesis 
of this dissertation must be rejected. There were differences in patient 
discharge status and post-hospital placement after the implementation of PPS. 
SECTION D: 
NATIONAL DATA 
The ultimate objective of PPS was to reduce the rate of growth in 
Medicare outlays for inpatient hospital care while maintaining an acceptable 
level of access to quality health care for beneficiaries. The goal of reduced 
expenditures was to be achieved through a restructuring of the financial 
incentives facing hospitals. Data published by the Health Care Financing 
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Administration (HCF A) and by other researchers are presented below to assess 
the degree to which Medicare's DRG-based Prospective Payment System (PPS) 
met its stated objective. Data are presented on inpatient hospital expenditures, 
non-hospital services expenditures, out-patient hospital services, skilled nursing 
facility (SNF) expenditures, home health (HH) expenditures, and hospital 
revenue data. 
Impact on Expenditures and Hospital Revenues 
The predicted effect of PPS on hospital costs was that costs per admission 
would go down (Guterman & Dobson, 1986; OTA, 1985). Thus, one primary 
indicator of the success or failure of PPS would be its effect on the volume and 
rate of growth in Medicare program expenditures. Between 1974 and 1982, 
inpatient hospital payments increased at an annual rate of 19.9 percent and 
never fell below 14 percent in any given year. However, in 1983, the rate of 
increase was only 10.2 percent, lower than at any time in the previous ten 
years. The rate fell to 8.2 percent in 1984 and by 1986, the rate of increase in 
hospital inpatient benefit payments had fallen to 4.6 percent, the smallest 
increase in the program's history (Guterman et al., 1988). Thus, PPS appears to 
have slowed the rate of increase in the inpatient hospital benefits portion of 
Medicare. However, it is important to remember that costs are, to a large 
extent, utilization-driven and thus, rates of growth in hospital expenditures 
could be slowing, not because hospitals have improved productivity, but because 
fewer people are going to the hospital and those going are leaving sooner (Davis 
et al., 1985). However, whatever the cause, PPS was intended to slow the rate 
of growth in inpatient hospital expenditures, which it appears to have done. 
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Non-hospital Sa-vices Expenditures. The non-hospital services funded by 
Medicare include services provided by physicians, outpatient departments, 
skilled nursing facilities, home health agencies and non-physician suppliers such 
as laboratories and durable medical equipment suppliers. If lengths of stay are 
reduced, as is expected under PPS, these services could be substituted for in-
patient hospital care. For example, the· number of physician visits in hospital 
settings should decline as should physician inpatient costs. Shorter stays would 
also reduce the potential for consultative visits for both medical and surgical 
discharges. However, if Medicare admissions increase, which was also 
predicted to occur, then there should be an increase in physician visits and thus, 
physician payments by Medicare. Between 1975 to 1983, the annual rate of 
increase in physician payments was never smaller than 15 percent (Guterman & 
Dobson, 1986). 
Health Care Financing Administration (HCFA) data from the first year 
evaluation of PPS show that the annual rate of increase in physician benefit 
payments declined slightly, down to 10.7 percent in 1984. Overall, the rate of 
growth in non-hospital expenditures was down from 8.9 to 8.1 percent for the 
first three years of PPS {Guterman et al., 1988). Thus, a change in the pattern 
of growth in Medicare payments for physicians services is supported, which is 
consistent with the decrease in inpatient expenditures rate of growth. 
·Out-patient Hospital Services. In 1984, outpatient hospital payments grew 
by only 11.9 percent but this rate continued to outpace the inpatient 
expenditures rate for the eleventh consecutive year (Guterman & Dobson, 
1986). By 1986, payments for outpatient services grew by less than 7.1 percent, 
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the smallest percentage increase since 1973. Still, the outpatient services 
payment rate of growth was again larger than the increase for inpatient 
services (4.696). Overall, hospital outpatient benefit payments grew a total of 
15.7 percent in the first three years under PPS versus an average annual rate of 
increase of 8.8 percent for the five years prior to PPS (Guterman et al., 1988). 
This may indicate that some of the savings on inpatient services under PPS are 
now being spent on outpatient services as care is shifted from the inpatient to 
outpatient setting. 
Skilled Nursing Expenditures. One of the anticipated effects of PPS 
incentives was that they would encourage hospitals to discharge patients to 
post-hospital care more frequently and at an earlier stage of recuperation. 
These actions could potentially increase the demand for skilled nursing and 
home care. Yet Medicare coverage of skilled nursing care is quite limited (20 
days of care with total coverage, and an additional 80 days with a 50 percent 
copayment), and there has been a chronic shortage of nursing home beds since 
Medicare's inception. This shortage is likely to continue since most skilled 
nun~ing facility (SNFs) expenditures for Medicare patients are actually made by 
State Medicaid programs. Largely because of limits to coverage, spend-down 
requirements and low reimbursement rates under Medicare, there has been 
little incentive to add nursing home beds for Medicaid patients (Feder & 
Scanlon, 1982). The net expenditure impact of increases in the use of nursing 
homes by Medicare beneficiaries may thus be greatest for the beneficiary, who 
must pay up to 50 percent of the SNF cost after 20 days. There are few data 
available on increases in out-of-pocket expenditures for skilled nursing home 
care as a result of PPS. 
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Overall, the growth in skilled nursing payments has accelerated since the 
implementation of PPS. Between 1983 and 1984, SNF expenditures increased at 
a rate of 5.6 percent compared to a decrease in the rate of growth prior to PPS. 
The program grew at an average rate of 4.7 percent between 1984 and 1986 
although the projected rate of increase for 1984 was 5.7 percent. However, the 
lower than expected rate of increase may indicate a relative upturn when 
comapred with the decreases in the pre-PPS period (Guterman et al., 1988; 
Guterman & Dobson, 1986). 
Home Health Expenditures. Between 1974 and 1983, Medicare 
reimbursement of home health providers grew at an average annual rate of 25 
percent and has never been below 19 percent (Guterman & Dobson, 1986; 
Leader, 1986). Put another way, total reimbursements in 1983 were ten times 
larger than the amount disbursed in 1974 (House Aging Committee, 1986; 
Leader, 1986). Amendments to the Medicare home health benefit, expanded in 
1980, began covering an unlimited number of home health visits (versus the 100 
visit per benefit period limit under existing law) and eliminated the 3-day prior 
hospitalization requirement (OTA, 1985). As a result, Medicare payments for 
home health services have increased rapidly in recent years. Medicare home 
health payments increased at a somewhat higher rate than did inpatient hospital 
payments during 1983. Since 1984, the growth has accelerated to a rate about 
4.5 times as high as that of inpatient hospital payments and more than twice as 
high as for any other major benefit category. Specifically, the growth in home 
health benefit payments increased an average of 12.7 percent in the first three 
years of PPS versus an average increase of 11.2 percent in the five years prior 
to PPS (Guterman et al., 1988). Although constrained by strict limits on it's 
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use, shifts in service delivery as a result of PPS have meant an increase in 
nursing home and home health expenditures. 
Hospital Revenues. Another area of concern under PPS was hospital 
financial viability. Because PPS generally pays hospitals a fixed price per 
discharge while the use of resources for patients in any given DRG may vary 
widely, PPS established a pattern of financial winners and losers across 
Medicare patients and the hospitals that serve them. However, such an uneven 
distriwtion of profits and losses among hospitals has three basic problems 
associated with it. First, it creates an incentive for hospitals to treat winner 
cases and avoid "loser cases" (Newhouse, 1983). To the extent that such cases 
can be identified before admission, serious implications for patient access arise. 
Second, random and unpredictable variation in treatment costs creates a 
financial risk that is borne only by the hospital. This risk varies inversely with 
the volume of cases a hospital sees. Small hospitals or those with low volumes 
are likely to suffer a disproportionate burden of financial risk resulting from 
cost variations. Third, some hospitals, by virtue of their mission or location, 
may end up serving a disproportionate share of high cost patients. Referral 
centers and public hospitals, for example, may be subject to this type of bias. 
Making such hospitals bear the financial burden of higher cost patients is not 
only inequitable but may threaten quality of care for those served by these 
institutions (OT A, 1985). 
Revenues will also vary across hospitals independent of differences in 
patient characteristics since hospitals are paid different rates per DRG, 
depending on their area wage index, urban or rural location, and until national 
rates kick in, the region of the country the hospital is located in. In addition, 
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teaching hospitals receive an extra payment to account for the extra patient 
costs associated with teaching. The assumption is that differences in DRG 
payment rates mirror differences in costs of providing care. Whether the DRG 
pricing structure is refined enough to reflect differences in input costs 
accurately is subject to much debate. 
The American Hospital Association (AHA) as well as many hospitals in 
rural counties or on the fringe of major metropolitan areas have daimed that 
urban/rural rate differentials discriminate against them (Mickel, 1984; Wallace, 
1984; Washington Report, 1985b). On February 17, 1984, eleven hospitals in 
Ohio sued the federal government seeking to redress the undue penalty imposed 
by PPS dassifications on rural hospitals, charging that the urban/rural 
classifications were "arbitrary and bear no national relationship to health care 
or to health care costs'' (Mickel, 1984, p. 37). Furthermore, it was argued that 
the classifications were unconstitutional, violating the 5th Amendment because 
the boundary dassifications amounted to the taking of private property without 
just compensation (Mickel, 1984). 
The federal court decided on September 15, 1984, that the jurisdiction does 
exist and that Ohio hospitals had no basis to challenge the PPS system 
(Hospitals, 1984a,c). However, members of Congress, especially those with 
larger rural populations, introduced bills to remedy the situation and in March, 
1985, the Congressional Record documented the belief that rural hospitals were 
getting "the short end of the DRG stick" (Mcilrath, 1985, p. 33). 
Political pressure on HCFA resulted in regional rates being eliminated, 
even though there is ample evidence that such differences exist (OT A, 1985). In 
addition, while rural hospitals will benefit from the change, some urban 
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hospitals will not (Lefton, 1985b). It is also unclear whether hospitals can 
adjust to uniform rates by changing physician behavior quickly enough or 
whether such uniformity of practice style is even desirable. 
Based on the urban/rural example, it is clear that if DRG pricing does not 
adequately reflect differences in input costs, certain hospitals will 
systematically have higher or lower surpluses than average. Changes in the 
payment structure could also produce redistributions of revenue unrelated to 
hospital behavior. Arbitrary redistributions are unfair to hospitals but even 
more so to the patients treated by these hospitals who may have their access to 
and quality of care jeopardized (OTA, 1985). 
Three studies simulating the impact of PPS revenues verus cost-based 
revenues predicted that small hospitals would fare well under PPS while large 
hospitals would fare relatively poorly (OT A, 1985). Teaching hospitals that 
qualify for large Medicare teaching allowances were generally expected to fare 
better than non-teaching hospitals. Government owned hopsitals were also 
predicted to do well, perhaps because many government owned hospitals are 
also teaching hospitals. Urban hospitals and hospitals in the North section of 
the country were expected to fare better than rural hospitals and hospitals 
located in the North Central and West Regions (Congressional Budget Office, 
1984; Vaida, 1984; Wennberg, 1984a). However, these simulation studies did not 
take into account changes in hospital behavior (e.g., staffing layoffs) or hospital 
characteristics (e.g., changes in case mix) or structural aspects of PPS 
(teaching allowances). Moreover, these studies were one dimensional. For 
example, small hospitals are predicted to do well but rural hospitals are 
201 
expected to fare poorly under PPS. It is possible for the predicted results to 
hold but only as long as a few large urban hospitals suffer heavy losses or as 
long as small, urban hospitals do well. It is dear that the financial distribution 
patterns of PPS were not well understood before the program was implemented. 
~ Although occupancy has fallen, hospital revenues have increased. 
Surplus revenue (the difference between income and expenses) for all U.S. 
hospitals more than doubled during the first year of PPS, with for-profit 
hospitals reporting a 44 percent increase in net income. The Inspector 
General's Office (IGO) of the Department of Health and Human Services 
(DHHS) reported that Medicare payments were an average of 14 percent 
greater than operating costs for Medicare patients in 1984 (Guterman & 
Dobson, 1986). Data from the American Hospital Association's National 
Hospital Panel Survey Report (1985) found that hospitals as a group saw a larger 
financial gain in 1984 (a $8.3 billion surplus) than in any year since the survey 
began. However, as predicted, the distribution of this surplus was not even 
across geographic areas or across hospitals. Hospitals in the West, South 
Central, and Mountain regions experienced financial declines and the smallest 
hospitals (those with 25 beds or less) suffered absolute losses (AHA, 1985). 
The percentage of hospitals with positive payment margins fell slightly 
between the first and second years of PPS, dropping from 83.1 percent to 79.2 
percent. As predicted, large urban hospitals and major teaching hospitals did 
well tnder PPS while small and rural hospitals did not. One hundred percent of 
the largest urban hospitals and 98.1 percent of major teaching hospitals had 
positive payment margins whereas only 67.8 percent of the smallest rural 
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hospitals did. Urban hospitals had larger payment margins than did rural 
hospitals by the second year of PPS (13.6% versus 7.8%). Hospitals which had 
exceptionally high payment margins were large urban hospitals and major 
teaching hospitals (17% with 685 or more beds and 18.3% of teaching hospitals). 
Of the hospitals that had negative payment margins in the first year of PPS, 
40.8 percent had positive payment margins by the second year of PPS, and only 
13 percent had negative payment margins in the second year of PPS (Guterman 
et al., 1988). The evidence suggests that large hospitals were able to cut costs 
rapidly while small hospitals were not, even though hospitals as group did well 
under the first two years of PPS (Lefton, 1985). 
It was expected that PPS would produce a significant redistribution of 
inpatient payments among hospitals, especially between urban and 
suburban/rural hospitals (Vladeck, 1985). A recent study by Ashby and Darmer 
(1988) supports the claim that Medicare payments are unevenly distrib.Jted 
across hospitals. Their study of 257 hospitals in five large urban areas 
examined the cost factors affecting core city and suburban portions of the same 
metropolitan areas. They found that the average unadjusted Medicare cost per 
case was 33 percent higher in core city hospitals relative to the suburban areas 
and that less than half of this difference was accounted for by the adjustment 
for case mix complexity and teaching costs. 
The data also indicated that core city location was associated with a $654 
higher cost per case with all other factors held constant. The authors 
conduded that there are other essentially non-controllable factors affecting 
hospital costs per case; such as urban core location requiring higher wage levels 
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to attract employees, service to patients at an advanced acute stage of illness 
and with more frequent comorbidities not included in the DRG criteria, more 
difficulty in arranging post-hospital placement for patients, greater patient 
assistance costs (education and counseling, transportation), additional property 
related costs (parking structure operations, security), and added costs for 
patient account collection efforts and eligibility determination for Medicaid 
and charity care programs. Cutting accross these factors is the added cost of 
treating larger numbers of low-income or indigent patients. The average loss in 
the first year of PPS was estimated at $331 per case in city hospitals compared 
to only $74 in suburban hospitals (Ashby&: Darmer, 1988). Because neither core 
city location nor caring for indigent patients is recognized by PPS, the cost 
impacts of these factors translate directly into greater payment losses for 
many urban hospitals. The study demonstrated that current wage index systems 
in the DRG-based PPS system lmfairly penalizes core city hospitals and rewards 
suburban hospitals, resulting in a redistribution of Medicare funds away from 
those hospitals serving the poor and indigent. 
Summary. Medicare benefit payment under both the HI and SMI programs 
grew at annual rates exceeding 20 percent prior to PPS. However, the rate of 
growth in the HI benefit payments was sharply reduced after PPS and both HI 
and SMI benefit payments grew at about half of their pre-PPS rates during the 
first year of PPS (Guterman &: Dobson, 1986). Over the three year period since 
PPS was implemented, the overall level of benefit payments has increased at a 
slower rate, due to a sharp decline in the growth of HI payments while SMI 
payments increased at a somewhat faster rate than before PPS. Thus, PPS 
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appears to have slowed the rate of increase in Medicare inpatient hospital 
benefit payments. Although this increase is still above the general rate of 
inflation, it does represent a downturn in the rapid growth of inpatient costs. 
The increase in Part B expenditures (SMI payments) may mean that there is a 
shift in the location of service delivery, such as from inpatient to outpatient 
sites, and that some of the savings being achieved in Medicare's Part A 
(inpatient hospital expenditures) may now be being spent on outpatient services 
(physician's services, outpatient surgeries, post-hospital care). The next section 
examines the impact of PPS on quality of care for Medicare beneficiaries. 
PPS IMPACT ON QUALITY OF CARE 
Medicare's PPS incentives for inpatient hospital services clearly have the 
capacity to alter the quality of care delivered to the elderly, both in positive 
and negative directions. However, in order for PPS to reduce inpatient hospital 
expenditures, one or more of the following has to occur: A) the cost of treating 
patients must be shifted from hospitals to other care settings; B) hospitals must 
reduce the cost of treating inpatients; or C) a portion of the cost of treating 
Medicare patients must be borne by payers other than Medicare. Each option 
has implications for the efficiency and fairness of PPS. Absolute reductions in 
the cost of treating hospital patients without shifting costs to other settings 
would be the most desirable provided this does not come at the expense of 
quality hospital care. 
If cost reductions are accomplished by shifting patients to care sites 
outside the hospital, which must also be paid for, then actual savings in 
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hospital expenditures will be offset by expenditures in other parts of the 
program or by beneficiaries themselves. However, if hospitals finance the 
treatment of patients by raising charges to other patients, questions of equity 
arise. Or, hospitals could reduce costs of care to such a degree that Medicare 
inpatients become profitable, generating a surplus that could be used to 
subsidize other kinds of care. These considerations lead to three critical policy 
evaluation questions (OTA, 1985): 
(1) What, if any, negative effects has PPS had on the quality of 
hospital care for Medicare beneficiaries? 
(2) What is the net effect of PPS on the quality of hospital care for 
Medicare beneficiaries? 
(3) How has PPS affected the quality of care in nonhospital settings? 
Quality of Hospital Care 
Several outcome measures can be used to detect serious negative effects 
of PPS on the quality of hospital care, including in-hospital and post-discharge 
mortality rates, rates of occurrence of complications or iatrogenic events, 
admission and readmission rates, changes in length of hospital stay and 
discharge rates, changes in case-mix severity, levels of hospital staffing, and 
changes in the management and organization of hospitals. 
Mortality Rates. In-hospital and post-discharge mortality rates can be 
measured as total death rates across institutions for specified types of 
facilities. Some rates are specific to patient populations (e.g., the frail 
elderly), and some rates are specific to diagnosis, surgical procedure, or DRG. 
Post-discharge death rates can also be measured at various intervals following 
discharge. It has been suggested that an increase in in-hospital and post-
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discharge mortality rates are to be expected if less seriously ill patients are 
shifted to outpatient while more seriously ill patients are hospitalized. The 
question to be addressed is whether elderly patients with given medical 
conditions or with similar levels of severity of illness are dying in the hospital 
or shortly after discharge at rates demonstrably above those in the pre-PPS era 
(OT A, 1985). 
Data from the three-year evaluation of PPS show that hospital mortality 
rates for the Medicare population did increase between 1984. and 1985. The 
population-based mortality rate for aged persons in 1985 was 5,140 per 100,000; 
this was somewhat, but not significantly, higher than the rate predicted by a 
time-trend model of mortality rates since 1979. The 30-day post-admission 
mortality rate for beneficiaries rose from 6.6 percent in 1984 to 7.2 percent in 
1985, representing a 9.3 percent increase in one year. However, the total 
number of deaths actually decreased by 3 percent. The fact that total 
population-based mortality did not change and there was a large decline in 
admission rates strongly suggests that hospital-based mortality has been 
affected by PPS; that is, hospitals are discharging patients to other care 
settings to die (Guterman et al., 1988). 
While not an intended consequence of PPS, the cost cutting incentives of 
the program have resulted in changes in hospital behavior. One consequence 
has been the admission and discharge of sicker patients, some of whom were 
expected to die. Adjusting the fiscal year 1985 mortality rates according to the 
case-mix changes both within and between DRGs, Conklin et al. (1988) found 
the increase in crude 'mortality rates between 1984 and 1985 fully accounted for 
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by an increase in the case mix severity. Adjustments for stage of disease, high 
risk comorbidity, age and sex resulted in expected mortality rates for 1985 of 
7.3 percent, which is slightly higher than the observed 1985 mortality rate of 
7.2 percent. The results indicated that despite the increase in morbidity at 
hospital admission and the incentives to reduce service delivery and length of 
stay, PPS apparently has not increased the risk of mortality following hospital 
admission. 
Iatrogenic Events. Iatrogenic events, often called "sentinel. events," 
including infections acquired by patients during a hospital stay, drug reactions 
and other mishaps due to treatment in the hospital. These and other 
preventable problems can signal that quality of care has declined (OT A, 1985). 
Since they help in distinguishing between very bad care and adequate care, they 
can serve as useful screening indicators of the direction that inpatient quality 
of care may be taking. The question under PPS is whether the rates of such 
problems increa~e as PPS incentives to reduce services and personnel begin to 
be applied. However, there has been no information published to date regarding 
the level of iatrogenic events pre-and-post-PPS. 
Admissions. PPS was expected to increase admissions, especially in those 
DRGs for which the cost of treatment was expected to be less than the DRG 
payment rate. Hospitals also have the incentive to increase admissions. Since 
both the aged population and the average age of the elderly is increasing, added 
admissions would generate added revenue and since decreases in length of stay 
were anticipated under PPS, increased admissions would fill empty beds. 
Furthermore, hospital admissions of Medicare patients had increased every year 
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since the program was implemented with an annual increase never falling below 
3.3 percent. Contrary to expectations, Medicare admissions actually dropped 4 
percent in 1984, the first decline since the program was initiated (Guterman & 
Dobson, 1986). 
By contrast, admissions had risen over 2 percent in 1983 (OTA, 1985). 
Since 1984, an unprecedented decline in hospital admissions has been observed 
for both Medicare and non-Medicare patients (Davis, 1985). Medicare 
admissions fell another 4.3 percent between 1985 and 1986 and Medicare 
admissions overall fell by a total of 11.3 percent between 1983 and 1986 
(Guterman et al., 1988). Thus hospitals appear to be limiting admission to only 
those severely ill and shifting more routine care to other, non-PPS covered 
sites. 
Hospital admissions have declined for all age groups also; falling by 10.3 
percent between 1983 to 1986 while the number of inpatient days fell by 15.7 
percent for the same period. Results from a preliminary study of the impact of 
PPS on general hospital admission rates suggest that admission rates per 1,000 
Blue Cross/Blue Shield members and hospital days per 1,000 Blue Cross/Blue 
Shield members have declined at rates exceeding those for Medicare 
beneficiaries (Scheffler & Gibbs, 1986). The proportion of all community 
hospital admissions for people 65 or above increased 10 percent between 1979 
and 1986. These data tend to reinforce the conclusion that PPS has had a 
system-wide impact versus an impact on Medicare beneficiaries only (Guterman 
et al., 1988). The data may also reflect the changing role of the hospital in the 
contemporary health care system as a result of increased cost and utilization 
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controls used by private insurers, the increase in alternative delivery system 
enrollment, the increase in the shift in care to alternative delivery sites, and/or 
changes in utilization in rate setting and PPS waiver states (Davis, 1985). 
Readmission Rates. Readmissions can reflect a deterioration in the quality 
of care for a variety of reasons. Some patients will require rehospitalization 
for problems unrelated to the original admission. Readmissions can also occur 
if routine testing or specialized consultations are curtailed, so that unsuspected 
condititions are not detected or confirmed on a first admission. Readmission 
can also be prompted by complications arising from surgery or because of 
inappropriate care or inadequate recuperation before discharge ~'premature 
discharge"). One form of readmission arises from sequencing of admissions, one 
admission for diagnostic testing and workup and a second for surgery or other 
definitive therapy. Thus, it is important to determine if PPS incentives for 
curbing length of stay, routine testing, follow-up of diagnostic tests, and 
specialty consultations seem to be associated with a rise in readmissions of this 
sort. 
Readmission rates within 30 days of hospital discharge have remained 
relatively stable under PPS (Guterman et al., 1988). However, very little 
detailed information on readmissions has yet been published but the decline in 
admissions probably means that the readmission rate has not significantly 
increased (OT A, 198.5). A study of 270,266 Medicare readmissions before PPS 
(between 1974 and 1977) indicated that approximately .5 percent were 
readmitted within .5 days and that 22 percent of Medicare patients dishcarged 
from the hospital were readmitted within 60 days (Anderson & Steinberg, 1984). 
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The fact that admissions declined in the first year of PPS, rather than 
rising as predicted, suggests three different explanations: one, that there may 
be strong counteractive forces operating to keep hospitals from admitting more 
Medicare patients; two, that strategies aimed at increasing admissions takes 
time to be developed; or three, that admissions are difficult for hospital 
managers to influence directly. Thus, it may be easier for hospitals, at least 
initially, to increase outpatient visits (since they are reimbursed on a cost basis) 
than to increase inpatient admissions in profitable DRGs (OTA, 1985). 
Length of Stay. Statistics compiled by the Health Care Financing 
Administration (HCF A} tend to support the notion that hospitals have resorted 
to an "early discharge" strategy in response to the financial incentives of PPS. 
Although average length of stay (ALOS} has been declining over the past 15 
years, PPS appears to have accelerated this trend for the elderly. Annual data 
on average length of stay for Medicare beneficiaries for the period between 
1967 and 1984 show length of stay has been steadily declining over the 15 years 
prior to PPS. Average length of stay declined from 10.3 to 10 days between 
1982 and 1983 (when TEFRA provisions were in effect}, a 2. 9 percent decline. 
Between 1983 and 1984 (when PPS was implemented}, average length of stay 
dropped to 9.1 days, a 9 percent decline (Guterman et al., 1988). The Office of 
Technology Assessment (OTA, 1985} and Davis (1985) both report an even larger 
decline for the elderly, from 10.4 days in 1981 to 8.8 days in 1984, 
approximately a 15 percent decline. 
While Medicare beneficiaries experienced declines in the overall use of 
hospitals in both 1984 and 1985, the two years differed greatly in the nature of 
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the declines. The sharp decreases in length of stay in 1984 were followed by 
more moderate declines in 1985 and 1986. Average length of stay for all 
Medicare beneficiaries declined just 3.5 percent in 1986, for a total of a 17 
percent decline since 1984. The declines in length of stay also varied across 
age groups. Length of stay declined more for the oldest age group (86+), with a 
drop of 6.5 percent in 1985, than for the youngest age group (65- 75 years), 
with a drop of 4 percent (Guterman et al., 1988). Finally, the decline in the 
elderly's length of stay was more dramatic for those hospitals under PPS the 
longest. Hospitals under PPS since 1984 had a 14.6 percent decrease in LOS 
between 1982 and 1984. Because the need for sub-acute post-hospital care is 
greatest for older persons, length of stay reductions could pose significant post-
hospital care problems for this older group. 
Although length of stay for all ages under 65 has also been declining, the 
rate of decline has been more modest. OT A (1985) reports that average length 
of stay in the under 65 population declined from 6.6 to 5.8 days between 1974 
and 1983. The American Hospital Association (AHA) reports a 7 percent 
decline in general average length of stay, from 5.9 days in 1981 to 5.5 days by 
1984 (Davis, 1985). Overall, average length of stay for all community hospital 
patients under age 65 has decreased only 5.1 percent since 1979 (Guterman et 
al., 1988). 
Case-Mix Severity. It was hypothesized that elderly Medicare patients 
needing long-term care services, most often referred to as Medicare "outliers" 
(those with hospital stays greater than the geometric mean length of stay), 
would be much more likely to be discharged earlier ~han those discharged to 
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self-care (Meiners & Coffee, 1984). Contrary to expectations, it appears that 
the decline in length of stay under PPS has been achieved through shorter stays 
across the board, rather than efforts aimed specifically at patients who have 
the longest stays and are, presumably, the most severely ill. This conclusion is 
supported in the data reported by the Health Care Financing Administration 
(Guterman et al., 1988) as well as in the data presented in this dissertation 
where length of stay declined significantly in all five DRG categories examined. 
If less severely ill beneficiaries are being diverted, then there should be a 
corresponding increase in the average severity of illness among Medicare 
patienh admitted to hospitals. 
While LOS has decined, there has been a marked increase in the average 
severity of illness among those Medicare patients who are admitted to the 
hospital. The Medicare Case-Mix Index (CMI) increased sharply with the 
implementation of PPS. The CMI was 8.4 percent higher in 19&4 than in 19&1, 
exceeding estimates that were made prior to the implementation of PPS. Some 
of this increase could be the result of changes in documentation (upcoding), 
improvements in data collection, and/or changes in physician practice patterns 
(Guterman & Dobson, 19&6). However, the CMI has continued to increase at an 
annual rate of 3 percent per year between 19&4 and 1986. In addition, HCFA 
found that the percentage of hospital days spent in special care units by 
beneficiaries increased, from 6. 4 percent to 7.1 percent, in 1984, reinforcing 
the perception that the only the more severely ill are being admitted to 
hospitals in the post-PPS period (Guterman et al., 1988). 
However, a study by GAO (1985b) found that the use of intensive care units 
was lower in 1984. GAO atributed the decrease to PPS. Moreover, the 
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Commission on Professional and Hospital Activities (CPHA) found that the use 
of cardiac care units decreased in the first year of PPS (CPHA, 198.5). More 
data over a longer term are needed to sort out the relative impacts of PPS on 
case-mix and utilization. 
Hospital Staffing. It was also expected that hospitals would reduce 
expenses by laying off staff, eliminating beds, and negotiating lower prices with 
suppliers (OT A, 198.5). Restructuring staffing patterns under DRG-based PPS to 
reduce unit labor costs and increase efficiency stems from reduced LOS, shifts 
to oupatient services and general pressures to decrease health care costs. One 
method of cutting costs is by "down substitution of staff" (replacing staff with 
less skilled staff; e.g., RNs with LPNs). These activities have definite 
implications for quality of care. Inadequate staffing ratios and changing mix of 
professional and ancillary personnel save money, yet PPS is predicted to 
increase the acuity of those admitted as less ill patients are shifted to 
outpatient and ambulatory care. Decreasing personnel ratios may delay or 
hamper restoration to full function and even increase chances of morbidity or 
mortality through decreased patient education activities, increased infection 
rates, reduced CPR time, etc. 
A decrease in hospital occupancy frequently corresponds with a decrease in 
staffing. There is clear evidence that hospitals have been reducing their staffs 
in response to PPS. Data from the American Hospital Association (AHA) show 
that after having increased at an annual rate of 4.1 percent between 1974 and 
1983, there was a 2.2 percent decline between May 1983 and May 1984, 
primarily because of a decrease in full-time employees (Washington Report, 
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1984). The number of part-time workers decreased only .2 percent during the 
same period (OT A, 1985). The American Nursing Association reports that there 
has also been a shift away from licensed practical nurses towards the more 
highly trained registered nurses (American Medical News, 1985). 
Berki (1985) reports a 1.5 percent decline in hospital personnel nationally in 
1984 and a 4 percent decline in the first quarter of 1985 while admissions 
increa!>ed by 6 percent during the same quarter. Similarly, after an annual 
increase in hospital beds of 1.4 percent between 1975 amd 1983, hospital beds 
were reduced by .6 percent between 1983 and 1984 (Davis, 1985). Moreover, 
health care labor costs had been rising at a three percent annual rate before 
PPS, whereas they decreased by almost one percent in the first year of PPS 
(Hellinger, 1985). Data from specific states and regions reinforce this picture 
of hospital cost containment through staff reductions (OT A, 1985). 
A reduction in staffing does not necessarily mean less staff time per 
hospitalized patient. Because of recent trends towards fewer admissions and 
reduced LOS, the number of full-time-equivalent (FTE) employees per 100 
patients actually increased between May, 1983 and May, 1984. Full-time 
equivalent personnel per 100 patients increased 3.2 percent annually from 1975 
to 1983 but increased by 7.4 percent in 1984 (Davis, 1985; Washington Report, 
1984). There is little research published to date regarding the impact of staff 
reductions on the quality of care beneficiaries are receiving within the hospital 
setting. 
Hospital Management and Or@!niza.tion. PPS appears to be having an 
impact on hospital information systems and their use in management. The use 
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of DRGs as the basis for payment has led to a proliferation of computer 
packages aimed at helping hospitals estimate their actual costs per case and 
predict the reimbursement levels per patient (Business Week, 1984; OTA, 1985). 
Furthermore, the medial records departments of hospitals are assuming a 
greater role in management since accurate records processing is necessary for 
prompt maximum reimbursement (Johnson & Appel, 1984). This has resulted in 
automated medical records processing. One market research survey showed 
that the use of automated processing among sampled hospitals jumped from 
28.3 percent in 1981 to 48.1 percent in 1984 {Hospitals, 198.5). While the 
increasing use of computers has taken place in many industries, PPS may be a 
contributing factor in their rapid application to hospital management. 
The relationship between the financial pressure imposed by PPS and the 
resulting changes in hospital behavior, such as the steep declines in ALOS and 
admissions, may indicate that PPS has been effective in encouraging hospitals 
to change the way they provide inpatient care. However, PPS is not the only 
factor that has contributed to changes in patient care and management 
practices in acute care hospitals. Other factors such as competition among 
providers and increased utilization review by third-party payers have also 
influenced provider behavior. It is difficult to disentangle the specific effects 
of PPS from these other, equally influential, forces. 
Net Effect of PPS on Quality of Hospital Care 
Evaluating the net effect of PPS on the quality of hospital care is limited 
by the fact that mortality rates, readmission rates, or sentinel events alone are 
poor measures of more subtle changes in patient care of the elderly. Even if 
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death or readmission rates show little or no change, as they appear to have done 
from the data published so far, PPS may have an effect on changes in discharge 
status, time to full recovery, impact on chronic impairments, and the emotional 
status of beneficiaries. Moreover, because standard measures (i.e., mortality) 
are relatively rare events, relying on these more general quality indicators is 
inappropriate and insufficient to trigger corrective action (OT A, 1985). 
Examination of the processes of care and "proximate," that is, short term, 
outcomes of care rendered in the hospital will provide a more balanced 
approach to the evaluation of PPS effects than just using studies of crude 
outcome measures. Only medical record audits, examining condition-specific 
process and outcomes related to medical and nursing care are likely to provide 
pre- and post-PPS data with the requisite reliability, validity, and clinical detail 
necessary to convince the medical profession, policymakers, and beneficiaries 
about the impact of PPS. 
General questions to be addressed in evaluating whether treatment 
patterns have changed include: (1) has PPS resulted in changes in treatment 
patterns? (2) have changes in treatment patterns adopted in response to PPS 
affected outcomes of care? and (3) have changes in treatment patterns adopted 
in response to PPS negatively affected outcomes of care? (Lewin & Associates, 
1986). Incentives for changes in care include reducing length of stay, 
developing a preference for the more lucrative surgical rather than medical 
treatments, decreases in the utilization of ancillaries, intensive care or heroic 
measures, maximizing pre-admission or post-discharge care as a substitute for 
inpatient care, use of less expensive treatments even if they are potentially less 
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effective over the long term, and the implementation of administrative and 
other changes in plant operation and maintenance procedures (OT A, 1985). 
Specifically, there is the potential for delayed diagnosis (e.g., failure to 
diagnose a condition at an earlier stage due to a less extensive diagnostic 
workup), and a reduction in less tangible aspects of quality of care. The two 
major determinants of these changes are hospital administrators and physicians. 
The pressure placed on hospital administration concerning the costs of care 
for the elderly has, in turn, created pressures on physicians in the allocation of 
health care. The trend towards shorter lengths of stay and early discharge 
could pose specific clinical problems for the care of the elderly. For example, 
while research has shown that multidisciplinary geriatric assessment and 
therapy can improve the functional level of outcome, reduce readmissions, 
reduce nursing home admissions, and decrease mortality rates, none of these 
services are covered under PPS (Rubinstein, et al., 1984). Instead, acute and 
intensive care continue to be emphasized in the new payment system, 
promoting continued over-utilization of some services and the loss of others 
which may be more relevant to the elderly's needs (Cassel, 1985). There i:. 
little published research on this issue. 
Surgical versus Medical Treatment. The incentives for physicians are 
complex and likely to occur within the hospital's organizational structure since 
PPS impacts physicians only indirectly. Hospital administrators are encouraged 
to specialize in those DRGs in which they can offer the most efficient and 
profitable treatment since PPS reimbursement continues the fee-for-service 
bias favoring surgical and procedure-based services over diagnostic judgment 
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and nonsurgical treatment. Hospital managers thus have the incentive to 
influence physicians to admit more patients in those DRGs with high profit-
margins and to develop "product lines" that maximize the hospital's net 
revenues (Berki, 198.5). For example, hospital management may choose to shift 
bed allocations from medicine to the more lucrative surgical DRGs, selectively 
grant staff privileges to physicians who are more likely to admit desired cases, 
and to de-emphasize special technology and support services for low-profit 
services, such as problem new-borns (Berki, 198.5; Omenn & Conrad, 1984). All 
these actions would, in fact, impact physicians practicing in the hospital. 
Lewin and Associates (1986), in a survey of current research on the impact 
of PPS, found some changes in treatment patterns since 1984 but most of these 
changes could not clearly be attributed to PPS. Moreover, a Rand study (Carter 
& Ginsberg, 198.5) compared the proportion of medical versus surgical DRGs in 
1984 to the number that would have been expected if prior trends had continued 
since 1981. These data were analyzed for each of the 1.5 Major Diagnostic 
Groups (MDCs) that have both medical and surgical DRGs. The results 
indicated that the proportion of Medicare discharges in surgical DRGs rose 
from 21 percent to 27 percent between 1981 and 1984, particularly in the MDCs 
where there was a substantial difference in the reimbursement of the DRG. 
The researchers were unable to determine if the shift towards surgical cases 
reflected more complete coding of minor surgical procedures or PPS induced 
surgery. 
Garrison and Neuman (1988) conducted a study examining trends in the 
concentration of six surgical procedures under PPS. Three principal findings 
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reported from the study were: first, there was little evidence of significant 
concentration of surgical procedures in higher volume hospitals during the first 
three years of PPS. Although average volume increased for five of the six 
procedures, the number of hospitals performing the procedures also increased. 
The authors suggest that the increase can be attributed to general growth, 
rather than a significant shift from low-volume to high-volume surgery in 
hospitals. Second, consistent with previous studies, there was a statistically 
significant negative relationship between volume and in-hospital mortality, 
controlling for case mix differences across hospitals, for five of the six 
procedures. For all six procedures, there was a negative relationship between 
volume and average Medicare hospital costs-per-case. Third, changes in volume 
of procedures between 1984 and 1986 at individual hospitals were associated 
more with historical operating margins than PPS. Thus, increases in 
concentration were small and changes in concentration did not result in 
significant improvements in mortality or cost savings. The authors conclude 
that, contrary to expectations, PPS did not lead to a concentration of 
procedures in facilities that were more efficient or that provided higher quality 
of care. 
In addition, PPS was predicted to lead to a restructuring of the physician's 
role in hospital decision-making (Omenn & Conrad, 1984). Organization theory 
suggests that all organizational systems have a variety of mechanisms available 
to influence behavior, ranging from indirect controls such as positive and 
negative incentives to more direct controls such as bureaucratic rule making. 
Bureaucracy uses red tape, specialization of function, adherence to fixed rules, 
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and hierarchy of authority as control mechanisms. In hospitals, the use of 
treatment protocols that make clinicians adhere to fixed rules, the requirement 
that medical student orders be countersigned or that standing orders be 
periodically reviewed by the chief resident are examples of fixed rules {Berki, 
1985). The change predicted under PPS is that these rules which were, prior to 
PPS, almost exclusively determined by hospital practitioners, now are being 
evaluated and changed by hospital managers. 
Management may be pressuring medical staff to develop clinical treatment 
protocols. The thrust of managerial control would be to make individual 
physicians accountable for costly behavior on the basis of data on length of 
stay, use of specific types of ancillary services, and total treatment costs per 
physician in relation to the treatment protocols {Omann & Conrad, 1984). 
Under such circumstances, physicians will lose much of their historical 
dominance of hospital operations (Berki, 1985; Young, 1985). There is the 
suggestion that hospital staff are, in fact, being asked to determine the kinds of 
resources necessary to successfully treat a condition {Young, 1985). With the 
management imperative to restrict decision making by physicians in order to 
minimize costs, conflicts may arise between clinicians and administrators as 
PPS incentives force managers to bureaucratize the practice of medicine. 
The major questions regarding PPS-physician impact; that is, has PPS 
resulted in changes in treatment patterns and have these changes affected the 
outcomes of care are still largely unanswered {GAO, 1985; Lewin & Associates, 
1986; OT A, 1985). Early reports from officials of the American Medical 
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hospitals is diminishing under PPS. The AMA has been monitoring physicians' 
experience with PPS through its DRG Monitoring Project. Overall, 66 percent 
of physicians surveyed in 1985 stated that quality of care had deteriorated and 
73 percent stated that hospital admission and discharge policies had changed 
since the introduction of PPS. The information collected so far indicates that 
there is more pressure on physicians to discharge patients prematurely, to limit 
laboratory tests and to more carefully select 'patient mix' so that sicker 
patients aren't admitted to hospitals (Rogers, 1986). 
Similarly, responses to HCFA's Physician's Practices, Costs and Incomes 
Survey (Pretest, n=200 physicians in five states) are consistent with the AMA 
data; 37 percent of physicians agreed that hospitals have encouraged physicians 
to shorten length of stay, 16 percent agreed that hospital administrators had 
pressured them to reduce ancillary services, 13 percent agreed they had been 
pressured to increase admissions, and 50% of radiologists, anesthesiologists and 
pathologists surveyed stated they had been encouraged to reduce outpatient 
testing (Guterman & Dobson, 1986). Moreover, the decrease in admissions in 
hospitals may partially be explained by the increased pressure on physicians to 
treat patients in non-hosptial settings. 
Ancillary Services. A report by the Prospective Payment Assessment 
Commission (Pro-PAC) in 1985 indicated that some changes in the use of 
ancillary services occurred between 1981 and 1984-. Laboratory and radiology 
charges declined, from 31.7 percent to 28.6 percent, as a proportion of total 
ancillary charges for Medicare. However, no conclusions could be drawn since 
the change may have occurred because the services were being shifted from 
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inpatient to outpatient settings. Drugs, however, increased from 18.4 percent 
to 19.9 percent and medical supplies increased from 12.5 percent to 14.3 
percent of total ancillary charges. These data support the contention that 
patients are leaving the hospital in greater need of care than prior to PPS. 
There are little data on the provision of pre-admission or post-hospital care 
pre/post PPS (Lewin & Associates, 1986). 
AmbulatoryCare. Changes in medical technology and financial incentives 
have resulted in a marked trend towards ambulatory care. In terms of hospital 
pressures on physicians to treat patients on an outpatient basis, data from an 
analysis of Medicare reimbursement data between 1983 and 1985 show that 
ambulatory care continued to be the fastest-growing segment of the health care 
industry (Leader & Moon, 1988). Outpatient revenue per visit has grown at an 
accelerated rate since PPS, although the increase in the rate of growth is not 
statistically significant. Both Medicare and non-Medicare outpatient visits 
declined in the first year after PPS implementation but both increased during 
the second year of implementation (Guterman, et al., 1988). Again, it is not 
clear how much of an impact PPS may have had on the shift to ambulatory care 
in relation to other forces affecting the health care market. Longer term (i.e., 
5 to 10 years) longitudinal studies are needed to determine the relative impact 
of each of these factors in the changes occurring in the health care industry. 
Quality of Care in Non-hospital Settings 
Some of the most important quality of care questions raised by the 
introduction o:f PPS can be addressed by focusing on two issues related to care 
delivered in non-hospital settings: 1) the condition of Medicare patients when 
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they are discharged from the hospital and 2) the appropriateness of post-
hospital placement for patients who require sub-acute care (GAO, 1986). Prior 
to PPS, hospitals had the incentive to provide too much health care. There 
were also problems of access to post-hospital care services, most notably 
skilled nursing facilities (SNFs), resulting in patients remaining in hospitals 
longer than was medically necessary (GAO, 1983). Further, limitations in 
Medicare coverage for post-hospital services reinforced the incentives to 
extend hospital stays past the point where patients' acute care needs were met. 
Some of this extended care provided in hospitals could have been covered by 
Medicare in post-hospital settings. In other cases, the extended care was 
probably custodial or supportive care for chronically ill patients and would not 
have been covered by Medicare (GAO, 1986). 
In shifting to a system of prospective payment, Medicare removed the 
financial incentives to provide more health care services than were needed in 
the hospital setting. Since hospitals can profit financially only from cutting 
back on medically appropriate as well as inappropriate services, the discharge 
of patients still in need of hospital care has become a major quality of care 
concern. In addition, the fact that only inpatient acute services are paid 
prospectively under PPS provides additional incentives for hospitals to use other 
services which are paid retrospectively, including skilled nursing facilities (SNF) 
and home health (HH) care, wherever possible. 
Patient's Condition at Hospital D.isdlarge. A major concern about the 
effect of PPS was that hospitals would discharge patients to post-hospital care 
more frequent! y and at an earlier stage of recuperation; that is, "q.Jicker and 
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sicker." Premature discharge may necessitate readmissions (or cycles of 
discharges and readmissions), illness treatable at an early stage could progress 
undetected to a much more serious degree, or patients could be forced to 
acquire follow-up care in inappropriate settings with ramifications for the 
elderly's physical and mental well-being (OTA, 198.5). While reducing lengths of 
stay may not influence whether or not a patient needs post-hospital follow-up 
services, it is also possible that some patients may be discharged at a time in 
their illness when they have substantial needs for care (GAO, 1986). Such 
patients are likely to experience quality of care problems if they do not receive 
appropriate and competent post-hospital care. In other cases, patients 
discharged with needs for post-hospital care could be more likely to seek out 
such services on their own after they leave the hospital. Both of these 
possibilities mean that patients who might not have used post-hospital care in 
the past may now use home health (HH) or skilled nursing facility (SNF) services 
during their recovery (GAO, 1986). 
Measuring patient condition at the time of hospital discharge is essential 
for three reasons: in order to determine whether Medicare patients are 
receiving adequate hospital care, to assess the appropriateness of discharge 
decisions, and to anticipate the demand for post-hospital services. Thus, 
patient condition at discharge provides information about the process of care 
inside the hospital and post-hospital care requirements (GAO, 1986). While 
HCF A is current! y funding a number of research efforts to develop measures of 
patient condition, these studies tend to focus on ways to compensate for 
variations in severity of illness and resource requirements of particular patients 
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whose hospital stays are classified under the same DRG. These measures may 
then be used to adjust DRGs in order to more accurately reflect variations in 
the total cost of providing appropriate treatments for patients with varying 
needs. Indeed, this area of concern has been the focus of the ProPAC 
deliberations almost to the exclusion of other, equally important, issues related 
to quality of care. 
The reimbursement research efforts generally share two characteristics; 1) 
for the most part, the focus is on resources expended or required for 
appropriate care rather than patient condition per se and 2) most attempt to 
describe the seriousness of the illness and are not designed to track changes in 
patient condition and needs at different points in the course of hospitalization 
(GAO, 1986). The exception is the Northwest Oregon Health Systems study 
(1986) which specifically focused on assessing patient condition at discharge. 
The study, as described in this dissertation, applied a newly developed 
instrument, the Dependency at Discharge Classification Instrument, to medical 
records in 5 DRGs in order to measure patient dependency at discharge. 
Dependency was used as a proxy measure of patient care needs at the time of 
hospital discharge and was based on four items: Activity, Mobility, Symptoms, 
and Procedures. As reported earlier, the data showed that length of stay 
declined significantly in all five DRGs and that Dependency significantly 
increased in four of the five DRGs examined between the PRE and POST 
periods. While the study was limited (e.g., non-generalizable to larger 
populations, one city data collection}, the study represents the only systematic 
effort published to date that attempted to develop valid measures which can 
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measure changes in patient condition at discharge (GAO, 1986). This study was 
important to the quality of care in non-hospital settings because of concerns 
regarding patient functional status upon hospital discharge. Problems related 
to patients' ability to function independently when they leave the hospital are 
most relevant to patients entering into post-hospital, community-based care. 
The findings of the Northwest Oregon Health Systems study concerning 
dependency and of this dissertation concerning post-hospital placement are 
supported in more recent work conducted by Systemetrics (Guterman et al., 
1988). Analysis of a large sample of hospital records using the medical illness 
severity grouping system (MEDISGRPS) measure showed that average severity 
of illness at both and admission and discharge was greater in the post-PPS 
sample (1985) than in the pre-PPS sample (1982). The proportion of live 
discharges with the lowest severity level at admission decreased by 5.6 percent; 
that is, sicker patients were being admitted, and the proportion with the lowest 
severity level at discharge decreased by 9.6 percent between the pre and post 
measures; that is, sicker patients were being discharged. 
Furthermore, the proportion of live discharges with no dependencies in the 
activities of daily living (ADLs) index decreased from 44.8 percent to 37 
percent and the proportion of discharges with the maximum of 5 dependencies 
increased from 23.4 to 29.2 percent between 1982 and 1985 (Guterman et al., 
1988). The data from both the NOHS and Systemetrics studies support the 
contention made by post-hospital care providers that Medicare beneficiaries are 
being discharged earlier and with greater needs for sub-acute care. When 
combined with the data on the decline in average length of hospital stay, the 
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NOHS and the Systemetrics studies suggest that Medicare patients who are 
hospitalized are, on average, likely to be sicker than those who were 
hospitalized before PPS and are likely to leave the hospital earlier than they 
would have before PPS was enacted. 
What these changes mean for the long-term care system has yet to be 
systematically examined. Did those patients who were discharged earlier have 
better or worse outcomes? Anecdotal evidence of patients encountering 
problems in obtaining adequate post-hospital care in the home or in nursing 
homes has increased public awareness of the possibility that the gains in 
hospital efficiency have come at the cost of quality, at least for some people. 
However, there is no large scale study providing valid information concerning 
the quality impacts of earlier discharge (Wagner, 1986). 
Post-Hospital Placement. Patients not acutely ill do not, by definition, 
need acute care hospital services and an important benefit of PPS is that it 
discourages excessive lengths of hospital stay. Many concerns raised about PPS 
relate to the discharge of elderly patients who, while they may not have needed 
acute care, were discharged either before they could take care of themselves 
adequately at home or without providing for needed non-medical services. It is 
not appropriate to attrib.Jte all such problems to PPS, since they also derive in 
large part from problems with discharge planning or the availability or quality 
of community-based long-term care services. However, it was feared that PPS 
would exacerbate any problems of access or quality already existing in 
community-based care settings. 
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It is likely that there will be differential effects on quality of post-
hospital care for different groups of Medicare patients. Because most Medicare 
patients do not use post-hospital care, PPS incentives pose fewer quality 
problems for them. However, the patients who do require post-hospital care 
tend to have had longer-than-average stays. An analysis of 1980 Maryland 
hospital discharge data has shown that about 67 percent of recorded discharges 
to home health care and about 70 percent of discharges to nursing homes stayed 
in the hospital longer than the computed averages for their DRG (Miners & 
Coffee, 1983). This could make these types of patients more susceptible to 
hospital cost-control efforts. In addition, a recent study of hospital discharges 
found circulatory and cardiovascular DRGs to be among the most frequent self-
care cases. Stroke, hip and other joint procedures and mental disorders were 
the most prevalent DRGs among nursing home cases. Home care patients were 
most frequently cancer and diabetes DRGs (Miners & Coffey, 1985). &lch 
patients are often frail or chronically ill and have multiple health care problems 
which make them less attractive for hospitals to admit and harder for them to 
place upon discharge. Thus, the frail and chronically ill could experience 
disproportionate access and quality of care problems under PPS through a 
combination of premature discharges, inappropriate or sub:tandard post-
hospital care, or no care at all since they typically rely heavily on family and 
friends for help (GAO, 1986). 
Variations in hospital practices and long-term care resources across the 
country could mean that there will be substantial differences in the way that 
PPS affects the quality of care in non-hospital settings. There are, for 
example, large variations in average lengths of stay in hospitals in different 
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sections of the country as well as in the availability of different types of post-
hospital care. Hospitals which have relatively low lengths of stay or are 
located in areas with relatively extensive networks of post-hospital care 
providers will probably have less difficulty adapting to the incentives of PPS 
than those with longer lengths of stay or without networks of post-hospital care 
providers. 
Furthermore, it is not clear whether post-hospital care providers, including 
nursing homes, home health agencies and community service organizations are 
ecpipped to handle sicker patients. To the extent that the decreases in length 
of stay for Medicare beneficiaries represent a reduction in unnecessary care 
and the substitution of suitable non-hospital services for inpatient care, then 
PPS may be seen as encouraging appropriate utilization. However, if patients 
are being discharged premature! y to inadequate post-hospital care settings, 
then the system may be stimulating inappropriate post-hospital care. 
An investigation into the two most common problems predicted to occur 
under the prospective payment system I) premature discharge of Medicare 
patients; that is when they still require hospital care and 2) inappropriate 
transfers; that is, when they no longer need acute care but have inadequate 
arrangements for post-hospital subacute care was conducted by the Inspector 
General's Office (IGO) of the Department of Health and Human Services 
(DHHS) in 1986. 
The IGO study reviewed 3,549 problem cases reported to the Health Care 
Financing Administration during the period October, 1983, to May, 1985. Of 
the 3,549 cases, discharge was determined to be premature in 2,907 cases 
230 
transfers were determined to be inappropriate in 491 cases (1496), and other 
problems existed in 151 cases (496). Sixty percent of the cases reviewed implied 
poor quality of care while 40 percent were determined to be premature 
discharges or inappropriate transfers not related to quality of care. The IGO 
concluded that the Health Care Financing Administration (HCFA) was not 
effectively addressing the issue of quality and continuity of care under PPS 
(Senate Finance Committee, 1986). 
Investigations conducted by the Senate Aging Committee {1985) also found 
that large numbers of Medicare patients still in need of heavy medical care 
were being prematurely discharged from hospitals into their communities for 
care. Data obtained from reports prepared by HCFA indicated that "there had 
been a 40 percent increase in discharges to skilled nursing facilities and a 37 
perent increase in discharges to home health care" in the first full year of PPS. 
The number of older Arnericanc; affected by these trends is substantial. It was 
estimated that, by the end of 1985, more than 50,000 additional patients were 
being discharged yearly to skilled nursing facilities and to horne health care 
than had been discharged to these same providers prior to PPS (Senate Aging 
Committee, 1985). 
Skilled Nursing Facility Utilization. A study by the General Accounting 
Office (GAO, 1983) reported a growing need for nursing home care by the 
elderly. The report also documented problems of access for elderly as a result 
of constraints on the supply of nursing horne beds due to state Medicaid rules 
and certificate of need laws. GAO concluded that both factors had led to 
increasing access problems for the elderly. 
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Another study conducted by GAO (198.5) on the potential impact of DRGs 
on post-hospital care indicated a marked increase in the use of skilled nursing 
facilities as well as problems associated with arranging placements for patients 
who depend on Medicaid for reimbursement and those who require "heavy" care 
or the use of sophisticated high technology services. The report pointed out 
that a community's ability to effectively meet this increased need may be 
limited by such factors as the shortage of nursing home beds and the 
importance of state Medicaid reimbursement policies for nursing homes. 
Because of the limited coverage for a skilled nursing facility under Medicare, 
nursing homes may avoid accepting too many Medicare patients. In addition, 
since Medicaid reimbursement rates for skilled care are not always sufficient to 
cover costs, nursing homes may limit the number of Medicaid patients as well. 
Thus, PPS may significantly impact the skilled nursing facility system. 
With hospitals seeking to reduce lengths of stay for Medicare patients 
under PPS, an increase in the rate of transfers of Medicare cases to nursing 
homes was anticipated. Data on skilled nursing facility (SNF) admissions 
showed a slight acceleration in the projected rate of increase during fiscal year 
1984 after a period of no increases from 1981 to 1983 (Guterman et al., 1988). 
However, the number of covered days per SNF admission declined from 29.2 
days per stay in 1981 to 23.4 days in 198.5, a decrease of 20 percent, indicating 
a trend toward more short-stay patients. The percentage of Medicare patients 
using SNF services within 60 days of a hospital discharge did not change 
substantially from 1981 to 1983 but increased by 44 percent between 1983 and 
198.5. By age group, the increase in SNF use from 1983 to 198.5 varied from 31 
percent for the 8.5 or older group to 71 percent for the group 6.5 to 74 years of 
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age. Finally, patients discharged from hospitals with large length of stay 
r<:>ductions in 1982-1984 increased their use of SNF care from 1981 to 1985 by 
83 percent, compared with only 58 percent for patients dishcarged with small 
length of stay reductions (Guterman et al., 1988). 
Data from this dissertation indicated almost no impact on the discharge 
of patients to nursing homes POST -PPS. However, the data were confounded 
somewhat by the fact that many of the cases included in the study were 
admitted from a nursing home and therefore were to be discharged back to 
their nursing home bed. In addition, in Oregon, certificate of need regulations 
and a Medicaid waiver program designed to place discharged patients in the 
community rather than institutions may have had an impact on the availability 
of beds for Medicare patients. It is clear that more research is needed to 
evaluate the true impact of PPS on access and quality of care in skilled nursing 
facilities. 
Home Health Care Utilization. Although expenditures for Medicare home 
health benefits represent only about 2.4 percent of total program expenditures, 
it historically has been one of the fastest growing components of the Medicare 
program. By nearly every measure, home health utilization has increased 
dramatically: i.e., charges per visit, visits per user, total number of visits, and 
visits per 1,000 Medicare enrollees have all increased. The Health Care 
Financing Administration attributes most of this growth to an increase in the 
rate of utilization by Medicare beneficiaries: up from 17 per 1,000 enrollees in 
1974 to 33 visits per 1,000 in 1981 to 46 visits per 1,000 in 1983 to 51 visits per 
Medicare enrollee in 1985 (Guterman, 1988; Leader, 1986; House Aging 
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Committee, 1986). Rowland (1987) documents growth in home health visits, 
growing from $6.1 million for 8.5 million visits in 1970 to $801 million for 24.4 
million visits in 1981. 
While utilization rates per 1,000 enrollees have increased sharply, 
increased use is clearly linked with beneficiary age. The oldest old use home 
health much more than do younger beneficiaries. This is to be expected due to 
age-associated frailty, lack of family support, and diminishment of recuperative 
powers. It also means that the growth of the aging population will continue to 
increase the demand for home care. For example, from 1983 to 1985, the 
increase in use of home health services 60 days after discharge increased 27 
percent. Although rapid, this was less than the PRE-PPS rate of increase. 
However, it should be noted that Medicare home health benefits are restricted 
to recovery from acute illness and can only be- provided to an elderly person 
who is homebound and nee-ds intermittent skilled nursing, spe-ech or physical 
the-rapy. The rigor with which these restrictions are applie-d by Medicare- could 
significantly influence the- volume- of use of these services. 
A national surve-y of Area Age-ncies on Aging (AAAs) indicated that 
community-based long-te-rm care providers reported major shifts in service 
delivery patterns due, in part, to PPS. With few exceptions, most agencies 
surve-yed reported incre-ased service unit provision in the- post-PPS period. 
Service unit provision for case- management services increased 365 pe-rce-nt and 
in-home skilled nursing care se-rvices increase-d 196 pe-rcent (Harlow &: Wilson, 
1985). 
Substantial increases we-re- also noted for house-kee-ping (69.2%) and 
personal care se-rvices (63%). The substantial incre-ase-s in in-home skilled 
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nursing, housekeeping and personal care indicate a clientele which may be 
experiencing increased levels of temporary or permanent health impairment-;. 
In addition, for most responding agencies, both length of service delivery and 
number of units per client have increased and this increase was more dramatic 
among those agencies where DRGs had been in effect the longest (Harlow & 
Wilson, 1985). Similar results were found in Oregon. An analysis of client and 
service data for Oregon Project Independence (OPI) services and Medicaid 
senior services conducted in June, 1984 by the Multnomah County Aging 
Services Division, showed a marked increase in the demand for publicly funded 
community-based services over the pre-DRG period (Murray, 1984). Thus, 
earlier discharge under PPS could affect outcomes of care if that care is 
inappropriate for their needs, provides inadequate care, or is unavailable. 
Between 1974 and 1983, Medicare reimbursements grew at an average 
annual rate of 25 percent versus just under 15 percent in 1985. Evidence 
suggests that regulations for eligibility have been more stringently applied by 
Medicare in recent years, both through increased denials of claims and 
reinterpretations of regulations such as the "intermittency" requirement and 
homebound status. Denials of claims increased 133 percent from the first 
quarter of 1984 to the first quarter of 1986. Moreover, there is great 
variability across fiscal intermediaries in these denial rates (Leader, 1986). 
There are three major concerns raised by advocates for the elderly 
regarding Medicare's home health benefit under PPS. One, the dual 
requirements of intermittency and homebound status can act as a "catch-22" 
for patients, particularly those newly discharged from the hospital. More or 
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less stringent interpretations of eligibility requirements (e.g., needing daily 
care for more than 2 or 3 weeks is not considered intermittent or requirements 
that the person be confined to home and need skilled care) can affect the 
ability of Medicare patients to receive needed care. Second, quality of care 
concerns arise for those lucky enough to receive home care. In contrast to its 
efforts to constrain eligibility, Medicare has few regulations to ensure quality 
or to regulate the home care industry (House Aging Committee, 1986). Further, 
quality concerns are even more important for those receiving services not paid 
for by Medicare where there is no regulation. Finally, Medicare's home health 
benefit has largely been interpreted as an extension of acute care services 
instead of a program for those with chronic conditions; leaving the non-acute, 
frail elder! y uncovered and perhaps, underserved (Leader, 1986). 
In response to the increased acuity of patients being referred to home 
health agencies, a study by Eastern Washington AAA (EWAAA, 1986) found that 
home care providers were purchasing more sophisticated equipment, such as 
intravenous pumps and hospital beds and were securing training for personnel in 
topics ranging from use of more sophisticated medical equipment to the 
performance of complicated nursing procedures in the home. In addition, the 
study found the HH agencies were experiencing an increase in the use of 
traditional nursing supplies, such as skin care kits, gauzes, irrigation sets, and 
intravenous kits; an increase in the demand for the delivery of rehabilitative 
services, especially speech and physical therapy, and an increase in the growth 
of staff nurses, aides, and office personnel. 
A study analyzing the impact of New Jersey's DRG system on home health 
care (Cushman, 1986) documented an increase in hospital referrals to home 
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health care of 67 percent since the DRG system was phased in and a significant 
increase in the provision of high tech care in the home, such as catheter care 
(98%), tracheostomy care (88%), intravenous therapy (51%), respirator care 
(33%), and chemotherapy (26%) between 1981 and1983. The study also found 
that home health agencies expanded their hours of operation, both business and 
service. Before the DRG system, only 66 percent of the New Jersey home 
health agencies provided services seven days a week or during the evening. 
After the implementation of the New Jersey system, over 82 percent of home 
health agencies scheduled admissions and visits seven days a week and provided 
services during the evening. 
While data from the Health Care Financing Administration indicate an 
increase in HH and SNF placements, HCF A also reports that there is no 
systematic evidence that access to needed post-hospital care has been affected 
by PPS (Senate Aging Committee, 1986). However, the General Accounting 
Office (GAO, 1987) surveyed hospital discharge planners in 985 Medicare 
certified hospitals regarding problems in placing Medicare patients in post-
hospital care. The results indicated that most discharge planners experienced 
problems in obtaining access to appropriate post-hospital care for Medicare 
patients. 
In general, discharge planners viewed Medicare rules and regulations (i.e., 
eligibility determination problems and limited coverage of needed services) as 
the most important barrier to placing patients in both skilled nursing facilities 
(SNFs) and home health care (HH). The problem most often identified as a 
barrier to placement in a nursing home was Medicare rules and regulations 
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(71%) while the availability of beds and need for complex services (e.g., 
respirator care) were the next most frequently cited factors (63%) inhibiting 
placement. In terms of home health care, over half of all responding discharge 
planners cited Medicare rules and regulations as the most important barrier to 
arranging HH care for beneficiaries. Availability of services was cited as the 
next most frequent barrier (13%). Finally, more than half of all discharge 
planners reported that the percentage of Medicare patients waiting in the 
hospital for appropriate care was greater in 1985 than in 1982 (GAO, 1987). 
Concern about discharge planning has accelerated sharply since the 
advent of cost containment policies. Of major interest is the key role of 
discharge planning in reducing unnecessary days in the hospital, thereby 
reducing hosptial costs. However, social workers report that discharge planners 
are caught between the conflicting goals of providing the continuity of health 
care while at the same time trying to stimulate hospital efficiency. Like the 
GAO survey of discharge planners, a Senate Committee on Aging (1985) 
investigation found that hospital discharge planning services had been severely 
taxed under the new payment system and that they were often inadequate. 
According to a national survey of hospital discharge planners, caseload since 
PPS has risen faster than resources and, as a result, necessary followup on 
patients has been unavailable (Senate Aging Committee, 1985). While hospitals 
have set specific guidelines for those who may receive discharge planning 
services, most of these systems were established well before PPS and may not 
be responsive to new conditions in the current PPS environment and the type of 
patient being admitted. 
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CONCLUSION 
The data presented in this dissertation indicate that hospital 
administrators have resorted to operational, labor, and structural changes in an 
attempt to control costs and increase the viability of their hospitals under PPS. 
Operational changes are occurring; such as shortening length of stay (resulting 
in increased dependency at discharge and increased use of post-hospital 
community-based care); reducing the use of ancillary services and decreasing 
admissions/readmissions; treating less severely ill patients on an outpatient 
basis (increasing the severity of hospital case-mix); eliminating or converting 
beds to new services; and shifting dying patients to other care settings. 
Labor changes include staff reductions and skill-mix reconfigurations 
while structural changes have included emphasizing profitable DRGs (surgical 
versus medical treatment}, shifting control of hospital operations from 
physicians to management; the implementation of computerized case-mix 
management data systems and horizontal and vertical integration (hospital-
based home health services). All these actions are just some of the strategies 
being used to reduce costs, improve market share and maintain hospital 
profitability. However, how much and to what degree the changes implied by 
the data presented in this dissertation were prompted by DRG-based PPS is 
difficult to determine. 
The relationship between the financial pressure imposed by PPS and the 
resulting changes in hospital behavior, such as the steep declines in average 
length of stay and admissions, may indicate that PPS has been effective in 
encouraging hospitals to change the way they provide inpatient care. Support 
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of this interpretation of the data published to date comes from the declines in 
the rate of growth in Medicare inpatient hospital expenditures for the first 
three years of PPS. Rates of growth fell to 4.6 percent between 1984 and 1986, 
the smallest increase in the program's history. However, PPS is not the only 
factor that has contributed to changes in patient care and management 
practiCes in acute care hospitals. Other factors such as increased competition 
among providers; increased utilization review by third-party payers; increased 
consumer awareness and media attention paid to the problem (e.g., Medicare's 
impending bankruptcy) may have influenced provider behavior. Consequently, it 
is difficult to disentangle the specific effects of PPS from these other, equally 
important, forces in the health care arena. 
In terms of discharge status and post-hospital placement, the data 
generated for this dissertation indicate that Medicare patients are being 
discharged earlier, in poorer states of health, and in need of more intensive 
post-hospital care services than before the new payment system and as a result, 
these patients may now be experiencing inadequate treatment or inappropriate 
placement. For example, skilled nursing facility services may either be 
tu1available locally or the Medicare patient may not satisfy stringent eligibility 
criteria for SNF care. But, because of t~e intermittency requirement for 
Medicare HH care, the patient may not be able to obtain home health care 
either. Available data do not permit a precise assessment of the extent to 
which the Medicare benefit for either SNF or HH care actually meets the 
demand for this care. Futhermore, those patients requiring the most intensive 
forms of post-hospital services, such as respirator care, may also be 
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problems with access to appropriate post-hospital care. The data presented 
suggest a profound change in the use of post-hospital care services. Demand 
for nursing home and home health care is increasing, even under Medicare's 
stringent utilization requirements. Problems of quality and access in the skilled 
nursing home setting are still evident and may be exacerbated by PPS. Quality 
assurance in home health care is virtually non-existant and has been called the 
"black box'' issue of home care services (Senate Aging Committee, 1986). 
Finally, because many technologies are new to the post-hospital care 
setting, providers may not have the equipment or enough properly trained staff 
to administer the equipment. It may be that the complexity of these prcedures 
and greater vulnerability of patients dependent upon them increases the 
likelihood of problems of quality (GAO, 1986). Subacute care providers may 
respond to a rise in the demand for services or changes in the types of services 
needed by discharged Medicare patients, by increasing the volume or changing 
the type of services they provide. However, if providers do not respond to 
increases in demand or to a need for different or more extensive services, the 
quality of post-hospital care could be compromised. As has been pointed out, 
there are little data available regarding the changes PPS has caused in the post-
hospital care system (GAO, 1986). The next chapter summarizes the data 
presented in this dissertation, identifies needed research, and discusses the 
findings in relation to the future of PPS and the U.S. health care system. 
CHAPTERV 
THE POUCY IMPUCATIONS OF PROSPECTIVE PAYMENT 
The recent changes (in the health care system) are 
important because they abandon the prindple, in fact if 
not in rhetoric, that medical care should be provided 
whenever it is needed, that costs should not be 
considered when life or health is at stake ••• This 
represents a fundamental change from the philosophy 
that has driven the system for a long time, and the 
beginning of a search for a new balance between costs 
and benefits (Lave, 1984, p. 254). 
The American health care system has undergone significant change in the 
past two decades prompted by national policy responses to rapidly escalating 
costs and increased utilization of health care services. Among the most 
prominent of these changes have been the significant shift in the relationship 
between supply and demand (surplus of physicians and hospital beds}, the 
corporati.zation of many sectors of the health care industry (multi-hospital 
systems, vertical integration of services}, the introduction of capitation and 
other forms of alternative health care delivery systems (HMOs, PPOs); the 
emergence of organized buyers of medical services such as commercial insurers, 
employer and union cnalitions, and Blue Cross/Blue Shield plans; a growing 
reliance on market forces as compared to economic regulation to deal with 
c:Osts; and dramatically different incentives arising from changes in the way 
health care services are financed (state-wide rate regulation). These changes 
have created unprecedented challenges for the traditional health care providers 
as the contemporary health care market rapidly changes. For example, the 
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dominance of physicians and the central role hospitals have historically played 
in medical care delivery ironically now places them in a precarious postion as 
the once dominant structure of the community, not-for-profit hospital with its 
independent, largely sola-practitioner medical staff becomes a thing of the past 
(Grey &:: McNerney, 1986). 
THE "OLD" HEALTH CARE SYSTEM 
Over the past 20 years, policy makers at the federal level have responded 
to the dramatic rises in health care costs using two policy approaches: 
regulation and competition. National policy initiatives during the 1970s relied 
heavily on various forms of regulation: including ·health planning and 
certificate of need regulation (CON); state-wide hospital rate-regulation; 
professional standards review organizations (PSROs); health care wage and 
price freezes; and continually more stringent interpretations of eligibility for 
Medicare and Medicaid services (Brown, 1986b). While some of these regulatory 
programs were successful in moderating spending increases, they were either 
not successful enough or they generated significant opposition from provider 
groups to the point where many of the programs were dismantled or eliminated. 
For example, health systems agencies (HSAs) were established to control 
the formation of expensive new capital projects, such as building or renovating 
a hospital, or the purchase of new medical equipment costing more than 
$1.50,000. No new major hospital expansion or capital expenditures were 
permittted without state-approved certificate of need (CON). However, HSAs 
were severely constrained by their lack of direct control over hospital 
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reimbursement and state regulatory processes. Furthermore, HSAs had to 
contend with organized provider groups with enormous resources, able to 'fight' 
CON decisions, as well as conflicting goals written into the health planning 
legislation (i.e., cost containment, improved access, upgrading facilities, etc.). 
These forces combined to prevent HSAs from achieving effective cost control 
regulation (Altman & Rodwin, 1988; Brown, 1986b; Havighurst, 1985; Marmor & 
Marone, 1980). 
The closest the federal government came to effective regulatory cost 
control was during the Economic Stabilization Program of 1971 to 1974. 
However, even under this freeze, controls were placed only on what could be 
charged for services not on what could be spent. Nevertheless, the Economic 
Stabilization Program was successful in limiting spending for hospital care. 
Hospital costs per admission grew by 11.2 percent just prior to the program. 
During the program, the growth rate slowed to 8.5 percent. After controls 
were lifted in 1974, hospital and total medical care spending returned to pre-
freeze levels (Altman & Rodwin, 1988; Brown, 1986b). 
Overall, the research on the impact of regulatory efforts on costs 
suggests that CON controls had little effect on costs or utilization while the 
economic stabilization program of the early 1970s generally had a short-run 
positive, but long-run negative, impact on hospital costs. The evidence also 
suggests that rate regulation worked better when the programs were mandatory 
(state-wide) and were in effect for several years (Coelen & Sullivan, 1981; 
Vladeck, 1981). Merrill and McLaughlin (1986), in an analysis of HMOs, rate 
regulation, certificate of need (CON), and professional standards review 
organizations (PSROs), found that regulatory efforts produced mixed results. 
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None of the existing regulatory efforts appeared to have had a significant 
effect on overall per capita hospital costs; although mature mandatory rate-
regulation programs did appear to have lowered the growth rate in cost per 
admission and cost per day. In addition, Worthington and Piro (1982) found that 
rate-regulation 3,!so led to longer lengths-of-stay while PSROs led to shorter 
lengths-of-stay but higher admission rates. 
By the late 1970s, regulation strategies were being replaced by three 
competition or 'market-oriented' cost-containment approaches: one, increased 
consumer awareness of health care costs through individual cost-sharing, e.g., 
deductibles and copayments; two, the encouragement of health maintenance 
organizations (HMOs) and other alternative delivery systems that would 
compete with traditional providers by marketing diverse blends of quality, 
access and cost health care plans; and three, the development of market power 
of organized purchasers of medical services in order to achieve more favorable 
payment arrangements (Brown, 1988a; Meyer, l983b). 
Businesses, which paid more than $100 billion in health insurance 
premiums in 1986, had begun to feel the pressure of increased insurance costs 
on their ability to compete in foreign and domestic markets. Prompted by 
studies showing that consumers reduce utilization when they are required to 
bear a portion of the costs, employers began to limit their financial liability for 
medk.al services by redefining what they would (and wouldn't) pay for. The 
evidence regarding consumer behavior has also prompted insurers to design 
health plans with more frequent and extensive use of deductibles and 
copayments thereby requiring patients to pay more from their own pockets for 
each service. 
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Prudent purchaser programs, a second market-oriented approach, have 
included self-insurance options for employers and the use of competitive 
bidding for contracts. Groups of employers formed health care coalitions in 
conjunction with labor, insurers, and providers in an effort to reduce health 
care costs through the sharing of information and joint bargaining. Similarly, 
large employers used their purchasing power to demand more favorable terms 
of payment and greater provider efficiency. The primary result of this 
approach appears to be the fact that payers have now become involved in 
"managing" the delivery of medical care (Altman & Rodwin, 1988, p. 329). 
Employers as well as unions are beginning to require second opinions and pre-
admission screening, promote wellness programs, and to emphasize outpatient 
services. They have begun to shop for health plans among competing insurance 
companies, to monitor the cost and quality of medical services received, and to 
lobby among practitioners for reduced fees (Havighurst, 1983a; Meyer, 1983a; 
Samors & Sullivan, 1983). 
Recent evidence suggests that a well-operated managed care program can 
save between 8 and 10 percent of total premium dollars (Gertman, 1987). Even 
with these changes, more than 70 percent of all medical expenses are still being 
paid by public and private third-party payers (Gibson & Waldo, 1984). It also 
should be pointed out that many of these private sector initiatives could not be 
successful without the corresponding influence of a physician surplus and the 
establishment of PSROs and PROs, which have provided important data on 
utilization and methods of monitoring provider performance, and that both of 
these influences are the result of government regulation (Altman & Rodwin, 
1988). 
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The major competitive activity of the last ten years has been the 
encouragement of health maintenance organizations (HMOs) as a means of 
introducing competition into the health care marketplace. It is well-
documented that HMOs have been able to reduce their own costs by cutting 
down the number and duration of hospitalizations. However, some of these 
reductions may be offset by increased utilization of outpatient services since 
HMOs typically include more outpatient benefits than traditional insurance· 
plans (Brown, 1988b; Luft, 1984, 1985; Luft, Maerki, & Trauner, 1986). 
Proponents have argued that the growth of HMOs will create health care 
price competition. These advocates hypothesize that as HMOs gain large 
market shares, the cost-containment features of HMOs; for example, fixed 
budget financing, reducing inpatient utilization by keeping patients out of 
hospitals and using fewer resources once a patient is admitted, and controlling 
significant amounts of patient volume, will require other third-party buyers of 
care to adopt the same behavior if they are to become more price-conscious 
and cost-effective (Feldman et al., 1986). That is, HMOs will create a 
"spillover effect" to other providers in a medical market (Merrill & McLaughlin, 
1986). 
There have been a number of empirkal tests of the competitive impact of 
HMOs at the community level. Chiswkk (1976), analyzed variation in 
occupancy and admission rates in 192 SMSAs. His results indicate that the 
presence of an HMO in a state did, on average, reduce the admission rate by 7.6 
percent. Goldberg and Greenberg (1981) found that the greater the market 
share of HMOs, the lower the hospital utilization rate for privately-insured 
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individuals in a given state. Feldman et al., (1986), in a study of the effects of 
HMOs on utilization, found certain types of HMOs (staff network versus IPA 
HMOs) did lower utilization. 
However, some of the ways HMOs compete appear to have shifted costs 
among payers and increased, rather than decreased, total spending for medical 
care. There is some evidence that HMOs market themselves in such a way so as 
to encourage a favorable selection of patients; that is, patients that will cost 
less (e.g., creaming). This is accomplished through such techniques as offering 
services that will attract young and generally health people (e.g., well baby 
care; sports medicine); locating in neighborhoods that are middle class; and they 
do not "cater" to groups with high-cost illnesses (Altman & Rodwin, 1988; 
Etheridge, 1986; Luft, 1985; Wilensky & Rossiter, 1986). 
While there was some initial evidence that the presence of HMOs in a 
market lowered the costs of competing providers, more recent evaluations 
suggest that this is not the case. Merrill and McLaughlin (1986), in their study 
of 25 medical markets, found that competition (as measured by degree of 
market penetration) had no significant spillover effect on reducing overall 
hospital costs. Further, the researchers found that HMOs had no impact on the 
growth rate of hospital expenses per capita or per patient-day. Another study 
of HMOs in Hawaii, Rochester, and Minneapolis/St. Paul (Luft, Maerki, and 
Trauner, 1986) found that in none of the three markets was there a reduction in 
hospital use that could be attributed to HMOs. Instead, reductions were 
attributable to other factors; such as biases in the data, long term trends 
predating the HMOs, indirect effects of other policy changes, and other forms 
of competition. 
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Many of the so-called competitive initiatives (i.e., employer-based 
initiatives, HMOs) have been restricted to a rather narrow 'corridor' of 
purdlasers, usually at the high end of the market. While producing a sort of 
competition, it was not the kind that occurs for most other goods or services 
where options range from inexpensive to expensive (Altman & Rodwin, 1988). 
As Altman and Rodwin (1988) persuasively argue, the new incentives promoted 
competition but only between high-quality benefit packages or delivery systems 
and higher quality services and benefits. The authors state: 
Such competition does little to reduce the expense of 
basic coverage, and it may even encourage the market to 
sell policies that carry additional protection. Since 
insurance policies still largely insulate patients from 
most costs, the increased use of consumer incentives has 
at best only a marginal effect on resource utilization or 
expenditure control (p. 326). 
It is striking that approximately 1.5 years after the introduction of 
competition in health care (e.g., Nixon's HMO legislation), there appears to be 
little agreement on what is actually meant by a competitive approach to health 
care cost-containment. There appears to be no central core or unified theory 
of ex>mpetition in health services, we seem to know very little about the 
workings of competition or about the outcomes of competition, and as Brown 
(1988a) points out, " ••• while sifllificant progress has been made toward 
enhancing competition, in whatever form, there is little data that shows this 
'progress' has saved the system money ••• or why there is nearly a complete lack 
of documented progress toward cost-containment'' (p. 362). 
Summary. Based on the data reviewed, neither competition nor regulation 
appears to have had a significant impact on reducing overall health care costs. 
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The results from these studies suggest that competition must encompass more 
than just HMOs if oompetitive strategies are to succeed and that regulation 
must involve more than just certificate of need or wage and price freezes to 
contain rises in costs. 
Competition and regulation have converged in the contemporary health 
care market, blurring the traditional health care boundaries as providers deliver 
new types and levels of care, become involved in both the financing and 
provision of care; and form for-profit/not-for-profit hybrids. The Reagan 
Administration, more than any other, has encouraged both competitive and 
regulatory activities in health care to create a "health care system in which 
measures of a>mpetition and regulation unthinkable ten years earlier were not 
only present but accepted and applauded'' (Brown, 1986, p. 580). With the 
government's retreat from system-wide regulation in the 80s and its pressing of 
the anti-trust attack upon monopoly practices in health care, decision-making 
power has begun to devolve upon the consumer and on the private entities 
accountable to them in the competitive marketplace. In light of the historical 
development of the health care system and the degree of control providers have 
wielded since the turn of the century, this decentralization of decision-making 
is significant (Havighurst, 1986). It has resulted in the movement from cost to 
price, from unconstrained provider behavior to intensive scrutiny, from 
paternalism to self-responsibility and reflects the seminal changes driving 
health care from a public good to a private good (Brown, 1986). 
While some form of a prospective payment reimbursement system had been 
advocated for Medicare since the early 70s as a means of containing rising 
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costs, Congress's reluctance to alter the basic structure of the program 
combined with fierce opposition by the health care industry, stood in the way of 
fundamental reform. In 1972, Congress mandated the Health Care Financing 
Administration (HCFA) to grant waivers to states wanting to experiment with 
prospective reimbursement. Several states experimented with a variety of 
systems and some had favorable results (e.g., New Jersey's DRG-based system). 
With the ink hardly dry on the New Jersey waiver application, the Reagan 
Administration already was touting DRG-based prospective payment as its 
"competitive" solution to the Medicare financial crisis. Viewed by 
Administration officials as the first significant change in Medicare 
reimbursement since its passage in 1965, the intent of PPS was to constrain 
rising hospital rosts while ensuring continued access to quality health care for 
Medicare beneficiaries (Guterman & Dobson, 1986; Thompson, 1986). The 
ftndamental issue central to the new payment system was the radical change in 
incentives that PPS represented. 
THE NEW HEALTH CARE SYSTEM 
Changing the method of reimbursement for hospital care alters two major 
dynamics of the health care system: the incentives facing hospitals and the 
behavior of physicians. PPS changes the role of the hosptial from a revenue 
center to a rost center. Before PPS, more care meant more revenue. Now, 
more care can mean less revenue. Similarly, before PPS, the hospital's role was 
to provide the facilities to produce the maximum combination of services 
physicians wanted to order. Under PPS, providers must reduce costs by 
reducing services and they must produce those services more efficient! y (Berki, 
1985). 
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Many observers fear that the Medicare payment reform is actually a 
"euphemism" for minimizing federal fiscal responsibility and a strategy to "shift 
the burden of payment from government to individuals" (Cohodes, 1987, p. 66). 
They fear that the changes now occurring in the health care system may reduc:e 
the accessibility and quality of care available to the public and that the elderly 
will be paying more out-of-pocket costs for their health care. There is also a 
great deal of concern that the emphasis on cost-containment will result in 
permanent damage to the health care system. Others fear that the health care 
system will equally be damaged if costs are not brought under control. It is not 
clear that ei.ther group's fears will be proven right but what is dear is that 
budget realities (i.e., the large federal deficit and Medicare's continued fisc:al 
problems) will continue to bring pressure to bear on the scope of federal 
welfare programs. 
Although the direction of the incentives under PPS and some of the 
resulting impacts were predicted by the designers of PPS, the assumptions 
behind the new payment system are still largely untested. Both positive and 
negative impacts have been predicted, including serious undesirable results of 
.PPS on patients' access to and quality of health care (OTA, 1985). The 
widespread concern regarding the threat to the health care system that PPS 
poses as well as the fact that very little is known or understood about the short 
and long term consequences of . such a reimbursement system underscores the 
need for valid and timely data on the impacts of PPS. Without such 
information on which to base decision-making, policy makers will be unable to 
nurture the positive effects, or ameliorate the negative effects, of PPS without 
doing major damage to the health care system and to Medicare beneficiaries. 
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WHAT DO THE DATA SHOW? 
The data presented in this dissertation indicate that PPS does appear to 
have slowed the overall rate of increase in inpatient hospital expenditures. 
Although the rate of growth was still above the general rate of inflation, it 
represents a downturn in the rapid growth of inpatient hospital payments prior 
to PPS. However, the data also show a corresponding increase in outpatient 
expenditures, expenditures for skilled nursing facilities (SNF), and expenditures 
for home health (HH) care. The data also show a significant decrease in 
average length of stay for Medicare beneficiaries, an increase ~n patient 
severity of illness at hospital admission, an increase in patient Dependency at 
Discharge, and an increase in discharge placements of more dependent patients 
to community-based care, especially to home health care. 
Hospital Expenditures 
Data from the Health Care Financing Administration (HCF A) (Guterman, 
. et al., 1988) on the first three years of PPS show that, as predicted, the rate of 
growth ·in Medicare inpatient hospital expenditures decreased after the 
implementation of PPS. After having increased at an average annual rate of 
19.9 percent since 1974, inpatient hospital expenditures grew at a rate of 10.2 
percent in 1983, at 8.2 percent in 1984, and fell to 4.6 percent in 1986. This 
was the smallest rate of growth in the program's history. In addition, 
expenditures for non-hospital inpatient services (e.g., physicians services) 
declined slightly, down from 8.9 to 8.1 percent for the first three years of PPS 
(Guterman et al., 1988). However, it was not clear that the decline was a result 
of PPS or whether it was a result of a 15 month physician's fee freeze instituted 
by the Health Care Financing Administration in 1984. The freeze was expected 
to save Medicare $2.9 billion over a three year period. 
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Outpatient Expenditures 
Outpatient hospital payments grew at 11.9 percent in 1984, an increase 
larger than the rate for inpatient expenditures for the eleventh consecutive 
year. While payment rates grew by less than 7.1 percent in 1986, this was still 
larger than the rate of increase for inpatient expenditures. 
Skilled Nursing and Home Health Expenditures 
An anticipated effect of PPS was the encouragement to hospitals to shift 
the care of many Medicare patients to community-based care settings. This 
prediction turned out to be accurate. The growth in skilled nursing facility 
(SNF) payments has accelerated since the implementation of PPS. Between 
1984 and 1986, SNF payments grew at an average rate of 4.7 percent as opposed 
to a decrease in the rate of growth in SNF expenditures prior to PPS. Similar I y, 
home health (HH) expenditures have grown. Payments for home health care 
grew at an average of 12.7 percent over the first three years of PPS versus an 
average rate of growth of 11.2 percent for the five years prior to PPS 
(Guterman et al., 1988). Both SNF and home health care growth are significant 
in light of strict eligibility requirements and limited benefits under Medicare 
rules. These data indicate a profound shift in the delivery of health care since 
the implementation of PPS. 
Severity of Illness 
Severity at admission appears to have increased since PPS. The Medicare 
Case-Mix Index {CMI) increased 8.4 percent between 1981 and 1984, exceeding 
predictions made prior to the implementation of PPS. In addition, the CMI 
continued to increase at a rate of 3 percent per year between 1984 and 1986 
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(Guterman et al., 1988). Furthermore, hospital-based mortality rates, which 
were expected to rise as a result of PPS, showed an increase in population-
based mortality rate. However, this rate of increase was somewhat, but not 
significantly, higher than was expected based on trends since 1979. Analyses of 
these data in light of case-mix changes suggest that the increase in mortality 
was fully accounted for by the increase in case-mix severity. 
Admissions 
Admissions, which were expected to increase, actually decreased by 4 
percent in 1984, dropped another 4.3 percent between 1985 and 1986, and 
declined a total of 11.3 percent between 1983 and 1986 (Guterman et al., 1988). 
Readmission rates remained relatively stable. 
Length of Stay 
Length of stay has dropped significantly, down from 9.5 days in 1983 to 
7.5 days nationally in 1984 (GAO, 1985). Length of stay also declined 
significantly in the sample studied by Northwest Oregon Health Systems (NOHS) 
where average length of stay dropped from 11.3 days in the PRE-PPS period to 
8.6 days in the POST -PPS period, a drop of 2.7 days. Length of stay for those 
under 65 did not evidence this dramatic decline. 
Patient Status at Discharge 
Although national data on patient status at discharge are lacking, 
anecdotal evidence from surveys of health and social service providers suggests 
that elderly patients are leaving the hospital at an earlier stage in their 
recuperation and more in need of intensive, high technology sub-acute care than 
before PPS was implemented. The NOHS data indicate that patients in four of 
25.5 
the five DRGs studied were being discharged significantly more Dependent than 
before DRGs. Furthermore, the Northwest Oregon Health Systems data show 
that there was a significant increase in the numbers of patients being 
discharged to community-based care and a significant increase in the number of 
highly dependent patients being discharged to home health care. 
Hospital Operations 
Hospitals appear to have responded to the incentives in PPS by reducing 
staff; acquiring automated case-mix data management systems; and 
emphasizing high-return DRGs. For example, data from the American Hospital 
Association (Washington Report, 1984) show that there was a 2.2 percent 
reduction in full-time employees between May 1983 and May 1984. This 
decrease is in sharp contrast to the 4.1 percent increase in staff annually since 
1974. In addition, in a survey of OJrrent research on changes in treatment 
patterns since 1984, Lewin and Associates (1986) found some changes in 
treatment patterns since 1984 but these changes could not clearly be attributed 
to PPS alone. Furthermore, a Rand study (Carter & Ginsberg, 1985) found that 
the proportion of Medicare discharges in surgical DRGs rose from 21 to 27 
percent between 1981 and 1984, particularly in diagnoses where there. was a 
substantial difference in the reimbursement of the DRG. However, the 
researchers were unable to determine if the shift toward surgery cases 
reflected a more complete coding of procedures or if PPS had induced the 
change. 
Finally, it appears that PPS may be causing a redefinition of hospital care 
and a restructuring of the physician's role in hospital decision-making (Omenn & 
Conrad, 1984). Hospitals are no longer viewed as the primary site of treatment 
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but rather are now seen as a part of a continuum of care based in institutions 
and in the community. Physician's roles have also changed and they have lost 
some of the dominance over the health care system. With the emphasis on 
business principles for the maintenance of hospital financial viability, managers 
(i.e., hospital administrators) rather than the physician-staff appear to be 
taking control of hospital operations and pressuring physicians to be more 
accountable for their treatment decisions. 
EVALUATION OF PROSPECTIVE PAYMENT 
After three years under PPS, it is not clear that it has achieved its full 
objective. There appear to be two views: one, the official government view, 
that DRG-based PPS has worked fine; producing the intended economic 
transformation of the health care system. Advocates point out that in less than 
one year of implementation, startling reductions in average length of stay, 
admissions, and costs were identified. According to the Inspector General of 
HHS, hospitals were financially doing better under Medicare PPS than anybody 
had thought possible. The Inspector General reported that hospital profits on 
Medicare had risen to 14 percent in the first year of PPS (Spiegler & Kavaler, 
1988). There was praise for the Reagan Administration for its leadership in 
regulatory reform of the hospital sector and the introduction of competition into 
hospital service delivery resulting in hospitals adopting modern cost accounting 
procedures, business management techniques, and actual price development 
mechanisms. For example, the New York Times (June 12, 1985) editorial stated 
that " ••• the Reagan Administration has managed an apparent taming of hospital 
cost inflation. While caution may still be in order, so is credit for a triumph of 
social policy'' (p. 2). 
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Even while claiming credit for its policy "success," HHS and the Health 
Care Financing Administration acknowledged certain limits to the DRG system 
by officially recognizing the inequities in the reimbursement formulas (e.g., 
rural/urban differences; lack of a severity of illness factor; teaching/non-
teaching hospital status). For the most part, however, supporters of the system 
agreed that, even if PPS did not produce the total results anticipated, the 
health care system has been fundamentally altered. As one observer put it: 
" ••• the U.S. health care system won't ever go back to a retrospective, cost-
based reimbursement system" (Friedman, 1984b, p. 33). 
A second and, in my view, more compelling conclusion is that DRG-based 
PPS has only been a "qualified'' success. PPS can be called a qualified success 
for three reasons. In the first place, it is not clear that the reductions in costs 
and utlization are specifically due to PPS. Many of the 1984-1986 trends 
identified by HCFA as effects of PPS (e.g., decreases in length of stay, reduced 
utilization) predated PPS. In addition, the impact of PPS on average length of 
stay (ALOS) is complicated by the fact that ALOS under PPS is influenced by 
two separate incentives. First, if hospitals are able to attract patients with 
less severe conditions, ALOS will decline. Conversely, ALOS could rise in the 
same DRGs if all but the most severely ill are treated as outpatients. A second 
incentive influencing ALOS is the incentive for "early discharge." Reported 
ALOS will decline if patients are discharged earlier in their recovery to other 
care settings. 
Related to the issue of utilization reductions is that the decline in 
inpatient volume has not been uniform across hospitals or geographic areas. 
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The shortened stay of Medicare beneficiaries and sharp decline in admissions of 
nonelderly patients have had a tremendous impact on all hospital days. 
Although community hospitals overall experienced a 8.4 percent decline in 
admissions between 1983 and 1985, hospitals with less than 50 beds experienced 
a 22.3 percent decline and .hospital with 50 to 99 beds had a 17.1 percent 
decline. Thus, the combination of declining admissions and short stays for all 
age groups has been concentrated among small hospitals and confounds any 
clear connection to PPS (Guterman et al., 1988). 
The dramatic declines in ALOS may be leveling off. There has been little 
change in the decline in length of stay since the first year of PPS. In addition, 
the distribution of average length of stay has not changed much since PPS was 
implemented. Hospitals with short stays before PPS have had about the same 
decrease as hospitals with longer average stays. Data from the Medicare 
Provider Analysis and Review files show a decrease in average length of stay 
averaging only .6 percent per year (Guterman et al., 1988). This "leveling off" 
may be due to the strong initial response by hospitals to the PPS incentives 
while more stringent enforcement of utilization review nationwide may also 
have impacted the declines by diverting the less severely ill from inpatient to 
outpatient and other ambulatory care settings (Davis, 1985). 
Furthermore, other than shortening stays and reducing staff, there is no 
evidence published to date that indicates that physicians have altered their 
practice patterns or that hospitals are changing their basic methods of 
providing hospital care. Consequently, total hospital costs may have slowed, 
not because hospitals improved productivity or that physicians ordered fewer 
tests, but because fewer people utilized hospitals and because they were 
discharged earlier (Davis, et al., 198.5). 
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Without more comprehensive 
evaluations of inpatient hospital care practices to determine if PPS created the 
incentive for increased efficiency rather than just decreased utilization, PPS 
cannot be adequately evaluated nor defined a "success." 
Second, other factors may have had an equal or greater influence on the 
reductions in hospital ex>sts documented by HCFA, including the initial cost-
containment forces enacted under other federal health programs (e.g., TEFRA); 
a surplus of physicians (179 physicians per 100,000 population in 197.5 versus 207 
physidans per 100,000 population in 1981); the increased availablity of 
alternative treatment settings (e.g., an increase in free-standing emergency 
centers, growing from 44 in 1979 to almost .500 in 1982) and alternative health 
care deliverers (HMOs, PPOs); increased utilization review; increased pressure 
on employers to keep health care costs down; and the growth in the awareness 
of consumers regarding health care costs and avoiding hospitalization (Davis, 
1988; GAO, 1986; OTA, 1985). Therefore, the cost savings for the elderly may 
be more the result of systemwide changes than changes in the Medicare 
program. 
On the one hand, given the rapid multiple changes in the hospital sector, 
it is difficult not to attribute cost-reductions to these plausible alternative 
explanations. On the other hand, it is equally likely that the changes in the 
Medicare program contributed to the decline in hospital length of stay and may 
have affected other payers and patients (e.g., a spillover effect). It is just not 
clear what contribution each of the above mentioned forces has had on the 
health care system. The real test of the effectiveness of PPS on hospital cost-
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containment will be experienced in the long term and its effects on the long-
term care system with the shifts in the costs and site of care may influence the 
ultimate judgment of PPS's success. 
Finally, while the data presented in this dissertation suggest gains for the 
government, the control over costs has come at the expense of quality of care 
for the general public as well as the Medicare beneficiary. That is, controlling 
costs has required unacceptable trade offs; namely, the establishment of an 
explicit cost-based rationing of health care, specifically of inpatient hospital 
care; a slowing of the development, testing and adoption of new medical 
technology; the negative impact PPS has had on the long term care system; and 
the implementation of a largely untested policy that provided only short-term 
financial gains and ignored the larger health care financing problem. 
Rationing Hospital Care 
While rationing (i.e., refusing to care for or limiting care for patients who 
cannot pay) has always been a part of the American health care system, PPS 
has exacerbated the problem by placing some hospitals at such financial risk 
that they must turn away patients. Urban core hospitals and small, rural 
hospitals have been partirularly vulnerable to the cost-containment pressures of 
PPS. Similarly, decreases in the allocation of funds under PPS could influence 
physicians to undertreat patients or to discontinue treatment to the terminally 
ill. 
It was feared that PPS would rachet down hospital revenues to such an 
extent that hospitals would be forced to limit or forgo providing charity care to 
the medically indigent. For example, the medically indigent in California had a 
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22.6 percent decline in Medicaid hospital days in the first six months of 1984 
(Kinzer, 1984). In addition, the "dumping" of the undesirable poor and elderly 
on public institutions is increasing under PPS, with some hospitals carrying the 
burden on behalf of the rest of their communities. Cost-containment could 
force hospitals to adopt an "out of sight, out of mind" mentality to those 
needing emergency care due to the financial burden it might place on the 
facility. Arnold Reiman (1985) suggests that: 
As economic pressures grow and hospital managers 
are ••• forced to act like businessmen concerned primarily 
with profit margins, more and more patients will be 
denied access to urgently needed care ••• In such a 
climate, we cannot expect the emergency care of 
indigent and uninsured patients to be given a very high 
. priority- and it is not (p. 372). 
The question whether DRGs promote efficiency or rationing leads to a 
more fundamental ethical issue: whether hospitals and physicians are the 
appropriate actors to undertake the awesome responsibility of this new role in 
health care; i.e., allocators of scarce resources. Policy makers and society as a 
whole have yet to deal explicitly with the issue of rationing nor have they 
provided the medical profession with clear guidelines. As Spiegel and Kavaler 
(1988) have put it: 
We cannot ignore the fact that DRGs, and similar 
schemes, are simply ways of covertly rationing health 
care, without subjecting Congress to the wrath of the 
American electorate. The responsibility is shifted to the 
medical profession, which continues to serve as the 
scapegoat (p. 510). 
Thus DRGs change the method of allocation; that is, "who does the rationing 
and who is affected by it'' (Fuchs, 1985, p. 1332). 
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Impact on Medical Tedmology 
One of the objectives of DRG-ba.sed PPS was to eliminate unnecessary 
care, induding tests and procedures, that did not contribute to patient 
recovery. According to a report by the Office of Technology Assessment 
(OTA), medical costs increased over 107 percent between 1977 and 1982 and 
that approximately 28 percent of this rise could be attributed to the overuse of 
medical technology. OTA, in an evaluation of the impact of DRGs on medical 
technology, found that there was substantial evidence that the inappropriate 
use of medical technology is common and raises " ••• costs without improving 
quality of care" (American Medical News, 1984b, p. 2). The study went on to 
condude that, due to PPS, the number and intensity of ancillary inpatient 
procedures will decrease while procedures that can be shown to lower costs will 
increase. Furthermore, DRG payments will encourage the movement of 
technologies into the home, particulary for post-hospital care and that 
incentives to reduce costs will result in a concentration of capital intensive 
technologies in fewer institutions while increasing competition will ·create 
incentives for widespread acquisition of high return technologies. Finally, the 
report suggested that DRGs will promote greater product standardiation as 
more expensive models and procedures are eased out of the market through 
a>mpetition. In general, the report concludes, technologies that are cost-
reducing will be encouraged; cost-raising technologies will be discouraged. 
Many fear that these trends will mean that, under PPS, technology will 
wither away and the cheapest treatment will be used. A representative from 
the Health Industry Manufacturers Association (HIMA) stated during 
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Congressional hearings on PPS that the Association was concerned that PPS 
could jeopardize quality of health care by inhibiting the development of new 
diagnostic and therapeutic technologies. Since the reimbursement formula is 
based on historical data applying to established technology, this could bias 
reimbursement levels (Buzzel, 1983). Dr. David Banta, of the OTA, has stated 
that DRG-based PPS will mark the first time that concern for medical 
technology assessment will become part of the decision-making process on rates 
of payment for health care services. What this means, he said, is that "the 
hospital administrator is going to become very conservative about technology" 
(OTA, 1983, p. 11). 
At issue is the ability of policy to encourage the production and 
distribution of equipment and procedures that are both rational (i.e., better 
matched to the needs of the population) and more economical (i.e., more likely 
to yield maximum ouput from the dollars expended) (Brown, 1988b, p. 9). This 
means devising the criteria needed to govern the introduction, diffusion, 
application and withholding of technological advances. Important consideration 
in the development of these criteria is the impact on mortality and morbidity, 
the ethical issues involved in withholding treatments, the difficulty of 
prospective versus rei:rospective technological evaluation, and the intricacies of 
rationing care. Aaron and Schwartz (1984), in their analysis of the impact of 
cost containment on resource use, point out that: 
The idea that by getting rid of the fat we can keep the 
current system is a myth. The only way to cut costs will 
be to deny benefits to some people or deny benefits for 
some diseases (p. 117-118). 
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Impact on Long-Term Care 
With the introduction of PPS using diagnostic related groups (DRGs) to 
pay hospitals on a predetermined rate per case rather than by costs, average 
length of stay (ALOS) and hospital admissions decreased. While the former was 
anticipated, decreases in admissions were not. The hospital admission rate for 
those 65 and over was 377 admissions per 1000 Medicare enrollees. However, in 
1984, the hospital admission rate declined to 361 admissions per 1000 enrollees 
and by 1985, the admission rate fell to 352 admissions per 1000 enrollees 
(Gornick & Hall, 1988). 
Plausible explanations for the declines in hospital admission include a 
trend toward inceased provision of health care on an outpatient basis (e.g., 
hospital outpatient units, ambulatory care settings, surgicenters, physicians' 
offices) as well as more stringent utilization and quality control review 
programs. PPS incentives for shortened length of stay, earlier discharge and 
increased use of outpatient services have focused attention on assuring that the 
system does not have a detrimental impact on the quality of care or on the 
health status of the Medicare population. Two major issues related to early 
discharge and changes in the site of care need to be considered in any 
evaluation of the efficacy of the PPS program: one, the impact of the program 
on the availability of needed post-hospital care (called after-care) services and 
two, the impact of these changes on the quality of ~are delivered to the 
Medicare population (Gornick & Hall, 1988). 
Under PPS, many Medicare patients are now expected to receive care 
outside the hospital, in nursing homes or at home, for conditions that four years 
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ago would have kept them in the hospital. The availability and adequacy of 
post-hospital care services are especially important because of the 
sociodemographic characteristics of the elderly population and the resulting 
implications this has for health care delivery. For example, after the death or 
institutionalization of a spouse, many elderly live alone and may face special 
care needs after discharge from the hospital for an acute care episode. If the 
needed services are not available or are not adequate, there is the potential for 
delayed or interrupted recovery, readmission to the hospital, increased 
morbidity and even death. Moreover, acute illness often strikes those who 
already suffer from chronic illnesses. Those chronically ill or disabled elderly 
living in the community and who experience an acute care episode are likely to 
have greater care needs than other elderly discharges. 
Thus, appropriate placement and adequate after-care treatment are of 
major concern for these greater care elderly now leaving the hospital sooner 
and in more debilitated conditions. Skilled nursing. facility (SNF) services may 
either be unavailable locally or the Medicare patient may not satisfy stringent 
eligibility criteria for SNF care. But, because of the intermittency requirement 
for Medicare home health (HH) care, the patient may not be able to obtain 
home health care either. Available data do not permit a precise assessment of 
the extent to which the Medicare benefit for either SNF or HH care actually 
meets the demand for this care. 
Nursing Home Servi~. Until the implementation of the 1988 
Amendments to the Social Security Act, skilled nursing facility (SNF) benefits 
were available only to persons who were previously hospitalized for at least 3 
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days prior to the request for service. The patient also needed to have required 
daily skilled nursing or rehabilitation (physical, occupational, or speech therapy) 
services usually available only in a nursing home. Medicare did not cover 
skilled nursing or rehabilitation services that were required intermittently (i.e., 
one or two times a week) or if the person did not need to be in a SNF to receive 
the care. Further, Medicare covered only 100 SNF days for each episode of 
illness induding a maximum of 20 SNF days with no cost sharing. The 1988 
Amendments eliminated the 3 day hospitalization requirement, increased the 
number of covered days to 50 days per year and altered the co-payment 
requirements. These changes in coverage will take effect on January 1, 1990 
(Gornick & Hall, 1988). 
Federal, state, and private spending for nursing home care add up to more 
than $30 billion per year. Total annual expenditures ·from private sources is 
over $15 billion. Medicaid spends more than $14 billion yearly and Medicare 
spends approximately $650 million (Senate Aging Committee, 1986). On any 
given day, 1.5 million patients occupy beds in the nation's 15,000 nursing homes. 
National occupancy rates are stable at 95 percent, indicating a tight 
demand/supply situation. 
With the implementation of PPS, skilled nursing payments, which 
comprised a steadily decreasing share of total Medicare expenditures, increased 
slightly. It has been suggested by a number of analysts that this slight increase 
is significant in light of the fact that Medicare's nursing home benefit is limited 
by the number of allowable days and the skilled care need requirement (Leader, 
1986; Senate Aging Committee, 1986). Due to these factors, Medicare's share 
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of the total outlay in nursing home expenditures constituted only about 2 
percent of all funds spent for nursing home care in 1985 (Waldo, Levit & 
Lazenby, 1986). 
Data from the HCF A show that 3.2 enrollees per 1000 hospitalized 
Medicare benefidaries used covered SNF services in 1981. This figure rose to 
4.6 enrollees per 1000 hospitalized Medicare benefidaries between 1983 and 
1985. Similarly, there was an increase in the number of SNF users per 1000 
Medicare enrollees during the same time period. Between 1983 and 1985, SNF 
users per 1000 enrollees rose from 9 per 1000 in 1981 to 10 SNF users per 1000 
enrollees in 1985, an increase of 11 percent (Gornick & Hall, 1988). These 
increases not only reflect the decline in hospital admissions but also the trend 
toward early discharge under PPS. Another measure of SNF utilization, the 
mean number of covered SNF days per user, declined from 27.4 days in 1981 to 
21.7 days in 1985, reflecting both an increase in short Medicare-covered SNF 
stays and a decline in long SNF stays in general (Gornick & Hall, 1988). 
However, there are gaps in the long-term care system. Medicare, the 
primary source of funding for acute care services, was not designed to provide 
long-term or sub-acute care assistance. While Medicaid finances approximately 
40 percent of all nursing home care, it is available only to those who deplete 
their income to impoverishment and does not cover care in the community. A 
study by the General Accounting Office (GAO) found that some nursing homes 
will avoid accepting Medicare patients who might become eligible for Medicaid 
after exhausting their Medicare benefitis since Medicaid reimbursement usually 
does not cover the costs of care (GA.O, 1983). There are also access problems 
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for nursing home patients needing intensive or "heavy care" services. Thus, PPS 
may be increasing problems of access to nursing home care for Medicare 
beneficiaries. 
Furthermore, hospitals have historically augmented the effective supply 
of long-term care beds by providing "back-up" days, i.e., days waiting in the 
hospital for an available nursing home bed, largely at Medicare's expense. 
Access to post-hosptial care becomes critical in a hospital where attending 
physicians or a utilization and quality control peer review organization 
determines that a patient no longer needs acute care. Moreover, existing rules 
and regulations concerning the range of services covered under Medicare's 
skilled nursing care benefits are so limited that it is likely to heighten 
difficulties of nursing home access. 
Access to nursing home care has been a problem in many, but not all, 
states prior to PPS. With the incentives of PPS, the hospital is penalized while 
the patient awaits an available bed and is therefore motivated to discharge the 
patient as soon as possible to almost any care setting that is available. 
However, with occupancy rates exceeding 90 percent, experts are in general 
agreement that there are serious shortages of nursing home beds throughout the 
country. Extra nursing care needs and the requirement of co payment by the 
beneficiary make many nursing homes reluctant to admit short-stay Medicare 
patients. In addition, Medicare coverage for skilled care is liminted and the 
uncertainties of coverage following hospitalization put nursing homes at 
financial risk. Medicaid has become the major public financing mechanism for 
long term care for the elderly and poor. It provides full coverage and is fairly 
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comprehensive and predictable, but the level of reimbursement is lower than 
that provided by Medicare. Moreover, many states have chosen to hold down 
the costs of their Medicaid programs by reimbursing at a level such that the 
supply of beds is insufficient for the demand. This "back-up" of patients may 
allow nursing homes to discriminate among patients in a variety of ways; such 
as source of payment or intensity of care required (OTA, 1985). Consequently, 
the waiting list for both Medicare and Medicaid patients is, in effect, 
permanent. Thus, it appears that PPS has contributed to the problem of 
permanent excess demand for nursing home beds. 
Access to care will be affected by more than the behavior of the nursing 
home industry. Most significant will be the potential for an increase in the 
provision of post-hospital care by hospitals. Such developments as "swing beds" 
and hosptial-based home health services are early indicators that hospitals may 
choose to deal with the early discharge problem by providing care themselves. 
However, some states, induding Oregon, have not extended the concept of 
extended care beds from rural to urban hospitals and, despite the growing 
demand for nursing home care, deny certificate of need applications that would 
authorize new nursing home construction. 
Distribution of ex>st is another matter for concern. Medicare coverage for 
nursing home care is significantly more limited than coverage for inpatient 
hospital care. Substitution of care may shift costs from Medicare to patients 
and their families. It is estimated that the elderly not covered by Medicaid and 
J 
their families pay an average of $20,000 to $30,000 per year in nursing home 
costs (Holahan & Palmer, 1988). A recent Senate Committee on Aging (1986) 
report noted that near! y 70 percent of single elderly nursing home residents are 
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impoverished after only 13 weeks in a nursing home while impoverishment for a 
couple takes an average of only six months. To the extent that Medicare 
patients eventually become sufficiently impoverished to go on Medicaid, costs 
will be shifted to the state Medicaid programs (OTA, 1985). 
Finally, quality of care has always been an issue in the nursing home 
industry. Findings from a two-year investigation by the Senate Committee on 
Aging (1986) into the quality of care provided in nursing homes found five 
significant problems in the nursing home industry. One, thousands of patients in 
nursing homes still suffer from the poor nutrition, inadequate nursing care and 
squalid conditions which were to have been corrected by state and federal 
reforms of the past 10 to 15 years. Nursing home inspection reports reveal that 
over one-third of the nation's 8,800 certified skilled nursing homes failed to 
comply fully with essential health, safety, and quality standards of the federal 
government. Nursing home inspection reports also reveal that in 1984, about 11 
percent (1,000) certified skilled nursing homes were cited for violating three or 
more critical minimum standards for health and safety. 
Two, federal inspection reports show that between 600 and 800 certified 
skilled nursing homes in the U.s. chronically fail year after year to meet 
minimum quality standards. One reason cited for poor quality is inadequate and 
poorly targeted reimbursements by Medicare and Medicaid which force some 
SNF operators to "cut corners" (Senate Aging Committee, 1986). 
Tfree, finding a vacancy in a nursing home, let alone one that offers 
quality care, is extremely difficult and one in which the consumer has little 
control. A serious shortage of nursing home beds exists in many communities 
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which effects Medicaid eligible patients, those who will shortly spend down and 
become Medicaid eligible, and those with heavier care needs. Four, HHS has 
failed in its Congressionally mandated responsibility to ensure that nursing 
homes receiving federal funds provide high quality medical and rehabilitative 
care. Five, existing federal penalties for use against sul>-standard homes are 
ineffective in that they limit the number of enforcement actions that can be 
taken against sub-standard nursing homes and expose residents to serious risks 
from transfers. 
The Report recommends that Congress strengthen the nursing home 
inspection system, develop a case mix reimbursement system for Medicaid 
nursing homes, expand the hospital swing-bed program to ease the tight bed 
supply, provide a larger array of intermediate sanctions, strengthen nursing 
home patients' rights, and strengthen the national long term care ombudsman 
program. Many of these recommendations were incorporated into the Quality 
of Care Amendments to the Social Security Act passed in 1986. Still, PPS 
incentives for early discharge continue to exacerbate the problems of access 
and quality of care in the nursing home sector. 
Home Health Care. Home health benefits are covered by Medicare for 
beneficiaries who are home bound and who require 'intermittent' skilled nursing 
care or physical or speech therapy. This benefit does not cover general 
household services (housekeeping, meal preparation, shopping, etc.) or other 
personal care needs. No prior hospitalization is required, there is no limit to 
the number of visits covered and there is no beneficiary cost sharing (Gornick&: 
Hall, 1988). The 1988 Amendments to the Social Security Act expanded the 
interpretation of skilled care, which had traditionally been conservatively 
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defined, to cover 38 consecutive days of care at any given time and redefined 
intermittent to cover up to 6 days of care a week for those qualifying (versus 
the prior limit of 4 days a week). These changes take effect on January 1, 
1990. 
Between 1974 and 1983, Medicare home health (HH) expenditures grew at 
an average annual rate of 25 percent. However, after the introduction of PPS, 
growth in the HH oomponent of Medicare declined to 15 percent, although this 
was still 4 1/2 times faster than the rate of growth in inpatient hospital 
expenditures (Guterman et. al., 1988; Moon, 1986). Additionally, HH use rose 
from 35 users per 1000 Medicare enrollees in 1981 to 51 per 1000 enrollees in 
1985 (Gornick & Hall, 1988). Attributing increases in HH expenditures to PPS is 
difficult since the program was growing rapidly before PPS. However, 
Medicare expenditures alone are not a good indicator of HH use due to the 
limits on eligibility for the HH benefit. 
Other indicators, such as elderly out-of-pocket expenditures, should also 
be examined. It was estimated that the elderly spent over $2 billion in out-of-
pocket expenses for home health care in 1985 (Leader, 1986). In addition, 
absolute expenditures by Medicare add insight into the issue of PPS impact on 
HH use. Total Medicare benefits increased from $41.2 billion in 1981 to $74 
billion in 1986, an increase of 80 percent. Included in that increase is a 65.9 
percent increase in inpatient hospital benefits, a 32.7 percent increase in skilled 
nursing facility (SNF) payments and, in contrast, a 147.9 percent increase in 
home health benefit payments. The relatively small increase in SNF payments 
reflects, in part, the high percentage of beneficiary cost sharing required after 
the 21st. day of nursing home care (Gornick & Hall, 1988). Thus, the most 
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visible impact of PPS appears to be on the home health industry. ''It appears 
that home health agencies are bearing the brunt of ••• earlier discharges under 
the PPS system (Cushman, 1986, p. 3). 
Analysis of a sample of Medicare hospital discharges in 1981 and 1984-
1985 showed that, if a patient was discharged from the hospital in 1981, there 
was a .41 percent chance that the patient would go into a SNF and be covered 
for 7 or fewer days. In 1984-1985, that chance would have increased to .65 
percent. The chance that the patient would go into an SNF and be covered for 
more than 30 days increased only slightly, from .86 in 1981 to .88 in 1984-1985. 
Analysis of HH use suggests that PPS has increased the percentage of patients 
receiving home health visits within 7 days of discharge by 14 percent (Guterman 
et al., 1988). 
However, home health care outlays have not kept pace with this increase 
in need/demand. It appears that this is the result of a variety of factors. First, 
legislative changes in the program enacted since 1980, such as ceilings on home 
health reimbursements, eliminating occupational therapy benefits, and requiring 
copa.yments for durable medical equipment all reduced expenditures somewhat. 
Second, there has been tremendous variability in the annual rate of change in 
total Medicare reimbursements for home health. Therefore, the recent decline 
in rate of outlays may be a temporary phenomenon. Since the bulk of charges 
for home health services reflects labor costs, lower inflation rates could have 
led to lower rates of increase in charges, but it is not dear how much this 
factor contributed to the lower rates of growth. 
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Third, another source of limits to growth in home health has been 
administratively induced reductions in access to care. For example, HCFA has 
implemented a series of administrative rules and guidelines intended to tighten 
eligibility, coverage and reimbursement for services. One consequence of this 
administrative reduction in benefits is an increase in the denial rate for 
provider claims. As an example, between 1978 and the first three months of 
1986, the percent of all Medicare bills denied for any reason rose from 2.8 
percent to 3.9 percent, a 39 percent increase. In comparison, recent national 
data on Medicare denials for home health claims show that the denial rate 
increased 133 percent from the first q..~arter of 1984 to the first q..~arter of 1986 
(House Aging Committee, 1986; Leader, 1986). Tightened eligibility and more 
stringent determinations of the "intermittency" and "home bound" requirements 
for home health services have also added to an impossible siutation for 
Medicare beneficiaries needing home care. That is, they must be basically 
confined to their home in order to obtain home health services, yet the amount 
of care provided under Medicare may be insufficient to meet their needs. 
Furthermore, if family members supplement Medicare-covered services, they 
may jeopardize the receipt of those services (Leader, 1986). 
Continued restrictions on growth in the home health benefit could 
jeopardize access and quality of care for home health services. Further, the 
General Accounting Office (GAO, 19853.) reported that a prospective payment 
system for home health care would increase expenditures if payments were set 
at 7 5 percent of costs per visit. Cost control measures will adversely affect 
beneficiaries in that small and rural providers will be bankrupted; that costly 
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services will be curtailed; that heavy care patients will be rejected as 
unprofitable; and that the volume of indigent care provided by on-profit 
providers will decline. 
Even with the 1988 Amendments, significant gaps in coverage of 
Medicare's home health benefit remain in effect. HCFA's guidelines primarily 
reflect the focus on acute care of the Medicare program which effectively 
eliminates the home health benefit from those elderly requiring part-time 
skilled care or to the frail elderly or those with chronic conditions. In addition, 
while Medicare pays for hospital beds, canes, and walkers, the program will not 
pay for bathroom equipment, occupational therapy, home intravenous antibiotic 
therapy supplies, equipment, or services, and excludes all drugs and biologicals 
when provided by a home health agency (House Aging Committee, 1986). These 
gaps in coverage, specifically when combined with the increased severity and 
intensity of care needed in post-hospital care as a result of early discharge have 
meant increased beneficiary costs. 
There are significant issues of quality of care in the home health industry. 
The rapid growth in Medicare utilization of home health care has occurred in 
virtual "regulatory vacuum" in which consumer needs and interests are poorly 
understood or protected (Leader, 1986). Medicare dollars are being spent on 
services for which there is little knowledge and few quality standards •. Existing 
regulatory organizations (e.g., PROs; ProPAC) are inadequate, the effects of 
home care on patient well-being and satisfaction are unknown, and there is 
little understanding of the extent of unmet need for services. The increased 
demand for home health care in lieu of more costly hospital car~ has resulted in 
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the growth of private home care agencies in the home care market. Between 
1966 and 1986, the number of home health agencies inceased from 1,275 to 
6,005 and recent average annual growth rates in the industry have ranged from 
20 to 25 percent. Since 1982, the number of home health agencies certified 
under Medicare increased by more than 55 percent (Leader, 1986). 
There has also been a dramatic shift toward proprietary ownership in the 
home health industry with large chains and hospitals seeking to vertically 
integrate home health care into their systems. By 1984, 42 percent of all 
hospitals offered home health care. In 1985, the percentage increased to 65 
percent. In addition, the greatest growth has occurred in investor-owned 
agencies with their numbers increasing 300 percent during that period (Leader, 
1986). Proprietaries now make up more than 30 percent of Medicare certified 
agencies, up from less than 6 percent in 1979 (House Aging Committee, 1986; 
Leader, 1986). The proliferation of private home care agencies is a fairly new 
phenomenon and there is little information comparing service delivery in 
private versus public agencies. There is a lack of information about who is 
providing these services, how many people are being served and how many 
public and private dollars are going to home care. 
Concerns have been expressed by advocates for the elderly that private 
home health agencies might be "skimming the cream off the top" of the home 
care market by caring primarily for paying patients and referring them to 
public agencies only after their funds have run out. In a study comparing a 
public and a private home health agency, Kornblatt et al. (1985) found that the 
public agency studied had clients req.Jiring more frequent visits, a longer length 
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of care and greater nursing intensity than the private agency. The public 
agency also had a larger proportion of Medicaid and medically indigent patients. 
The private agency, which served approximately the same number of home 
health referrals during the study period, had clients with needs for less frequent 
visits, shorter length of care, and less intensive nursing services. The private 
agency also had a larger proportion of Medicare and Blue Cross/Blue Shield 
patients. Thus, public and private agencies serve different patient populations, 
the types of visits made by public and private agencies are not equivalent in 
terms of intensity, and they serve different populations with respect to ability 
to pay. 
The growth of the home health industry is of concern for a number of 
reasons. One, the growth in the numbers of and the increased vulnerability of 
elderly persons receiving health care and personal support services in the home 
setting require greater knowledge regarding the cost and the quality of services 
than is current! y available. It is estimated that about 8 million persons needed 
assistance with personal care in 1985 -- 5.2 million of them were over age 65. 
Every month since 1960, an average of 149,000 persons joined the ranks of the 
elderly. The total age 65 population doubled between 1950 and 1980 and is 
expected to double again by 2020 (House Aging Committee, 1986). The kinds of 
home care services needed by this burgeoning population encompass health and 
social support services, many of which are provided by the home care industry. 
Two, because of the location of delivery of home health services, i.e., in 
the home, their actual delivery makes them essentially invisible and, therefore, 
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largely beyond the reach of public or professional scrutiny. Furthermore, the 
industry is underregulated. As of June 198.5, only 34 states required a 
certificate of need (CON) for new home health agencies. There is some 
evidence that when states drop their CON requirement, the number of providers 
increases dramatically. For example, when Texas dropped its CON requirement 
in 1981, the number of agencies in the state quadrupled by 1984 (Leader, 1986). 
Some states, such as Massachusetts, do not require either a CON or a license. 
In 198.5, only 32 states required any licensure of home health agencies at all. In 
some of these states, only proprietary agencies are licensed and there is no 
uniformity among licensure laws and state regulations. 
The American Bar Association's Commission on Legal Problems of the 
Elderly recently reviewed state regulation of home health agencies and found 
that most states simply cite the Medicare home health regulations and to not 
regulate the non-health component (homemaker, personal care) at all. Few 
states require home health aides to meet minimum training requirements and 
there is little evidence of state capability of investigating complaints against 
providers. Further, the study found that effective consumer protections in 
home health care are rare, if not wholly absent (House Aging Committee, 1986). 
Furthermore, Medicare monitoring of home health agencies is virtually 
nonexistent. Medicare regulation primarily consists of surveys of home health 
agencies to ascertain compliance with standards and does not even stipulate the 
amount of training reqJired by home health aides. Clients are not routinely 
interviewed and there is no independent assessment of quality of care provided. 
Very vew providers have been terminated from the Medicare program for 
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failure to comply with requiared standards. This virtual lack of effective 
independent quality ·control and consumer protection in the industry has 
significant consequences because of the explosive growth in home health 
service utilization since the implementation of PPS (Leader, 1986). 
Three, the lack of knowledge regarding horne health services is also of 
concern because a great deal of money is now being spent for home health care. 
An estimated $9 billion was spent for horne health care products and services in 
1985 with an expansion to $16 billion predicted by 1990 (House Aging 
Committee, 1986). There is concern because Medicare's home health benefit is 
the only service which is reimbursed on a cost basis and is exempt from 
beneficiary cost-sharing. Thus, Medicare provides the industry's "life blood" 
because 80-90 percent of those served are age 65 and older and because only 20 
percent of the market consists of private pay patients (House Aging 
Committee, 1986; Leader, 1986). 
Finally, there is little, if any, objective data on the quality of home care 
(House Aging Committee, 1986). Most literature on the issue of long-term care 
focuses on the frail and chronically ill in terms of the cost/benefit of 
community versus institutional care.- This focus is of little relevance to the 
current home health beneficiaries where the Medicare benefit is primarily being 
used for post-acute care; that is, the focus of current Medicare home health 
services is on recuperation, not on maintenance of those with chronic 
conditions. And, the requirement that skilled nursing care in the home be 
provided on a part-time or intermittent basis precludes the substitution of home 
care for skilled nursing facilities. 
280 
Policy issues that need to be addressed regarding the "black box'' of home 
health care include more effective oversight and regulation of the home health 
industry in order to protect consumers and ensure the quality of services being 
purchased by consumers, including Medicare. Furthermore, standardized, as 
well as useful, measures of quality of care and outcome are needed in order to 
establish and achieve high levels of quality and compliance with those 
standards. Finally, policymakers need to establish incentives and graduated 
sanctions within the home health regualtory process in order to maintain high 
standards of quality of care (House Aging Committee, 1986; Leader, 1986). 
In addition, policymakers should examine HCFA's efforts to arbitrarily 
reduce access to services by means of vague and inconsistently applied 
eligibility rules. With the implementation of PPS, demand for home health care 
has become the "growth industry" in health care. It is important to accurately 
assess policy options concerning the shift in health care to community-based 
settings that focus on more than just budgetary issues. Because of the 
capricious manner in which eligiblity is determined and the increase in need for 
home health benefits due to PPS, more and more "beneficiaries may need care 
and yet fail to qualify for either SNF or home health care" (Leader, 1986, p.23). 
Furthermore, HCF A's strict adherence to regulations that exclude the 
frail elderly and the chronically ill from access to home health care benefits 
needs to be reexamined. Such an exclusion creates a serious gap in coverage, 
generates large out-of-pocket expenses for the elderly who must privately 
purchase needed care, and may serve to increase the rate of institutionalization 
of these elderly in nursing homes (Leader, 1986; House Aging Committee, 1986). 
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In terms of needed post-hospital care research, it is incumbent upon 
Medicare to fund research which would determine the effect of PPS on the 
extent and nature of the need for home health care, both for sub-acute post-
hosptial care and for the frail elderly and the chronically ill, research 
comparing the cost and quality of services provided by non-profit and 
proprietary home health agencies, analyses on the effects on cost and quality of 
care provided by vertically-owned home health agencies verus independent 
providers, and evaluations of the cost effectiveness of Medicare reimbursement 
rules for durable medical equipment (Leader, 1986). 
While a number of pieces of legislation have been proposed to address 
some of the identified concerns with the home health care sector (see Leader, 
1986 or House Aging Committee for detailed discussions of each legislative 
proposal), many areas of concern remain. The major shift occurring in the 
location of the delivery of care, from institutional settings to amoolatory care, 
and the concern over increasing costs should not be allowed to over-ride the 
e~ally valid goals of quality and access to care for those in need. It is 
important for policymakers, reseachers, and program administrators to keep the 
elderly beneficiary as central to the policy making process as are costs. It must 
be remembered that the goal of PPS was not only to reduce the costs of 
inpatient hospital care for the Medicare program while maintaining access to 
and the quality of care for beneficiaries, but also to indude some method of 
addressing the need for long-term care and the more efficient integration of 
our social and health services system. 
PPS and Future Cmt-Ccmtainment 
There is ample reason to believe that the significant oodgetary savings 
achieved in the first three years of PPS cannot be sustained (Brown, 1988b; 
282 
Holahan & Palmer, 1988). Recent analyses of the status of the Medicare 
program (both the HI and SMI trust funds) indicate that the Medicare program is 
still in deep finandal trouble (Holahan & Palmer, 1988). The conjunction of 
continued rapid escalation of overall health care costs, the rapidly expanding 
elderly population, and the increasing need for health care services among the 
elderly has created another policy dilemma for the Medicare program (Vladeck 
& Alfano, 1987). It is now believed that Medicare faces a "far greater fiscal 
problem than did the Social Security Program a few years back" (Holahan & 
Palmer, 1988, p. 53-54). 
In 1982, the Trustees of the Social Security program issued a report 
predicting insolvency for Medicare's Hospital Insurance Fund by 1987. In 1984, 
the date was moved to 1991. In their 1985 report, the Trustees claim that the 
hospital fund is solvent until 1998. Credit for these positive changes were 
attributed to PPS, low inflation, and high employment levels. However, the 
report also cautioned that the positive prediction assumed a hospital DRG-rate 
freeze in 1986 and adjustments in rates in the future of no more than hospital 
market-basket inflation plus one-fourth of one percent. To ensure solvency for 
the next 25 years, the report states, either benefits will have to be reduced by 
19 percent or payroll taxes increased by 24 percent (Finn, 1985). 
In their analyses of the dimensions of the fiscal problem, Holahan and 
Palmer (1988) condude that, even under optimistic assumptions and despite the 
slight decreases in the rates of growth under PPS, the long-run picture for the 
Medicare program looks bleak. Under optimistic assumptions, the total revenue 
shortfall (that is, the amount of additional revenues and/or expenditure 
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cuts necessary to maintain fiscal balance in the Medicare program) will total 
over • .5 percent of GNP (or $27 billion) by the end of the 1990s. By the time the 
"baby boomers'' are all past retirement age (2030), this annual fiscal shortfall 
will be well in excess of 2 percent of GNP (or $117 billion annually). 
Under pessimistic assumptions, the relative size of the fiscal gap is well 
over twice as large as tmder optimistic assumptions (Holahan & Palmer, 1988). 
While PPS may have slowed the rate of increase in inpatient hospital payments, 
rates of growth in both the inpatient and outpatient components of Medicare 
are rising faster than the general rate of inflation and still threaten the fiscal 
solvency of the Medicare program. 
Another upward pressure on costs involves the rate of increase in the PPS 
payment levels. Medicare PPS rates were increased by the "market basket plus 
.25 of 1 percent" in 198.5, were frozen for seven months in 1986 and allowed to 
rise by just • .5 percent for the rest of the year. In 1987, the rate of increase 
was just 1 percent (Holahan & Palmer, 1988, p. 67). This is in contrast to the 3 
to .5 percent annual increase over the past 1.5 years. Holding growth rates so 
close to the market basket will also begin to constrain physician's treatment 
decisions and the application of medical technology. Political problems are 
sure to arise if this occurs. Furthermore, it private sector payers allow faster 
rates of growth than Medicare, access to care will be affected as will the 
quality of care. Costs may also be shifted to other third party payers and self-
pay patients and states may begin to adopt all-payer systems in response. 
Furthermore, the incentives inherent in PPS for early discharges are 
shifting increasing amounts of care to post-acute care providers. While limited 
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in the initial years of PPS due to restrictive Medicare coverage requirements 
and constraints on the availability of services, the costs of this shift in care 
appear to be growing substantially. PPS incentives also encourage unbundling 
of services as in diagnostic testing prior to admission and the performance of 
certain surgical procedures in outpatient settings. Both actions could increase 
Medicare costs since many of these services are not covered by PPS. 
Finally, the uninsured will bear the brunt of any resource allocation plans. 
So far, HHS has resisted pressures to provide additional funds to hospitals 
serving a disproportionate share of indigent patients even though a court order 
forced HCFA to redefine disproportionate share hospitals in 1985 (Mdlrath, 
198.5:1). Moreover, access problems for the poor and elderly will arise if 
payment rates to providers do not keep pace with costs. Thus, policies must be 
developed that more equitably distribute provider payments across hospitals 
while maintaining access to and the quality of care for vulnerable groups. 
Although hospitals overall had their highest recorded profits in the first 
three years under PPS and these were still higher than during the 1970s, this 
trend appears to have slowed down. Higher operating margins may also reflect 
a reduction in charity care as well as the shifting of care to fee-for-services 
settings (ambulatory care, outpatient visits, and other non-inpatient services). 
In addition, although hospitals are generally more profitable, the American 
Hospital Association (AHA) reports that 18 percent of all hospitals experienced 
revenue deficits in 1984. Many of these hospitals were small, rural facilities 
without much flexibility in planning their budgets and urban public hospitals 
which treat a high proportion of the uninsured population (Guterman & Dobson, 
1986). 
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However, the main challenge to Medicare's fiscal integrity lies in the 
interplay between demographics and costs. Demographic trends will aggravate 
pressures on the program. Since 1960, the population aged 65 and over has been 
growing twice as fast as the younger population; the group aged 75 to 84 has 
grown 65 percent faster and the group 85 and over have grown 174 percent 
faster. In 1960, 16.7 million old people constituted 9.1 percent of the 
population. In 1980, 25.9 million elderly comprised 11.1 percent, and it is 
estimated that the figure for the year 2000 will be 36.2 million (13.2 percent), 
rising to 52.6 million (17.2 percent) by 2020 and more than 67 million by 2040 
(Burke, 1988; Rice & Feldman, 1983). 
These demographic trends mean increased demand for physicians' services 
and large increases in hospital stays, nursing-home days, home health 
expenditures and out-of-pocket costs to the elderly themselves which will 
obviously strain Medicare's funding base. The fund ration in the hospital 
insurance part of the program (i.e., funds available at the start of a year 
divided by disbursements during the year) declined from a peak of 70 percent in 
1975 to 45 percent in 1981, triggering predictions that the trust fund would go 
bankrupt by the late 1980s. While PPS, lower inflation and diminished 
utilization have helped ease the problem, "the demographic forecasts offer 
little ground for complacence" (Brown, 1988b, p. 24). 
Although the full consequences of PPS on access, quality and budgetary 
savings are still uncertain, it is dear that PPS alone cannot control the rise in 
health care costs. One critic of the system called it an "incomplete" cost-
control device and noted that admissions and preventive care weren't included 
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in the system and that the physician was really "out of the picture" (Meyer, 
1984b, p. 98). A number of policy options have been proposed to address the 
rapid and continuously expanding gap between expenditures and projected 
revenues in the Medicare program. Most observers agree with Hollahan and 
Palmer (1988) when they state: 
Maintaining fiscal equili bri urn in the program ••• will 
require some combination of intensified efforts to 
control provider payments, increased financial burdens 
on the elderly themselves and higher taxes on the under-
65 working age population (p. 65). 
POLICY OPTIONS FOR THE MEDICARE PROGRAM 
There are enormous political concerns involved with each of the proposed 
reforms as well as corresponding pratical consequences. However, without a 
more concentrated approach to health care cost containment, Medicare will 
continue to have fiscal problems and access to care and the quality of health 
care will be compromised for all of those groups who cannot pay for their care. 
Although PPS directly impacts Medicare expenditures, it also indirectly affects 
the Medicaid program. When the programs were enacted in 1965, policy makers 
pictured a general division of labor in which Medicare would assist the aged 
while Medicaid predominantly served the younger "welfare" poor (Brown, 
1988b). However, due to the joint federal-state structure of Medicaid, which 
allows great variation in eligibility standards, Medicaid today covers fewer than 
half the poor (Brown, 1988b). Groups usually excluded include two parent 
families, the medically indigent, the unemployed, and the uninsured. This 
exacerbates the problem of uncompensated medical care for hospitals. In 
addition, because Medicare will pay for medical but not chronic care of the 
287 
elderly, Medicaid has become the principal public source of funds for nursing-
home care. The maintenance of the fiscal integrity of the Medicare program 
has produced three broad themes, induding: 1) increased control over provider 
payments, including capitation and rate setting proposals; 2) reduced benefits or 
increased cost sharing; or 3) increased tax burdens on the working population 
(Brown, 1988b; Holahan & Palmer, 1988). 
Controlling Provider Payments 
Controlling provider payments will be difficult and cannot be achieved 
without some impact on the quality of care available to at least some elderly 
and poor. As was discussed above, hospital payments are already below the 
cost of living/CPI and it is difficult to believe significant savings can be 
achieved in the future since costs are again beginning to rise. Moreover, 
projections of Medicare's fiscal problems already incorporate optimistic 
assumptions about the government's availabilty to control costs. In reality, the 
government will be "lucky'' to get what it hopes for. The question remains 
lDlanswered as to how much more can be squeezed out of provider payments 
(e.g., fat in the system). Continuing to hold Medicare hospital payment growth 
to a minimum raises serious political and ethical questions as quality of care 
begins to be compromised (Holahan & Palmer, 1988). 
Physician DRGs. Physician DRGs, physician fee schedules, capitation and 
national health insurance have all been proposed as ways to save on costs for 
physicians' services. Each of the proposals has been debated by policymakers 
with great controversy and fanfare. However, effective lobbying efforts by 
physicians' groups have, up to now, successfully contained federal efforts to 
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implement any such payment control system for physician's services. Yet, some 
form of amtrols appear to be on the horizon. With strong opposition to 
physician DRGs, alternatives, such as relative value scales, bundling services, 
and capitation systems are being considered by HCF A and appear to have 
general public support. As Congressman Ron Wyden (D, OR.) has stated, "the 
Medicare legislation is like a gun without bullets. Without cost controls on the 
attending physician, who controls the volume of inpatient services, costs 
cannot be controlled" (Spiegler & Kavaler, 1986, p. 519). 
There is concern, however, that instituting provider controls will only 
limit access. Gabel and Rice (1985) cite their study of the impact of the 
physician's fee freeze of 1984 in California, where services to Medicare 
patients increased from 8 to 15 percent in one year. They contend that 
physicians countered the freeze by increasing the complexity and the number of 
services delivered to patients. The researchers also found that physicians were 
less likely to care for public program patients under restricted payment modes. 
The authors suggest three options to control costs and volume while altering the 
fee-for-service mechanism: one, increase reimbursement rates for some 
medical services while freezing or reducing payments for others; two, reduce 
hospital admissions by freezing or cutting physician reimbursement for hospital 
visits while increasing payment for office and home visits; and/or three, 
contract selectively with groups of physicians to provide all medical care to 
Medicare and Medicaid patients. 
Other forces could influence the willingness of physicians to control costs. 
For example, the physician surplus has prompted doctors to form joint 
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practices, join PPOs and HMOs, and to practice in underserved areas (Ginsberg, 
1985b). However, Holahan and Palmer (1988) point out that this option factor is 
limited by the fact that physicians are not as dependent upon Medicare as 
hospitals for the majority of their income (3096 of physician's income is 
Medicare related versus 40% of hosptial revenues). 
Capitation. Capitation arrangements have been proposed as a way to curb 
both physican and hospital costs, such as prepaid health plans. Both health care 
management experts and investment analysts predict a larger role for 
capitation schemes. Indeed, when PPS was enacted it was hoped that PPS 
would encourage the development of new forms of payment systems in the 
private sector. To illustrate, then HCFA administrator Carolyn Davis, in a 
1984 speech, alluded to DRG-based PPS leading to "a pluralistic system with 
the concept of capitation, either with episodic or voucher payments for 
hospitals and physicians" (Rust, 1984, p. 2). Stuart Altman, Chairman of 
ProPAC, also forecasted a greater percentage of capitated systems by 1990 
(Hospitals, 1984b). 
Despite the optimism with which the HMO movement has been seen, less 
than 3 percent of the Medicare population is currently enrolled in some form of 
capitated arrangement and there is much uncertainty about both the 
accomplishments and the potential of HMOs and other variants such as 
independent practice associations (IPAs) and preferred provider organizations 
(PPOs) to contain costs. For example, there is little firm evidence on the cost-
oontainment accomplishments of PPOs, their growth has been explosive. At the 
end of 1984, there were 141 PPOs; by 1988, there were 646. Evidence on the 
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impact of HMOs is more abundant but does not necessarily support the 
contention that HMOs lower costs. After more than a decade of "hope and 
hype" concerning HMOs in 1988, only about 12 percent of the population was 
enrolled in HMOs with membership highly concentrated in certain regions of the 
country (Brown, 1988b, p. 36). 
Furthermore, expanding the number of enrollees in these programs poses 
enormous implementation problems, such as the difficulty of setting capitation 
rates that accurately reflect the extremely diverse needs of the Medicare 
population or policy questions as to whether membership in the plan should be 
mandatory or voluntary. Finally, the limited availability of HMOs willing and 
able to accept the financial risks of Medicare beneficiaries in pre-paid plans 
may constrain the feasibility of this policy option (Brown, 1988b; Spiegel & 
Kavaler, 1986). 
National Rate Setting. National rate setting as a form of capitation on 
physicians and hospital services has also been proposed, often in the form of 
state-wide or national health insurance. Such systems, in effect, would yield 
the greatest benefits to the public since total health care costs woUld be 
controlled. Indeed, the PPS legislation mandated a report to Congress on the 
concept of a national rate setting system by December 198.5. Moreover, while 
many health care analysts and consumer groups supported PPS, they believed 
that a single payer cost control program was doomed to failure because of the 
potential for cost-shifting. They advocated that PPS should be the "forerunner" 
of a national all-payers prospective payment system. If it was not, they argued, 
many of the potential negative consequences of PPS (e.g., mergers and closings 
of hospitals; deterioration of care), would certainly occur (Milch, 1984). 
291 
While offering the potential for controlling costs without creating 
incentives for discrimination against beneficiaries, this is a radical departure 
from the current health care system and, unless carefully tailored to the 
idiosyncrasies of the American health care system, would be difficult to 
implement. Furthermore, the combination of public and private influences on a 
"hybrid'' national health insurance program would most certainly limit its 
potential to control costs. Finally, while many policymakers, advocates for the 
elderly, and health care analysts support a universal health care system, it is 
not dear that the political will is there to so fundamentally change the 
American health care system. 
Reduced Benefits and/or Increased Costs to Beneficiaries 
A second group of policy options concerns reducing benefits, or more 
plausibly, increasing costs to beneficiaries. It is believed that increased cost 
sharing (e.g., higher deductibles and copayments) will reduce health care 
utilization since people will be reluctant to spend money if the dollars come 
from their own pockets. It is argued that financial participation on the part of 
consumers will 1) influence demand while not discouraging essential services; 2) 
will influence the choice of services (i.e., encourage lower cost ambulatory or 
home care in preference to inpatient services); 3) will improve understanding of 
services provided as well as their .value; 4) will permit patients to express their 
preferences and priorities; 5) will contribute to accurate reporting of services 
provided to the patient; 6) will provide essential financial resources when other 
priorities dictate limitations on hmding by payers; and 7) will permit discretion 
and flexibility (Health Care Financial Management Association, 1983). 
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Reductions in benefits could take various forms, induding reductions in 
the number of beneficiaries (raising the initial age of eligibility or retreating 
from the program's universal coverage), restrictions in the scope of services for 
which it will pay; cuts in payment per service (which, as was discussed above, 
might reduce access by beneficiaries and strengthen providers' incentives to 
increase the volume of services); or to make beneficiaries pay more out-of-
pocket for their care (Ginsberg & Moon, 1984). In contrast to increased cost-
sharing, the other approaches to cost containment do not appear to be 
politically feasible in the near future. In fact, reductions i_n benefits appear to 
be contrary to the current political dimate as evidenced in the recent passage 
of Medicare's catastrophic illness coverage where Congress actually expanded 
benefits and lowered the cost sharing targets of the program. 
The more politically feasible approach, and one utilized by Congress in 
the passage of catastrophic health, was an increase in beneficiaries' 
contribution to their own health care coverage. The greatest strength of 
increased cost sharing is that it presumably discourages unnecessary care; the 
greatest weakness is that it increases the costs for precisely those beneficiaries 
who already have the greatest financial liabilities for their health care (Brown, 
1988b). Although the elderly overall have had their financial situation improved 
for the past 25 years, many elderly still suffer from considerable economic 
hardship. Added to a very sizable group of poor elderly is a very large group 
(nearly half of all of those 65 or older) that is not poor but not "financially 
secure" (Holahan & Palmer, 1988, p. 72). 
Looking toward the future, there is little evidence to suggest that the 
elderly will continue to enjoy the relative gains in their financial situation that 
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they have in the past. For successive new cohorts of retirees, benefits will no 
longer rise faster than wages, and at the turn of the century, benefits will not 
even keep pace with wages, as the increase in the age of eligibility to 67 for 
full benefits contained in the 1983 Social Security amendments is gradually 
phased in {Holahan & Palmer, 1988). While the elderly as a class should share in 
any economic growth, with little prospect of the elderly's financial situation 
improving markedly, it is difficult to argue that they can contribute very much 
to Medicare's fiscal problems. 
Shifting some portion of beneficiaries' health care expenditures to 
Medicare recipients poses a sizable financial burden on the moderately well-off 
and poor beneficiary. In 1984, the average out-of-pocket health care expense 
for non-institutionalized elderly amounted to over 21 percent of income for 
those with incomes between $5,000 and $10,000. And since personally paid 
health care costs have been rising faster than income, these figures are 
increasing, especially for post-hospital and chronic care. Furthermore, the 
elderly now have only about 45 percent of their medical costs covered by 
Medicare. Critics argue that if cost-sharing really were an effective deterrent 
to utilization, its effects should be evident by now {Brown, 1988b). Finally, the 
nearly one-fourth of all elderly requiring hospital care each year bear the 
greatest financial burden for the program. Thus, increased cost shifting would 
pose enormous hardship on an already burdened segment of the population. The 
main point, say Holahan & Palmer {1988), is that under current Medicare 
benefit policies, including catastrophic coverage, "a sizable segment of the 
elderly population appears to be already severely strapped by health care 
expenses" (p. 73). 
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Other approaches to increasing beneficiary costs, such as increases in the 
already-established SMI premium, instituting an hospital insurance (HI) 
premium, and raising the age of full eligibility, do not offer the potential of 
increasing efficiency in the use of health care services, since they are not tied 
to utilization; but they do have the important advantage of not concentrating 
the increased costs on those already shouldering a substantial burden. Rather, 
these options spread the increase in costs evenly across all Medicare 
beneficiares when such costs are not income-related or focus the increase 
among higher-income beneficiaries when the costs are income-related. For 
example, an increase in the SMI premium was used to cover the catastrophic 
health benefits. However, these approaches begin to undermine the traditional 
"earned right" to hospital insurance fund benefits that is the foundation of the 
Medicare program and leads to the political issue of "means testing." While I 
believe this may inevitably be the road Medicare must take as a partial solution 
to the cost problem, I do not believe it will be an explicit policy of means 
testing. The probable option will be some form of capitated system with 
increased costs to beneficiaries with some income-related conditions for care. 
Increased Taxation of the Working Population 
As the above discussion suggests, large increases in Medicare revenues 
will probably be required to aid in Medicare's financial solution. These revenues 
will most likely have to come from other forms of taxation, including increases 
in the financial burden of the working population and more aggressive changes 
in provider reimbursement. However, this latter option will result in 
policymakers having to more explicitly define the cost-containment role of the 
federal government and may mean a stronger presence of the federal 
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government in the health care sector. This increased role will have to be 
determined by a tough political process and can result in one of two 
conclusions: one in which federal control is limited to the Medicare and 
Medicaid programs but where the role is much larger than it is today. However, 
this larger role in only two, albeit significant, payer systems in health care 
could limit its effectiveness. Two, the development of a 'national' system of 
cost control could be instituted. This option, at least at the present time and 
with approximately 3.5 million Americans either under or not insured for health 
care, appears to be more feasible than at any time in the past 2.5 years. A 
model such as the Canadian long-term care system, which has been able to 
provide a desirable mix of community based services at a relatively controllable 
cost of about 10 percent of the nursing home budget (Connolly, 1988). Overall, 
Canada spent 8 • .5 percent of its GNP on health care in 1983 as compared to our 
10.8 percent for that year. However, besides flying in the face of the historical 
antecedents of the U.S. health care system and our cultural abhorrence for 
anything "socialist," the feasibility of adopting such a plan in the United States 
is in question. 
CONCLUSION 
The policy choices involving continued or increased control of provider 
costs, increased costs to beneficiaries or reduced benefits, and rates of 
increases in taxation to the working population seem to be the choices now 
facing the American government in its effort to conrol health care costs. The 
form these choices take will mean either the continued "mainstreaming" of 
Medicare patients with resulting increases in costs to Medicare or the 
deliberate fostering of a "two-tier" health care system in which only the well-
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off or fully insured have access to the best care. Efforts to reduce provider 
payment rates too far below the norm will eventually lead to reductions in the 
amount and quality of services being provided to Medicare (and poor) patients. 
No reductions will mean unacceptable increases in costs. Thus, policymakers 
face the very difficult trade-offs between major reductions in provider 
payments, with the very real potential for lessed access and quality of care, or 
.continued growth in the Medicare program. 
There are many significant forces increasing health care expenditures 
other than the inefficient use of medical services. These forces are unaffected 
by any efficiency gains produced by market competition or by health care 
regulation. Among these forces affecting market strategies are a growing 
population; the increasing size of the oldest age cohort, which uses more 
medical services and long-term care; the increasing medicalization of social 
problems; and the growing AIDS epidemic. Forces impacting regulatory 
strategies include conflicting goals of much cost-containment legislation (e.g., 
health planning, certificate of need), the costs of implementing health care 
regulation, and the limited and focused nature of most regulatory legislation 
that ignored many of the ftndamental forces driving costs in the health care 
system (e.g., physicians). 
Medical care spending has not abated during the last decade. From 1976 
to 1987, medical care spending increased by almost 80 percent above the level 
of inflation and far exceeds the nation's growth as measured by GNP (Altman & 
Rodwin, 1988). While there was a small decline in the rate of growth between 
1984 and 1986, reflecting the cost-containment efforts of the federal 
government (PPS) and private payers (employers, insurance companies), health 
care costs have begun to rise again. 
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Policymakers are now faced with a dilemma with Medicare similar to the 
one they were with Social Security. However, as Holahan and Palmer (1988) 
point out, the proposals to "fix" Social Security (including cuts in benefits to 
slow growth) produced such a "political backlash in Congress that the President 
was forced to withdraw them and appoint a bipartisan presidential commission 
to'recommend an alternative course of action" (p.80). The result was the 1983 
Social Security Amendments which introduced the Prospective Payment 
System. 
As this dissertation has tried to demonstrate, PPS has been only a 
marginal success in terms of budgetary savings and it is still not clear what 
effect it may be having on access to and the quality of care. Furthermore, 
Medicare's problems will not be solved with just one solution. A combination of 
the above proposals will have to be instituted if we are to even minimally 
address the fiscal problems facing Medicare. Further, this political process 
must include all segments of society if it is to be successful. It is going to 
require the fundamental rethinking of the underlying assumptions of Medicare, 
and perhaps, all entitlement programs, and a better understanding of the 
impacts of any policy changes will be necessary if we are to avoid the same 
pitfalls experienced under the Prospective Payment System. Research is 
needed before the policy change, not afterward. Finally, we must, finally, 
overtly address how we as a society want to organize health care and how much 
we want to pay for it. 
Fuchs (1986) has identified three ways spending for medical services can 
be controlled. One way is to improve efficiency in the provision and allocation 
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of services; two is to reduce the prices paid for the materials and services used 
in health care, which implies paying producers and providers less; a third way is 
to reduce the volume of services provided or to shift the balance from high-cost 
to low-cost services. Both regulatory and competition strategies have 
attempted to utilize these three methods to control costs. But, as we have seen 
in the above discussion, the historical development of the American health care 
system and the incremental nature of our legislative process have both impeded 
efforts to effectively implement one or the other strategy. It does not appear 
that PPS will be any more successful. 
While the Prospective Payment System is shifting care away from the 
inpatient to the outpatient and community care setting, this shift in care is 
creating enormous demand for these other forms of care, many of which are 
inadequately covered by insurance or Medicare/Medicaid and has resulted in 
increased costs to consumers. Furthermore, cost-containment efforts have yet 
to address the larger and more fundamental issue of financing long-term care, 
both because of the increasing demand for greater coverage of these services 
and the fact that these programs significantly impact state as well as federal 
budgets. In addition, the true forces in health care costs, third-party payers, 
have been unable to unite to effectively confront providers on the issue of cost. 
Several years of reduced inflation and high corporate earnings appear to have 
deflected attention away from health care cost concerns (Altman & Rodwin, 
1988). 
As opposed to the acute care system, the United States has never had an 
explicit, coherent policy toward the organization and financing of long-term 
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care. Rather, the system of care for the frail elderly and chronically ill has 
evolved incrementally and disjointedly, "often as an after-thought or an add-on 
to other pieces of health and social legislation" (Connolly, 1988, p. 3). The 
current system is heavily biased toward the institutionalization, medicalization 
and fragmentation of the financing and delivery of health care system. As an 
example, the main public programs supporting long-term care services are 
Medicaid, Medicare, the nutrition and social services programs authorized under 
Title III of the Older Americans Act (OAA), Title XX of the Social Security 
Act, and the long-term care programs provided by the Veterans Administration 
(VA). As a result of these different sources of funding, existing social and 
medical services rarely intersect and they are delivered in a piecemeal fashion. 
This presents enormous problems of coordination. 
The gaps in the programs supporting the delivery and the explicit non-
policy toward long-term care have encouraged the growth of a largely 
proprietary nursing home industry and is now encouraging a greater number of 
proprietary home health agencies. Based on the track record of the nursing 
home industry, it is dear that policymakers need to be concerned about the 
quality of care of an industry that is largely hidden from view and for which 
there is little regulation. 
Thus, how to design an acute and long-term care system that is 
affordable, both now and in the future when the population in need of those 
services is larger, remains a growing public policy issue. It is possible to design 
public policies that balance the need to contain costs with the assurance of 
continued access to care and the provision of quality care. But, to do so, we 
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must explicitly address the larger social questions of the role of health care in 
society, whether health care is in fact a "right" or a "privilege," and how much 
we as a society are willing to pay to maintain the "best health care system in 
the world'' and one that includes a comprehensive strategy of acute and long-
term care financing and delivery. 
If one were to speculate, based on the discussion presented in this 
dissertation, on what the future of the American health care system would look 
like, it might look something like this: the role of the hospital in the health 
care system will be much different from its historical role. In the first place, 
hospitals have to become businesses if they are to financially survive. Much 
more attention will be focused on the hospital's "bottom-line" and business 
management techniques, such as strategic planning, finance and accounting, 
marketing, and human resources issues, which will become extremely important 
in the hospital's competitive position in the health care market. I believe we 
will continue to see vertical and horizontal integration in the hospital sector, 
with larger corporate systems providing a broader range of services (e.g., home 
health care, hospice care, nursing home care, specialized services, etc.) 
including services once reserved for the insurance industry (i.e., HMOs, PPOs, 
etc.). In short, hospitals will have to merchandize themselves and move toward 
utilizing capitated payment arrangements with a whole host of purchasers, not 
just the government. The by-word for the successful hospital will be "total" 
health care management rather than the traditional hospital management focus. 
In terms of the larger system, hospitals will become cost centers as 
opposed to the historical role of service centers as system-wide capitation 
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systems are adopted. Alternative delivery systems (e.g., ambulatory care 
clinics, surgicenters, hospital satellite clinics) will increase and the system may 
be financed under some form of national health insurance. HMO growth will 
continue, spurred on by the continuing physician surplus and strict utilization 
review procedures for care management. 
Physicians, home health, and nursing homes will be financed, at least in 
part, by capitated systems. Due to the surplus of physicians, graduate medical 
education will no longer be funded and more and more new physicians will opt 
for "corporate" medicine instead of private practice. Competition for 
ambulatory care patients among physicians, hospitals and alternative delivery 
providers will increase with the result that physicians' incomes will continue to 
decline. Finally, the end of the fee-for-service system, particularly for 
physicians, appears to be on the horizon. 
In terms of public programs, DRG-based PPS, or capitated arrangements, 
will spread to more state Medicaid programs as state governments attempt to 
contol health care costs. Medicare will continue to face dire financial 
constraints but will move toward more capitated payment systems (i.e., HMO 
enrollment for beneficiaries; provider fee schedules, etc.). Increases in costs to 
beneficiaries, potential strict limits on current services, and a larger tax burden 
for Medicare to be borne by the working population also appear imminent. It is 
even plausible that a "capitated" national health program, for Medicare and 
Medicaid, will be established. 
For the beneficiary, greater participation and responsibility (both 
financial and in terms of decision-making) will be required. As greater amounts 
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of health care information are passed on to the consumer, health care decision-
making will become a "team" process where the team includes the patient as 
well as the providers. 
There will be a greater need for vigilence concerning quality of care as 
multi-faceted organizations enter into the health care arena and as cost-
containment pressures encourage the provision of minimal, versus maximal, 
care. We must be careful not to let cost-containment become care-
containment. Finally, it appears that policymakers are at last "ready" to 
discuss the medically indigent problem as third-party payers continue to refuse 
to accept the cost shift from government programs. Thus, costs, not 
policymakers, will continue to force change in the health care system. In 20 to 
25 years, the United States health care system will look different. However, I 
believe there will be one major factor that is consistent with the past; that is, 
whatever form the future takes in health care, it will be done on an incremental 
basis with the system incorporating minor changes over time, hopefully on the 
basis of good information and thorough political debate. Furthermore, it will 
not resemble the European model of national health care; it will still be a 
hybrid of public and private programs pieced together to form the American 
"whole." 
The analysis presented in this dissertation attempted to evaluate the 
impact of Medicare's Prospective Payment System (PPS) on specific 
components of the health care sector. Attention has been paid to the 
formulation of the PPS policy and to the strategy of its implementation. The 
focus of this dissertation has been to examine a number of the predicted 
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impacts of PPS in relation to original data gathered for this purpose and from 
published studies regarding PPS implementation and its impact on quality of 
care to the Medicare beneficiary. 
There are a number of limitations to this dissertation. First, the 
feasibility of any evaluation of PPS is limited by the kinds and quality of the 
data available, the cost of obtaining the data, the administration or ethical 
barriers to their use, and by the lack of comprehensive and balanced measures 
of quality of and access to health care. Second, attributing any observed effect 
to PPS is constrained by several factors, induding the fact that because PPS 
has been implemented universally among non-Federal oommunity hospitals, the 
opportunities for comparison are limited. Another problem is that PPS is not 
the only change underway in the U.S. health care system. Simultaneous 
influences, which can often only be distinguished by the passage of time, 
confound attempts to directly attrib.Jte many changes in the health care sector 
to PPS. Finally, this dissertation is limited in its generaliza.bility to the larger 
population of Medicare beneficiaries and therefore constitutes an important 
preliminary step in the process of a comprehensive evaluation of the impact of 
PPS on the quality of care. However, the pre/post analyses presented in this 
dissertation do offer strong suggestive evidence about the impacts of PPS on 
the discharge status of Medicare beneficiaries and subsequent changes in post-
hospital placement. 
FUTURE RESEARCH 
Two excellent analyses of the requirements to adequately evaluate the 
impact of PPS on both inpatient and post-hospital care settings have been 
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published recently. The first is Medicare's Prospective Payment System: 
Strategies for Evaluating Cost, Quality, and Medical Technology (OT A, 1985) 
and focuses on research in the inpatient setting. A central objective of the 
OT A study was to identify critical evaluation questions that need to ·be 
addressed with respect to PPS impacts on five important dimensions of health 
system performance: 
1. expenditures and costs; 
2. quality of care; 
3. access to care; 
4. technological change; and 
5. clinical research. · 
For OTA, these questions arise from the incentives inherent in the 
structure of PPS relative to cost-based reimrursement. New incentives leading 
to alterations in the behavior or providers and patients will be brought about as 
a result of a combination of three aspects of PPS: (1) it is a system of 
expenditure control; (2) it pays hospitals by case rather than by day or by 
service; and (3) it uses DRGs as the system of classifying patients for payment 
. purposes. The report points out that it will be difficult to disentangle the 
effects of each of these three components of PPS from one another. The 
ultimate effects of PPS on the health care system will occur through effects on 
the utilization and organization of health care services. However, changes in 
the utilization and organization of health care services by themselves are 
insufficient measures of the ultimate impact of PPS. Without detailed analyses 
of how any observed changes in the utilization and organization of services 
affect beneficiary health status and costs of health care, little can be said 
about the extent to which PPS has achieved its objectives. However, the report 
concludes that the evidence of PPS impacts thus far illustrates the lack of 
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linkages between measured effects (e.g., length of stay, admissions) and the 
critical impacts (e.g., quality, access). 
The second report, Post-Hospital Care: Efforts to Evaluate Medicare 
Prospective Payment Effects Are Insufficient (GAO, 1986), focuses on the post-
hospital care environment. Prospective payment methods are, in general, 
designed to reduce the rate of increase in hospital costs by providing incentives 
to providers to adopt more efficient practices, both in administrative 
operations and in patient care. Because the PPS system is based on a fixed rate 
per case, there are incentives to limit the costs of care for each patient by 
reducing patients' length of stay in acute care facilities. One possible outcome 
of reducing length of stay is that more patients will be discharged at ap earlier 
stage of their recuperation and in need of post-hospital care than would have 
occurred before the payment system was implemented. In addition, the fact 
that only inpatient acute services are paid prospectively provides additional 
incentives to use other services which are not paid prospectively, including 
Skilled Nursing Facility (SNF) and Home Health (HH) care. Together, these 
related incentives could affect the following five health care outcomes for 
which descriptive, change-over-time, and attributive studies are needed: 
1. patient's condition at hospital discharge; 
2. the use of post-hospital services; 
3. expenditures for those services; 
4. access to those services; and 
5. quality of care delivered by post-hospital 
providers. 
The GAO report assesses Health and Human Services research activities 
as they relate to post-hospital sub-acute care and concludes that the level of 
effort and resources devoted to developing appropriate information on post-
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hospital care is small relative to the overall need. Furthermore, many of the 
studies are only preliminary or "feasibility" studies of evaluation options and 
not well-organized, long term "attributive" studies. Finally, the level of 
expenditures for many of the descriptive and change-over-time studies are as 
expensive as the necessary attributive research. 
Both reports are excellent compendiums of current research on PPS and 
are extremely critical of the Health Care Financing Administration's current 
efforts to adequately fund evaluations of the impact of PPS. Consequently, 
because these reports provide extensive analyses on the status of current 
research efforts and needed directions, this section will focus on issues 
specifically related to the question addressed in this dissertation: post-hospital 
placement. 
Pmt-Hospital Placement 
The decreases in lengths of hospital stay, increases in patient transfers, 
and increases in the use of outpatient care (both for surgery and for post-
discharge followup) all require evaluations of the quality of care prior to 
admission and the outcomes of care after discharge (OT A, 1985). PPS's 
emlflasis on reducing hospital use also calls for special attention to subsets of 
patients most vulnerable to cost-containment efforts as well as on patients who 
are never admitted, either because their conditions can be treated adequately 
on an ambulatory basis or because their poverty or severity of illness makes 
them undesirable. 
In addition, study of the broader effects of PPS requires longitudinal 
studies of panels of patients or cohorts of Medicare beneficiaries whose course 
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of diagnosis, treatment, and recovery can be tracked through an entire episode 
of illness wherever care was provided. Patient outcomes such as physical 
functioning, emotional well-being, and capacity for independent living as well 
as effects on family members, are all critical dimensions of care to be 
evaluated. Investigations are needed to determine how the outcomes of care 
are changing in the post-PPS era, with evidence strong enough to link such 
changes at least provisionally to PPS (OT A, 198.5). 
Another important area of research is changes in access to post-hospital 
care as a result of PPS. Measuring access to care is a major problem. 
Traditional measures, such as waiting lists, complaints to ombudsmen for the 
elderly, information on problems recorded by discharge planners, while helpful, 
are not likely to be available in a consistent form either across sites or for pre-
PPS periods. There are no other established measures for access to post-
hospital subacute care and no related measures that have been found which 
could plausibly be adapted for this purpose. Until basic measures for this 
concept are identified, refined, and tested, systematic analysis of this issue 
cannot proceed (GAO, 1 986). 
Another area of needed research is the quality of post-hospital subacute 
care. GAO (1986) identified three dimensions of quality of care discussed in the 
literature: health outcomes, process measures and structural characteristics of 
health care facilities. Process measures, which focus on the amount and types 
of services provided) and structural measures, that is, measures of the adequacy 
of physical plant and equipment, staff and organizational resources on quality 
of care are integral parts of the certification process for many providers, but 
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the relationship between them and health outcomes has not been established. 
Global indicators of health care quality outcomes, such as deaths and hosptial 
readmissions, are available and could be used for preliminary analyses but they 
convey only limited and sometimes ambiguous information about the quality of 
post-hospital services. 
More direct measures of the quality of care in long-term care settings are 
currently under development by HHS and others. However, this work largely 
focuses on the general long-term care population and its relevance to post-
hospital subacute care is uncertain. Measures that have focused on the health 
care outcomes of patients who are chronically ill or are suffering from 
progressively serious or terminal conditions would not be important for the 
post-hospital subacute patient. In general, potential outcome, process and 
structural measures of health care quality currently exist and continue to be 
refined, but their application to post-hospital subacute care needs to be 
validated through appropriate testing (GAO, 1986). 
Furthermore, studies are needed to document the types of post-hospital 
services provided to patients. Outcome measure should include measures of 
morbidity and mortality over an episode of illness, including hospital and post-
hospital care. Studies are needed to examine the extent to which family 
members and self-care are used and the effects of the demands for care on 
family and informal care providers. Finally, studies are needed to compare 
need for post-hospital care and access to post-hospital care pre/post PPS. With 
these and the other identified areas of needed research (e.g., GAO, 1986; OTA, 
1985), a broader understanding of the impact of PPS on Medicare beneficiaries 
and the health care system will be achieved. 
REFERENCES 
Aaron, H. J., 1984. "Commentary: Prospective Payment: The Next Big Policy 
Disappointment?" Health Affairs, Vol. 3:102-107. 
Aaron, H. J. and Schwartz, W. B., 1984. The Painful Prescription, Washington, 
D. C.: The Brookings Institution. 
Abel-Smith, B., 1970. Value for Money in Health Services, London: Heinman. 
Allen, P. J., 1984. "The Effects of PPS on the Medical Supply Industry," 
Hospitals, Vol • .58:64-68. 
Alpha Center Monographs, 1986. "Converting Excess Hospital Capacity to Other 
Uses," Washington, D. C.: Office of Health Planning, 1-20. 
Altman, S. H. and Rodwin, M.A., 1988. "Halfway Competitive Markets and 
Ineffective Regulation: The American Healthcare System," Journal of 
Health Politics, Policy and Law, Vol. 13:323-340. 
American Hospital Association, 198.5. National Hcspital Panel Survey, Chicago, 
11.: American Hospital Association. 
American Medical News, 198.5a. "HCFA Reopens Bids for SuperPRO," American 
Medical News, Vol. 28:17. 
American Medical News, 198.5b, "More RN's, Fewer LPN's Finding Jobs at 
Hospitals- ANA Survey," American Medical News, Vol. 28:24. 
American Medical News, 1984a. "PRO Proposal Jeopardizes Confidentiality," 
American Medical News, Vol. 27:4. 
American Medical News, 1984b. "High-Tech Medicine Cited in Medical Hike:' 
American Medical News, Vol. 27:2, 1.5. 
Ament, R., 1976. "The Use of Case Mix Figures in Analyzing Average Charges 
for Inpatients," PAS Reporter, 14(3):1-7. 
Anderson, G. F., 198.5. "Data Watch: National Medical Care Spending." Health 
Affairs. Vol. 4:100-107. 
Anderson, G. F. and Steinberg, E. P., 1984. "Hospital Readmissions in the 
Medicare Population," New England Journal of Medicine, Vol. 311:182-
18.5. 
Anderson, R. J., 1983. "Testimony before the U.s. Congress Committee on 
Finance, Subcommittee on Health," February 2, 1983:239-240. 
Ashby,:;. L. and Palmer, c., 1985. "The Impact of Prospective Payment on 
Central City and Suburban Hospitals," Health Affairs, Vol. 4:99-108. 
310 
Arthur Young, 1983. The Medicare Law and Its Implications. New York: Arthur 
Young. 
Ballard, S. and McNamara, R., 1983. "Quantifying Nursing Needs in Home Health 
Care," Nursing Research, Vol. 32:236-241. 
Bankhead, C., 1985. "States Assess Waiver Status," American Medical News, 
Vol. 29:92. 
Bayes, C. W ., 1977. "Case-mix Differences Between Non-profit and For-profit 
Hospitals," Inq..tiry, Vol. 14:17. 
Berenson, R. A., Pawlson, L. G., 1984. "The Medicare Prospective Payment 
System and the Frail Elderly," Journal of the American Geriatrics Society, 
Vol. 32:843-48. 
Bently, J.D., 1981. "HCFA Case Mix Index: Implications for Hospitals," Hospital 
Progress, Vol. 62(1):49-55. 
Bergner, M., 1985. "Measurement of Health Status," Medical Care, Vol. 23:696-
705. 
Berki, S. E., 1985. "DRGs, Incentives, Hospitals, and Physicians," Health 
Affairs, Vol. 4:70-76. 
Berki, S. E., (Ed.), 1983. "Health Care Policy in America," The Annals, 468:1-
295. 
Beyer, R. and Callahan, D., 1985. "Medicare Reform: Social and Ethical 
Perspectives," Journal of Health Politics, Policy and Law, Vol. 10:533-548. 
Bice, T. W ., 1988. "Health Services Planning and Regulation," in Williams and 
Torrens (Eds.) Introduction to Health Services (3rd. Edition), New York: 
John Wiley and Sons, pp. 373-406. 
Blendon, R. J. and Altman, D. E., 1987. "Public Opinion and Health Care Costs," 
in Schramm (Ed.) Health Care and Its Costs, New York: W. W. 
Norton and Company, pp. 49-63. 
Blendon, R. J., Altman, D. E., and Kilstein, S. M ., 1983. "Health Insurance for 
the Unemployed and Uninsured," National Journal, Vol. 15:1146-1149. 
Boyle, J., 1987. "Health Policy Agenda for the American People." Journal of the 
American Medical Association, Vol. 257:1199-1210. 
Boyle, J., 1984. "Should We Learn to Say No?," Journal of the American 
Medical Association, Vol. 252(6):782-784. 
Bragg, M. E. and Lovedale, L. C., 1986. The Appropriateness of Patient 
Discharge Pilot Study: Final Report, Portland, OR.: Oregon Medical 
Professional Review Organization. 
311 
Brill, R., Sc:holosser, A., and Widmer, G., 1978. "Home Health Care Services and 
Cost," Nursing Outlook, Vol. 26:488-493. 
Brill, R., Sc:holosser, A., and Widmer, G., 1984. "Discussant," in Greenberg and 
Southby (Eds.) Health Care Institutions in Flux, Arlington, VA: 
Information Resources Press. 
Bromberg, M.D., 1986. "DRGs: The New Regulatory Strategy." Federation of 
American Hospital Review, May/June, 7-21. 
Brook, R. H. and Lohr, K. N. 1985. 11Efficacy, Effectiveness, Variations, and 
Quality: Boundary-Crossing Research," Medical Care, Vol. 23:710-723. 
Brook, R. H., Ware, J. E., Rogers, W. H., 1983. "Does Free Care Improve 
Adults Health?11 New England Journal of Medicine, Vol. 39:1426-1434. 
Brown, L. D., 1988a. 11Afterward to Competition in the Health Care Sector," 
Journal of Health Politics, Policy and Law, Vol. 13(2):361-363. 
Brown, L. D., 1988b. Health Policy in the United States: Issue and Options. 
New York: Ford Foundation. 
Brown, L. D., 1986. "Introduction to a Decade of Transition, .. Journal of Health 
Politics, Policy, and Law, Vol. 11:569-584. 
Brown, L. D. 198.5. 11Technocratic Corporatism and Administrative Reform in 
Medicare," Journal of Health Politics, Policy and Law, Vol. 10:579-.599. 
Brown, L. D., 1983. "Competition and Health Care Policy: Experience and 
Expectations, .. The Annals, Vol. 468:48-59. 
Burke, T. R., 1988. "Long Term Care: The Public Role and Private 
Initiatives," Health Care Financing Review, Annual Supplement:1-6. 
Buzzell, H. o., 1983. Testimony on PPS, U.S. Senate Subcommittee on Health, 
Feb. 17, 1983:93-99. 
Caldwell, J. M., 1982. "Home Care: Utilizing Resources to Develop Home 
Care," Hospitals, Vol. 56:68-72. 
Campbell, D. T. and Stanley, J. C., 1963. Experimental and Quasi-
Experimental Designs for Research, Chicago, ll.: Rand McNally and Co. 
Campion, E., Bang, A., May, M. I., 1983. "Why Acute Care Hospitals Must 
Undertake Long-Term Care," New England Journal of Medicine, Vol. 
308(2):73. 
Carter, G. M. and Ginsberg, P. B., 1985. The Medicare Case Mix Index 
Increase, Santa Monica, CA.: The Rand Corporation. 
Cassel, C. K., 198.5. "Doctors and Allocation Decisions: A New Role in the 
New Medicare," Journal of Health Politics, Policy and Law, Vol. 10:.549-
.564. 
Center for Health Research, 1986. Health Insurance: Access and Choice- A 
Survey of Community Households, Portland, OR: Kaiser Permanente. 
Chassin, M., 1983. Variations in Hospital Length of Stay: Their Relationship to 
Health Outcomes. Washington, D. C.: Office of Technology Assessment 
(OTA-HCS-24). 
Chiswick, B. R., 1976. "Hospital Utilization: An Analysis of SMSA Differences 
in Occupancy Rates, Admission Rates, and Bed Rates," Explorations in 
Economic Research, Vol. 3:326-378. 
Coe, M. F., Wilkinson, A. M., Patterson, P., 1986. Preliminary Evidence on the 
Impact of DRGs: Dependency at Discharge Study, Portland, OR: 
Northwest Oregon Health Systems. 
Coelen, C., and Sullivan, D., 1981. "An Analysis of the Effects of Prospective 
Reimbursement Programs on Hospital Expenditures," Health Care 
Financing Review, Vol. 2:1-40. 
Cohen, H. A. and Atkinson, J. G., 1982. "Case Mix and Regulation," Health 
Care Financing Review, Vol. 8:21-28. 
Cohen, W. J., 198.5. "Reflections on the Enactment of Medicare and Medicaid," 
Health Care Financing Review, Annual Supplement:3-11. 
Cohodes, D. R., 1987. "The Loss of Innocence: Health Care under Siege," in 
Schramm (Ed.) Health Care and Its Costs, New York: W. W. Norton and 
Company, 64-104. 
Congressional Budget Office, 1984. Reducing the Deficit: Spending and 
Revenue Options (Part 3), Washington, D.C.: Congressional Budget 
Office. 
Congressional Budget Office, 1983. Changing the Structure of Medicare 
Benefits: Issues and Options. Washington, D.C.: Congressional Budget 
Office. 
Commission on Professional and Hospital Activities, 198.5. The Impact of the 
PPS on Quality of Care, Chicago, IL: CPHA. 
Cromwell, J. and Kanak, J., 1982. "The Effects of Prospective Reimbursement 
Programs on Hospital Adoption and Service Sharing," Health Care 
Financing Review, Vol. 4:67-73. 
Crozier, D. A., 1984. "Data Watch: National Medical Care Spending." Health 
Affairs, Vol 3:108-120. 
Cushman, M. J., 1986. "Testimony before the Senate Finance Committee on 
behalf of the National Association for Home Care," Washington, D. C. 
312 
Davis, K., Anderson, G.F., Renn, S.C., Rowland, D., Schramm, C. J., and 
Steinberg, E., 1985. "Is Cost Containment Working?" Health Affairs, Vol. 
4:81-94. 
Davis, R. G., 1985. "Congress and the Emergence of Public Health Policy," 
Health Care Management Review, Winter:61-73. 
Demkovich, L., 1985. "New Watchdog Program for Medicare Could Jeopardize 
Care for Patients," "National Journal, Vol. 17:9-11. 
Demkovich, L., 1984. "Public and Private Pressures to Control FHealth Care 
Costs May Be Paying Off," National Journal, Vol. 16:2390-2393. 
Demkovich, L., 1983a. "Who Says Congress Can't Move Fast? Just Ask 
Hospitals," National Journal, Vol. 1.5:704-707. 
Demkovich, L., 1983b. "Medicare on the Critical List: Can Congress Plug a 
$200 Billion Gap?" National Journal, Vol. 15:1.580-1.58.5. 
Demkovich, L., 1983c. "Despite White House Hostility, Peer Review for 
Doctors is Moving Ahead," National Journal, Vol. 1.5:2169-2169. 
Demkovich, L., 1983d. "Verdict Is Still Out on Proto-type of New Hospital 
Cost-Cutting Plan," National Journal, Vol. 1.5:2.573-2.576. 
Demkovid1, L., 1982a."Relying on the Market-The Reagan Approach to 
Containing Medical Costs," National Journal, Vol. 14:194-197. 
Demkovich, L., 1982b. "Devising New Medicare Payment Plan May Prove Much 
Easier than Selling It," National Journal, Vol. 14:1981-198.5. 
Demkovich, L., 1981. "Reagan Takes on the Elderly Again as He Seeks to Slow 
Medicare's Growth," National Journal, Vol. 13:1616-1620. 
Donabedian, A., 1966. "Evaluating the Quality of Medical Care," Millbank 
Memorial Fund Quarterly/Health and Society, Vol. 44:166-203. 
313 
Dowell, M. A., 1987. ''Hill-Burton: The Unfulfilled Promise," Journal of Health 
Politics, Policy and Law, Vol. 12:1.53-176. 
Duke University, 1978. Multidimensional Functional Assessment: The OARS 
Methodology, Durl:iam, NC.: Duke University Center for the Study of 
Aging and Human Development. 
Dt.mham, A. B. and Morone, J A., 1984. DRG Evaluation: Vol. n Economic and 
Financial Analysis, Princeton, NJ: Health Research and Educational 
Trust of New Jersey. 
Dunham, A. B. and Morone, J. A., 1983. DRG Evaluation: Vol. VI-A The 
Politics of Innovation- The Evolution of DRG Rate Regulation in New 
Jersey, Prince't?;n, NJ: Health Research and Educational Trust of New 
Jersey. 
Eastern Washington Area Agency on Aging (EWAAA), 1986. An Informal Study 
of the Impact of DRGs on the Community-Based Social and Health 
Services Delivery System, Patients, and Families in Eastern Washington, 
Spokane, WA: Eastern Washington Area Agency on Aging. 
Ebert, R., 1987. "The Changing Role of the Physician," in Schramm (Ed.) 
Health Care and Its Costs, New York: W. W. Norton and Company, pp. 
14.5-184. 
Eby, C. L. and Cohodes, D. R., 198.5. "What Do We Know About Rate-
Setting?" Journal of Health Politics, Policy, and Law. Vol. 10:299-327. 
Etheridge, L., 1986. Ethics and the New Insurance Market," Inquiry, Vol. 
23:30.5-31.5. 
Etheridge, L., 1984, "An Aging Society and the Federal Deficit." Millbank 
Memorial Quarterly/Health and Society, Vol. 62:.512-.543. 
Enthoven, A. c., and Noll, R. G., 1984. "Prospective Payment: Will It Solve 
Medicare's Financial Problem?" Issues in Science and Technology, Vol. 
1:101-116. 
Enthoven, A., 1980. Health Plan (Second Edition), Reading, MA: Addison-
Wesley Publishing Company. 
Ernst and Whinney, 1983. Diagnosis Related Groups: Their Evolution, Current 
Applications, and Future Implications. New York: Ernst and 
Whinney. 
Evans, R. G., 1986. "Finding the Levers, Finding the Courage: Lessons from 
Cost Containment in North America," Journal of Health Politics, Policy 
and Law, Vol. 11:.58.5-616. 
314 
Evans, R. G., 198.5. "Illusions of Necessity: Evading Responsibility for Choice 
in Health Care," Journal of Health Policy, Politics, and Law, Vol. 10:439-
468. 
Farber, B. F., 198.5. "Cost Containment: An Interview with Bruce F. Farber, 
M.D., Asepsis, Vol. 7(1):1.5-19. 
Federation of American Hospital Systems Review, 1986. "Health Care 
Coalition Steps Up Attack Against Budget Cuts," (May/June) p. 1. 
Feder, J. M. and Scanlon, W. M ., 1982. "The Under-used Benefit: Medicare's 
Coverage of Nursing Home Care," Millbank Memorial Quarterly/Health 
and Society, Vol. 60:604-632. 
Fedorowicz, J., 1983. "Hospital Information Systems: Are We Ready for Case-
Mix Applications?" Health Care Management Review, Fall:33-41. 
Feigenbaum, s., 1987, "Risk Bearing in Health Care Finance," in Schramm 
(Ed.) Health Care and Its Costs, New York: W. W. Norton and Company, 
10.5-144. 
Feldman, R., Dowd, B., McCann, D., and Johnson, A., 1986. "The Competitive 
Impact of Health Maintenance Organizations on Hospital Finances: An 
Exploratory Study," Journal of Health Politics, Policy and Law, Vol. 
10:675-698. 
Feldstein, M., 1965."Hospital Cost Variation and Case Mix Differences," 
Medical Care, Vol. 3:95. 
Fetter, R. B., Shin, Y ., and Freeman, J. L., 1980. Case-mix Definition by 
Diagnosis-Related Groups, Medical Care, Vol. 18(2):2. 
Finn, J., 1985. "HHS Extends Medicare Trust Fund Solvency Projections," 
Hospitals, Vol. 59(9):40. 
Fiori, F., Bradford, P., Tenenbaum, J., Cromwell, P., 1984. Population 
Pyramids as a Tool for Health Planning, Monograph, Washington, D. C: 
Office of Health Planning. 
Fleiss, J., 1973. Statistical Methods for Rates and Proportions, New York: 
John Wiley and Son. 
Flood, A. B., Scott, W. R. and Eury, W ., 1984a. "Does Practice Make Perfect? 
Part 1: The Relation Between Hospital Volume and Outcomes for 
Selected Diagnostic Categories," Medical Care, Vol. 22:98-114. 
Flood, A. B., Scott, W. R. and Eury, W ., 198llb. "Does Practice Make Perfect? 
Part 2: The Relation Between Volume and Outcomes and Other Hospital 
Characteristics," Medical Care, Vol. 22:115-125. 
Foley, W. and Schneider, D., 1980. "A Comparison of the Level of Care 
Predictions of Six Long-Term Care Patient Assessment Systems," 
American Journal of Public Health, Vol. 70:1152-1161. 
Folstein, M ., Folstein, S. and McHugh, P., 197 5. "Mini-Mental State: A 
Practical Method for Grading the Cognitive State of Patients for the 
Clinician," The Journal of Psychiatric Research, Vol. 12:189-198. 
Freeland, M.S. and Schendler, c., 1984. "Health Spending in the 1980s: 
Integration of Clinical Practice Patterns with Management." Health 
Care Financing Review, Vol. 5:1-64. 
Freeland, M.S. and Schendler, c. 1983. "National Health Care Expenditure 
Growth in the 1980s: An Aging Population, New Technologies, and 
Increasing Competition." Health Care Financing Review, Vol. 4:1-68. 
Freudenheim, M., 1985. "HMO Growth Displays Vigor," New York Times, April 
16, 1985. 
Friedman, E., 1985. "PPS Called Death Knell for Traditional Medical Care," 
Hosptials, Vol. 59(7):2. 
315 
Friedman, E., 1984a. "PPS Needs Overhaul to Survive: Altman," Hospitals, Vol. 
58(22):33. 
Friedman, E., 1984b. "DRG Creator Says PPS May Reduce Quality of Care," 
Hospitals, .58(23):30-31. 
Friedsen, E. (Ed.), 1963. The Hospital in Modern Society, New York: The Free 
Press. 
Frye, J., 1984, "Hospitals Offer Incentives to Attract Patients," Medical World 
News, Vol. 2.5:70-71. 
Fuchs, V. R., 198.5. "Response to Letters to the Editor," New England Journal 
of Medicine, Vol. 312(22):1332-1333. 
Gabel, J. R., and Rice, T. H., 198.5. "Reducing Public Expenditures for 
Physician's Services: The Price of Paying Less," Journal of Health 
Politics, Policy, and Law, Vol. 9:.59.5-609. 
Garrison, L. P. and Neumann, P. J., 1988. "Trends in the Concentration of Six 
Surgical Procedures Under PPS and Their Implications for Patient 
Mortality and Medicare Costs,11 Paper presented at the .5th. annual 
meeting of the Association for Health Services Research, San Francisco, 
CA. 
Gay, E. G. and Kronenfeld, J. J., 1984. "Unintended Consequences, 
Organizational Theory and the Policy Process: The DRG Example," Paper 
presented at the American Public Health Association, Anaheim, CA. 
General Accounting Office, 1986a. Post-Hospital Care: Efforts to Evaluate 
Medicare Pros ective Pa ment Effects are Insufficient Washington, 
D.C.: U. S. Comptroller General GAO/PMED-86-10. 
General Accounting Office, 1986b. Past Overuse of Intensive Care Services 
Inflates Hospital Payments, Washington, D. C.: U. S. Comptroller 
General (GAO/HRD-86-2.5). 
General Accounting Office, 198.5a. Simulations of a Medicare Prospective 
Payment System for Home Health Care, Washington, D. C.: u.S. 
Comptroller General (GAO/HRD-8.5-110). 
General Accounting Office, 1983. Medicaid and Nursing Home Care: Cost 
Increases and the Need for Services Are Creating Prohlems for the 
States and the Elderly, Washington, D. C.: U.S. Comptroller General 
(GAO/IPE-84-1). 
316 
General Accounting Office, 1982. The Elderly Should Benefit from Expanded 
Home Health Care But Increasin These Services Will Not Ensure Cost 
Reductions. Washington, D. C.: U. S. Comptroller General GAO IPE-83-
1). 
General Accounting Office, 1980. Rising Hospital Costs Can Be Restrained By 
Regulating Payments and Improving Management. Washington, D.C.: U.S. 
Comptroller General (GAO/HRD-80-72). 
Gibson, R. M., Levit, K. R., Lazenby, H., and Waldo, D. R., 1984. "National 
Health Expenditures, 1983." Health Care Financing Review, Vol. 6:1-29. 
Giovanetti, P., 1978, Patient Classification Systems and Their Uses: A 
Description and Analysis, (DHEW Publication Number HRA 78-22), 
Springfield, VA.: National Technical Information Service. 
Ginsberg, P. and Moon, M., 1984. "An Introduction to the Medicare Financing 
Problem," Millbank Memorial Fund Quarterly/Health and Society, Vol. 
~=~-9~ . 
Ginsberg, P. B. and Sloan, F. A. "Hospital Cost-Shifting:' New Eng1and 
Journal of Medicine, Vol. 310(14):893-898. 
Ginzberg, E., 198.5a. American Medicine: The Power Shift. Totowa, N. J.: 
Rowman and Allanhe}d. 
Ginzberg, E., 198.5b. "What Lies Ahead for American Physicians," Journal of 
the American Medical Association, Vol. 2.53(19):2878-2879. 
Ginzberg, E., 1982. "Procompetition in Health Care: Policy or Fantasy? 
Millbank Memorial Fund Quarterly/Health and Society, Vol. 60:386-398. 
Goldberg, L. B. and Greenberg. W ., 1981. "The Determinants of HMO 
Enrollment and Growth:' Health Services Research, Vol. 16:421-438. 
Goldsmith, J., 1984. "Death of a Paradigm: The Challenge of Competition," 
Health Affairs, Vol. 3:.5-19. 
Goldstein, J. R., "Health Cost Curbs: Give DRGs Time," New York Times, 
April 12, 1984. 
Goran, M. J., "DRGs: Imperfect But Useful Reimbursement Tool," Hospital 
Progress, Vol. 62(3):6,8. 
Gornick, M. and Hall, M. J., 1988. "Trends in Medicare Use of Post-Hospital 
Care," Health Care Financing Review, Annual Supplement:27-38. 
Gornick, M., Greenberg, J. N., Eggers, P. W ., Dobson, A., 198.5. "Twenty Years 
of Medicare and Medicaid: Covered Populations, Use of Benefits, and 
Program Expenditures," Health Care Financing Review, Annual 
Supplement:13-.59. 
317 
Gray, B. H. and McNerney, W. J., 1986.''For Profit Enterprise in Health Care," 
New England Journal of Medicine, Vol. 314:1.523-1.528. 
Greenberg~ W. and South by, R. M ., (Eds.), 1984. Health Care Institutions in 
Flux: Changing Reimbursement Patterns in the 1980s. Arlington, 
VA.:Information Resources Press. 
Greenberg, W ., 1983. "How Will Increased Competition Affect the Costs of 
Health Care?" in Meyer (Ed.) Market Reforms in Health Care, 
Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute, pp. 46-60. 
Grimaldi, P. and Micheletti, J., 1983. Medicare's Prospective Payment Plan: 
DRG Update. Chicago, n..: Pluribus Press. 
Grimaldi, P. and Micheletti, J., 1982. "Homogeneity Revisited," Journal of the 
American Medical Association, Vol • .5.5(4):.56-70. 
Grimaldi, P. and Micheletti, J., 1980. "On the Homogeneity of Diagnosis 
Related Groups," Journal of the American Medical Association, Vol • 
.51(10):43-49. 
Guterman, S., Eggers, P. W ., Riley, G., Greene, T. F., and Terrell, S. A., 1988. 
"The First Three Years of Medicare Prospective Payment: An 
Overview," Health Care Financing Review, Vol. 9:67-82. 
Guterman, S. and Dobson, A., 1986. "Special Report: Impact of the Medicare 
Prospective Payment System for Hospitals." Health Care Financing 
Review, Vol. 7:97-114. 
Hadley, J., 1982. More Medical Care, Better Health? Washington, D. C.: The 
Urban Institute Press. 
Haglund, C. L. and Dowling, W .J., 1988. "The Hospital," in Williams and 
Torrens (Eds.) Introduction to Health Services (3rd. Edition), New York: 
John Wiley & Sons, 160-211. 
Hardwick, C., 1983. "DRG.s Spawn New Medical Team," Private Practice, Vol. 
1.5(11):24. 
Harlow, K. S. and Wilson, L. B., 198.5. "DRGs and the Community-Based Long-
Term Care System," Paper presented to the House of Representatives 
Committee on Education and Labor, July, 198.5, Washington, D. C. 
Havighurst, C. C., 1986. 11The Changing Locus of Decision Making in the 
Health Care Sector," Journal of Health Politics, Policy and Law, Vol. 
11:697-73.5. 
Havighurst, C. C., 198.5. "The Debate Over Health Care Cost-Containment 
Regulation: The Issues and Interests." in Meyer, (Ed.), Incentives vs. 
Cootrols in Health Policy: Broadening the Debate. Washington, D.C.: 
American Enterprise Institute, pp. 7-23. 
318 
Havighurst, C. C., 1983a. "Decentralizing Decision Making: Private Contract 
versus Professional Norms," in Meyer, (Ed.) Market Reforms in Health 
Care, Washington, D. C.: American Enterprise Institute, pp. 22-45. 
Havighurst, C. C., 1983b. "The Contributions of Antitrust Law to a 
Procompetitive Health Policy," in Meyer, (Ed.) Market Reforms in 
Health Care, Washington, D. C.: American Enterprise Institute, 295-322. 
Health Care Financing Administration, 1985. Report on PPS Monitoring 
Activities, Office of Research and Demonstrations, Washington, D. C.: 
DHHS. 
Health Care Financing Administration, 1984. DRGs: The Effect in New 
Jersey: The Potential for the Nation. Office of Research and 
Demonstrations, Washington, D. C.:DHHS (Pub. No. 03170). 
Health Care Financial Administration, 1983. Health Care Financing Grants 
and Contracts Report: The New ICD-9 DRG Classification Scheme. 
Office of Research and Demonstrations, Health Care Financing 
Administration, Washington, D. C.: DHHS. 
Health Care Financial Management Association, 1983. General Guidelines 
Concerning Prospectively Determined Prices, Revised. Washington, 
D. C.: HCFMA. 
Health Research and Educational Trust Fund of New Jersey, 1983. DRG 
Evaluation, Economic and Financial Analysis, Vol. II, Princeton: HRET. 
Hellinger, F. J., 1985. "Recent Evidence on Case-Based Systems for Setting 
Hospital Rates," Inquiry, Vol.22:78-91. 
Holahan, J. and Palmer, J. L., 1988. "Medicare's Fiscal Problems: An 
Imperative for Reform," Journal of Health Politics, Policy and Law, 
13:53-82. 
Horn, S., Horn, R., and Moses, H., 1986. "Profiles of Physician Practices and 
Patient Severity of Illness," American Journal of Public Health, Vol. 
76:532-535. 
Hospitals, 1985. "Rise in LOS May Signal Case-Mix Changes," Hospitals, Vol. 
59(9):25-27. 
Hospitals, 1984a. "Eleven Ohio Hospitals Sue Over PPS," Hospitals, Vol. 
58(6):17. 
Hospitals, 1984b. "An Honest Broker for Fine-Tuning Medicare," Hospitals, 
Vol. 58(19):11. 
Hospitals, 1984c. "Eleven Ohio Hospital to Appeal Ruling on PPS 
Classifications," Hospitals, Vol. 58(23):31. 
319 
Hospital Peer Review, 1983. "Medichoice offers a Way Out of DRG Payment 
Plan," Hospital Peer Review, 8(7):89-90. 
House Aging Committee, 1986. The Black Box of Home Care Quality, Hearing 
before the Select Committee on Aging, House of Representatives, 
Washington, D. C. 
Hsiao, W. and Dunn, D., 1987. "The Impact of DRG Payment on New Jersey 
Hospitals," Inquiry, Vol. 23(3): Fall, 1987. 
Iglehart, J. K., 1986. "Health Policy vs. Budget Cutting: A Conversation with 
Rep. Pete Stark," Health Affairs, Vol. 5:22-30. 
Iglehart, J. K., 1985. "Update: U.S. Health Care System: A Look to the 
1990's." Health Affairs, Vol. 4(3): 120-127, (Fall, 1985). 
Iglehart, J. K., 1984. "Washington News Analysis: Prospective Payment 
Commission," Hospital Progress, Vol. 65(2):20. 
Iglehart, J. K., 1983. "Another Chance for Technological Assessment," New 
England Journal of Medicine, Vol. 309(8):509-512. 
Iglehart, J. K., 1982. "The New Era of Prospective Payment for Hospitals." 
New England Journal of Medicine, Vol. 307:1288-1292. 
Ignagni, K. M., 1985. "Symposium: Twenty Years of Medicare and Medicaid," 
Health Care Financing Review, Annual Supplement:81-86. 
Jaskow, P., 1971. Controlling Hospital Costs: The Role of Government 
Regulation. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
Kane, R. and Kane, R., 1984. Assessing the Elderly: A Practical Guide to 
Measurement, Lexington, MA.: Lexington Books. 
Kagor, J., Walden, D., Wilensky, G., 1984. Who Are The Uninsured? National 
Health Care Expenditures Study, Washington, D. C.: National Center for 
Health Services Research. 
Katz, S., Ford, A., Moskowitz, R., Jackson, B., and Jaffee, M., 1963. "The 
Index of ADL: A Standardized Measure of Biological and Psychological 
Function," Journal of the American Medical Association, Vol. 185:914-
919. 
Kelly, J .. and Bankhead, C., 1985. ''DRGs: How Are They Stacking Up?" 
Medical World News, Vol. 26(5):80-103. 
Kerlinger, F. N., 1973. Foundations of Behavioral Research (2nd. Edition), 
New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc. 
Kidder, D. and Sullivan, D., 1982. "Hospital Payroll Costs, Productivity, and 
Employment Under Prospective Reimbursement," Health Care Financing 
Review. Vol. 4:89-100. 
320 
I<lastorin, J.D. and Watts, C. A., 1980. "On the Measurement of Hospital 
Case Mix," Medical Care, Vol. 18(6):67.5-68.5. 
Knauss, W. A., Draper, E. A. and Wagner, D.P., 1983. "Toward Quality Review 
in Intensive Care: The APACHE System," Quality Review Bulletin, 
7:196-204. 
Knowles, J. H., 1973. "The Hospital," Scientific American, Vol. 229:128-173. 
Koch, A. L., 1988. ''Financing Health Services," in Williams and Torrens (Eels.) 
Introduction to Health Services (3rd. Edition), New York: John Wiley and 
Sons, pp. 33.5-370. 
Kopit, W. G., 1983. "Health and Antitrust: The Case for Legislative Relief," in 
Meyer (Ed.) Market Reforms in Health Care, Washington, D. C.: 
American Enterprise Institute, pp. 323-331. 
Kornblatt, E. S., Fisher M. E., MacMillan, D. J., 198.5. "DRG Ripple: The 
Shifting Burden of Nursing Care to the Community," Paper presented at 
the annual meeting of the American Public Health Association, 
Washington, D.C. 
Kmtz, E., 1984. "Task Forces Scour Diagnosis, Therapy Methods for Cost-
Cutting Procedures," Modern Healthcare, Vol. 14:138-142. 
Langwell, K., 1982. Research on Competition in the Financing and Delivery of 
Health Services: A Summary of Policy Issues. Washington, D.C.: National 
Center for Health Services Research. 
Lave, J. R., 1984. "Hospital Reimbursement Under Medicare." Millba.nk 
Memorial Fund Quarterly/Health and Society, Vol. 62:2.51-268. 
Lave, J. R., Lave, L. B., and Silverman, L. P., 1972. "Hospital Cost Estimation 
Controlling for Case-Mix," Journal of Applied Economics, Vol. 4(9):16.5-
180. 
Lave, J. R. and Lave, L. B., 1971. "The Extent of Role Differentiation Among 
Hospitals," Health Services Research 6:1.5. 
Lawton, M. and Brody, E., 1969. "Assessment of 0 lder People: Self 
Maintenance and Instrumental Activities of Daily Living," The 
Gerontologist, Vol. 9:179-186. -
Leader, s., 1986. Home Health Benefits Under Medicare, (Publication Number 
8601) Washington, D. C.: American Association of Retired Persons. 
Leader, S. and Moon, M., 1988. "Medicare Trends in Ambulatory Surgery," 
Paper presented at the 5th. annual meeting of the Association for Health 
Services Research, June, 1988, San Francisco, CA. 
Leatt, P., Bay, K. and Stinson, R., 1981. "An Instrument for Assessing and 
Classifying Patients by Type of Care," Nursing Research, Vol. 30:14.5-
1.50. 
321 
Lefton, D., 198l:l. "Hospitals Score Record Profits Under DRGs," American 
Medical News, Vol. 28(6):1. 
322 
Lefton, D., 1985b. "Rural Hospitals Press HHS for Overdue DRG Rate Report,11 
American Medical News, Vol. 28(8):1,24. 
Lee, M. L. and Wallace, R. L., 1973. "Problems in Estimating Multiproduct 
Cost Functions: An Application to Hospitals," Western Economic Journal, 
Vol. 11:350. 
Lee, M. L. and Wallace, R. L., 1972. "Classification of Diseases for Hospital 
Cost Analysis," Inquiry, Vol. 9:69. 
Lee, P.R. and Benjamin, A. E., 1988. "Health Policy and the Politics of Health 
Care," in Williams and Torrens (Eds.) Introduction to Health Services 
(3rd. Edition), New York: John Wiley and Sons, pp. 455-479. 
Lesparre, M ., 1984. "PPS Commission Explores Change, Political 
Implications," Hospitals, Vol. 58(2):29. 
Lewin and Associates, Inc., 1986. Research Agenda: The Impact of PPS and 
Capitation on Quality and Access to Care, Washington, D. C.: Office of 
Health Planning and Evaluation, Public Health Service. 
Long, S., Settle, R., and Link, C., 1982. "Who Bears the Burden of Medicare 
Cost Sharing?" Inquiry, Vol. 19:217-224. 
Luce, B. R., 1988. "Medical Technology and Its Assessment," in Williams 
and Torrens (Eds.) Introduction to Health Services (3rd. Edition), New 
York: John Wiley and Sons, 281-307. 
Luft, H. S., Maerki, s. C. and Trauner, J. B., 1986. "The Competitive Effects 
of Health Maintenance Organizations: Another Look at the Evidence 
from Hawaii, Rochester, and Minneapolis/St. Paul," Journal of Health 
Politics, Policy and Law, Vol. 10:625-658. 
Luft, H. S., 1985. ''HMOs: Friends or Foes?" Business and Health, Vol. 3:5-9. 
Luft, H. S., 1984. "How Do HMOs Achieve Their Savings? Rhetoric and 
Evidence," New England Journal of Medicine, Vol. 298(6):1136-1143. 
Lmdberg, C. J., 1982. "New Tax Bill Mandates Changes for HHAs," Hospitals, 
Vol. 56:81-84. 
Mahoney, F., 1984. "Diagnosis-Related Groups (DRGs) May Present Threat to 
Quality of Care," Hospital Peer Review, Vol. 7(11):142-144. 
Major Legislation of the Congress, 1984. "Medicare," Washington, D. C.: 
Congressional Research Service, (MLC-066-December). 
Major Legislation of the Congress, 1983. "Medicare," Washington, 
D.C.:Congressional Research Service, (MLC-056-January). 
Marmor, T. R., 1986. "American Medical Policy and the 'Crisis' of the Welfare 
State: A Comparative Analysis," Journal of Health Politics, Policy and 
Law, Vol. 11:617-632. 
Marmor, T. R. and Morone, J., 1980. "Representing Consumers Interests: 
Imbalanced Markets, Health Planning and HSAs," Millbank Memorial 
Fund Quarterly/Health and Society, Vol • .58(1):12.5-16.5. 
May, J. J. and Wasserman, J., 1984. "Selected Results From an Evaluation of 
the New Jersey Diagnosis-Related Group System," Health Services 
Research, Vol. 19:.547-.5.59. 
McClure, W ., 198.5. "Buying Right: The Consequences of Glut," Business and 
Health, 43-46. 
McClure, W ., 1983. "The Competition Strategy for Medical Care," The Annals, 
Vol. 468:30-47. 
Mcilrath, S., 198.5a. "DRGs Make Hospitals Stretch Their Dollars," American 
Medical News, Vol. 28(1):30. 
Mcilrath, S., 198.5b. "Congress Hears DRG Horror Stories," American Medical 
News, Vol. 28(10):1,33. 
Mcilrath, S., 1983. "New Rates Published, $1 • .5 Billions Savings Sought from 
DRGs," American Medical News, Vol. 26(34):10-11. 
McLaughlin, C. G., Merrill, J. C. and Freed, A. J., 1984. "The Impact of HMO 
Growth on Hospital Costs and Utilization," in Scheffler and Rossiter 
(Eds.) Advances in Health Economics and Health Services Research, Vol. 
1. Greenwich, CN.: JAI Press. 
Mechanic, D., 198.5. "Cost Containment and Quality of Care: Rationing 
Strategies in an Era of Constrained Resources." Millbank Memorial Fund 
Quarterly/Health and Society, Vol. 63:4.53-47.5. 
Medical World News, 198.5. ''Insuring Medicare's Future Beyond 1988," Medical 
World News, Vol. 26(8):100. 
Meiners, M.and Coffey, R., 1983. "Hospital DRG's and the Need for Long-
Term Care Services: An Empirical Analysis," Paper presented at the 
111th. Annual Meeting of the American Public Health Association. 
Melnick, G. A., Wheeler, R. C., and Feldstein, P. J., 1981. "Effects of Rate 
Regulation on Selected Components of Hospital Expenses," Inquiry, Vol. 
18:240-246. 
Merrill, J. C. and McLaughlin, C. G., 1986. "Competition versus Regulation: 
Some Empirical Evidence," Journal of Health Politics, Policy and Law, 
Vol. 10:613-624. 
323 
Meyer, J. A., 1984a. "Cost-Shifting: Passing the Health Buck," American 
Medical News, Vol. 27(6):28. 
Meyer, J. A., 19&4b. "Increased Consumer Cost-Consciousness and 
Competition," Bulletin of the New York Academy of Medicine, Vol. 
60{1):98-105. 
Meyer, J. A., (Ed.), 1983a. Incentives vs. Controls in Health Policy: 
Broadening the Debate. Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise 
Institute. 
Meyer, Jack A., (Ed.), 1983b. Market Reforms in Health Care: Current 
Issues; New Directions; Strategic Decisons. Washington, D.C.: American 
Enterprise Institute. 
Meyers, B., Churgia, S., Mann, J., and Tereskicwica, L., 1985. "Uncompensated 
Hospital Care and the Medically Indigent: Old Problems in New 
Contexts," Paper presented at the Western Comsortium for the Health 
Professions, San Francisco, CA. 
Mickel, c., 1984. "Congress, HHS Consider DRG Adjustments," Hospitals, 
Vol. 58(7):37. 
Milch, R. B., 1984. "Future Implications of Prospective Payment," in DRGs: 
The Effect in New Jersey, The Potential for the Nation, USDHHS, HCFA 
Pub. No. 03170, pp. 219-220. 
Milhalski, E., 1984. "The New Era of Utilization Review and Quality Control: 
Peer Review Organizations," Bulletin of the New York Academy of 
Medicine, Vol. 60(1):43-53. 
Monheit, A., Hagan, M. M., Berk, M. L., and Farley, P. J., 1985. "The 
Uninsured and the Role of Public Policy," Inquiry, Vol.22:329-444. 
Morris, J., 1984. Searching for a Cure: National Health Policy Considered, 
New York: Pica Books. 
Moscovice, I., 1988. "Health Care Professionals, in Williams and Torrens 
(Eds.), Introduction to Health Services, (3rd. Edition), New York: John 
Wiley & Scns, pp. 308-334. 
Mass, H. C., 1984. "Planners Haven't Learned from Mistakes, MD Says," 
American Medical News, Vol. 27(19):6. 
Mulstein, S., 1984. "The Uninsured and the Financing of Uncompensated Care: 
Scope, Costs and Policy Options," Inquiry, 21:214-229. 
Mmnell, A. H., 1985. "Paying for the Medicare Program," Journal of Health 
Politics, Policy, and Law, Vol. 10:489-512. 
Murry, c., 1984. Impact of DRGs: Results of a Preliminary Study, Multnomah 
County: Area Agency on Aging, Portland, OR. · 
324 
Nathanson, M., 1984. "Labs Should Try to Cut Patients' Stay, Market Testing 
Services," Modern Healthcare, Vol. 14:146-148. 
Newhouse, J. P., 1983. "Two Prospective Difficulties with Prospective 
Payment of Hospitals," Journal of Health Economics, Vol. 2:269-274. 
New York Times, 1984. "Editorial: Failure of a Hospital," April 2, 1984. 
Office of Technology Assessment, 1983. DRGs and the Medicare Program: 
Implications for Medical Technology, Washington, D. C.: U.S. 
Government Printing Office (OTA-TM-H-17). 
Omenn, G. S., and Conrad, D. A., 1984. "Implications of DRGs for Clinicians," 
New England Journal of Medicine, Vol. 311:1314-1317. 
Owen, J. W ., 1984. "Coping with Medicare Prospective Payment," in 
Greenberg and Southby (Eds.), Health Care Institutions in Flux, 
Arlington, VA.: Information Resources Press. 
Patterson, P., Coe, M. F. and Wilkinson, A.M., 1987. Dependency at Hospital 
Discharge: Instrument Development for Measuring DRG Impact on 
Beneficiaries, New York: Nationell League of Nursing. 
Palmer, J. L. and Gould, S., 1986. "The Economic Consequences of an Aging 
Society," Daedalus, Vol. 115(11):29.5-323. 
Patricelli, R., 1986. "Musings of a Blind Man: Reflections on the Health Care 
Industry." Health Affairs, Vol. 5:128-134. 
Pointer, D. and Ross, M ., 1984. "DR G Cost-per -Case Management," M oclern 
Healthcare, Vol 14(3):109-110,112. 
Renn, s. C. 1987, "The Structure and Financing of the Health Care Delivery 
System of the 1980s," in Schramm (Ed.) Health Care and Its Costs, New 
York: W. W. Norton and Company, pp. 8-47. 
Reiman, A., 1985. "Economic Considerations in Emergency Care: What are 
Hospitals For?" New England Journal of Medicine, Vol. 312(6):372-373. 
Reiman, A., 1980. "The New Medical-Industrial Complex," New Eng1and 
Journal of Medicine, Vol. 303: 963-970. 
Rice, D., 1986. "Living Longer in the U.S.: Health, Social, and Economic 
Implications," Journal of Medical Practice Management, Vol.l:243-264. 
Rice, D. and Feldman, J., 1983. "Living Longer in the U.S.: Demographic 
Changes and Health Needs of the Elderly." Millbank Memorial 
Fund Quarterly/Health and Society, Vol. 61:363-395. 
32.5 
Richards, G., 1984. "Layoff Wave Rolls Through Industry," Hospitals, 
Vol.58:7 6-82. 
Richardson, M., 1988. "Mental Health Services: Growth and Development of a 
System," in Williams and Torrens (Eds.) Introduction to Health 
Services (3rd. Edition), New York: John Wiley and Sons, 255-275. 
Robert Wood Johnson Foundation, 1983. Update Report on Access to Health 
Care for the American People. Princeton, N.J.: Robert Wood Johnson 
Foundation Press. 
Rogers, D. and Blendon, R., 1984. "Checking for Symptoms of Declining 
Health Care." Wall Street Journal, September 12, 1984, p. 1. 
Rogers, H. L. Jr., 1986. "Statement of the American Medical Association on 
Quality of Care Under Medicare's Prospective Pricing System," 
Testimony before the U.S. Senate Committee on Finance, June 3, 1986, 
Washington, D.C. 
Rohrer, J. E., 1987. "The Political Development of the Hill-Burton Program: 
A Case Study in Distributive Policy," Journal of Health Politics, Policy 
and Law, Vol. 12:137-151. 
Rowland, D., 1987. "Meeting the Long-Term-Care Needs of an Aging 
Population," in Schramm, (Ed.), Health Care and Its Costs, New York: W. 
W. Norton and Co., pp. 222-251. 
Romeo, A. A., Wagner, J., and Lee, R., 1984. "Prospective Hospital 
Reimbursement and the Diffusion of New Hospital Technologies," 
Journal of Health Economics. Vol. 3:1-24. 
Rosen, G., 1963. "The Hospital: Historical Sociology of a Community 
Institution," in Friedsen, (Ed.), The Hospital in Modern Society, New 
York: The Free Press. 
Rosenberg, C. E., 1987. The Care of Strangers: The Rise of America's 
Hospital System, New York: Basic Books. 
Rosenblum, R. W ., 1985. "Medicare Revisited: A Look through the Past to the 
Future," Journal of Health Politics, Policy and Law, Vol.9:669-682. 
Rosko, M.D. and Broyles, C., 1986. "The Impact of the New Jersey All-Payer 
DRG System," Inquiry, Vol. 23(1):43-69. 
Rosko, M.D., 1984. "The Impact of PPS: A Multi-dimensional Analysis of New 
Jersey's SHARE Program," Journal of Health Policy, Politics and Law, 
Vol 9(1):81-101. 
326 
Rowland, D., 1987. "Issues of Long-Term Care," in Schramm (Ed.) Health Care 
and Its Costs, New York: W. W. Norton and Company, 222-251. 
Rubenstein, L. z., Josephson, K. R. and Wieland, G. D., 1984. "Effectiveness of 
a Geriatric Evaluation Unit," New England Journal of Medicine, Vol. 
311:1664-1670. 
Rucker, N., 1984. 11Hospital Cut-Backs Hurt Quality: MD's,11 Modern 
Healthcare, Vol. 14(5):50. 
Russell, L. B., (Ed.), 1981. Setting National Priorities: Agenda for the 1980s. 
Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution. 
Rust, M., 1984. "DRGs Need Fine Tuning: Dr. Davis," American Medical 
News, Vol. 27(40):2,28. 
Samors, P. W. and Sullivans., 1983. "Health Care Cost Containment Through 
Private Sector Initiatives," in Meyer, (Ed.) Market Reforms in Health 
Care, Washington, D. C.: American Enterprise Institute, 144-162. 
Sapolosky, H. M., 1986. "Prospective Payment in Perspective," Journal of 
Health Politics, Policy and Law, Vol. 11:633-640. 
Senate Aging Committee, 1985. Impact of Medicare's Prospective Payment 
System on the Quality of Care Received by Medicare Beneficiaries, Staff 
Report, Washington, D. C.: Special Committee on Aging, U. S. Senate. 
Senate Finance Committee, 1986. Quality and Access to Health Care Under 
Medicare's Prospec1fve Payment System. Background Paper. 
Washington, D.C.: Senate Committee on Finance. 
Senate Finance Committee (Sub-Committee on Health), 1983. Hearings on 
Hospital Prospective Payment System, Part II, Washington, D. C. 
Scanlon, W. J., 1988. "A Perspective on Long-Term-Care for the Elderly,11 
Health Care Financing Review, Annual Supplement:7-25. 
Scanlon, W. J. and Feder, J., 1984. "The Long-term Care Marketplace: An 
Overview," Healthcare Financial Management, 14:1. 
Scheffler, R. and Gibbs, J., 1986. 11Blue Cross Utilization and Payment Rates 
Before and After Prospective Payment," Chicago, II.: Blue Cross and 
Blue Shield Association. 
Schramm, C. J., (Ed.), 1987. Health Care and Its Costs: Can the U.S. Afford 
Adequate Health Care? New York: W. W. Norton and Company. 
Schwartz, W. B., 1983. "The Competitive Strategy: Will It Affect Quality of 
Care?" in Meyer, (Ed.) Market Reforms in Health Care, Washington, 
D.C.: American Enterprise Institute, pp. 15-21. 
Scitovsky, A. A., 1984. "The High Cost of Dying: What Do the Data Say?" 
Millbank Memorial Fund Quarterly/Health and Society, Vol. 64:573-609. 
327 
Shaboda, T., 1984. "PPS to Spur Ethical Dilemmas: Speakers," Hospitals, Vol • 
.58(12):22. 
Shaffer, F., (Ed.), 1986. Patients and Purse Strings; Patient Classification and 
Cost Management, New York: National League for Nursing. 
Shaffer, F., "DRGs: History and Overview," Nursing and Health Care, Vol. 
4(7):388-396. 
Shannon, K., 198.5. "Outpatient Surgery Up 77%: Data," Hospitals, Vol • 
.59(1 0 ): .54. 
Shapiro, L. E., 1983. "Legal Issues Arising Under the Consumer Choice 
Proposals," in Meyer (Ed.) Market Reforms in Health Care, Washington, 
D. C.: American Enterprise Institute, pp. 269-294. 
Shinn, Y., 1977. Variation of Hos ital Cost and Product Hetero eneit • 
Health Insurance Studies Research (77-11722. Washington, D.C.:U. S. 
DHHS. 
Sheingold, S. H., 1986. "Unintended Results of Medicare's National Prospective 
Payment Rates," Health Affairs, Vol • .5:.5-21. 
Shonick, W ., 1988. "Public Health Services: Background and Present Status," 
in Williams and Torrens (Eds.) Introduction to Health Services (3rd. 
Edition), New York: John Wiley and Sons, 4-123. 
Seymour, D., 1984. "What PPS Means for Hospital Marketing," Hospitals, 
Vol • .58: 70-72. 
Simborg, D. W., 1981. "DRG Creep: A New Hospital-Acquired Disease," New 
England Journal of Medicine, Vol. 304(26:1602-1604. --
Sloan, F. A., 1983. "Rate Regulation as a Strategy for Hospital Cost Control: 
Evidence From the Last Decade," Milbank Memorial Fund Quarterly. 
Vol. 61:19.5-221. 
Sloan, F. A., 1981. "Regulation and the Rising Cost of Hospital Care. The 
Review of Economics and Statistics. Vol. 63:479-487. 
Smits, H. L., R. B. Fetter, and McMahon, L. F., 1984. "Variations in Resource 
Use Within Diagnosis-Related Groups: The Severity Issue," Health Care 
Financing Review, Vol. 38(11):71-78. 
Sorkin, A., 1986. Healthcare and the Changing Economic Environment. 
Lexington, MA: Lexington Books. 
Spiegel, A. D. and Kavaler, F., 1986. Cost Containment and DRGs: A Guide to 
Prospective Payment, Owings Mill, MD: Rynd Communications/National 
Health Publishing. 
Stanley, G., 1984. "DRGs Must be Changed to Take Patient's Illness Severity 
Into Account," Modern Healthcare, pp. 86-88. 
328 
Starr, P., 1982. The Social Transformation of American Medicine. New York: 
Basic Books. 
State of Oregon, 1982. Placement Information Base, Salem, OR.: State of 
Oregon Printing Office. 
Stern, R. S., and Epstein, A.M., 198.5. "Institutional Responses to Prospective 
Payment Based on Diagnosis-Related Groups: Implications for Cost, 
Quality and Access," New England Journal of Medicine, Vol. 312:621-627. 
Sullivan, R., 198.5. ''Decline in Hospital Use Tied to U.S. Policies," New York 
Times, April 16, 198.5. 
Tatge, M., 198.5. "Patients are Sicker, Need More Care Than They Did 3 Years 
Ago-Survey," Modern Healthcare, Vol. 1.5(3):98. 
Thompson, F. J., 1986. "New Federalism and Health Care Policy: States and 
the Old Questions," Journal of Health Politics, Policy and Law, Vol. 
11:647-670. 
Thompson, J.D., Fetter, R., and Mross, c., 1977. Case-Mix and Resource 
Use," Inquiry, Vol. 12:289-308. · 
329 
Thurow, L., 198.5. "Medicine Versus Economics." New England Journal of 
Medicine, Vol 313: 611-614. 
Torrens, P. R., 1988. "Historical Evolution and Overview of Health Services in 
the United States," in Williams and Torrens (Eds.) Introduction to Health 
Services (3rd. Edition), 3-32. 
Torrey, B., 1985. "Sharing Increasing Costs in Declining Income: The Visible 
Dilemma of the Invisible Aged," Millbank Memorial Fund 
Quarterly/Health and Society, Vol. 13:377-394. 
Vaida, M., 1984. "The Financial Impact of Prospective Payment on Hospitals," 
Health Affairs, Vol. 3:112-119. 
Vladeck, B. C. and Alfano, G. J., 1987. Medicare and Extended Care: Issues, 
Problems, and Prospects, Owings Mills, MD: National Health Publishing. 
Vladeck, B., 1986. "America's Hospitals: What's Right; What Could Be Better." 
Health Affairs, Vol. 5:100-107. 
V!adeck, B. C., 1985. "Reforming Medicare Provider Payment," Journal of 
Health Politics, Policy and Law, Vol. 10:.513-532. 
Vladeck, B. C., 1984. "Medicare Hospital Payment by DRG," Annals of 
International Medicine, Vol. 100(4):576-591. 
Vladeck, B. C., 1981. "The Market versus Regulation: The Case for 
Regulation," Millbank Memorial Fund Quarterly/Health and Society, Vol. 
59:209-23. 
Wagner, J., 1986. "Statement Before the Senate Committee on Finance on the 
impact of Medicare's Prospective Payment System on the Quality of 
Care," June, 1986, Washington, D. C. 
Washington Report, 1985. "DRGs and Quality of Care," Washington Report on 
Medidne and Health, Vol. 39:Perspectives. 
Washington Report, 1984. "DRGs, LOS, and FTEs," Washington Report on 
Medidne and Health, Vol. 35:Perspectives. 
Waldo, D. R., Lent, K. and Lazenaby, H., 1986. "National Health Expenditures, 
1985," Health Care Finandng Review, Vol. 8(1):1-21. 
Waldo, D.R. and Lazenby, H., 1985. "Demographic Characteristics and Health 
Care: Use and Expenditures by the Aged in the U.S.:1977-1984," Health 
Care Financing Review. Vol.6:1-29. 
Wallace, C., 1984. "Rural Hospitals Attack Payment System," Modern 
Healthcare, Voi. 14(.5):48. 
Ware, J. E., Brook, R. H., and Davies, A. R., 1981. "Choosing Measures of 
Health Status for Individuals in General Populations," American Journal 
of Public Health, Vol. 71:620-625. 
Wehr, E., 1984. ''Coogress Seeks Elusive Cure for Medicare Finandal Ills," 
Congressional Quarterly, Vol. 42(5):841-844. 
Wehr, E., 1983a. "Major Changes in Medicare Payment System Approved," 
Congressional Quarterly, Vol. 41(8):421. 
Wehr, E., 1983b. "Major Changes in Medicare Hospital Payment System is on 
Fast Track in Congress," Congressional Quarterly, Vol. 41(9):455-457. 
Wehr, E. and Fessler, P., 1983a. "Sodal Security Rescue Plan Wins Final Hill 
Approval," Congressional Quarterly, Vol. 41(12):596-600. 
Wehr, E. and Fessler, P., 1983b. "Sodal Security Rescue Plan Rushes to Final 
Hill Accord," Congressional Quarterly, Vol. 41(10):487-489. 
Weisbrod, B. A., 1983. ''Competition in Health Care: A Cautionary View," in 
Meyer (Ed.) Market Reforms in Health Care, Washington, D. C.: 
American Enterprise Institute, pp. 61-74. 
Wennberg, J. E., 1984a. "Dealing With Medical Practice Variations: A Proposal 
ior Action," Health Affairs, Vol. 3:6-32. 
Wennberg, J. E., 1984b. Small Area Variations in Hospitalized Case-Mix-Final 
Report, Hanover, NH: Dartmouth Medical School. 
Wennberg, J. E. McPherson, K., and Caper, P., 1984. "Will Payment Based on 
Diagnosis-Related Groups Control Hospital Costs?" New Eng1and Journal 
of Medicine, Vol. 311:295-300. · 
330 
Wennberg, J. E. and Gettlesohn, A., 1982. "Variations in Medical Care Among 
Small Areas," Scientific American, Vol. 246:120-134. 
Wilson, F. A. and Neuhauser, D., 1982. Health Services in the United States, 
{2nd. Edition}, Cambridge, MA.: Ballinger Publishing Company. 
Wilensky, G. and Rossiter, L., 1986. "Patient Self-Selection in HMOs," Health 
Affairs, Vol. 5:66-80. 
Wilensky, G., 1984. "Solving Uncompensated Hospital Care," Health Affairs, 
Vol. 3:50-62. 
Wolinsky, F. D., 1980. The SociologY of Health: Principles, Professions, and 
Issues, Boston, MA.: Little, Brown and Company. 
Worthington, N. L., and Piro, P. A., 1982. "The Effects of Hospital Services: A 
Preliminary Analysis," Health Care Financing Review, Vol. 4:47-61. 
Young, D. W ., 1985. "Physician Accountability for Health Care Costs," Busines 
and Health, Vol. 3:16-19. 
Young, W. W ., Swinka, R. B., and Hutton, M.A., 1980. "Assessment of the 
AUTOGRP Classification System," Medical Care, Vol. 18{2):228-244. 
Zuckerman, H., 1983. "Industrial Rationalization of a Cottage Industry: Multi-
Institutional Hospital Systems," The Annals, Vol. 468:216-230. 
331 
APPENDIX 
ACTIVITY AND MOBILITY 
BATHING AND HYGIENE 
PROCEDURES 
SIGNS AND 
SYMPTOMS 
Revised: 2/81 
+6 
In bed always, needs turning 
assist; If able to transfer, 
needs 2-person assist to 
gerlchalr or commode 
needs total oral hygiene 
and bathing assistance 
tube feedings; rriaJor sldn 
care with medications 
and/or wet/dry dressings; 
Hickman or dialysis cath, 
Intermittent urinary 
catheterization; continuous 
respirator; suctlonlngs 
frequent urinary Incon-
tinence without indwelling 
catheterization; fecal 
Incontinence; lower limb 
paralysis; apbagla; comatose; 
severe pain or confusion 
PACIFIC HEALTH POLICY RESEARCH, INC. 
DEPENDENCY AT DISCHARGE CLASSIFICATION TOOL• 
By: Patterson, Coe and Wilkinson 
+4 
In bed mostly, needs !-person 
assist to transfer or walk 
a few feet, or is confined to 
wheelchair or walker when 
out of bed 
needs partial assistance to 
complete bath but is able to 
manage own oral hygiene; 
washes at bedside 
Indwelling urinary catheter; 
ostomy care; complex dry 
dressings or minor decubitus 
care; speech therapy; 
ambulatlon retraining; 
frequent blood drawings 
or x-rays · 
moderate dizziness; pain; 
nausea, fatigue, anxietY,, 
or epresslon; generallzed 
weakness, IBlSteadiness; 
stress incontinence; upper 
limb paralysis; severe 
hearing or vision limits 
+2 
wallcs around room, uses bath-
room; may require standby 
assist or walker 
needs supervision or minor 
assist for safety to bathe 
or shower; washes most of 
self If done in bed; may 
need help with footcare 
or pericare 
oxygen; nebulizer; simple 
dry dressing; strengthening 
exercises; sling; ace wrap 
TED hose; IV site care; 
occasional blood drawing 
minimal weakness; dyspnea on 
exertion; occasional scattered 
rales, slight ankle swelling; 
mild confusion, disorientation, 
dysarthria or anxiety 
*Copyright Patterson, Coe, and Wilkinson, 1987 
0 
walks independently, ad 
lib; uses hallway; uses 
no assistance devices 
Independent with bath or 
or shower; washes In 
bathroom 
none 
none 
Class I = 0- 'points 
Class D = 6 • I I points 
Class m = 12- II points 
Class IV = 18- 24 points 
1.>) 
\>) 
\>) 
